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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Introduction & Methodological Approach 
 
This report summarises the methods, results and implications of a research study funded by the 
Department of Health Policy Research Programme to quantify the potential impact of policies 
targeting pricing and promotion of alcohol on alcohol related harm in England. It accompanies 
the report of Phase 1 of this study, a systematic review report summarising the existing 
research evidence on this topic.  
 
The aim was to model the potential implications of changes to current policies, especially the 
population-based impact on health, crime, and wider economy, again for the population as a 
whole and also with a focus on: 
· young people under 18 who drink alcohol 
· 18-24 year old binge drinkers 
· harmful drinkers whose patterns of drinking damage their physical / mental health or 
causes substantial harm to others. 
 
The questions that the study has been able to address are: What is the potential effect on 
alcohol related harm of introducing 
· general price increases, including separate analyses for on- and off-trade and for low-
priced alcohol (on-trade refers to licensed premises, off-trade to supermarkets, off-
licenses etc) 
· minimum prices per unit of alcohol 
· restrictions on the extent of discounted price-based promotion in the off-trade. 
 
The study has not been able to examine questions around on-trade promotions such as ‘happy 
hours’, due to a lack of systematically collected quantified data on the scale and types of 
discounting and the resulting effects on consumer demand. 
 
The study also contains exploratory analyses concerning the potential impact of restrictions on 
advertising (in particular focussed on the proportion of advertising space/time for public health 
messages, and on reducing exposure to advertising for under-18s). We report on the substantial 
uncertainty in the available evidence and the need for further research. 
 
Based on existing guidelines on alcohol consumption in England, drinkers are classified in three 
drinking categories based on their mean intake per week: 
- “moderate drinkers”, i.e. drinkers with an intake of alcohol less likely to damage health 
and/or associated with negative consequences (up to 21 units per week for men and 14 
units for women) 
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- “hazardous drinkers”, i.e., drinkers with an increased risk of psychological and physical 
consequences due to alcohol intake (more than 21 to 50 units per week for men and 
more than 14 to 35 units for women) 
- “harmful drinkers”, i.e. drinkers with an intake that is likely to adversely affecting health 
and/or other negative consequences (more than 50 units per week for men and more 
than 35 units per week for women). 
Individuals can also be classified as a “binge drinker” based on the maximum intake of alcohol 
during a single session. A binge is defined as an intake of more than twice the recommended 
daily limit (i.e. more than 8 units per day for men and more than 6 units per day for women). 
 
Harms Included in the Analysis 
 
The study examines alcohol related harm in terms of health, crime and employment. 
 
For health, the study examines 47 conditions which are either wholly attributable to alcohol (e.g. 
alcoholic liver disease), partially attributable to long-term chronic alcohol use (e.g. throat 
cancers), or partially attributable to level of acute alcohol intake on a single occasion (e.g. falls 
or road traffic accidents). Published research evidence is used to quantify the relationship 
between extent of alcohol use and the risk of illness and death for each condition, split by 
gender and age group. For chronic conditions, the model considers the time it takes to achieve 
the full effect on disease prevalence following a change in the extent of alcohol use. The model 
results for each policy are measured using deaths avoided, illnesses avoided (person specific), 
numbers of hospital admissions avoided, and NHS costs (including inpatient, outpatient, A&E, 
ambulance and primary care costs). By examining life expectancies for the deaths avoided 
using survival statistics, we also estimate the ‘years of additional life’ for the population. An 
index of health-related quality of life is used to allow comparison across conditions (with a score 
between 1 for perfect health, and 0 for a health condition so severe that death might be equally 
preferable). This enables improvements in both quality of life and survival to be summarised into 
the measure ‘quality adjusted life years’ (QALY) gained by the policy change. The policy effects 
on health can be valued financially using the Department of Health valuation of £50,000 per 
QALY. Together with the direct NHS costs this then provides an estimate of the full health-
related costs saved by each policy alternative. 
 
For crime, the study builds upon previously published work by the Cabinet Office and the Home 
Office, examining policy impacts on violent crimes, criminal damage, thefts, robberies and other 
offences.  As with health, published statistics on the extent to which each crime is attributable to 
alcohol are used, and published research evidence quantifies the relationship between the 
extent of ‘acute’ alcohol intake on a single occasion and the risk of each crime, again split by 
gender and age groups.  The research evidence on the proportion of crime that is directly 
related to alcohol consumption and the how risk of crime varies for different consumption levels 
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is less robust than in the health field. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is undertaken to examine 
how model results change when using different assumptions or evidence sources. The model 
results for each policy are measured using reductions in numbers of crimes, costs to the 
criminal justice system and a measure of the impact of crimes on victims, using published QALY 
estimates for each type of crime. The policy effects on crime are valued using the Home Office 
valuation of approximately £80,000 per QALY for victims of crime. Together with the direct 
criminal justice system costs, this provides an estimate of crime costs saved by each policy 
option. 
 
For employment, the study examines absence from work and unemployment attributable to 
alcohol use. Published evidence is used on the extent to which absence is attributable to 
alcohol and to quantify the relationship between the extent of ‘acute’ alcohol intake and the risk 
of absence. Similarly, evidence is used to quantify the relationship between ‘chronic’ high 
volume alcohol and the risk of unemployment, again split by gender and age groups. Sensitivity 
analysis examines the effects of using alternative assumptions/evidence sources. Model results 
are measured in days of absence and numbers unemployed and given a financial value by 
multiplying by gross average salary levels for the age/sex groups.   
 
Evidence on Alcohol Consumption, Purchasing Patterns and Pricing 
 
A key aspect of this research study is the use made of two detailed individual-level population 
survey datasets. One provides data on alcohol consumption (the General Household Survey or 
GHS), the other on alcohol purchasing including price paid (the Expenditure and Food Survey or 
EFS). 
 
The consumption patterns reported in the latest available version of the GHS (2006) provide the 
baseline position in our analysis. This dataset provides, for each individual, details on mean 
consumption of alcohol (used for modelling ‘chronic’ harms), and maximum per day alcohol 
intake in the survey week (used for modelling ‘acute’ harms).  We split the consumption data 
into the categories beers, wines, spirits and ‘Ready-To Drinks’ (RTDs, these are also called 
alcopops). Consumption level is reported in standard alcohol units. For the modelling, we split 
the population into moderate drinkers, hazardous drinkers and harmful drinkers. As the GHS 
does not cover under-16s, data on 11-15 year olds was obtained from the Smoking Drinking 
and Drug Use Survey, a school survey which contains the same consumption indicators as the 
GHS (SDD). The most important issue with the GHS is that there is no information on the price 
paid or the place of purchase (on-trade or off-trade) of the alcohol consumed.   
 
The EFS is an annual household survey which uses a 14-day diary to record purchasing of 
products.  Access to data from the latest 5 surveys (2001/2 through to 2005/6) has enabled a 
detailed analysis of alcohol purchasing patterns showing alcohol units purchased split by beers, 
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wines, spirits and RTDs including an on- and off-trade split and most importantly the price paid 
for each purchase.  In particular, this allows analysis of volumes of purchasing of the different 
categories of alcohol and distributions of prices paid for moderate, hazardous and harmful 
drinkers split by the age groups and gender.  Both the EFS and the GHS have data on the age, 
sex, income, education history and other attributes of the individual respondents allowing 
statistical adjustment for these factors.  
 
Econometric analysis on the EFS 5-year dataset has been undertaken to quantify the elasticity 
of demand for alcohol – the change to purchasing levels that can be expected to happen when 
prices change. We undertook elasticity analyses for 16 different categories of alcohol: beers, 
wines, sprits and ready-to-drinks, split by on- or off-trade purchase and further split into two 
price categories, using a cut-off for low priced alcohol of less than 30p per unit of alcohol (off-
trade) and less than 80p per unit of alcohol (on-trade). 
 
The primary results of this econometric analysis are ‘own-price elasticities’ which describe how 
demand for a product changes if the product’s own price changes. An own-price elasticity of, 
say, -0.5 for beer is interpreted as follows: if the price of that product is increased by 1% then 
the amount of beer purchased would change by -0.5% i.e. a price increase results in reduced 
purchasing. The analyses also provide ‘cross-price elasticities’ which give a picture of switching 
between products when prices change e.g. a cross-price elasticity of +0.2 between beer and 
wine would mean that people would increase their purchasing of wine by 0.2% as a result of a 
1% increase in the price of beer. Analyses have been undertaken for the whole population and 
separately for moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers. 
 
The results show for example that typical own-price elasticities are in the range -0.36 to -0.62 
overall, which is in line with evidence reported in our systematic review. Own price elasticities 
for moderate drinkers range typically from -0.23 to -0.52, for hazardous drinkers from -0.30 to 
-0.61 and for harmful drinkers from -0.41 to -0.70. Patterns for cross-price elasticities suggest 
that product switching is complex, with some products being substitutes i.e. price change 
causes a switch and others being complements i.e. a price rise in one causes reductions in 
purchasing of both. Cross-price elasticities are higher in scale (i.e. switching occurs more) for 
hazardous and harmful drinkers than for moderate drinkers, with cross-price elasticities as high 
as +0.06 for hazardous compared with +0.01 for moderate. These elasticity analyses are 
fundamental to the integrated model estimates for policy options in which prices change. 
 
To examine the extent of discounted price-based promotion, the study has gained access to an 
important market research database on alcohol sales and prices in the off-trade sector from 
Nielsen. Data is based on the barcodes of off-trade purchased products in major grocery chains 
across England, and enables analysis of the volumes and prices of alcohol sold. Importantly, 
the dataset provides information on whether the product was sold on a promotion and an 
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estimate of its regular sale price. Thus, for example, we can see that of beer sold in 
supermarkets at a price of 20p to 25p per unit of alcohol, 67% is sold on promotion, and of the 
promoted volume 26% has a regular price in that range, 33% has an RRP of 25-30p, 24% of 30-
35p, 11% of 35-40p, 5% of 40-50p and 1% of 50-60p.  This enables the modelling to analyse 
the effects of restrictions to price-based promotion, e.g. no longer allowing promotions of more 
than 20% below regular price. 
 
The model looks forward examining the harm reduction changes estimated for each policy year 
on year. In line with Treasury and Department of Health policy, benefits accruing several years 
from now are discounted using standard discounting rates.   
 
Model Results 
 
The modelling undertaken in this report has analysed 53 separate scenarios to examine the 
impact of various policies around pricing and advertising of alcohol on health, crime, and 
employment related harms. These analyses, reported in detail in the results section of this 
report provide thousands of numerical results, estimates for the effects of policies and sensitivity 
to uncertainties in the evidence or values of particular model parameters.  Here, we report the 
main trends, themes and findings rather than detailed results. 
 
1. Policy effects on alcohol consumption 
 
General price increases: General price increases (to all products in the on- and off-trade at 
once) tend to exhibit relatively large reductions in mean consumption for the population. This is 
partly due to only limited switching behaviour because prices increase across the board, and 
partly because all consumer groups are targeted equally. The model results show that greater 
general price increases lead to larger consumption reductions. Policies targeting price changes 
specifically on low-priced products lead to smaller changes in consumption, as they only cover a 
part of the market. Targeting low priced products also causes some switching. 
 
Minimum pricing options: Increasing levels of minimum pricing show very steep increases in 
effectiveness. Overall changes in consumption for 20p, 25p, 30p, 35p, 40p, 45p, 50p, 60p, 70p 
are: -0.1%, -0.3%, -0.6%, -1.4%, -2.6%, -4.5%, -6.9%, -12.8% and -18.6%. Lower minimum 
prices affect beers and spirits more than wine. Higher minimum prices reduce switching effects. 
Minimum prices targeted at particular beverages are less effective than all-product minimum 
prices, and only minimum prices for beer show noticeable effects. Differential minimum pricing 
for on-trade and off-trade leads to more substantial reductions in consumption (30p off-trade 
together with an 80p on-trade minimum price -2.1% versus -0.6% for 30p only; 40p together 
with 100p -5.4% compared to -2.6% for 40p only). This is firstly because much of the 
consumption by younger and hazardous drinking groups (including those at increased risk of 
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criminal offending due to high intake on a particular day) occurs in the on-trade.  It is also 
because increasing prices of cheaper alcohol in the on-trade dampens down the behaviour 
switching effects when off-trade prices are increased. 
 
Restrictions on off-trade price promotions: Bans of off-trade ‘buy one get one free’ offers 
have small impacts as these affect only a small proportion of total sales. Tighter restrictions on 
off-trade discounting have increasing effects. For example, bans of discounts of >30% (covering 
“3 for the price of 2” offers) and >20% (covering “5 for the price of 4”) lead to overall 
consumption reductions similar to the 25p and 35p minimum pricing scenarios, respectively. 
Tighter restrictions affect wine consumption most. Bans on discounts only for lower-priced 
alcohol (<30p per unit) are not effective in reducing consumption. A total ban on off-trade 
discounting is estimated to reduce consumption by -2.8%. 
 
2. Policy effects on consumer spending 
 
Price increases are not matched by consumption reductions and overall spending on alcohol is 
estimated to increase. Changes in spending per drinker for each policy are broadly 
proportionate to the price increase. As might be expected, those who buy more alcohol are 
disproportionately affected, and changes in spending affect mostly harmful drinkers, with 
hazardous drinkers somewhat affected and moderate drinkers affected very little.  
 
3. Policy effects on sales, duty and VAT 
 
The extent to which the on-trade or off-trade sectors benefit from significant gains in retail 
receipts varies according to policy. Policies targeting only off-trade prices for example 
sometimes cause switching behaviour to on-trade consumption. 
 
Effects on tax and duty are estimated to be relatively small and vary according to whether on- or 
off-trade is most affected. The exact picture varies by policy because the duty is applied to the 
volume of sales on a per unit basis (which in most scenarios is reducing), but the VAT applies to 
the monetary value of the sales (which is increasing).   
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4. Policy effects on health harms 
 
As prices increase, alcohol-attributable hospital admissions and deaths are estimated to reduce. 
Prevented deaths occur disproportionately in harmful drinkers.  On balance, the health harm 
reductions mostly relate to chronic diseases rather than acute conditions such as injuries. This 
is because much of the alcohol-attributable health harm occurs in middle or older age groups at 
significant risk of developing or dying from chronic disease. For chronic diseases, the time for a 
change in consumption to achieve the full effect in changing the prevalence of disease is 
important in the modelling. Health harm reductions in Year 1 for chronic diseases are estimated 
to be around 1/10th of the level that will accrue when the full effect of consumption changes 
occurs. 
 
Policies resulting in bigger price increases reduce numbers of deaths in moderate and 
hazardous drinkers as well. In terms of hospital admissions, policy options which increase 
prices for only a proportion of products and by marginal amounts have very small effects (e.g. 
increasing the prices of cheap off-trade alcohol by 10% or 25%, increasing prices of cheap on-
trade alcohol by 10%, introducing a 20p minimum unit price or banning discounts at the 40% 
level). Policy options leading to greater price rises do begin to have larger effects, e.g. a 40p 
minimum price gives an estimated change of around 40,000 admissions per annum at the full 
effect (-5.2%).  
 
5. Policy effects on crime harms 
 
Crime harms are estimated to reduce as prices are increased. Crime reductions for policies take 
place across the spectrum of violent crime, criminal damage and theft, robbery and other 
crimes. A minimum price of 30p is estimated to reduce total crimes by around 3,800 whereas for 
40p the reduction is estimated at 16,000 per annum. Crime harms are estimated to reduce 
particularly for 11-18s because they are disproportionately involved in alcohol-related crime and 
are affected significantly by targeting price rises at low-priced products. It is important to note 
that different policies emerge as effective when compared to health harms: discount bans, 
targeting cheap off-trade alcohol and low minimum pricing options, which effectively influence 
only the off-trade sector, are all less effective in reducing crime compared to health or 
employment.  
 
6. Policy effects on employment harms 
 
Unemployment harm reduces proportionately more than health or crime harms. Generally, all 
policy options that target harmful and hazardous drinkers are effective in reducing alcohol 
related harm in the workplace.  The size of the effect is dependent on the extent of price 
increases. Unemployment due to alcohol problems is focussed on harmful drinkers and is 
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estimated to reduce as prices increase: e.g. 3,800 avoided unemployment cases for 30p versus 
12,400 for 40p minimum price. Absence reductions are particularly focussed on hazardous and 
harmful drinkers: e.g. for 40p, the 100,000 estimated reduction in days absence is made up of 
34,500 days for hazardous and 54,300 days for harmful drinkers.  
 
7. Financial valuation of policies 
 
The societal value of harm reduction for many of the potential policies can be substantial when 
accumulated over the ten year time horizon of the model. Many policies have estimated 
reductions in harm valued over £500m and some as high as £5billion over the ten year period. 
The financial value of harm reductions becomes larger as prices are increased. The largest 
financially valued component of harm avoided due to policies is in the estimated unemployment 
reductions. The financial value of avoided mortality and morbidity is valued using direct (NHS) 
costs avoided and also using the quality-adjusted life years (QALY) measure. This latter 
measure also improves as prices are increased: e.g. the value of QALY loss avoided changes 
from -£400m for the 30p minimum price to -£1,931m for 40p. Crime costs are also estimated to 
reduce as prices increase. The financial value of crime harm reduction comes mostly via 
reductions in consumption for harmful drinkers. For example, the ten year cumulative value of 
harm reduction estimated for the 30p minimum price is -£0.1bn for moderate drinkers, -£0.1bn 
for hazardous, and -£1.2bn for harmful drinkers. Quality of life impacts on crime victims is an 
important component of the evaluation, and as with health in many policies tends to exceed the 
actual criminal justice system costs saved when crime is reduced. 
 
8. Differential effectiveness for priority groups 
 
Consumption: Moderate drinkers are affected in only very small ways by the policy options 
examined both in terms of their consumption of alcohol and their spending.  Harmful drinkers 
are expected to reduce their absolute consumption most, but in the more effective policy options 
also spend significantly more on their purchases. Policies which target low-priced alcohol affect 
harmful drinkers disproportionately (as well as 11-18s). This is because moderate drinkers tend 
to drink only a small proportion of the very low price products available.  
 
Health effects are shared across the priority groups. There are significant effects on harmful 
drinkers, but important health gains also occur in hazardous and moderate drinkers. Even 
though moderate drinkers are at the lower risk of health-related harms, there are large numbers 
and the small changes in their consumption feed through in the model to small changes in risk 
and appreciable changes in health. In general across the policies, deaths avoided occur 
disproportionately in the harmful drinking group. This is especially the case for policies which 
produce small scale changes in consumption, for example, because they specifically target very 
low priced alcohol purchased disproportionately by harmful drinkers. 11-to-18-year-old drinkers, 
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and the 18-to-24-year-old hazardous drinkers group (a proxy for 18-to-24-year-old binge 
drinkers), benefit less from health harm reductions because their baseline levels of risk for many 
of the conditions examined and attributable to alcohol are very low at such young ages.  
 
Patterns of crime reduction estimated by the model are very different across the priority groups 
from those for health. A much larger proportion of the crime-related harm occurs from the 11-
18s and the 18-to-24-year-old hazardous drinkers. When estimating policy impacts, crime 
avoided comes more from the harmful and hazardous drinking groups them from the moderate 
group. However there is some reduction in crime due to changes in moderate drinkers 
consumption because even though they are by definition moderate, and therefore a lower risk in 
terms of their average weekly alcohol intake, they do occasionally binge and within the model it 
is binge behaviour, i.e. the maximum daily intake of alcohol, that is related to risk of committing 
crime. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis and Uncertainty (Pricing Policy Results) 
 
A series of sensitivity analyses have been undertaken on key model parameters and 
assumptions. The basecase analysed was for the 40p minimum price policy option, chosen as it 
has reasonably large effects on each of the model dimensions. The sensitivity analyses 
included: an alternative structure for elasticity matrices (moderate, hazardous and harmful 
separately), different slopes for the expected scale of binge given mean consumption function, 
the exclusion of any protective effects of alcohol, alternative time to full effect for chronic harms 
ranging from 5 to 15 years, use of alternative evidence on the multiplier for the extent of 
reporting of “less serious wounding” crimes and on the fraction of crimes attributable to alcohol, 
use of UK-based work absence data, use of a lower value for salary to compute unemployment 
effects, and the value for the relative risk of not working for harmful drinkers (from MacDonald 
and Shields 2004).  Each had some small or modest effect (+/-25% of the basecase for 10-year 
cumulative value of harm) except for the elasticity matrices (-39%) and the relative risk of not 
working for harmful drinkers (+68%).  All of the sensitivity analyses are on model parameters 
rather than the particulars on any one policy over another.  They would therefore not 
substantially affect the relative differences between the policies. 
 
Exploratory Analyses around the Effects of Advertising Restrictions 
 
The published quantified evidence on the effects of restrictions on advertising, including the 
small number of UK studies, exhibit considerable uncertainty, with effect sizes ranging from very 
small to substantial (see Systematic Review report). The limited published evidence on public 
health promotions (counter-advertising) suggests marginal or insignificant effects on 
consumption. We have undertaken exploratory analyses to evaluate the impact of these 
uncertainties in the model results.  The recently suggested policy that 1/6th of advertising be 
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devoted to public health messages is modelled assuming no beneficial effects on consumption 
but a reduction in total alcohol advertising by 1/6th. Results vary substantially depending upon 
which published evidence is assumed to be most applicable to England, with overall changes in 
consumption of between -0.2% and -2.2%, and the financial value of harm avoided over 10 
years ranging from -£0.39bn to -£3.9bn. Similar exploratory analyses for the total elimination of 
exposure to advertising for under-18s show an overall change in consumption ranging from -
0.1% to -0.4%, and the financial value of harm avoided over 10 years ranging from -£0.3bn to -
£1.0bn.  
 
There is disagreement in the academic research literature concerning whether advertising bans 
(in the absence of other legislation) reduce alcohol consumption, or increase it (by having the 
unintended side-effect of increased price competition between competitors). Depending on 
which position is taken, the effects of a total ban in advertising are estimated to range from an 
overall change in consumption ranging from –26.9% to +4.9%, and a financial value of harm 
avoided over 10 years ranging from -£44.0bn to +£9.5bn. The substantial range between the 
higher and lower end of possible effects in these advertising analyses suggests that definitive 
further research on advertising impacts, particularly around elimination of exposure would be 
valuable for policy makers. 
 
Discussion, Limitations, and Possible Further Research 
 
This is the first study to integrate modelling approaches intended to answer specific policy 
questions around pricing and promotion of alcohol and the related effects on harms in terms of 
health, crime and employment in England.  We have developed an integrated suite of models, 
linking the aspects of price, advertising, drinking patterns, purchasing patterns, elasticities, 
health conditions including diseases wholly attributable to alcohol, chronic and acute alcohol-
related illnesses and mortality, crimes including violence and criminal damage, and work 
absence and unemployment attributable to alcohol.  This study is the first to derive own-and 
cross-price elasticities for 16 beverage categories (high- and low-priced beers, wines, spirits 
and RTDs, split further by on- and off-trade purchasing). The model contains detailed data on 
individual consumption and purchasing patterns through linked use of GHS and EFS data, 
enabling analysis by age/sex/consumption group and by the 16 categories of alcohol, and 
accounting for the heterogeneity in the UK drinking population in terms of consumption 
preferences and of responses to changes in product prices.  
 
In a validation / comparison, we ran the model to the very extreme in a scenario of zero alcohol 
consumption in England, producing broadly the same scale of effects as estimated recently by 
Home Office and NWPHO reports. The cross-sectional econometric modelling also produces 
elasticities consistent with published evidence (Gallet 2007). 
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The large scale databases used from GHS and EFS provide a wealth of material but are not 
without limitations.  Binge drinking is not adequately represented in EFS, and we also cannot 
disentangle response to price from response to price promotions.  Of course, the person who 
buys is not necessarily the person who drinks, and alcohol bought in the off-trade may be stored 
over any length of time.   Alcohol surveys have a number of general limitations, including a 
tendency to underestimate alcohol consumption due to underreporting and under sampling 
people who drink the most. Our analyses suggest under-estimates in GHS of 21% which will 
affect sales value estimates in the modelling but not the harm analyses.   
 
Many risk estimates were based on non-UK research as UK studies were not available, lacked 
necessary detail, or were not available for all age and gender groups modelled, most notably for 
the under-18s age group.  Risk function evidence is less well developed in crime and in 
employment and a linear approach was often selected, in the absence of empirical evidence, to 
translate attributable fractions into risk functions 
 
There are several areas for further research.  Analysis of time trends in population consumption 
could be incorporated into the modelling. Direct costs to government of implementation and 
monitoring of any of the policies should be accounted for when available. Economic research 
could account industry response to the policy options and possible effects on market structure 
and supply, and possibly extend to wider costs or benefits, “drinkers’ pleasure” or “social 
lubricant” effects, or include lower-level social disorder and the effect on families and friends of 
harmful drinkers.  Detailed data on the extent of sales promotion in the on-trade are lacking and 
research or infrastructure investment to ascertain patterns here would probably be beneficial for 
policy and evaluation of change.  There remains substantial uncertainty in the effects of 
changes or restrictions in advertising and further UK based research or data collection may be 
warranted.  
 
Finally, the development of these modelling approaches to consider policy questions represents 
a substantial challenge. This work has surmounted several of the important hurdles and aims to 
support policy makers directly in relation to important decisions.  We hope it will be useful for 
current and future policy decisions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT 
 
 
In the Updated Alcohol Strategy (2007)1, the UK Government announced plans to commission 
an independent review of evidence on the relationship between alcohol price, promotion and 
harm, and to consider the need for future regulatory change, if necessary. The Government 
wished to review the evidence on how and in what circumstances price – including discounting, 
advertising and other forms of promotion – drives overall consumption of alcohol and problem 
drinking in particular. The review was also to consider the evidence that pricing structures may 
form an effective part of a harm reduction strategy.  
 
This research was commissioned by the Department of Health Policy Research Programme. 
The original objectives were as follows: 
 
a) Systematically review the evidence on 1) the link between the price and promotion of alcohol 
on the one hand and patterns of consumption and alcohol-related harm on the other and 2) the 
effectiveness of related policy interventions 
 
b) Indicate how pricing and promotion affect total alcohol intake and patterns of consumption in 
the whole population and also with a focus on four priority groups.  
 
c) Model the potential implications of changes to current policies, especially the population-
based impact on health, crime, and the likely impact on the alcohol industry and wider economy, 
again for the population as a whole and also with a focus on: 
· young people under 18 who drink alcohol 
· 18-24 year old binge drinkers 
· harmful drinkers whose patterns of drinking damage their physical / mental health or 
causes substantial harm to others. 
 
d) Summarise/disseminate the practical, policy and research implications of the findings. 
 
Phase one of our study undertook the systematic reviews of evidence2. The current report 
focuses on the modelling of the likely effects of pricing and promotion policies on alcohol 
consumption and harm. 
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1.2 OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF THE BURDEN OF 
ALCOHOL-RELATED HARM IN ENGLAND 
 
In 2003, the Cabinet Office produced a significant report “Alcohol Misuse: How Much Does It 
Cost?  September, 2003”3. The main focus of the report was to analyse the costs attributable to 
alcohol misuse in England in relation to health, crime, and employment/productivity harms. 
Analyses were undertaken using a prevalence-based estimate, i.e. all costs incurred at any time 
in a given year. Only external costs were examined (cost to third parties) using a “societal 
perspective”, i.e. direct (costs associated with treatment, prevention, law enforcement) and 
indirect costs (i.e. loss of productivity) as the results of alcohol misuse. 
 
Healthcare costs attributable to alcohol were mainly derived from data available at the time of 
the study (Hospital Episode Statistics, GHS, MORI etc) and assumptions when appropriate. 
Costs in the workplace were analysed for three components; absenteeism, unemployment and 
reduced efficiency. Main sources used were the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) study for 
absenteeism4 and MacDonald and Shields (2004)5 for unemployment. Costs associated with 
reduced efficiency could not be estimated due to the lack of data, while lost outputs due to 
premature mortality were estimated based on the Labour Force Survey (2001)6, the 2001 New 
Earning Survey7 and data from Transport (DTLR,2001)8. Alcohol-related crime costs were 
mainly derived from the British Crime Survey (BCS)65 and Brand and Price (2000)66. Crime 
costs were examined for three components: costs incurred in anticipation of crime, costs 
incurred as a consequence of crime and costs to the criminal justice system (CJS). Overall, 
alcohol misuse was estimated to account for health, crime and employment costs of between 
£18.5 to £20.0 billion in England.  
 
This study was recently updated by the Home Office/Department of Health in the consultation 
document “Safe, Sensible, Social – consultation on further action, Impact assessment”9 based 
on recent estimates for the costs of alcohol-related crime and costs to the NHS10. The update 
for the employment/productivity merely adjusted earlier figures for inflation. For crime, the 
methodology was updated to take into consideration additional costs. Furthermore, assumptions 
were mainly made about multipliers (to move from reported crimes to an estimate of the actual 
number of offences committed) and the proportion of crime attributable to alcohol. Healthcare 
costs attributable to alcohol were extracted from a recent report published by the Department of 
Health aimed at estimating the cost of alcohol harm to the NHS in England10. This study took 
into consideration the increase in the cost of crime as well as recent data on alcohol 
consumption and harms. The new estimate of costs of alcohol misuse in England was estimated 
to range between £17.7 and £25.1 billion. Details of costs are presented below in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Update of the Cabinet Office overall costs of alcohol misuse – reproduction of 
the DH consultation document (DH, 2008)9 
 
 First estimate 
(£ millions) 
Second Estimates (£ 
millions) 
Healthcare costs   
Hospital inpatient & day visits   
Directly attributable to alcohol misuse   168 168 
Partly attributable to alcohol misuse   1,023 1,023 
Hospital outpatient visits   272 272 
Accident and emergency visits   646 646 
Ambulance services   372 372 
Practice nurse consultations   10 10 
NHS GP consultations   102 102 
Laboratory tests N/A N/A 
Dependency prescribed drugs   2 2 
Other health care costs   54 54 
Specialist treatment services   117 117 
Workplace and wider economy costs   
Lost output due to absenteeism   1,389 2,044 
Lost output due to reduced employment   1,976 2,465 
Lost output due to reduced employment efficiency N/A N/A 
Lost output due to premature death   2,580 2,841 
Costs of alcohol-specific and alcohol-related crime 9,000 15,000 
   
TOTAL COSTS   17,711 25,115 
 
1.3 PREVIOUS WORK ON MODELLING EFFECTS OF POLICY 
CHANGES ON ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION 
 
Some previous modelling studies examine consumption defined as a number of discrete states, 
then use transition probabilities to describe how consumption changes from year to year. State-
transition models are a natural approach to alcohol consumption modelling – and have also 
been used in tobacco policy modelling (see, for example, Levy et al’s (2006) SimSmoke)11.  
 
This approach has been used by Chisholm et al (2004)12 in an implementation of the WHO-
CHOICE cost-effectiveness framework (Tan Torres et al, 200313) based on Lauer et al’s (2003) 
state-transition population health model (known as PopMod)14. The model has a set of states for 
every year of life, with the transitions between consumption states for the population at age a 
during the period t to t+1 forming the initial conditions for age a+1 at time t+1. A basic schematic 
of PopMod is shown below: 
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Figure 1: Schematic of PopMod 
 
where b = birth rate, h = incidence rate for heavy drinking, r = remission rate, m0 = mortality 
rate, m1 = mortality rate of heavy drinkers.  Only two consumption states (heavy drinking and 
non-heavy drinking) are used in PopMod, which constrains the data requirements for transition 
probabilities but limits the range of outcomes that can be measured.  The approach is also 
limited because the transition probabilities are derived at the WHO sub-region level only and do 
not vary by age. 
 
In a broader state-transition approach, Hollingworth et al (2006)15 used a model with six 
consumption states. Transition probabilities were defined for 10 year periods, with those for 
young drinkers estimated from US longitudinal data. However transitions for post-30 year olds 
had to be derived from the younger drinkers based on general trends in cross-sectional data. 
Again, this approach has limited applicability for England since corresponding longitudinal data 
is not available and the US transition probabilities may not be an appropriate surrogate. 
 
Holder and Blose (1987)16 developed a system dynamics-based framework known as SimCom 
for modelling community prevention strategies. Like PopMod, SimCom also uses a set of 
consumption states (or classes) split by gender and age. However the SimCom model is static 
from a population perspective: cohorts do not age over time as they do in PopMod. Policy 
interventions impact on this steady-state by changing the prevalence of consumption between 
classes for each {gender, age} group modelled. This change of prevalence is assumed to occur 
over a time step of the simulation. A schematic of SimCom is shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of SimCom 
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where Q is consumption, t is time step, Δstimulus is the change in price (or other factor) and 
elasticity is the elasticity corresponding to the stimulus (which may be a function of other 
parameters in the system dynamics model).  The core assumption in SimCom is that there are 
no cohort effects for the consumption of alcohol: consumption patterns are determined by life-
cycle changes associated with age, and these patterns are relatively stable over time (for 
example, the prevalence of drinking in 20 year olds in 2018 would be the same as that for 20 
year olds in 2008, all else being equal). The data requirements for this approach are viable in an 
English context, since only cross-sectional data on current consumption prevalence is required, 
rather than the longitudinal data needed to derive transition probabilities. However the key 
concern is whether or not the consumption patterns in England are sufficiently stable to assign 
consumption by age group in the model. 
 
In the only known birth cohort analysis of alcohol consumption for the English population, Kemm 
(2003)17 used multiple cross-sectional data from the General Household Survey (GHS) to test 
for any cohort effects using data from 1978 to 1998. The prevalence of light or heavy drinking 
was seen to be narrowly distributed across birth cohorts for most ages for both males and 
females, although prevalence was seen to have increased in 1998 for most female cohorts, and 
particularly dramatically so for women in the latest birth cohort.  We have extended Kemm’s 
(2003)17 analysis with GHS data to 200623 to test for cohort effects that would breach the core 
SimCom assumption. The prevalence of heavy drinking by age for both males and females is 
shown in Figure 3. The increase in heavy drinking for the later female birth cohorts is seen to 
have continued post 1998. The prevalence for women between the ages of 15 and 25 is seen to 
be close to – and in some cases exceeding – the corresponding prevalence for men. This is 
very different to the behaviour in this age range for older birth cohorts as previously reported by 
Kemm (2003)17. The figure shows a move back to a lower prevalence of heavy drinking in the 
final two years of data, but it should be noted that changes to the consumption assumptions in 
the GHS may reverse this late trend (data not shown). 
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Figure 3 Percentage of drinking over weekly guidelines – extension of Kemm 
 
None of these models have undertaken a full analysis of the effects of pricing and promotion on 
alcohol consumption and harms with up to date English data. 
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1.4 POTENTIAL POLICIES TO BE EXAMINED 
 
The systematic review of evidence undertaken in phase 1 of our study2 identified a variety of 
policies for regulation of pricing or promotion of alcohol for which there is evidence of 
effectiveness.  The major findings from the systematic reviews were as follows: 
 
· The review found strong and consistent evidence linking the price of alcohol to the demand 
for alcohol.  Increasing the price of alcohol reduces consumption and alcohol-related harm. 
The strongest and most plentiful evidence was found for effects of price increases on total 
population-level consumption, although evidence also showed effects of increased prices 
on subpopulations, including young, binge and heavy drinkers. It is worth noting that studies 
have typically studied price increases in relation to taxation, with fewer studies on other 
pricing policies. 
· The review also found direct evidence linking price increases to reductions in chronic and 
acute health harms, including cancers, stroke, accidents, injuries and violence. 
· Increases in alcohol advertising expenditure were related to increased demand for alcohol, 
however the effect was small when compared to the impact of price changes. Longitudinal 
research on advertising exposure by young people typically shows that those who are 
exposed to more alcohol advertising during childhood have more positive drinking attitudes, 
start to drink earlier and drink considerably more as adolescents. 
· The review specifically looked for evidence on groups identified as a priority by the 
Government: underage drinkers, 18 to 24 year old binge drinkers and harmful drinkers of 
any age. Consistent evidence was found for an association between alcohol price and 
patterns of drinking for under 18s, binge drinkers and also harmful drinkers. Point of sales 
promotions and various types of advertising were found to influence the attitudes and 
drinking intentions of young people. 
· The review found conclusive evidence that alcohol consumption – and especially heavy 
consumption – is associated with a large range of both chronic and acute harms, including 
cancers, stroke, accidental injuries and violence. 
A summary of findings has been published on 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Consultations/Liveconsultations/DH_086412. 
 
In consultation with the Department of Health, the researchers considered the feasibility of 
modelling pricing- and advertising-related policy options which might be considered for adoption 
in this country, which specifically excluded tax-based options. In particular, these included:  
· Minimum pricing per unit of alcohol* 
· Ban on all price based promotions – off-trade and/or on-trade 
                                                
* In the UK, the alcohol content of a product is measured by alcohol units, whereby a unit of alcohol is the equivalent of 
10ml of neat (100%) alcohol. Minimum unit pricing would consider setting a minimum price on each alcohol unit. Thus, if 
a product contains 2 units (e.g. a can of beer) and the Government decided on a minimum price of 30p per unit, then 
product could not be sold for less than 60p (2x30p). 
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· Restrictions on price based promotions (e.g. those above a certain discount threshold) 
· Ban on price based promotions – on-trade (e.g. free drinks in large quantities or to 
specific groups, entry fees that purchase unlimited drinks) 
· Ban on loss leaders* (i.e. below-cost selling as defined by the Competition Commission) 
· Ban on time based promotions – on-trade (e.g. ‘happy hours’) 
· Bans† or watersheds for alcohol advertising, especially regarding adverts likely to be 
watched by children 
· Mandatory restrictions of certain types of advertising/promotion content likely to be 
attractive to young people (e.g. promotions linked to sport- or music-events) 
· Requirement for counter-advertising‡ by industry. 
 
1.5 NEED FOR EVIDENCE AND RELEVANT ENGLISH DATA 
 
When attempting to model the impact of policy options, there are two crucial constraints:  
the policies selected for consideration should be both evidence based and relevant in the local 
context.  
 
We are interested in a series of effects: 
· The effect of the policy on the distribution of price of different types of alcohol 
· The effect of price on patterns of consumption both on-trade and off-trade (patterns of 
consumption might be measured by (a) average consumption or (b) peak consumption, 
during a specified time period 
· The effect of advertising on consumption 
· The effect of price based promotions on consumption 
· The effect of consumption on health-related harm for diseases which are wholly 
attributable to alcohol (e.g. alcoholic liver disease), or partially attributable to alcohol on 
either a chronic (e.g. cancer of the oesophagus) or acute (road traffic accident) basis. 
· The effect of consumption on crime. 
· The effect of consumption on unemployment and absenteeism 
· The effect of changes in consumption on volume and value of sales of alcohol and 
hence income to the alcohol industry and tax revenues to the government. 
 
                                                
* A loss leader is defined as: “A good which is priced low, possibly even below cost, to attract customers who are 
expected to buy other goods which yield a profit. The use of loss leaders can be profitable only if consumers are more 
conscious of the relative prices of some goods than of others. This may be so, if goods differ in how easily their quality 
is checked, and how frequently they are bought. Selling cheap goods about which customers are well informed may be 
used to attract custom for other goods on which they are less well informed, and can therefore be exploited.” 1. Oxford 
Dictionary of Economics, Black, J., Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2002 (2nd Edition) 
† Advertising bans are here defined as total or partial legal prohibitions of advertising of alcoholic beverages. Partial 
bans limit advertising of either particular types of alcoholic beverages, in certain types of media, or during particular 
hours of the day. 
‡ Counter-advertising is defined here as actions involving the use of advertising-styled messages about the risks or 
negative consequences of drinking, for example in the form of print or broadcast advertisements (definition adapted 
from Babor et al 2003).  Note that the use of product warning labels is not included in our definition. 
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For each of these, the two key constraints of evidence of effect and data specific to England 
need to be met in order to produce realistic robust estimates.  For several of the potential effects 
identified above, it has proved impossible to derive realistic estimates because quantified 
evidence of the scale of effect of a policy on distributions of price or consumption are 
unavailable, or data needed as inputs to the model do not exist or cannot be obtained and 
analysed within the time and resources available to this research project.   
 
 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
 
Given the constraints of evidence and data available to analyse the potential policies, the 
research team has in discussion with the Department of Health prioritised the following set of 
policies for analysis: 
 
Q1. What are the likely effects of general price rises on alcohol consumption, alcohol 
sales, health harms, crime and employment? 
Q2.  What are the likely effects of introducing a minimum unit price on alcohol 
consumption, alcohol sales, health harms, crime and employment? 
Q3. What are the likely effects of introducing restrictions on alcohol price discounting on 
alcohol consumption, alcohol sales, health harms, crime and employment? 
Q4. What are the likely effects of introducing restrictions on advertising on alcohol 
consumption, alcohol sales, health harms, crime and employment? 
Q5 What are the likely effects of introducing counter-advertising requirements on alcohol 
consumptions, sales, health harms, crime and employment? 
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2 METHOD 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW  
 
The aim of the model is to appraise various policy options for the pricing and promotion of 
alcohol via cost-benefit analysis.   We have broken down the aims into a series of sub-questions 
to be modelled 
· The effect of the policy on the distribution of price of different types of alcohol. 
· The effect of price on patterns of consumption both on-trade and off-trade  
· The effect of advertising and other promotions on consumption 
· The effect of consumption on health-related harm 
· The effect of consumption on crime 
· The effect of consumption on unemployment and absenteeism 
· The effect of changes in consumption on sales of alcohol. 
 
Two connected models have been built: 
 
1. Model of the relationship between alcohol prices or promotion effects on the one hand 
and consumption on the other, which examines the relationship between average and 
peak volume of drinking and the distribution of consumption, for the total population, 
and split by moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers. This model uses newly 
estimated own-price and cross-price elasticities based on recent English data. 
 
2. Model of the link between average and peak consumption and health, crime and 
employment costs.  
 
The schematic below Figure 4 indicates the main sources and datasets used to provide different 
‘slices’ of the picture. The model developed links evidence from these datasets to enable 
analysis of policies as a whole. 
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1 Price paid available for On- / Off-Trade, high / low prices and beverage type 
2 Consumption available only by beverage type (distribution for On- / Off-Trade and High / Low price not 
available) 
 
Figure 4:  Schematic on integrating data sources 
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2.2 MODELLING THE LINK BETWEEN PRICE OR PROMOTION AND 
CONSUMPTION 
 
One major aspect in the modelling exercise was to integrate datasets on price, promotion and 
consumption due to the absence of a dataset in England covering all three components. While 
the General Household Survey (GHS) provides good estimates of the consumption in England, 
data is not available around purchasing and separate consumption distributions by price point or 
for alcohol purchased on- vs. off-trade. Conversely, while EFS provides a good picture of 
alcohol purchasing in England, a consumption distribution based on this dataset may not reflect 
accurately the patterns of consumption in England. 
 
The link between price, promotion and consumption was thus modelled using different datasets. 
Data available in each dataset are shown in Table 2. This section provides an overview of data 
sources on alcohol consumption, pricing and promotion, before detailing the procedures for 
modelling the effect of price and promotion policies and consumption. 
 
Table 2: Overview on integrating data sources 
 
Data 
Source 
Price based 
Promotion 
Price Purchasing by 
individuals 
Consumption 
 
 
GHS 
 
 
Nothing 
 
 
Nothing 
 
 
Nothing 
Detailed analysis of mean 
and binge consumption 
by individuals but no ‘on 
or off-trade’ or ‘price paid’ 
split 
 
 
EFS 
 
 
Nothing 
Price paid by individuals for 
different purchase including 
beers, wines, spirits and 
alcopops, on and off-trade, can 
be used to generate estimates of 
elasticities. No data on 
consumption patterns 
 
 
Nothing 
 
 
Nielsen 
Estimate of 
Regular price 
of promoted 
sales (off-trade 
only) 
Actual prices 
paid for 
different types 
of alcohol, no 
details on 
consumption 
patterns 
 
 
Nothing 
 
 
Nothing 
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2.2.1 ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION DATA 
 
Population surveys continue to provide the main approach to assessing alcohol consumption in 
the population. Such surveys ask respondents about the volume of certain types of drinks 
bought or consumed over a certain time period. These volumes are then standardised by 
converting them into alcohol units (one UK unit = 10ml of pure ethanol). The conversion of 
reported volumes to units is based on assumptions about the average alcohol content, or % 
ABV, of different types of drink. From 2006, government surveys have started to implement a 
revised methodology of unit counting which addresses several reasons for underestimating 
consumption (GHS from 2006, SDD 2007; see Goddard 2007 for details21). We also use this 
revised unit estimation method when converting EFS diary data on alcohol purchases into 
alcohol units.  
 
Importantly, it is generally accepted that this self-reported data underestimates actual 
consumption by as much as 50% (Stockwell et al 200418). For example, in the 2005 GHS men 
and women reported an average weekly alcohol consumption of 15.8 units and 6.5 units, 
respectively (Goddard 2006)19, whereas the estimate for all adults based on clearance data 
from the HMRC was 21.9 units (HMRC 2007)20. Also for 2005, HMRC data on clearances 
suggested per capita sales of 11.3 litres of pure alcohol over the year, whereas GHS estimates 
came to 5.6 litres. It is important to understand not only the magnitude of such underestimation, 
but also the potential biases: 
· Undersampling: Household and school-based surveys underrepresent some of the 
groups who drink the most (e.g. those in unstable living conditions, school excludees, 
drop-outs or truants, Stockwell et al 200418).  
· When asked about typical drinking, people do not take into account heavy drinking 
occasions (Goddard 200721, Stockwell et al. 2004) 18. 
Heavy drinkers tend to underestimate their drinking more than moderate drinkers (e.g. 
Townshend & Dukat 2002).22 
 
 
Regarding alcohol consumption, one main aspect is the classification of drinkers / non-drinkers 
in terms of typical alcohol intake per week and the maximum intake in a single occasion (i.e. 
binge drinking). 
 
Based on recent recommendation on alcohol consumption in England, drinkers are classified in 
three drinking categories based on their mean intake per week 
- “moderate drinkers”, i.e. drinkers with an intake of alcohol less likely to damage health 
and/or associated with negative consequences (less than 21 units per week for men 
and less than 14 units for women). 
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- “hazardous drinkers”, i.e. drinkers with an increased risk of psychological (such as 
mood disturbance) and physical consequences (such as injuries) due to alcohol intake 
(21 to 50 units per week for men and 14 to 35 units for women). 
- “harmful drinkers”, i.e. drinkers with an intake that is likely to adversely affecting health 
and/or other negative consequences (more than 50 units per week for men and more 
than 35 units per week for women). 
 
Individuals are classified as a “binge drinker” if they exceed a certain maximum intake of alcohol 
during a single session. A binge is commonly defined as an intake of over twice the 
recommended daily limit (i.e. over 8 units per day for men and over 6 units per day for women). 
Binge drinking can and does occur in each of the moderate to harmful drinking categories, 
however, both likelihood and scale of the binge (how much is drunk on each occasion) are 
strongly associated with mean consumption. 
 
2.2.1.1 The General Household Survey (GHS): Individuals aged 16 years 
old and over 
 
The General Household Survey (GHS)23 is an annual cross-sectional household survey of 
around 23,000 individuals living in UK households. Respondents are asked how often over the 
last year they have drunk each of a number of different types of drink, and how much they have 
“usually” drunk on any one day. The method used for calculating average weekly consumption 
is to multiply the number of units of each type drunk on a usual drinking day by the frequency 
with which it was drunk. Respondents are also asked about the number of units consumed on 
the heaviest drinking day in the past week. The GHS raw data on volumes of alcohol 
consumption is analysed and transformed into units of alcohol consumed.  
 
The main questions on alcohol consumption allow an estimation for each individual of: 
· Number of weekly units consumed (split by beers, wines, spirits and alcopops) – used 
as a proxy for average consumption.  
· Units consumed on the ‘heaviest drinking day’ during the past week – a measure of 
peak levels of drinking which provides a proxy for ‘binge drinking’ 
· Detailed population distribution by characteristics such as age, sex and income 
 
We have obtained and analysed data for the most recent year, GHS 2006, from the UK Data 
Archive (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/) and selected data relating to England only. In 2006, 
14,289 individuals had data for both the mean weekly consumption and the maximum 
consumption one day over the past week, excluding outliers (individuals with a mean weekly 
intake over 300 units and a maximum unit one day over the week over 60 units). 
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In terms of limitations, the GHS does not provide: 
· Information on prices paid for alcohol 
· Information on location of purchase or consumption i.e. no split of on-trade versus off-
trade 
· Information on whether bingeing occurred on more than one occasion in the past week 
or how typical this is for the respondent. 
· Information on young people (<16 years of age) 
· Information on some at-risk groups (e.g. homeless). 
 
The 2006 age and sex-specific distribution of alcohol consumption for adults (18+ years) in 
England is presented in Appendix 1 (Figure 36, Figure 37). The distribution of consumption split 
by category of drinker (moderate, hazardous and harmful) given their binge drinking the last 
week is presented in Figure 36 while Figure 37 reports the proportion of drinkers classified as 
binge drinkers based on their behaviour in the past week. 
 
In 2006, drinkers aged 18 years old and over in England had an average weekly intake of 
21.09±25.10 units for males and 11.16±15.28 units for females (Figure 5). Figures for the 
number units drunk on the heaviest drinking day are 6.03±6.55 and 3.64±4.52 respectively 
(Figure 6). 
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Figure 5: Distribution of the mean weekly intake among individuals aged 18 years old and 
over (GHS, 2006) 
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Figure 6: Distribution of the maximum unit drunk one day the last week among individuals aged 
18 years old and over (GHS, 2006) 
 
2.2.1.2 Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use Survey (SDD): Individuals aged 
11 to 15 years old  
 
Information on childhood drinking is available from the ONS survey Smoking, Drinking and Drug 
Use among Young People in England (SDD)24, a national annual cross-sectional school survey. 
We use data derived from the 2007 Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use in Young People Survey 
(data made available by the UK Data Archive, http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/)). The survey 
covers pupils in grades 7 through to 11 (ages 11-15). The 2007 survey includes data from 7,831 
pupils in 273 schools in England. The survey has in recent years suffered from low response 
rates, particularly in 2007 when it fell to 53%. Most non-response is at the school-level, with only 
61% of school agreeing to take part. If non-participating schools were disproportionately based 
in urban “problem” areas, this could lead to underestimation of alcohol consumption. Older 
pupils, who tend to drink more, were also more likely to refuse participation compared to 
younger pupils (Clements et al, 2008)25. There are also concerns about the validity of self-
reports especially for young people in school-settings. Previous studies have found 
exaggerations of substance use (false positive reporting), non-disclosure (false negative 
reporting) and recanting of previously disclosed substance use (Fendrich & Rosenbaum, 
200326; Percy et al 200527). In the SDD, there are attempts to minimise peer pressure by 
administering the – anonymous - questionnaires under ‘exam conditions’; pupils were not 
allowed to discuss the questions with each other or look at others’ answers. 
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In 2007, the alcohol consumption questions related to  
· the frequency of drinking (from never to every day/almost every day) and  
· past-week quantity consumed broken down by beverage type (Clements et al 200825).  
 
In some years, pupils are also asked about whether alcohol was bought, stolen, or obtained 
from family/friends, most recently in 2006. 
 
Limitations: The SDD does not provide 
· Information on prices paid for alcohol 
· Information on on-trade/off-trade split 
· Information on binge drinking 
· Information on some at-risk groups who are known to drink more and more heavily (i.e. 
those not in mainstream schools: Truants, young offenders, those in pupil referral units) 
(Donmall et al. forthcoming, ACMD 200628) leading to likely underestimation young 
people’s drinking levels. 
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2.2.2 PRICE DATA: THE EXPENDITURE AND FOOD SURVEY (EFS)29 
 
The EFS29 is an annual survey of around 7,000 households in the United Kingdom. It records 
the purchasing of a range of goods, via a diary system for the individual over a two week period. 
Parents keep diaries for children under 16, whilst over 16s (including 16-17 group) complete 
their own diary. In general, EFS records the amount of a good bought, the price paid by the 
purchaser and the type of outlet where the purchase was made. For alcohol, we are able to 
classify the purchasing into beers, wines, spirits and alcopops and outlets can be split into the 
on-license and off-license trade. To link estimates to those derived from the GHS, there is a 
need to convert the volume of a beverage bought into alcohol units, for which we adopted the 
new ONS methodology outlined in Goddard et al (2007)19.  We have obtained and analysed 
data for EFS for the 5 years from 2005/6 back to 2001/2.  The standard EFS data is available 
from the UK Data Archive, however anonymised EFS diary individual data was obtained directly 
from DEFRA after a special data request. Over these five years, we have records of 69,618 
individuals, of whom 44,150 (63.4%) purchased items of alcohol within their two week diary 
period. To account for inflation over the 5 year period, we apply specific RPI inflators for 
alcoholic beverages to provide the complete dataset in 2005/06 prices.  
 
Some limitations of the EFS need to be taken into consideration:  
· A low response rate of around 55% of approached households, with potentially 
important differences in the response rates by age, social class and educational status 
(Dunn, 200830).  
 
The resulting data allows an assessment for each individual of: 
· The price paid, type of alcohol, volume of beverage and hence number of units 
purchased.  This is split by beverage type (beers, wines, spirits and alcopops) and by 
on-trade (e.g. licensed trade) vs off-trade purchasing (e.g. supermarkets, off-licenses). 
· Mean units per week purchased over the two weeks (split as above) - providing a proxy 
for mean consumption. 
· Units purchased on each day during the two weeks – although off-trade purchasing may 
be consumed over several days or weeks, on-trade purchasing probably provides a 
satisfactory proxy of actual consumption. 
· Purchasers’ individual characteristics including age, sex, income, education 
 
The EFS does not provide: 
· Information on actual consumption of alcohol – only purchasing and prices paid. 
· Reliable data on  under 16s, as parents are unlikely to know about alcohol purchases 
by their children. 
· Information on some high-risk groups not covered by household surveys (e.g. those 
who are homeless) 
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Table 3: Distribution of prices paid per unit of alcohol (EFS05/06 prices)  
 
Price Band Cumulative % off-trade 
volume distribution 
Cumulative % on-trade 
volume distribution 
<15p/unit 2% 0% 
15p-25p/unit 12% 6% 
25p-30p/unit 27% 9% 
30p-40p/unit 59% 14% 
40p-60p/unit 83% 23% 
60p-75p/unit 97% 35% 
75p-100p/unit 98% 74% 
100-120p/unit 99% 87% 
120 – 200p/unit 100% 96% 
Over 200p/unit 100% 100% 
 
As part of this project, the Department of Health is keen to understand the pricing and promotion 
in particular of low priced alcohol.  Table 4 shows the distribution of prices paid derived from 
EFS (2005/06 prices).  For our analysis, we have defined the following categories: 
 
Table 4: Definition of our ‘lower priced’ category 
 
Category Price paid per unit threshold 
Off-trade lower priced alcohol <30p/unit 
Off-trade higher priced alcohol >=30p/unit 
On-trade lower priced alcohol <80p/unit 
On-trade higher priced alcohol >=80p/unit 
 
We can then define 16 categories of alcohol (the four beverage types by the four trade-price 
categories shown above) and use the EFS to examine patterns of purchasing for each and 
provide a baseline picture of alcohol purchasing. 
 
It is clear that off-trade purchasing on a particular day may bear little relationship to actual 
consumption that day since the purchase can be stored and consumed later.  However, 
purchasing of alcohol on-trade should bear some relation to consumption. We have defined an 
‘on-trade purchase binge’ whenever an individual in EFS purchased more than 8 units (males) 
and 6 units (females) on-trade. Of course such purchasing could be for friends and in ‘rounds’. 
However, we assume a zero effect, as round buying usually involves taking turns and in effect 
this would be similar to each person buying their own alcohol. However, such an assumption 
may overestimate or underestimate the binge drinking behaviour in some individuals. One quite 
significant limitation is that we are able to base this only on alcohol bought whilst in licensed 
premises, and alcohol consumed at home prior to going out (sometimes called “frontloading”) is 
not accounted for. This is particularly popular amongst young drinkers, therefore proportions of 
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binge drinkers and peak consumption levels are likely to be underestimated. It is also the case 
that at a population level, the fortnightly purchasing distribution from the EFS may bear some 
relationship to the mean weekly consumption from GHS.  Comparison of this with the analogous 
GHS distribution shows that a higher proportion of the population are towards either end of the 
distribution in the EFS and fewer in the middle area of the distribution.  This is firstly because 
many of the people who purchased no alcohol in the EFS may have purchased just before or 
just after the fortnight diary. Secondly, some of the ‘harmful purchase’ from EFS may be shared 
with other individuals in terms of consumption.  This comparison underlines the need to utilise 
GHS as the baseline for consumption patterns, and to make some form of link to EFS, which 
has the data combining purchases and prices paid. 
 
2.2.3 PROMOTION DATA: RETAIL SALES FROM NIELSEN31 
 
Data has been made available to the research team from Nielsen31 which allows an examination 
of the volume and sales value of alcohol for 32 different product types.  Most importantly, these 
datasets enable detailed analysis of the extent of priced based promotion in the off-trade sector.   
 
Nielsen collects data from off-trade stores across the UK on a weekly basis.  They have an 
extremely detailed dataset over the past three years.  As each new week of data becomes 
available the three year period is redefined and data older than 3 years old is discarded.  Whilst 
the detailed data provides a wealth of material, Nielsen does not provide any individual-level 
information on buyers e.g. no age/sex data, nor does it provide any direct information on actual 
consumption (as distinct from purchase) of alcohol. 
 
For the “Grocery Multiples channel”, which is essentially supermarket chains, data is collected 
at “”stock keeping unit (SKU) level”.  An SKU would, for example, be a 4-pack of a particular 
brand of lager with 4*440ml cans and is defined by individual bar-codes.  To protect the 
anonymity of individual brand data, Nielsen are unable to provide data at SKU level. However 
they are able to group the SKUs into 32 product types.  The Nielsen data on a particular SKU  
for alcoholic beverages, includes the following fields: 
• SKU code 
• Week 
• Store / outlet (at individual store level) 
• Volume of sales (litres of beverage) 
• Value of sales (in £) 
• Flag identifying whether these sales were on promotion or not 
• Product category 
Nielsen use an industry recognised method to determine if a price of an item (an SKU in an 
outlet) is promotional or not in any given week. The highest price recorded over the previous 5 
weeks in the outlet is treated as the regular price (“RRP”) of the item. If the price drops from the 
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regular price by 5% or more in a subsequent week, the item is classified as being on promotion. 
If the reduced price remains in place for more than 4 weeks it then becomes the new regular 
price (i.e. the item is no longer on promotion).  Thus, for each record in the data Nielsen can 
also produce the field: 
• Regular price (computed as above) if SKU had not been on promotion. 
 
Nielsen was asked to provide a series of analyses based on these data.  Our model performs 
analysis at the aggregated level of beers, wines, spirits and alcopops but we have slightly more 
detail by Nielsen’s Product categories in order to aggregate the later data by ethanol content.  
The transformation from litres of beverage to units of alcohol was necessary. This was achieved 
bv applying Alcoholic by Volume (ABV) estimates (Table 5) to the volume of the product to 
obtain ethanol quantity and then converting to units (1 UK unit = 10ml ethanol). The 32 product 
categories were: 
 
Beers: 
· Non/low alcoholic lager, Commodity lager, Standard lager,  Premium lager, Super-strength 
lager, Non/low alcoholic ale, Commodity ale, Standard ale, Premium ale, Super-strength 
ale, Stout, Cider and Perry 
Spirits: 
· Blended Scotch Whisky, Malt Whisky, Imported Whisky, Gin, Vodka, Liqueurs, 
Brandy/cognac, Rum 
Wines: 
· Australian Light Wine, French Light Wine, Italian Light Wine, USA Light Wine, German Light 
Wine, Chilean Light Wine, Sparkling Wine, Champagne  
Fortified wines: 
· Sherry, Port, Vermouth 
Alcopops: 
· RTDs (Flavoured Alcoholic Beverages) 
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Table 5: ABV estimates 
Product ABV Source 
Commodity lager 3.2% SGAIP* - assume same as beer 
Standard lager 4.0% SGAIP - assume same as beer 
Premium lager 5.0% SGAIP - assume same as beer 
Superstrength lager 8.0% SGAIP - assume same as beer 
Commodity beer 3.2% SGAIP 
Standard beer 4.0% SGAIP 
Premium beer 5.0% SGAIP 
Superstrength beer 8.0% SGAIP 
Stout 3.9% CCFRA labelling study† 
Cider and perry 6.5% SGAIP - mid-point of cider and perry 
Blended Scotch Whisky 40.0% SGAIP 
Malt Whisky 40.0% SGAIP 
Imported Whisky 37.5% SGAIP - assume maps to whiskey 
Gin 37.5% SGAIP 
Vodka 37.5% SGAIP 
Liqueurs 35.0% SGAIP - using non-cream version 
Brandy/cognac 40.0% SGAIP - using cognac 
Rum 37.5% SGAIP - using middle ABV rum category 
Australian Light Wine 12.9% CCFRA labelling study 
French Light Wine 12.4% CCFRA labelling study 
Italian Light Wine 12.0% CCFRA labelling study 
USA Light Wine 12.3% CCFRA labelling study 
German Light Wine 9.3% CCFRA labelling study 
Chilean Light Wine 13.3% CCFRA labelling study 
Sparkling Wine 12.5% SGAIP 
Champagne 12.5% SGAIP 
Sherry 15.8% CCFRA labelling study 
Port 20.0% CCFRA labelling study 
Vermouth 16.5% CCFRA labelling study 
RTDs 5.0% ONS (Goddard 2007) 
 
Data is available for Great Britain and can also be partitioned for England & Wales. Our 
requirement was for three separate analyses for each of the three years of Nielsen data.  Data 
for England in isolation is not available. Hence, data from England and Wales was used for the 
analysis 
 
In order to examine price distributions we defined 10 price range categories for the off-trade 
sector and a further 10 price range categories for the on-trade sector.  These were defined at 
Product level in terms of price per litre of beverage, with the prices selected such that each 
                                                
* Scottish Government – Alcohol Industry Partnership data (2008) 
† This data was collected for Monitoring Implementation of Alcohol Labelling Regime (Campden & Chorleywood Food 
Research Association Group, June 2008). The data was not collected for the ScHARR review, and CCFRA has no 
responsibility for the analysis of the data in this work. 
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category mapped back to an equivalent price per unit of alcohol (Table 6). Again, for SKU 
anonymity reasons, we were unable to obtain the price distribution at a greater resolution than 
10 price categories.  
 
Table 6: Price bin ranges for Nielsen data 
 
Price Category Off-trade price (£) 
per unit of alcohol 
On-trade price (£) 
per unit of alcohol 
 Lower Upper Lower Upper 
1 0 0.15 0 0.4 
2 0.15 0.2 0.4 0.5 
3 0.2 0.25 0.5 0.6 
4 0.25 0.3 0.6 0.7 
5 0.3 0.35 0.7 0.8 
6 0.35 0.4 0.8 0.9 
7 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 
8 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.3 
9 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.5 
10 0.7 N/A 1.5 N/A 
 
With these price ranges defined, we were able to obtain data on the sales volume and sales 
value of each of the 32 products in each of the three years.  For example (illustrative data): 
 
Table 7: Example of data collected 
 
Product: 
 Cider/ perry  
Non-promotional sales  
Price range  Total volume of sales (in litres) Total value of sales (in £) 
1 10,000,000  2,500,000 
2 12,000,000 7,000,000 
… … … 
10 1,000,000 7,500,000 
 
Tables such as these were available separately for the two Nielsen databases: 
§ Grocery multiples 
§ Impulse channels. 
 
In addition for Grocery multiples – but not in the other channels – promotion data was available 
and data tables of the form below were produced. The table shown is for all beverage 
purchases in the final year of data (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Grocery multiple data – final year © Nielsen 2008. 
 
Actual Price Band 
Sum of 
Promoted 
Volume (L) 
Sum of Non-
Promoted 
Volume (L) 
Sum of 
Promoted Value 
(£) 
Sum of 
Non_Promoted 
Value (£) 
Sum of Value 
of Promoted 
Sales (if on 
RRP) (£) 
1 20,327,944 46,285,416 19,703,950 42,812,704 23,145,839 
2 36,955,834 36,006,268 43,848,066 44,003,149 56,021,218 
3 138,746,558 51,107,748 176,483,153 117,026,750 222,164,862 
4 224,136,257 125,436,191 436,977,038 439,874,321 525,905,306 
5 196,205,092 182,858,206 551,566,021 564,042,178 650,918,536 
6 163,696,206 145,449,159 576,508,016 419,138,959 689,774,543 
7 188,464,714 168,081,603 805,369,389 690,468,709 987,568,927 
8 78,231,614 80,458,243 382,723,118 402,373,266 447,052,700 
9 25,388,792 37,287,395 152,863,898 222,876,130 174,997,504 
10 23,986,713 36,160,954 261,613,428 397,899,570 300,105,573 
 
Data is more limited for the Impulse and on-trade channels; in particular, promotion data is not 
available in these channels. 
 
For more detail on the data obtained for each of the 32 products see the data specification in 
Appendix 2. 
 
2.2.3.1 Purchasing patterns in the population 
 
By using combined purchasing data from EFS and Nielsen it is possible to build a 
representation of purchasing by different demographics in the population that is useful for 
modelling. 
 
We have used five years of EFS data, converted to price per unit and inflated to 2007 prices, to 
build overall detailed price distributions for beer, wine, spirits and ready-to-drink beverage in 
both the on-trade and off-trade. We then, in the off-trade, use the more aggregated, but more 
accurate, sales data from Nielsen to ensure that the price distribution matches with actual sales 
data at known points of the distribution. We then interpolate the EFS data between the known 
Nielsen data points. The results are shown in the Figure 7. The combined Nielsen-EFS price 
distribution is then decomposed into the different age, sex and consumption sub-populations 
(e.g. 18-24 year old male hazardous drinkers*) using the demographic data in EFS. 
 
 
                                                
* We use 18-24 year old hazardous drinkers – of whom 58% are estimated to be binge drinkers 
– as a proxy for the 18-24 year old binge drinking priority group. 
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Figure 7: Interpolation (fitting) of the (raw) EFS off-trade data based on Nielsen data 
 
Note that Nielsen do not provide distributional data for on-trade sales and so just the EFS data 
is used to build the price distribution for the on-trade. 
 
For the off-trade, the Nielsen-EFS price distribution can also be decomposed by level of sales 
discount. For each of the ten actual price categories, Nielsen provide the value and volume of 
sales across ten (equivalent) recommended retail price categories. Thus we are able to build a 
distribution of sales promotion conditional on a price being within a particular actual price 
category. We then use the observed mean sales price for each actual-RRP combination to 
estimate the scale of the discount corresponding to the observed volume of sales. 
 
For beer, the distribution of sales promotion is shown in Table 9. 
 
For example, 42.4% of promoted sales with an actual price of less than £0.15/unit have an RRP 
of between £0.15/unit and £0.2/unit, and have a mean discount of 20%. This data can be used 
in a model to understand how prices would increase if sales promotions were limited (assuming 
no market response). 
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Table 9: Distribution of promotional sales (based on data provided by Nielsen, © Nielsen 2008): 
Beer  RRP (p/unit)         
  0-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+ 
Sales 0-15 0.473 0.424 0.088 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Price 15-20 0.000 0.465 0.350 0.054 0.084 0.041 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(p/unit) 20-25 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.323 0.242 0.112 0.053 0.007 0.000 0.000 
 25-30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.308 0.346 0.199 0.095 0.051 0.001 0.000 
 30-35 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.427 0.367 0.169 0.028 0.008 0.001 
 35-40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.495 0.422 0.065 0.007 0.011 
 40-50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.689 0.244 0.050 0.016 
 50-60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.664 0.296 0.041 
 60-70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.633 0.367 
 70+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 10: Magnitude of promotional discount (based on data provided by Nielsen, © Nielsen 2008): 
Beer  RRP (p/unit)         
  0-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+ 
Sales 0-15 0.062 0.202 0.343 0.521 0.620 0.688 0.756 0.811 0.840 0.921 
Price 15-20 0.000 0.059 0.166 0.338 0.438 0.479 0.550 0.681 0.736 0.761 
(p/unit) 20-25 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.146 0.264 0.364 0.478 0.528 0.630 0.709 
 25-30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.142 0.254 0.353 0.488 0.535 0.692 
 30-35 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.121 0.246 0.367 0.496 0.565 
 35-40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.127 0.281 0.433 0.500 
 40-50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.156 0.252 0.440 
 50-60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.145 0.243 
 60-70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.167 
 70+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.081 
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2.2.4 A MODEL LINKING PATTERNS OF BINGE DRINKING TO PURCHASING 
 
For acute harms, it is the intake of alcohol in a single day (a proxy for intoxication), rather than 
the mean weekly units that is most strongly associated with harm e.g. falls, crimes or violence. 
Analysis of binge drinking behaviour rather than just mean consumption over the week or the 
year is therefore essential. In theory, it would be good to model two aspects of binge drinking:   
 
1. The sensitivity of binge drinkers to price and/or promotion: Binge drinkers might 
behave differently in their response to price and / or promotion than drinkers who do not 
binge. With an idea dataset containing both information on consumption and purchasing 
patterns, separate elasticities could be computed for “binge drinkers” and individuals 
who do not binge. 
 
2. The sensitivity of binge drinking (especially the number of units consumed during a 
binge drinking session) to price and promotion. People might respond differentially to 
price during binge drinking occasions compared to non-binging occasions (for example, 
it is plausible that the presence of friends and increasing levels of intoxication during 
typical binge drinking occasions may lead to reduced price sensitivity). It would 
therefore be useful to be able to compute elasticities relating price changes to changes 
in the number of units drunk during a binge. 
 
2.2.4.1 Issues in linking data on binge drinking to purchasing 
 
There are difficulties linking data on binge drinking (GHS/SDD) with data on price and 
purchasing (EFS). GHS data provides evidence on likelihood and scale of binge drinking via the 
maximum intake of alcohol during the last week. This variable is used in the model to represent 
the baseline level of binge drinking. However, since the GHS contains no information about 
price or purchasing, it cannot be used to generate the above mentioned elasticities.  
 
EFS data provides evidence on purchasing both on- and off-trade, but does not contain a 
measure of binge drinking. Whilst it would seem sensible to assume that on-trade purchasing is 
directly associated with consumption, it is clearly not reasonable to assume that off-trade 
purchases are consumed on the same day and by the individual purchasing the alcohol. EFS 
data can therefore provide only a very incomplete picture of binge drinking, which is essentially 
an estimate of the extent of ‘on-trade bingeing’ ignoring any off-trade consumption. This has 
significant limitations as it is recognised that significant proportions of binge drinking occurs at 
home or involves a combination of both on- and off-trade consumption. We attempted to 
produce a 16*16 matrix of elasticities for 6 subgroups (i.e. moderate, hazardous and harmful 
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drinkers by on-trade binge/off-trade binge). However, there were insufficient numbers of people 
in the sub-datasets, and it was not possible to compute such elasticities.  
 
We then chose to explore an alternative approach, based on the observation that in the GHS, 
probability and scale of binging is related to the mean weekly intake of alcohol (20% of 
moderate drinkers binge drink on at least one day the last week, whereas figures for hazardous 
and harmful drinkers were 62% and 74% respectively). This indicates that elasticity matrices 
developed for moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers allow at least some reflection of the 
differential purchasing response to price changes that bingers and non-bingers might have. 
However, it is important to note that this approach does not consider the possibility that price 
sensitivity may vary by whether drinking occurs during a binge drinking occasion or not. Using 
the overall matrices also does not address the issue of estimating the change in the scale of 
binge given a change in price and / or promotion. Our chosen solution to this is presented 
below, together with a discussion of limitations. 
2.2.4.2 Regression model to predict the scale of the binge 
 
One main advantage of the GHS (2006)23 is the availability of data for both the mean weekly 
intake (here converted to mean daily intake) and the maximum units drunk in the heaviest day. 
It was thus possible to map the scale of binge from the mean intake using standard statistical 
regression model techniques. Separate linear models were constructed for each drinker type 
due to the anticipated differences in behaviour of moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers. 
For each age and sex group, models predict the maximum daily intake from the average daily 
intake of alcohol*. 
 
Regression coefficients from the three models are presented in Appendix 3. For illustration, the 
three models were plotted for men aged 25 to 34 years in Figure 8. The gradient of the 
regression models are less steep as the daily intake of alcohol increase. 
 
                                                
* Individuals with data about the mean weekly consumption, the maximum unit drunk one day 
the last week and the income were selected. Individuals with a mean weekly consumption over 
300 units or a maximum unit drunk one day the last week over 60 were considered as outliers 
and removed accordingly. 
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Figure 8: Illustrative example in men aged 25 to 34 years old 
 
The regression models are used to predict the relative change in the scale of binge between 
baseline and an intervention. The relative change is then applied to the baseline unit of alcohol 
drunk on the heaviest day (original data from the GHS). To illustrate, consider a man aged 25-
34 with a mean daily intake at baseline of 8 units (i.e. a harmful drinker) who drunk 20 units on 
the heaviest drinking day. Let us assume a given policy reduces the mean daily intake by 2 
units. This changes the mean consumption from 8 units to 6 units, a reduction of 25%. Our 
models predict a corresponding reduction of 14% in the scale of binge, i.e. a reduction from 20 
units to 17.5 units. 
 
2.2.5 ESTIMATION OF PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES USING EFS DATA 
 
 
The EFS data enables a detailed analysis of the relationship between the demand for alcohol 
and, in particular, the price of alcohol, set in the context of recent patterns of purchasing in 
England. 
 
The analysis uses data from the most recent five years available (2001/02 to 2005/06).  We 
have been able to define our 16 categories of alcohol purchased: beers, wines, spirits and 
ready-to-drinks (alcopops), split by low priced and higher priced, and split by on- or off-trade 
purchase.  Also within the data set are variables recording expenditure on other non-durable 
goods such as food and tobacco.  We have transaction-level data on the individual purchasing 
the alcohol, from the two-week diary, in terms of volume purchased and price paid.  We also 
have a substantial set of information on the individuals’ characteristics, including: gender, 
ethnicity, age, education, region, household composition, household size, employment status 
and income. 
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An econometric model has been developed and used to examine the relationship between the 
purchasing of units of the 16 alcohol categories and of other non-durable goods (on the left 
hand side) and their prices, the income of the individual and the covariates around gender, 
ethnicity, age, education, region, household composition, household size and whether the 
individual is unemployed (on the right hand side).  The resulting system of equations was 
analysed using iterative three-stage least squares regression to estimate coefficients for all 
relevant terms.  We were then able to compute elasticities of demand for the various products 
from these coefficients.   
 
These elasticities provide information on the responsiveness of the population to price changes.  
They inform the scale of expected reduction in purchasing of a category of alcohol if its price 
changes.  They also inform the knock on effects on purchasing of other products, via the so-
called ‘cross elasticities’ for price, enabling an assessment of the potential scale of switching to 
increased purchasing of a second category of alcohol (e.g. cheaper off-trade wine) if the price of 
the first category of alcohol (e.g. cheaper on-trade beer) increases.   
 
Elasticities can also be estimated for income, enabling an assessment of the potential change in 
purchasing of alcohol with changes to income. 
 
We have attempted to estimate elasticities for advertising by putting into the model data on the 
level of expenditure on alcohol advertising in each of the five years.  Disaggregation of 
exposure of advertising to individuals within EFS is not possible due to lack of data.  It is 
possible in theory to disaggregate further than just national level advertising spend, for example 
by examining regional differences in expenditure or making assumptions concerning relative 
levels of exposure for different subgroups in the population, but again we could find no robust 
data sources for England.  The resulting advertising elasticities from our econometric model 
were both very small and not statistically significant and they are not reported here. 
 
We have been able to estimate 16*16 elasticity matrices for various population groupings within 
the overall English EFS data: 
 
· Total population (Table 14) 
· Moderate drinkers (Table 12) 
· Hazardous and harmful drinkers combined (Table 13) 
· Hazardous drinkers (Table 15) 
· Harmful drinkers (Table 16). 
 
As a simple example of how to interpret the elasticity matrices, consider the moderate drinker 
16*16 matrix shown in Table 12.The lead diagonal in the table shows the own-price elasticities. 
For example, the table shows an own-price elasticity of -0.4217 for off-trade low-price beer. This 
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indicates that a 1% increase in the price of off-trade low-priced beer would lead to an 
approximately 0.4% reduction in the demand for such a beverage. Complementary and 
substitute relationships between beverages are also indicated by the cross-price elasticities that 
comprise the remainder of the matrix. For moderate drinkers, the majority of cross-price effects 
are of a substitute-based nature. For example, the cross-price elasticity between off-trade low-
priced beer and on-trade higher-priced beer in Table 12 is +0.0157, indicating an estimated 
0.02% rise in demand for on-trade higher-priced beer if the price of off-trade low-priced beer 
were to rise by 1%. 
 
Note that the ideal scenario would be to produce 16*16 matrices for every sub-group in our 
analysis (e.g. 18-24 year old male hazardous drinkers), however there is insufficient data in our 
five-year EFS sample to enable the regression algorithm to converge satisfactorily on a robust 
solution. 
 
Further information on the methods used to estimate price, income and advertising elasticities 
can be found in Appendix 4, together with detailed summary statistics from the regression 
analyses. 
 
The elasticity matrices on their own are not sufficient to reveal the likely behaviour of the 
population to price changes, since these also depend on the preferences for beverage, drinking 
location and price point that the different sub-groups exhibit. However they do form a useful 
starting point for analysis, and can be compared with existing results from the literature. 
 
Recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses by Gallet (2007)36 and Wagenaar et al (2008)32 
found, respectively, a median elasticity for alcohol of -0.535 and a mean elasticity for alcohol of 
-0.51. By comparison, our elasticity matrix for all of England shows broadly similar results, with 
own-price elasticities ranging from a least elastic estimate of -0.2350 for on-trade higher-priced 
spirits to a most elastic estimate of -2.9386 for on-trade low-priced spirits. All other own-price 
estimates lie between these two points, and all exhibit inelasticity. 
 
In terms of a more detailed decomposition by beverage type, Gallet (2007)36 collated -0.360 for 
beer compared with our -0.4794 to -0.5525; -0.700 for wine compared with our -0.2829 to 
-0.5764; and -0.679 for spirits which is similar to our off-trade estimates of approximately -0.62. 
Note that elasticities do tend to be dependent on the country of interest, with the most popular 
type of beverage typically having the lowest estimated elasticity. 
 
Few elasticity estimates are available that relate closely to the population of England. The most 
recent analysis by Huang (2003)33 produced own price elasticity of -0.48  for on-trade beer, 
-1.03 for off-trade beer, -1.31 for spirits and -0.75 for wine excluding coolers. Like Huang (2003), 
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we have found a larger elasticity for off-trade beer than on-trade beer, although in relative terms 
our observed difference is somewhat smaller. 
 
Huang was also able to estimate cross-elasticities between beverage types, as was 
Gruenewald et al (2006)34 in a study of off-trade Swedish price and sales data. Both studies 
tend to produce larger cross-price elasticities than those observed in our analysis of EFS data. 
The substitution effects estimated by Gruenewald et al (2006) are sufficient to result in overall 
increased demand for alcohol for some price increase configurations. The 16*16 matrix of 
elasticities for hazardous drinkers, when implemented in our overall model, is also capable of 
generating such a result at sub-group level for some price change configurations (note the 
cross-price elasticities for off-trade higher-priced wine and on-trade beer in Table 12) but this 
behaviour is not observed at total population level. 
 
Some evidence exists in the literature to suggest that heavier drinkers are less responsive to 
price increases (in relative terms) than lighter drinkers. Manning et al (1995)35 derived a price 
elasticity response function with respect to drinking quantile, indicating that moderate drinkers 
are the most price elastic and that the 95th percentile of drinkers have an elasticity not 
significantly different from zero (perfect price elasticity). Wagenaar et al (2008)32 meta-analysis 
computes a mean elasticity of -0.28 for heavy drinkers compared to the overall -0.51 described 
earlier. By contrast, our elasticity estimates for moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers 
(Table 12, Table 15 and Table 16 respectively) show, in general, own-price elasticity 
magnitudes increasing with mean quantity of alcohol consumed. However the relationship we 
observe between overall price elasticity and level of drinking is more complex due to the 
inclusion of cross-elasticities, with hazardous drinkers showing the greatest level of substitution 
behaviour, which in some cases is an order of magnitude greater than that estimated for 
moderate drinkers. 
 
To enable more direct comparability with the estimates in the literature we have also generated 
elasticity estimates for total alcohol purchasing from the EFS, shown in Table 11. These are in 
broad agreement with the literature, showing that – at the highest level of aggregation – 
hazardous and harmful drinkers (combined elasticity of -0.21) are less price elastic than 
moderate drinkers (elasticity of -0.47). Note that these high-level estimates are provided for 
reference only and are not included in the model. 
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Table 11:  High-level elasticities for different drinking categories, derived from EFS 
 Drinking category 
  Moderate Hazardous or 
Harmful 
Elasticity (all alcohol) -0.47 -0.21 
 
 
In the baseline model we have chosen to use the moderate and combined hazardous and 
harmful matrices as input data. These provide a more central estimate of substitution behaviour 
than the matrix for all of England (which tends to smooth out the switching behaviour evident at 
sub-group level) and the separate matrices for hazardous and harmful (where, for hazardous, 
the magnitude of switching behaviour is perhaps somewhat greater than is realistic, given our 
knowledge of beverage, trade and pricing preferences from these groups from our synthesis of 
the EFS, GHS and Nielsen data). Hence these latter elasticity matrices are used only for 
sensitivity analysis. 
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Table 12:  Price-elasticity estimates from 5 years of EFS data for 16 alcohol categories (moderate drinkers) 
 
 
PRICE ¯ LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI
OFF BEER LOW -0.4217 0.0044 0.0023 0.0082 0.0011 0.0055 -0.0002 0.0035 0.0131 0.0157 0.0001 0.0020 0.0029 0.0048 0.0004 0.0050
HI 0.0037 -0.4224 0.0027 0.0095 0.0010 0.0037 0.0000 0.0032 0.0130 0.0174 -0.0001 0.0025 0.0033 0.0057 0.0006 0.0055
WINE LOW 0.0051 0.0063 -0.4127 0.0032 0.0012 0.0028 0.0001 0.0019 0.0115 0.0102 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0033 0.0033 0.0001 0.0038
HI 0.0040 0.0064 0.0012 -0.4612 0.0009 0.0032 0.0000 0.0019 0.0111 0.0155 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0038 0.0042 0.0002 0.0047
SPIRIT LOW 0.0030 0.0098 0.0023 0.0097 -0.5129 0.0029 0.0000 0.0018 0.0151 0.0142 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0024 0.0031 0.0003 0.0033
HI 0.0049 0.0056 0.0014 0.0085 0.0007 -0.5242 0.0000 0.0019 0.0124 0.0161 0.0000 0.0017 0.0025 0.0036 0.0003 0.0039
RTD LOW 0.0118 0.0075 0.0022 0.0010 0.0003 0.0008 -0.3146 0.0009 0.0123 0.0068 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0017 -0.0080 0.0004 0.0039
HI 0.0059 0.0104 0.0001 0.0053 0.0011 0.0027 -0.0001 -0.3287 0.0083 0.0103 0.0002 0.0016 0.0020 0.0034 0.0004 0.0041
ON BEER LOW 0.0051 0.0067 0.0027 0.0083 0.0010 0.0047 -0.0001 0.0027 -0.3778 0.0259 -0.0003 0.0044 0.0043 0.0082 0.0009 0.0064
HI 0.0060 0.0085 0.0022 0.0091 0.0010 0.0042 -0.0001 0.0032 0.0206 -0.4063 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0051 0.0123 0.0006 0.0075
WINE LOW 0.0007 -0.0019 0.0009 0.0030 0.0019 0.0016 0.0000 0.0005 0.0148 0.0150 -0.2328 0.0013 0.0010 0.0067 0.0002 0.0060
HI 0.0021 0.0034 0.0010 0.0052 0.0007 0.0031 0.0000 0.0010 0.0121 0.0072 -0.0002 -0.2907 0.0022 0.0053 0.0006 0.0041
SPIRIT LOW 0.0017 0.0006 0.0032 0.0101 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0029 -0.0110 0.0001 0.0190 -1.7810 0.0100 0.0023 0.0183
HI 0.0015 0.0011 0.0009 0.0023 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0060 -0.0011 -0.0102 -0.0005 -0.1891 0.0004 -0.0020
RTD LOW 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0038 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0011 0.0075 0.0061 -0.0022 0.0094 0.0414 -0.0149 -0.3304 0.0067
HI 0.0009 0.0019 -0.0004 0.0020 0.0006 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0087 0.0012 0.0001 0.0043 0.0050 -0.0087 0.0007 -0.3191
SPIRIT RTD
CONSUMPTION ® OFF
BEER
ON
BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD WINE
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Table 13:  Price-elasticity estimates from 5 years of EFS data for 16 alcohol categories (hazardous and harmful drinkers combined) 
 
 
PRICE ¯ LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI
OFF BEER LOW -0.5896 0.0086 0.0088 0.0367 0.0041 0.0057 0.0002 0.0006 0.0167 0.0249 -0.0002 0.0041 0.0019 0.0073 0.0002 0.0053
HI 0.0094 -0.5746 0.0098 0.0357 0.0039 0.0033 0.0003 0.0006 0.0136 0.0206 0.0005 0.0032 0.0016 0.0061 0.0004 0.0054
WINE LOW 0.0198 0.0142 -0.5603 0.0116 0.0024 0.0065 0.0003 0.0043 0.0248 0.0281 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0006 0.0048 0.0005 0.0038
HI 0.0168 0.0151 0.0053 -0.6260 0.0047 0.0062 0.0002 0.0012 0.0280 0.0390 0.0000 0.0025 -0.0001 0.0085 0.0008 0.0037
SPIRIT LOW 0.0064 0.0120 0.0041 0.0206 -0.6266 0.0016 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0181 0.0206 0.0006 0.0036 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0004
HI 0.0056 0.0042 0.0037 0.0182 0.0017 -0.6459 0.0000 0.0007 0.0205 0.0236 0.0001 0.0025 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0009
RTD LOW -0.0049 -0.0115 0.0038 0.0178 -0.0047 -0.0013 -0.3816 -0.0005 0.0018 0.0044 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0213 0.0001 -0.0007
HI -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0135 0.0072 0.0045 0.0057 0.0000 -0.4158 0.0015 0.0077 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0028 0.0037 0.0001 0.0008
ON BEER LOW 0.0201 0.0175 0.0129 0.0464 0.0052 0.0061 0.0000 0.0024 -0.6161 0.0524 -0.0011 0.0034 0.0039 0.0059 -0.0011 0.0088
HI 0.0201 0.0185 0.0113 0.0415 0.0046 0.0055 0.0002 0.0015 0.0329 -0.6331 -0.0001 -0.0027 0.0048 0.0015 0.0003 0.0026
WINE LOW 0.0049 -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0017 0.0123 0.0001 -0.0038 -0.0312 0.0122 -0.3799 0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0069 0.0032 0.0045
HI 0.0097 0.0045 0.0021 0.0121 0.0029 0.0045 0.0002 0.0007 0.0148 -0.0039 0.0001 -0.4106 -0.0028 -0.0050 0.0013 0.0025
SPIRIT LOW 0.0176 0.0190 -0.0019 0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0036 0.0000 0.0001 0.0147 0.0128 -0.0012 0.0277 -3.7220 0.0227 -0.0019 -0.0138
HI 0.0066 0.0023 0.0055 0.0179 -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0048 -0.0181 -0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0006 -0.2861 -0.0002 -0.0043
RTD LOW 0.0052 0.0042 -0.0046 0.0043 -0.0049 0.0046 0.0003 0.0006 0.0055 0.0119 0.0045 0.0020 0.0679 -0.0299 -0.3925 0.0135
HI 0.0024 -0.0002 0.0048 0.0100 0.0019 -0.0020 0.0002 0.0003 0.0152 0.0022 0.0008 0.0086 0.0019 -0.0053 0.0012 -0.4194
SPIRIT RTD
CONSUMPTION ® OFF
BEER
ON
BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD WINE
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Table 14:  Price-elasticity estimates from 5 years of EFS data for 16 alcohol categories (All drinkers) 
 
 
PRICE ¯ LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI
OFF BEER LOW -0.5525 0.0003 -0.0072 -0.0094 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0085 0.0093 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0022 0.0001 0.0020
HI 0.0024 -0.5160 -0.0035 -0.0129 -0.0002 -0.0032 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0078 0.0095 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0014 0.0018 0.0004 0.0025
WINE LOW 0.0001 -0.0030 -0.5117 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0010 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0009
HI -0.0012 -0.0058 0.0005 -0.5764 0.0002 -0.0023 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0012
SPIRIT LOW -0.0077 -0.0019 -0.0089 -0.0139 -0.6131 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0020 0.0001 -0.0013
HI -0.0046 -0.0106 -0.0064 -0.0213 0.0003 -0.6217 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0003 -0.0030 -0.0002 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0007
RTD LOW -0.0066 -0.0112 -0.0035 0.0002 -0.0043 -0.0019 -0.3562 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0116 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0014 0.0066 0.0001 0.0008
HI -0.0041 -0.0023 0.0033 -0.0011 0.0022 0.0017 0.0000 -0.3815 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0028 0.0005 0.0001 0.0013
ON BEER LOW 0.0046 0.0014 -0.0023 -0.0035 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.4794 0.0240 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0015 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0038
HI 0.0058 0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0074 -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0203 -0.5049 -0.0001 -0.0051 0.0001 0.0031 0.0003 0.0021
WINE LOW -0.0050 -0.0103 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0028 -0.0095 0.0070 -0.2829 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0010 0.0040
HI -0.0028 -0.0059 -0.0003 0.0036 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0060 -0.0049 -0.0002 -0.3280 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0015
SPIRIT LOW 0.0037 -0.0015 -0.0011 0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0022 0.0000 -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0417 -0.0005 0.0180 -2.9386 0.0129 -0.0030 -0.0046
HI -0.0018 -0.0059 -0.0011 -0.0048 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0184 -0.0348 -0.0014 -0.0105 -0.0005 -0.2350 -0.0002 -0.0047
RTD LOW -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0087 -0.0028 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0167 -0.0087 0.0010 0.0021 0.0239 -0.0346 -0.3672 0.0072
HI -0.0022 -0.0045 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0029 -0.0124 0.0003 0.0031 0.0045 -0.0099 0.0008 -0.3638
CONSUMPTION ® OFF
BEER
ON
BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD WINE SPIRIT RTD
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Table 15:  Price-elasticity estimates from 5 years of EFS data for 16 alcohol categories (hazardous drinkers) 
 
 
PRICE ¯ LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI
OFF BEER LOW -0.5360 0.0154 0.0190 0.0589 0.0064 0.0107 -0.0002 0.0028 0.0266 0.0367 0.0001 0.0078 0.0009 0.0096 -0.0002 0.0065
HI 0.0130 -0.5398 0.0163 0.0536 0.0056 0.0092 0.0001 0.0026 0.0220 0.0307 0.0004 0.0056 0.0023 0.0101 0.0001 0.0068
WINE LOW 0.0266 0.0223 -0.4991 0.0182 0.0052 0.0101 0.0003 0.0049 0.0317 0.0335 0.0000 0.0022 -0.0005 0.0082 0.0004 0.0041
HI 0.0210 0.0225 0.0078 -0.5646 0.0053 0.0110 0.0001 0.0024 0.0344 0.0462 0.0000 0.0043 0.0012 0.0106 0.0005 0.0054
SPIRIT LOW 0.0207 0.0234 0.0168 0.0440 -0.5822 0.0051 0.0004 0.0038 0.0329 0.0397 0.0007 0.0092 0.0004 0.0028 0.0001 0.0011
HI 0.0144 0.0172 0.0107 0.0496 0.0027 -0.6056 0.0001 0.0020 0.0308 0.0375 0.0002 0.0045 0.0002 0.0019 0.0003 0.0020
RTD LOW -0.0149 -0.0046 0.0146 0.0361 0.0122 -0.0012 -0.3004 -0.0012 0.0045 0.0171 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0015
HI 0.0104 0.0054 0.0095 0.0113 0.0029 0.0043 0.0000 -0.3991 0.0039 0.0111 -0.0004 0.0015 0.0002 0.0029 0.0001 0.0013
ON BEER LOW 0.0229 0.0237 0.0187 0.0592 0.0072 0.0107 0.0001 0.0033 -0.5739 0.0603 -0.0006 0.0036 0.0036 0.0090 -0.0003 0.0105
HI 0.0236 0.0249 0.0197 0.0584 0.0077 0.0105 0.0001 0.0012 0.0415 -0.5987 -0.0007 -0.0025 0.0115 0.0069 -0.0001 0.0046
WINE LOW 0.0005 0.0033 0.0023 0.0033 0.0041 0.0048 0.0000 -0.0030 0.0058 0.0135 -0.3595 0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0103 0.0005 -0.0015
HI 0.0124 0.0076 0.0029 0.0120 0.0023 0.0062 0.0001 0.0022 0.0184 -0.0032 0.0003 -0.3974 -0.0041 0.0001 0.0007 0.0046
SPIRIT LOW 0.0162 0.0223 0.0029 0.0267 0.0007 0.0002 0.0000 0.0007 0.0260 0.0229 -0.0006 0.0292 -3.5809 0.0195 0.0020 -0.0110
HI 0.0077 0.0058 0.0046 0.0228 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0059 -0.0048 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0039 -0.2751 0.0000 -0.0038
RTD LOW 0.0088 0.0044 -0.0025 0.0119 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.0002 0.0266 0.0115 0.0020 0.0189 0.0683 -0.0201 -0.3836 0.0139
HI 0.0039 -0.0004 0.0061 0.0152 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 0.0263 0.0077 0.0000 0.0127 0.0038 -0.0020 0.0010 -0.4118
RTD WINE SPIRIT RTD
CONSUMPTION ® OFF
BEER
ON
BEER WINE SPIRIT
 
 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 57 
Table 16:  Price-elasticity estimates from 5 years of EFS data for 16 alcohol categories (harmful drinkers) 
 
 
PRICE ¯ LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI
OFF BEER LOW -0.6315 0.0092 0.0190 0.0576 0.0136 0.0111 0.0008 0.0002 0.0134 0.0231 -0.0002 0.0024 0.0038 0.0070 0.0007 0.0051
HI 0.0114 -0.6195 0.0159 0.0504 0.0104 0.0063 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0082 0.0145 0.0008 0.0017 -0.0003 0.0024 0.0010 0.0040
WINE LOW 0.0349 0.0145 -0.6263 0.0158 0.0104 0.0119 0.0002 0.0050 0.0261 0.0345 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0014 0.0025 0.0009 0.0039
HI 0.0331 0.0166 0.0082 -0.6928 0.0153 0.0118 0.0003 0.0017 0.0290 0.0446 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0023 0.0081 0.0014 0.0019
SPIRIT LOW 0.0170 0.0139 0.0158 0.0442 -0.6551 0.0020 0.0000 -0.0015 0.0183 0.0154 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0021 0.0006 0.0010
HI 0.0132 0.0032 0.0118 0.0291 0.0023 -0.6833 0.0000 0.0007 0.0194 0.0200 0.0001 0.0017 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0009
RTD LOW 0.0159 -0.0133 0.0081 0.0237 -0.0115 -0.0019 -0.4261 -0.0013 0.0082 0.0071 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0023 0.0381 0.0003 0.0007
HI -0.0076 -0.0095 0.0165 0.0123 0.0082 0.0078 0.0000 -0.4359 0.0003 0.0084 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0047 0.0059 0.0001 0.0001
ON BEER LOW 0.0312 0.0202 0.0209 0.0648 0.0142 0.0103 0.0001 0.0030 -0.6965 0.0530 -0.0020 0.0058 0.0067 0.0026 -0.0030 0.0058
HI 0.0290 0.0210 0.0149 0.0576 0.0108 0.0093 0.0002 0.0048 0.0308 -0.6915 0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0060 -0.0070 0.0014 -0.0003
WINE LOW 0.0205 -0.0059 0.0011 0.0048 0.0006 0.0290 0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0498 0.0216 -0.4057 -0.0016 -0.0038 -0.0024 0.0073 0.0152
HI 0.0148 0.0050 0.0036 0.0188 0.0095 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0028 -0.0191 -0.0001 -0.4486 -0.0048 -0.0233 0.0028 -0.0048
SPIRIT LOW 0.0478 0.0039 0.0079 -0.0318 -0.0009 -0.0069 0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0116 -0.0026 0.0210 -4.0713 0.0371 -0.0119 -0.0163
HI 0.0156 0.0003 0.0124 0.0290 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0065 -0.0005 -0.0409 -0.0005 -0.0031 0.0073 -0.3078 -0.0005 -0.0040
RTD LOW 0.0036 0.0100 -0.0024 -0.0013 -0.0034 0.0135 0.0006 0.0016 -0.0083 0.0319 0.0093 -0.0230 0.0808 -0.0416 -0.4058 0.0147
HI 0.0140 0.0091 0.0083 0.0116 0.0124 -0.0021 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0034 -0.0076 0.0034 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0117 0.0018 -0.4356
SPIRIT RTD
CONSUMPTION ® OFF
BEER
ON
BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD WINE
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2.2.6 PRICING/PROMOTION TO CONSUMPTION MODEL 
 
 Data from the GHS23 were used to provide the baseline for consumption of alcohol in England. 
 
The main mechanism in the model is that a change in price and / or promotion modifies the 
consumption pattern from the GHS, i.e. that a new GHS is simulated year after year based on 
the impact of selected policies. 
 
However, as explained earlier, the GHS does not provide information about on- and off-trade 
and high and low price consumption, while EFS contains such data. Such a distribution is 
necessary to model the impact of specific policy aimed at on-/off-trade or low and high prices. 
The price/promotion to consumption model is thus based on three major steps (Figure 9): 
1) derive a new GHS for 16 elements of the matrices (on/off, high/low, beer, wine, spirits, 
alcopops) 
2) interpolate the EFS29 from Nielsen data31 (see Method section 2.2.3.1) 
3) estimate the impact of the implementation of a policy in terms of change in consumption 
 
Step 1 was carried out by combining the consumption distribution from GHS with the EFS 
purchasing distribution to produce a “new GHS” for the 16 elements of the matrices*. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Model initialisation steps: creation of a new GHS and new EFS-Nielsen dataset 
 
                                                
* Note that for the modelling we compute the preference vector at a group level rather than at individual sample level to 
mitigate the issue of zeros in consumption vectors. Since our elasticity matrix works on relative price changes, zeros 
could potentially bias the results by underestimating cross-price effects. 
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1 While no information about binge drinking was available in the SDD (2006) for individuals aged 11 to 15 years old, 
binge drinking behaviour was estimated assuming a linear consumption over the week derived from the total unit of 
alcohol drunk over the last week and the number of days drunk in that week. Such assumption may underestimate the 
measure of binge drinking in 11 to 15 year old given that it consumption patterns out of drinking occasions over a week. 
 
More details about step 2 are available in section 2.2.3.1 (methods) 
 
Finally, after a “new GHS” has been created, the impact of a price /promotion policy on the 
mean consumption was examined using the elasticity matrices described in section 2.2.5. The 
formula used to apply elasticity is shown below: 
       %ΔConsumption= eT * %Δprice with eT = elasticity 
 
Regression models are then used to predict the change in the scale of binge (see section 
2.2.4). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Steps to simulate a “new consumption dataset” after the policy has been 
implemented 
 
2.2.7 INCREMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS ON A STAY STEADY ALCOHOL 
CONSUMPTION BASELINE 
 
The current version of the model treats GHS 200623 as the base year of consumption, assumes 
that not changing policy would result in a stay steady scenario of existing consumption, and 
analyses the incremental effect of a policy affecting price or promotion on consumption and 
hence harms. 
 
Further research work could be undertaken to model the recent trends in consumption for 
different population subgroups over the last few years, and project forward a continuation of 
these trends if no policy action were taken.  The estimated incremental effect of a policy over 
and above such a trend based baseline model would be of the same scale as in our current 
version because the same elasticity evidence would be used to compute it. 
Policy 
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2.2.8 EVIDENCE USED FOR ADVERTISING ANALYSES 
 
The alcohol policy model needs information on how consumption levels change as a result of 
policy impacts on alcohol advertising. There is significant debate on whether advertising effects 
can be adequately estimated using currently available methodologies and data. The main 
criticisms are: 1) oversimplification of consumer decision making processes and disregard of the 
mechanisms through which advertising influences consumers, especially in the longer term and 
2) in a market where there is advertising saturation, it may be difficult to detect effects of 
marginally higher or lower advertising efforts.  
 
Estimates of advertising effects tend to come from two sources: 1) advertising elasticities, which 
provide a measure of how changes in industry spending on advertising relates to changes in 
consumption; and 2) cohort studies, which include repeated measures of advertising exposure 
amongst children and relate these to adolescent and adult drinking outcomes.  
 
There are limitations to both approaches. Studies estimating advertising elasticities rely on high-
level aggregates of advertising expenditure, mostly with short-run series. This makes it unlikely 
that such studies will find significant effects. This approach is also unable to differentiate 
between different forms of advertising or groups of drinkers. Cohort studies can be prone to 
confounding effects, i.e. unmeasured third variables that influence both advertising exposure 
and later drinking behaviour.  
 
In light of these problems, we decided to base our analysis on a range of different sources of 
evidence, thereby providing an indication of the likely minimum and maximum effects that can 
be expected from changes to advertising policy. We also attempted to estimate new advertising 
elasticities for England, but due to the nature of the available data (short-run, highly aggregated) 
we were unable to obtain reliable estimates. 
 
2.2.8.1 Meta-analysis of Studies 
 
Gallet (2007)36 conducted a meta-analysis of 322 estimates of advertising elasticities, the 
majority of which stem from US studies. He reports an overall median advertising elasticity of 
0.029, and advertising elasticities for beer (0.020); wine (0.007) and spirits (0.070). An 
advertising elasticity of 0.029 means that for every 10% increase in advertising expenditure, the 
demand for alcohol increases by 0.29%. We will use this estimate in one of the model runs. 
 
2.2.8.2 UK-specific data37 
 
Duffy (2003)37 reports advertising elasticities specifically for the UK which, depending on the 
model used, vary between 0.018 and 0.025. These elasticities are very similar indeed to the 
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findings of the more recent meta-analysis by Gallet (2007)36, therefore separate results based 
on these estimates will not be reported. 
 
2.2.8.3 Advertising Exposure: Effect on Young People38 
 
Research estimated the effectiveness of advertising restrictions on youth (age 13 to 17) 
drinking, based on longitudinal US survey data (Saffer and Dave, 2006)38 
 
Depending on the estimation model used, relevant advertising elasticities varied between 0.065 
and 0.21, with the latter presenting the highest advertising elasticity reported in the econometric 
literature. We chose to model the more conservative 0.065 for people under 18 in the model. 
2.2.8.4 Advertising Bans39 
 
The same team estimated the effectiveness of advertising bans on consumption, based on 
pooled time-series data from 20 countries over 26 years (Saffer and Dave, 2002)39. A ban was 
defined either as partial - a ban of advertising of one beverage type on one media channel e.g. 
ban of beer adverts on TV – or full (all beverage types on one media channel). Up to 3 media 
bans were possible: for TV, radio and print. Saffer and Dave’s estimate was that the introduction 
of a partial ban could reduce consumption by 5% per partial ban, whilst a total ban would 
reduce consumption by 9% per ban. We have implemented both formulations in the model, but 
for simplicity we will only report results for the latter form of ban. 
 
2.2.8.5 Counter-Advertising 
 
Counter-advertising is defined here as actions involving the use of advertising-styled messages 
about the risks or negative consequences of drinking, for example in the form of print or 
broadcast advertisements (definition adapted from Babor et al 200340).  The use of product 
warning labels is not included in our definition. Government has proposed the introduction of 
requirements for industry to use 1/6 of broadcast advertising time for counter-advertising 
measures. The possible effects are two-fold: (1) reduction of advertising expenditure by 1/6 as 
industry now had to fund counter-advertising; (2) any effects of the counter-advertising message 
in changing consumption.  There is very limited evidence on the effect of counter-advertising on 
consumption outcomes. What evidence there is seems to suggest that there are minimal or no 
effects2. Therefore, we only model the effect of a 1/6th reduction in advertising expenditure by 
industry.  
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2.2.8.6 Modelling of advertising policies 
 
As discussed above, we do not have sufficient data to enable a detailed model to be built in the 
manner of price or sales promotion described earlier. Instead we apply elasticities from the 
literature directly to the GHS-level consumption data to produce revised consumption estimates. 
These elasticities are assumed to apply to mean consumption only, and therefore the binge 
model is again used to estimate revised maximum daily drinking levels. 
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2.3 IMPACT OF ALCOHOL ON HARMS: OVERVIEW AND METHOD TO 
ESTIMATE RISK FUNCTIONS 
 
The main mechanism of the consumption to harm model is the definition of risk functions. Risk 
functions are essential for modelling the impact on consumption associated with the 
implementation of price and /or promotion policies. 
2.3.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALCOHOL-ATTRIBUTABLE FRACTION AND 
RELATIVE RISK  
 
The methodology by which the relationship between alcohol exposure and harm can be 
analysed is described in a new report by the NWPHO on “Alcohol-attributable fractions for 
England”43, published in June 2008. The AAF of a disease can be defined as the difference 
between the overall average risk (or incidence rate) of the disease in the entire population 
(drinkers and never-drinkers*) and the average risk in those without the exposure factor under 
investigation (never-drinkers), expressed as a fraction of the overall average risk. For example, 
the AAF for breast cancer is simply the risk of breast cancer in the total female population minus 
the risk of breast cancer in women who have never drunk alcohol, divided by the breast cancer 
risk for the total female population. Thus, AAF are used as a measure of the proportion of the 
disease that is attributable to alcohol. While this approach has traditionally been used for 
chronic health-related outcomes, such approach can in principle be applied to other harms. 
 
AAF can be calculated using the following formula: 
 
Equation 1:  AAF Formula 
 
where,  
RRi is the relative risk of exposure to alcohol for band i 
pi is the proportion of the population exposed to alcohol in band i 
p0 the proportion of the population in the reference category (in this case zero alcohol) 
 
If the reference category is abstention from alcohol then the AAF describes the proportion of 
outcomes that would not have occurred if everyone in the population had abstained from 
drinking. Thus the numerator is essentially the excess expected cases due to alcohol exposure 
and the denominator is the total expected cases.  In situations where alcohol consumption 
reduces the risk of an outcome (e.g. coronary heart disease) the AAF can be negative and 
would describe the additional cases that would have occurred if everyone was an abstainer.  An 
example calculation is shown below in Table 17.   
                                                
* Never drinkers are different from abstainers 
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Table 17:  Relative risks for males: malignant neoplasm of oesophagus (see Table 2 in 
NWPHO report43) 
  Grams of alcohol per day 
  0 1-19 20-39 40-74 75+ 
RRi * 1.00 1.20 1.39 1.93 3.59 
Illustrative p_i 20% 30% 30% 15% 5% 
(RRi-1)*pi 0 0.0600 0.1170 0.1395 0.1295 
Numerator 0.4460         
Denominator 1.4460         
AAF 0.3084         
* Source = Corrao et al., 200441 
 
Note that there are methodological difficulties with attributable risk studies. One problem is in 
defining the non-exposed group – in one sense ‘never drinkers’ are the only correct “non-
exposed” group, but they are rare and usually quite different from the general population in 
various respects. However, current non-drinkers include those who were heavy drinkers in the 
past (and these remain a high-risk group, especially if they have given up due to alcohol-related 
health problems). Several recent studies show that results showing avoided coronary heart 
disease risk may be based on systematic errors in the way abstainers were defined in the 
underlying studies. For example, Fillmore et al (2006)42 reanalysed data from previous studies 
and concluded that if ex-drinkers had been excluded from the abstainer group, then no 
protective effects of moderate consumption would have been observed. 
 
2.3.2 METHODS USED TO ESTIMATE RISK FUNCTIONS FOR HARMS 
 
The impact of a change in consumption on harm was examined using four categories of risk 
functions: 
1. Relative risk functions already available in the published literature 
2. Relative risk functions fitted to risk estimates for broad categories of exposure 
(common for chronic health harms), 
3. Relative risk function derived from AAF for partially attributable harms 
4. Absolute risk functions for wholly attributable harms. 
 
The methods used to obtain the three latter risk functions are described below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Risk functions fitted to risk estimates for broad categories of 
exposure 
 
While it may be possible to use risk estimates from broad categories of exposure assuming 
essentially flat relative risks across each consumption category, this does not allow the 
examination of the effects of relatively small shifts in patterns of consumption. Continuous risk 
functions were therefore fitted when risk estimates were available using polynomial curves. 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 65 
 
One limitation of the approach is that risk estimates are available for only a few exposure 
groups which may under- or overestimate the risk beyond the last data point. This was notably 
the case in health chronic harms. Thus, an upper threshold was applied for conditions where the 
predicted estimates were unlikely to match the anticipated behaviour. Essentially, this results in 
a flat risk after this upper threshold. This assumption was made in the absence of consensus in 
the literature2. 
 
2.3.2.2 Deriving a relative risk function from the AAF 
 
For some types of harms, evidence about AAF but not relative risk functions was available such 
as for crime or acute health harms. Such evidence can be used to derive a relative risk function 
assuming the relationship described in Equation 1, since the AAF is a positive function of the 
prevalence of drinking and the relative risk function (NWPHO, 2008)43.  
 
Two assumptions are necessary to compute a relative function from an AAF: 
· assumptions about the form of the curve (or risk function)  
· assumptions about the threshold below which the relative risk is 1 (i.e. harm is not 
associated with alcohol). 
 
A linear function was selected in our study due to the lack of data in the literature.  
 
Consequences of alcohol consumption tend to be distinguished in terns of those due to average 
drinking levels (chronic harms) and those due to level of intoxication (acute harms), and 
different thresholds were thus used according to the link between harms and drinking pattern: 
a) the risk was assumed to start from 3 units per day for males and 2 units per day for 
females for harms related to chronic drinking (mean consumption). These 
thresholds were derived from government recommendations for moderate drinking, 
i.e. drinking less than 21 units per week for males and 14 units per week for 
females.  
b) The risk was assumed to start at 4 units for men and 3 units for women for harms 
related to peak consumption (measured as units drunk on the heaviest drinking day 
during the past week). These thresholds deliberately do not correspond to the 
intoxication definition (more than 8 and 6 units for men and women respectively), 
because this would imply that the risk for those drinking at the threshold would be 
the same as the risk of abstainers, which contradicts published evidence on acute 
harms2. The use of 4 units for men and 3 units for women (the recommended daily 
limits) appears a sensible choice, since it is also unlikely that the risk starts 
increasing from zero units of alcohol.  
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The resulting relative risk function is therefore a function of consumption and threshold as 
follows: 
 
Equation 2: Relative Risk Linear Function 
( ) 1=nconsumptioRR   if thresholdnconsumptio <  
and 
( ) ( ) 1+-´= thresholdnconsumptionconsumptioRR b   if thresholdnconsumptio ³  
 
An example of a linear function constructed from an AAF is presented in Figure 11. The function 
is composed of two parameters: 
· the threshold  
· the slope. 
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Figure 11. Illustrative linear relative risk function for a partially attributable chronic harm 
(threshold of 4 units) 
 
2.3.2.3 Methods used to estimate the absolute risk function for wholly 
attributable harms 
 
While it was possible to estimate RR functions for most harms, it was impossible to derive such 
a RR function for wholly attributable harms (with an AAF of 100%) due to the absence of a 
reference group. 
 
An alternative approach was thus adopted. Absolute risk functions were calculated based on 
the number of events, the drinking prevalence, and the total population. As for RR functions, 
assumptions were necessary about the curve form and the starting threshold. The same 
assumptions were used for consistency. 
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An example of a linear absolute risk function constructed from the number of deaths is 
presented in Figure 12. The function is composed of three parameters: 
· the threshold 
· the slope 
· the scale (or constant). 
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Figure 12: Illustrative linear relative risk function for a wholly attributable chronic harm 
(threshold of 4 units) 
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2.4 CONSUMPTION TO HARM MODEL OVERVIEW 
 
The consumption to harms model is constructed to assess the impact of a change in 
consumption on three categories of harms: 
· health harms, 
· crime harms and 
· workplace harms 
 
These three components were modelled separately, i.e. that there was an assumption that there 
is no interaction between the health, crime and workplace models.  
 
The consumption to harms model integrates data from different sources and datasets. An 
overview of the main integrated sources for each component of the consumption to harms 
model is provided in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Price paid available for on- / off-trade, high / low prices and beverage type 
2 Consumption available only by beverage type (distribution for on- / off-Trade and high / low price not 
available) 
 
Figure 13:  Schematic on integrating data sources 
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2.5 CONSUMPTION TO HEALTH HARMS MODEL 
 
2.5.1 HEALTH HARMS MODELLED 
 
As mentioned before, since our systematic reviews2 an important study has been published on 
health-related morbidity and mortality associated with alcohol misuse in England, the report 
”Alcohol-attributable Fractions for England”43. This study provides up-to-date analyses of 
hospital admissions, mortality data and AAF for 48 different conditions which evidence suggests 
are caused by alcohol misuse (Appendix 5).  
 
In relation to alcohol, harms were classified into four categories of attribution 
 
1. Wholly attributable (AAF=100%) chronic – meaning that the harm cannot occur in the 
absence of alcohol consumption and risk of occurrence changes with chronic exposure 
to alcohol (e.g. alcoholic liver disease ICD10 code = K70) 
2. Wholly attributable acute – meaning that the harm cannot occur without alcohol as its 
cause and risk of occurrence changes with acute exposure to alcohol including 
intoxication (e.g. accidental poisoning by and exposure to alcohol, ICD10 code = X45) 
3. Partially attributable chronic – meaning that the harm can occur without alcohol but the 
risk of occurrence changes with chronic exposure to alcohol (e.g. malignant neoplasm 
(cancer) of the oesophagus, ICD10 code = C15) 
4. Partially attributable acute – meaning that the harm can occur without alcohol but the 
risk of occurrence changes with acute exposure to alcohol including intoxication (e.g. 
falls, ICD10 code = W00-W19, or assault, ICD10 = X85-Y09) 
 
The same set of conditions was assessed in our analysis, with one exception: heart failure was 
excluded from our analysis due to the very small AAF reported in the NWPHO study. The list of 
conditions is presented in Table 18.  
 
2.5.2 RISK FUNCTIONS 
 
Absolute risks for wholly attributable conditions were calculated according to the method 
described in section 2.3.2.3 for the number of person-specific hospital admission and deaths by 
age and sex group. While wholly attributable chronic conditions were assumed to be a 
consequence of chronic drinking (use of the mean daily consumption to fit the curve), risk for 
wholly acute conditions was derived from the units drunk in the heaviest day the last week.  
 
Relative risk for partly attributable conditions were derived directly from risk estimates and/or 
AAF when appropriate (see methods in section 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2). Similar sources for AAF 
and RR were used as in the NWPHO report43 (Table 18). Risk estimates for chronic conditions 
were primarily extracted from a recent meta-analysis conducted by Corrao et al (2004)41 for 15 
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chronic conditions attributable to alcohol. Risk estimates for breast cancer were extracted from 
a meta-analyses conducted by Hamajima et al (2002)44. Pooled estimates from Gutjahr et al 
(2001)45 and Rehm et al (2004)46 were also examined for other conditions (for example 
epilepsy, spontaneous abortion etc). One important limitation surrounding the use of evidence 
from these studies was the impossibility to derive a relative risk function for each age/sex group. 
Where separate data was not available, risk functions were assumed to be similar between age 
and sex groups. We are aware that such an assumption may under- or overestimate alcohol-
related harm in some age groups, notably in individuals aged less than 18 years old. 
Epidemiological data is usually collected for adults only. While it is likely that the relative risk for 
children is different from adult estimates, in the absence of data we use the estimate from the 
next oldest available age group. 
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Table 18: Health conditions included in our analysis 
 
 Conditions ICD-10 code(s) Type of consumption Sources for AAF 
and/or RR 
     
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome E24.4 Mean daily 
Degeneration of the nervous system G31.2 Mean daily 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 Mean daily 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 Mean daily 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I42.6 Mean daily 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 Mean daily 
Alcoholic liver disease K70 Mean daily 
W
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 c
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Chronic pancreatitis K86.0 Mean daily 
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of 
alcohol 
F10 
Max (heaviest day) 
Ethanol poisoning T51.0 Max (heaviest day) 
Methanol poisoning T51.1 Max (heaviest day) 
Toxic effect of alcohol, unspecified T51.9 Max (heaviest day) 
W
ho
lly
 a
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ab
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e 
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s 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to alcohol X45 Max (heaviest day) 
100% attributable 
to alcohol 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity and pharynx C00-C14 Mean daily 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus C15 Mean daily 
Malignant neoplasm of colon C18 Mean daily 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum C20 Mean daily 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and intrahepatic bile ducts C22 Mean daily 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 Mean daily 
Corrao et al (2004) 
Malignant neoplasm of breast 
C50 
Mean daily Hamajima et al 
(2002) 
Diabetes mellitus (type II) E11 Mean daily Gutjahr et al (2001) 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus G40-G41 Mean daily Rehm et al (2004) 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I15 Mean daily Corrao et al (2004) 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 Mean daily Corrao et al (1999) 
Cardiac arrhythmias I47-I48 Mean daily Gutjahr et al (2001) 
Haemorrhagic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 Mean daily 
Ischaemic stroke I66-I66,I69.3, I69.4 Mean daily 
Oesophageal varices* I85 Mean daily 
Corrao et al (2004) 
Gastro-oesophageal laceration-haemorrhage 
syndrome 
K22.6 
Mean daily English et al (1995) 
Unspecified liver disease K73, K74 Mean daily Corrao et al (2004) 
Cholelithiasis K85, K86.1 Mean daily Gutjahr et al (2001) 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis 
L40 excluding 
L40.5 
Mean daily Corrao et al (2004) 
Psoriasis O03 Mean daily 
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Spontaneous abortion   Mean daily 
Gutjahr et al (2001) 
Road traffic accidents - non pedestrian   Max (heaviest day) 
Pedestrian traffic accidents V90-V94 Max (heaviest day) 
Ridolfo et al (2001) 
Water transport accidents V95-V97 Max (heaviest day) 
Air/space transport accidents W00-W19 Max (heaviest day) 
Single et al (1996) 
Fall injuries W24-W31 Max (heaviest day) Ridolfo et al (2001) 
Work/machine injuries W32-W34 Max (heaviest day) English et al (1995) 
Firearm injuries W65-W74 Max (heaviest day) Single et al (1996) 
Drowning W78 Max (heaviest day) English et al (1995) 
Inhalation of gastric contents X00-X09 Max (heaviest day) 
Fire injuries X31 Max (heaviest day) 
Accidental excessive cold X60-X84 Max (heaviest day) 
Single et al (1996) 
Intentional self-harm X85-Y09 Max (heaviest day) English et al (1995) 
Pa
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Assault E24.4 Max (heaviest day) Single et al (1996) 
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For external causes (acute partially attributable conditions), only AAF were available in the 
literature. AAF were mainly extracted from the published literature in Australia (Ridolfo et al, 
200147; English et al, 199548) and Canada (Single et al, 199649) as described in the NWPHO 
report. A RR function was computed for each age/sex group with an AAF. Again, where 
separate age/sex group AAF were not available, the risk function was assumed to be the same. 
The use of AAF from Australia and Canada and their application to the UK context may 
represent a limitation. While the use of country specific AAF will provide a more accurate picture 
of alcohol burden in England, these sources were recently used to describe AAF in England 
(NWPHO, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, one important limitation is that most of the literature on partially attributable 
disease risk functions and AAF examines both mortality and hospitalisation data together in 
some weighted mix, so that different relative risk functions for mortality and morbidity are not 
available. Where this limitation exists we use the same relative risk functions for both mortality 
and morbidity. Similarly, AAF and/or risk estimated from the literature may not take into 
consideration possible confounding factors such as smoking which may inflate the risk attributed 
to alcohol.  
 
Risk functions and/or estimated slopes are presented in Appendix 6. 
 
2.5.3 MODEL STRUCTURE 
 
To model health harms attributable to alcohol it was necessary to model two separate aspects 
of health: 
· the mortality attributable to alcohol 
· the morbidity attributable to alcohol. 
 
Furthermore, when modelling the link between consumption and harm, one important input is 
the assumption surrounding the ‘time lag’, or the time needed to achieve the full benefit 
(reduction of harms) associated with a reduction of consumption. Such data is necessary for 
chronic conditions. 
 
We reviewed the evidence in the literature on the time lag for full effects. For this, we would 
ideally have liked to find population-based time lags, but such evidence was not available. We 
therefore made the assumption that the time lag between onset of chronic alcohol consumption 
and onset of the disease in an individual could serve as a proxy for lag to full effect. Our review 
showed that the average time lag to full effect varies between 5 and 15 years, depending on the 
condition. Such evidence was reported for neurological disorders50, chronic pancreatitis induced 
by alcohol 51, alcohol cardiomyopathy52,53 alcoholic liver disease54, oesophageal cancer55, 
epilepsy56, heart failure and oral cancer57, although it is acknowledged that the exact onset of 
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harmful consumption is very difficult to establish. The time lag for full effect associated with 
certain types of cancer was reported to be slightly higher, for example the lag between 
consumption and onset of laryngeal and rectal cancer (between 15 and 20 years)58.  
 
A mean lag of 10 years was assumed for all chronic conditions. While such time lag may 
under/over estimate the true mean time lag for some conditions, given the lack of consensus it 
was felt to be a plausible estimate. The time lag for acute conditions was assumed to be zero 
since benefits associated with a reduction of acute harms occur instantaneously. 
 
Our figure was compared to one reported by Nordstrom and Skog (2001)59, the only paper 
identified which specifically mentions population-lags. The authors suggest an overall lag of 4 or 
5 years (for combined chronic and acute conditions). The use of 10 years for chronic conditions 
and zero for acute conditions results in a similar average and appears thus to be a reasonable 
assumption. 
 
One potential limitation is the assumption that the time lag was similar for both morbidity and 
mortality which is unlikely to be true for many conditions. However in the absence of data and 
consensus, such assumption had to be made. 
 
The time lag effect was considered in our model assuming a linear progression. This is 
supported by Nordstrom and Skog, who fitted a geometric function with lambda = 0.8 to 
estimate the effect of the lag, which is very close to a linear effect. 
 
Thus, for a 10 year time lag, benefits associated with a reduction in consumption at year 1 will 
be associated with 1/10th of the expected full benefits. 1/10th of full benefits will be achieved 
each year up to Year 10. An illustration is shown in Figure 14: 
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Figure 14: Illustrative example for the time lag effect for chronic conditions 
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2.5.4 MORTALITY MODELLING 
 
A simplified version of the model structure for mortality is presented below in Figure 15.  
 
The model is developed to represent the population of England in a life table, with data for the 
baseline year (2006) obtained from ONS population statistics60. Separate life tables have been 
implemented for males and females. Note that in the life table approach we are not following 
individuals and their disease progression but rather examining a current cohort within the life 
table for each year of the model.  
 
The lifetable is implemented as a linked set of simple Markov models with individuals of age a 
transitioning between two states – alive and dead –  at model time step t. Those of age a still 
alive after the transition then form the initial population for age a+1 at time t+1 and the 
sequence repeats. 
 
The transition probabilities from the alive to dead state are broken down by condition and are 
individually modified via potential impact fractions over time t, where the PIF essentially varies 
with consumption (mean for chronic conditions and maximum daily for acute conditions) over 
time: 
i
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å
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 where PIFt is the potential impact fraction relating to consumption at time t, i = GHS 
sample number, N = number of samples in sub-group, ri,t is the risk relating to the consumption 
of GHS sample i at time t, ri,0 is the risk at baseline, and wi is the weight of sample i. 
 
Note that the PIF can be decomposed to enable different population groups at baseline – for 
example, moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers – to be followed separately over the course 
of the model. 
 
Importantly, the PIF gives the full effect if the change in consumption were achieved 
immediately. For acute harms, the full effect obtained from the PIF is assumed to occur in year 
one. For chronic conditions, the full effect is assumed to occur after 10 years (see section 2.5.3 
for more details) assuming a linear progression over this period. 
 
The model computes mortality results for two separate scenarios (a baseline – implemented as 
‘no change to consumption’ in the analysis herein – and an intervention). The effect of the 
intervention (pricing or promotion policy) is then calculated as the difference between the 
lifetables of two scenarios: enabling the change in the total expected deaths attributable to 
alcohol due to the policy to be estimated. 
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Outcomes from the mortality modelling are expressed in terms of life years saved. Morbidity 
valuation is the purpose of a second model described below (section 2.5.5). 
 
 
 
 
Consumption t=0 Consumption t=t1
PIF estimate t=t1
Modified mortality 
rate t=t1
Relative risk 
function
Baseline mortality 
rate t=0
Alive t=t1
Life table
Dead t=t1
Transition 
probability
 
 
Figure 15: Simplified mortality model structure 
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2.5.5 MORBIDITY MODELLING: CONSEQUENCES AND HEALTH SERVICE 
COSTS 
 
2.5.5.1 Person-Specific Hospitalisation 
 
The estimates of morbidity consequences included within the model are based on the recent 
NorthWest Public Health Observatories (NWPHO) report43 which provides information on 
‘person specific hospitalisations’ for each of the 47 conditions studied. The NWPHO analysis 
utilises routine NHS data on hospital admissions, the Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES)61 
dataset, to examine the number of admissions in alcohol related diseases. Because data is 
individualised and different admissions for the same person can be examined, it is possible to 
analyse how many individual persons have been admitted.  Thus, for example, if the same 
person was admitted on three separate occasions for oesophageal cancer during the year, then 
this would be counted as just one person-specific hospitalisation. Table 16 in the NWPHO 
report sets out the data for each condition. When an individual is admitted on two or more 
different occasions for two different reasons (e.g. once for oesophageal cancer and once for a 
fall) then the person-specific admission needs to be attributed to one of these reasons 
(otherwise there will be double counting). The NWPHO set out their rules for judging which is 
the most important of the admissions (primarily by examining which is the condition with the 
higher AAF) in the footnote on page 8 of their report43. NWPHO then use the same methods as 
for mortality to examine relative risks and attributable fractions for the diseases. 
 
Essentially in our modelling we assume that the person-specific hospitalisation rates for each 
age/sex group can be considered as a proxy for the prevalence of the disease. Clearly, this 
assumption has some major limitations, since persons with an alcohol-attributable disease who 
are not hospitalised during the year are not included in the dataset†. 
 
Data from the NWPHO report were used as the baseline.  
 
2.5.5.2 Morbidity model structure 
 
A simplified schematic of the morbidity model is shown in Figure 16. As for the mortality model 
we are not modelling the individuals’ disease history, but the expected disease prevalence for 
population cohorts. Thus, we only need to model how many of the population in that age/sex 
group are expected to suffer from the specific disease each year in the separate baseline and 
policy scenarios. If an incidence based approach were used instead, then much more detailed 
modelling of survival time, cure rates, death rates and possibly disease progression for each 
disease for each age/sex group would be needed. 
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The morbidity model works by partitioning the alive population at time t, rather than using a 
transition approach between states as previously described for the mortality model. Alive 
individuals are partitioned between all 47 alcohol-related conditions (and a 48th condition 
representing overall population health, not attributable to alcohol) analysed based on morbidity 
rates calculated from the NWPHO. 
 
As in the mortality model, the PIF is calculated based on the consumption distribution at time 0 
and t and risk functions. The PIF is then used to modify the partition rate (i.e. the distribution of 
the 47 conditions for alive individuals) to produce person-specific sickness volumes. These 
volumes then form the basis for estimating both health service costs and health related quality 
of life. 
 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) was examined using the difference in health-related quality 
of life (utility) in individuals with alcohol health harms and the quality of life measured in the 
general population (or “normal health”). Utility scores usually range between 1 (perfect health) 
and 0 (a state equivalent to death), though it is possible for some extreme conditions to be 
valued as worse than death. The utility scores are an expression of societal preference for 
health states with several different methods available to estimate them.  
 
A time lag was then applied for chronic sickness as described in section 2.5.3. Note that 
because we have adopted a life-table approach, the method to estimate QALY change for 
morbidity also encompasses the mortality valuation. 
 
Annual healthcare costs to the NHS associated with alcohol related harms are then estimated 
based on the cost per hospital admission derived from recent work by the Department of Health. 
Since the model works on person-specific hospital admissions (PSHA), a multiplier was used to 
derive the number of actual hospital admissions (more detail about the calculation of the 
multiplier is available in section 2.5.5.3). More details about the estimation of health care cost to 
the NHS are available in section 2.5.5.3 below. 
 
Health outcomes (QALYs) and costs were discounted at 1.5% and 3.5% annually respectively 
based on standard Department of Health practice. For the purpose of the cost-benefit analysis, 
it was necessary to assign a financial value for discounted QALYs. Analyses were conducted 
assuming a financial value of £50,000, consistent with recent Department of Health impact 
assessments. 
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Figure 16: simplified structure of morbidity model 
 
 
2.5.5.3 Mapping between PSHA and Hospital-Admission 
 
While morbidity was assessed mainly using the PSHA definition, it was necessary to translate 
this figure onto a total number of hospital admissions (THA) to estimate costs. 
 
A multiplier was thus calculated to map PSHA and THA for each condition. The multiplier was 
calculated from the number of THA related to alcohol (DH Impact Assessment, personal 
communication, 2008) in 2006 and the number of PSHA attributable to alcohol (NWPHO report) 
for the same year. It was possible to calculate a multiplier only for conditions with a positive 
AAF. The average multiplier was applied for conditions with a negative AAF.  
 
Multipliers used are presented in Appendix 7. 
 
2.5.5.4 Health Care Cost to the NHS 
 
Costs to the NHS were derived from recent work by the Department of Health on NHS costs of 
alcohol attributable diseases10 to approach the recent estimated cost of £2.7 billion of alcohol 
misuse. This cost was broken down by hospital inpatient and day visits, hospital outpatient 
visits, accident and emergency visits, ambulance services, NHS GP consultations, practice 
nurse consultations, dependency prescribed drugs, specialist treatment services and other 
health care costs. 
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The original analysis10, for inpatient costs did not include all the conditions analysed in the 
NWPHO report due to the indicator chosen (Public Service Agreement, NHS Performance 
Framework and Local Government Performance Framework). Conditions with a small AAF were 
also excluded.  
 
Inpatients costs were thus updated for missing conditions using the average tariff from the NHS 
reference cost (2006) while the number of alcohol hospital admissions was derived from the 
HES (2008)61 and the NWPHO (2008)43 for AAF. Inpatient costs and admissions for other 
conditions were directly extracted from the original DH analysis (personal communication, 
2008)10. The cost per hospital admission for each condition is reported in Appendix 7. 
 
Since the DH report did not report the breakdown per condition for other costs to the NHS (i.e. 
outpatient, A&E, ambulance, GP costs), an alternative method was used to estimate the 
breakdown of events (consultation) per condition. After discussion with clinical colleagues, costs 
were derived using the estimated total number of consultations due to alcohol in England10 and 
the likelihood of consultation/event per condition (based on expert judgement). The mean 
number of consultations (for example, outpatient, GP, nurse visits) was estimated for each 
condition and calibrated using clinical colleagues opinion so that the total number of 
consultations approach the recent DH estimates (Table 19). 
 
Table 19: Alcohol related cost in England – 2006 (reproduction) 
 
 Cost Estimate £ (in million) Number of consultation 
attributable to alcohol 
Unit costs £ 
Inpatient visits 1,190.3 811,444 HRG tariffs 
Outpatient visits 272.4 3,200,000 85 
Accident and Emergency 645.7 6,622,796 97.5 
Ambulance services 372.4 1,242,500 299.7 
NHS GP consultations 102.1 2,870,000 35.55 
Practice consultations 9.5 1.060.000 9 
Dependency prescribed drugs 2.1   
Specialist treatment services 55.3   
Other health care costs 54.4   
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2.5.5.5 Health-Related Quality of Life 
 
A QALY approach has been used to value health outcomes in this analysis. It was necessary to 
estimate the health related quality of life or ‘utility’ score for each of the health harm conditions. 
 
Utilities for all 47 conditions included in our model were derived from one single source, the 
Health Outcomes Data Repository62 (HODaR) to avoid potential bias and variability between 
studies (extracted from eHODaR https://www.crc-limited.co.uk). The HODaR data measures 
utilities using the EQ-5D, a widely used generic (disease non-specific) quality of life instrument 
as recommended by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) for health 
economic evaluation.  Data was collected by the Cardiff & Vale NHS Hospital Trust serving a 
local population of 424,000, and providing tertiary care for the whole of Wales.  Patients 
discharged from hospital are requested to complete an EQ-5D questionnaire 6 weeks after their 
discharge via postal questionnaire.  Data is collected on: demography, Health utility (EQ5D 
index), and Diagnoses (ICD-10) as well as a large range of other clinical, administrative and 
economic related information. 
 
A mean utility value was thus extracted for each condition based on diagnoses (or ICD-10 
codes). While utilities can be extracted per age and sex group, only the mean utility was 
extracted because direct analysis at a condition / age level involves very small sample sizes. 
The mean utilities for the condition were adjusted for age using the % increment/decrement 
observed in utilities observed in the general population (Kind and Dolan, 200563).  Utilities in 
individuals aged below 18 years were assumed to be similar to the utility in individuals aged 18 
– 24 years old. The utility was also assumed to be similar for men and women.  
 
For conditions for which no utility data was available, utilities were assumed to be similar to 
close conditions. Thus, utilities for mental and behavioural and alcohol induced Cushing 
syndrome were assumed to be similar to alcoholic polyneuropathy. Utilities for alcoholic 
myopathy were assumed to be similar to utilities for alcoholic cardiomyopathy. Similarly, the 
utility for methanol poisoning was assumed to be similar to Ethanol poisoning. Utilities for 
air/space and water transport accidents were assumed to be similar to road traffic accidents. 
Finally, utilities for firearm injuries, drowning, fire injuries and accidental excessive cold was 
assumed to be similar to pedestrian traffic accident. 
 
The resulting utilities for each of the 47 conditions by age group are shown in Appendix 8. 
 
There are some limitations in our use of these analyses. In particular, for acute conditions such 
as admission for road traffic accident, or fall or intentional self harm, there is a question as to 
whether the measure of utility at 6 weeks following discharge is representative of the full 
consequence of the disease.  For acute conditions there is clearly the likelihood that utility 
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scores might be worse than the 6 week recorded measure immediately around the time of the 
incident. Equally, it is plausible that through the recovery process, patients’ utility score might be 
better 6 or 9 months post incident than they were at just 6 weeks.  In the absence of data at 
other time points we assume that the 6 week utility score is representative of the score for a full 
year in our model.  This may under- or over-estimate QALY gain of avoided health harms for 
acute conditions. 
 
Utilities in the general population for “normal health” were extracted from Kind and Dolan (2005) 
for each age group63. This study showed that the average health related utility score reduces 
fairly steadily with age because on average more health related problems emerge for people at 
older ages. 
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2.6 CONSUMPTION TO CRIME HARMS MODEL 
 
2.6.1 PREVIOUS CABINET OFFICE AND HOME OFFICE ANALYSES 
 
The modelling of crime-related harms adapts original work by the Cabinet Office3 and makes 
use of recent Home Office updated analysis of the costs of alcohol related crime (published in 
Appendix 2 of the July 2008 “Consultation on the future of alcohol” document64). 
 
The Home Office analysis of alcohol related crimes64 examines 20 defined crimes, the 
proportion attributable to alcohol and an estimate of the alcohol attributable costs. More details 
about the methodology are available elsewhere9. Findings from this study are presented in 
Appendix 9. Less serious wounding, criminal damage, sexual offences and causing death by 
dangerous driving were the major contributors to the overall costs of crime attributable to 
alcohol in England. 
 
It should be noted that one important parameter in the Home Office analysis is the ‘multiplier’ for 
“less serious wounding”, which uplifts recorded crime statistics to estimated total offences to 
account for under-reporting. Whilst good estimates are available on the difference between 
recorded and unrecorded crime for serious wounding and assault without injury, this is not the 
case for less serious wounding. The Home Office study suggests that the choice of multiplier 
used for “less serious wounding” has important implications for the overall cost of crime 
attributable to alcohol. Assuming a multiplier of 7.7 (as for “assault without injury) gives a total 
cost of crime of about £7.9billion. This figure is reduced to £1.8billion when the multiplier for 
“more serious wounding” (1.8) is applied. 
 
The total number of offences reported in the Home Office report (including multipliers) was used 
as a basis for our model analysis. Sensitivity analyses are carried out for the choice of multiplier 
for “less serious wounding”. 
 
2.6.2 NUMBER OF OFFENCES BY AGE AND SEX GROUP 
 
While the total number of offences in England in 2006 was extracted from the Home Office 
analysis, no information was given about how offences were distributed according to age and 
sex groups. It was necessary to collect such data to allow the model to estimate the impact of a 
policy on specific age and sex group. 
 
Information about the age and sex distribution for reported crime is available from the British 
Crime Survey (BCS, 2005)65. However, the age split was limited to individuals aged under 21 
years old and over 21 years old. Using such a coarse differentiation would limit our ability to 
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consider the effects of consumption changes in subpopulations, for example young adult males, 
who tend to have very high binge drinking and crime rates. 
 
An alternative approach was thus examined based on the distribution in offenders found guilty 
or cautioned in 2003 (ONS, 2005). Distributions were available for following age groups, split by 
gender: 10-15, 16-24, 25-34, 35+ for 7 offence categories. Assumptions were made about the 
mapping between offence categories and crime when appropriate (Appendix 9). While this study 
provides an age/sex distribution for crimes, it was necessary to adjust figures according to the 
modelled age distribution. The distribution in individuals aged 16 to 24 years old was collapsed 
for individuals aged 16 to 17 years old and 18 to 24 years old assuming an equal probability of 
crime at each age of the age group. Such assumption is not ideal since younger individuals may 
be more likely to commit crime; however, in the absence of data, we judged that this assumption 
was the most reasonable. 
 
For individuals aged 35 years old and over, it is unlikely that the probability of committing a 
crime is similar between a person aged 35 years and 75 years. We felt that a decrease of crime 
with increasing age was the most appropriate assumption. Based on this, the distribution for 35 
years old and over was collapsed assuming that 50%, 27.5%, 15% and 7.5% of crimes 
committed in this age group were committed by 35 – 44, 45 – 54, 55- 64 and 64 – 75 years olds, 
respectively. While this assumption may also present a limitation, no more appropriate data was 
identified. Finally, no alcohol-related crimes were assumed to be committed in individuals aged 
less than 10 years old or more than 75 years old.  
 
The approach of using CJS statistics is not ideal and may over- or under-estimate the 
distribution for particular age/sex groups. For example, a bias could have been introduced since 
young offenders may be more/less likely to be found guilty or cautioned than older offenders. 
Furthermore, ideally the age and sex distribution should have been extracted directly from 
reported crimes data. However, access to such data was not available given the timescales of 
this report. 
 
2.6.3 AAF FOR CRIME AND RISK FUNCTIONS 
 
Prevalence-based risk modelling is not as well developed for crime as for chronic health 
conditions. The situation is more similar to acute health outcomes where attribution is based on 
direct measurement rather than an epidemiological fraction. Therefore risk functions are not 
generally available in the literature (the exception perhaps being road traffic accidents where 
there is evidence linking blood alcohol concentration prevalence to increased relative risk). 
 
The Cabinet Office’s alcohol-attributable fractions for crime are estimated, from a sample of 
arrestees, as the ratio of arrestees with a positive urine test for alcohol to the total number of 
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arrestees. This would tend to overestimate the AAF defined in classic epidemiological terms 
since it will contain a proportion of arrestees who would have committed the offence even 
without consuming alcohol. This is true of all AAF based purely on identified consumption, be 
this due to self-reporting, judgment by a third party (e.g. police or accident and emergency 
services) or measurement by a test. 
 
However it is also possible to estimate an AAF based on attribution of consumption to the 
outcome (usually self-reported). In surveys of criminality this is typically done by asking the 
respondent if he or she committed the act because of his or her alcohol consumption. If 
attributable fractions relating to self-reported attribution are available, then it is possible to 
reconstruct a relative risk and thus to model changes in these outcomes due to changes in 
consumption (either side of a defined threshold for excess risk). 
 
The Offending Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS) for 200565 includes two questions on offending 
related to alcohol. The first question (Q1) asks whether the offender was drunk at the time of the 
offence (”had you taken drugs or drunk alcohol when you did it?”). The second question (Q2) 
asks whether, in the offender’s view, they had undertaken the offence because they were drunk 
(”still thinking about when this happened, were any of these things reasons you did it?” followed 
by a multiple-choice list of responses including alcohol use). The Home Office update to the 
Cabinet Office costings for alcohol-related crime used results from Q19.  Note that the original 
Cabinet Office study used evidence from the NEW-ADAM arrestee survey, based on alcohol 
test findings in individuals’ urine. Those arrestees testing positive were considered to have 
committed alcohol related crimes. Both approaches are consistent in that it is any alcohol 
consumption prior to the offence that defines the attribution to alcohol, rather than whether 
offenders attribute their crimes to the use of alcohol. 
 
In this report, we adopt a more conservative approach and estimate the AAF from Q2. AAF from 
Q1 are generally higher than those estimated from Q2. For illustration, the AAF for wounding for 
males aged 16 to 25 using Q2 is 11%, compared to 26% when Q1 is used. For comparison, the 
original Cabinet Office study found an AAF of 37%, based on the presence of alcohol in 
arrestees’ urine samples ‡. 
 
While the use of Q2 may underestimate the proportion of crime attributable to alcohol, we felt 
that the question was probably more appropriate than Q1, and would more  accurately reflect 
the attribution due to alcohol. 
 
It was possible to derive AAF from the OCJS 2005 for males and females aged under 16 years 
old and 16 to 25 years old separately. Estimated AAF are reported in Table 14. 
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Table 20: Attributable fractions used as baseline in our modelling (OCJS 2005) 
 
  Reason for committed crime 
 
 
Crime N Under the 
influence of 
alcohol only 
Under the 
influence of 
alcohol and 
other drugs 
Other 
reason 
No reason 
given 
AAF 
Males Under 16 
Violent disorder 271 0.0% 0.0% 92.8% 7.2% 0.0% 
Wounding 118 0.0% 0.0% 93.1% 6.9% 0.0% 
Assault without injury 153 0.0% 0.0% 92.5% 7.5% 0.0% 
Vehicle related thefts 32 0.0% 0.0% 96.3% 3.7% 0.0% 
Burglary, robbery, other theft 214 0.0% 3.2% 87.1% 9.7% 3.2% 
Criminal damage 69 1.8% 0.4% 91.4% 6.4% 2.2% 
 
Females Under 16 
Violent disorder 191 0.4% 1.5% 94.1% 4.0% 1.9% 
Wounding 91 0.0% 2.2% 91.0% 6.8% 2.2% 
Assault without injury 100 0.8% 0.8% 97.0% 1.4% 1.6% 
Vehicle related thefts 16 0.0% 59.9% 40.1% 0.0% 59.9% 
Burglary, robbery, other theft 133 0.3% 3.4% 93.1% 3.2% 3.7% 
Criminal damage 32 4.1% 16.2% 78.0% 1.6% 20.3% 
 
Males 16-25 
 
Violent disorder 267 5.5% 9.0% 78.5% 6.9% 14.5% 
Wounding 132 2.3% 9.0% 78.0% 10.7% 11.3% 
Assault without injury 135 8.9% 9.1% 79.1% 2.9% 18.0% 
Vehicle related thefts 32 5.3% 0.0% 80.3% 14.4% 5.3% 
Burglary, robbery, other theft 183 1.4% 0.0% 84.0% 14.6% 1.4% 
Criminal damage 70 24.0% 7.1% 57.2% 11.8% 31.1% 
 
Females 16-25 
 
Violent disorder 163 1.1% 20.1% 64.7% 14.1% 21.2% 
Wounding 88 0.0% 28.3% 61.0% 10.7% 28.3% 
Assault without injury 75 2.2% 12.5% 68.1% 17.3% 14.7% 
Vehicle related thefts 10 51.4% 0.0% 32.0% 16.6% 51.4% 
Burglary, robbery, other theft 134 0.9% 0.4% 91.0% 7.7% 1.3% 
Criminal damage 20 4.0% 30.1% 61.1% 4.9% 34.1% 
 
AAF for each crime category from the OCJS (2005) was then mapped the closest offence 
(Appendix 11).  
 
As for health acute harms, risk functions were computed from the AAF and the exposure using 
the method described in section 2.3.2.2. Relative risk functions were calculated for males and 
females for both age groups separately. Crime was assumed to be a consequence of acute (or 
peak) drinking. It was anticipated that individuals are more likely to commit crimes as their level 
of peak drinking increases. 
 
In the absence of data about the AAF for other age/sex groups, the same relative risk function 
was used for individuals aged over 25 years old based on the risk function calculated for 16 to 
25 years olds. This approach is not ideal since it is likely that AAF for older individuals are 
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different to AAF for younger individuals. Whilst this is a limitation, it is not likely to greatly impact 
on the modelling results as individuals over 25 years contribute to less than 30% of all crimes.   
 
Relative risk functions for crimes are presented Figure 17, Figure 18, Figure 19 and Figure 20. 
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Figure 17: Relative risk functions in males aged less than 16 years of age 
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Figure 18: Relative risk functions in males aged 16 years to 25 years of age 
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Figure 19: Relative risk functions in females aged less than 16 years of age 
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Figure 20: Relative risk functions in females aged 16 years to 25 years of age 
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2.6.4 CRIME MODEL STRUCTURE 
 
As for the health model, the main mechanism is the PIF, which is calculated based on the 
consumption distribution at time 0 and time t and an estimated risk functions. The PIF is then 
applied directly to the baseline number of offences to give a new volume of crime for time t. The 
model uses the consumption distribution for the intake in the heaviest drinking day in the past 
week (peak consumption) since crime was assumed to be a consequence of acute drinking 
rather than chronic drinking. 
 
Outcomes are presented in terms of number of offences and associated cost of crime and 
QALY impact to the victim. More details about unit costs of each type of crime are presented 
below in section 2.6.5. 
 
Outcomes from both scenarios (“do nothing” and “policy implementation”) are then compared to 
estimate the incremental effect of the implementation of the policy. 
 
Consumption t=0 Consumption t=t1
PIF estimate t=t1
Modified crime 
volume t=t1
Relative risk 
function
Baseline crime 
volume t=0
QALY impact QALY estimate t=t1
Cost estimate t=t1 Unit costs
 
Figure 21: Model structure for the crime component of the model 
 
2.6.5 VALUING THE IMPACT OF EACH TYPE OF CRIME (UNIT COSTS) 
 
Unit costs of crime were extracted from Brand and Price (2000)66 and Dubourg et al (2005)67 as 
in the recent Home Office analysis9. Unit costs take into consideration several dimensions such 
as cost in anticipation of crime and cost to the justice system.  
 
Costs also include the physical and emotional impact on direct victims.  These are based on 
work by Dolan et al (2005)68 to obtain estimates of the quality of life impact of different crimes 
(see Table 2.1 in Dubourg 200567).  Note that the valuation of a QALY loss due to crime used in 
this work follows discussion with Home Office experts and is £81,000 per QALY (based on 
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Carthy et al. 199969).  Costs also cover lost economic output of victims and health services 
costs.   
 
One potential limitation in using unit cost for crimes reported from these studies is the possibility 
of double counting with other components of our model. Particularly, regarding QALYs 
associated with the victims, double counting may occur if the crime victims had also drunk 
alcohol and suffered from consequences of their alcohol intake (i.e. if they were counted as 
alcohol-related death and/or hospital admission). There is no data available to quantify these 
effects and we anticipate double counting in this regard to be relatively small. Finally, lost 
economic outputs from these studies included two dimensions: absenteeism and lost outputs 
due to premature deaths. While no double-counting was anticipated for absenteeism, the 
inclusion of the lost output due to premature deaths may overlap with the valuation of the QALY. 
To avoid such double counting, cost associated with lost output due to premature deaths for 
homicide was excluded from unit costs. While it was not possible to determine the proportion 
attributable to premature deaths for other crimes, it was anticipated that these proportion would 
be very low. 
 
Unit costs used are summarised in Appendix 12 and crimes committed in future years have their 
value discounted at an annual rate of 3.5%. 
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2.7 CONSUMPTION TO “HARMS IN THE WORKPLACE”  
  
The Cabinet Office report of 20033 examined 3 separate effects of alcohol on employment 
related issues.  These costs were revised for inflation in the recent update by the DH/Home 
Office9.  The three components were:  
· Absence from work caused by alcohol (£2.04 billions) 
· Unemployment caused by alcohol (£2.46 billions) 
· Lost outputs due to early death caused by alcohol (£2.84 billions). 
 
In our analysis, loss of outputs due to premature mortality was excluded to avoid double 
counting the social value of life years lost already estimated in the health and crime harms 
model. 
 
The consumption to “harms in the workplace” is thus composed of two components: 
unemployment and absenteeism.  
 
The absenteeism component is linked to the unemployment component in a dynamic approach 
such that a change in consumption is associated with a change in the working population and 
thus the absenteeism in this population. 
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2.7.1 UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
2.7.1.1 Link between alcohol and unemployment 
 
 
Few studies have reported on the association between excessive drinking and unemployment.  
 
MacDonald and Shields (2004)5 showed that “problem drinking”, measured by a combination of 
psychological and physical symptoms or in terms of quantity and frequency of alcohol 
consumption, was negatively associated with the probability of being in work. This study 
analysed data from the Health Survey for England (1997 – 1998) and focused on males aged 
22 to 64 years old.  This study showed that being a problem drinker lead to a reduction in the 
probability of working§ of between 7% and 31%. This evidence from was used by the Cabinet 
Office (2003) to estimate the impact of alcohol misuse on unemployment, assuming a reduction 
of the probability of working by 6.9% for men. 
 
The recent Home Office estimation of alcohol misuse on unemployment updated figures from 
the Cabinet Office (2003) assuming the same reduction in probability of working for problem 
drinkers. MacDonald and Shields (2004) did not report figures for females. The same figure was 
thus used in the Cabinet Office estimate for both males and females.  
 
2.7.1.2 Reduced probability of working and risk functions 
 
Our analysis used the same assumption as in the Cabinet Office estimate, i.e. a reduced 
probability of working for “problem drinkers” of 6.9%, which was the most conservative estimate 
in the MacDonald and Shields (2004) paper and was based on a definition of problem drinking 
as daily drinking. The paper also reports results for a problem drinker variable based on mean 
weekly intake, with a higher effect. Since our model is based on the quantity of alcohol 
consumed rather than a frequency measure, the probability based on such variable may have 
been a better approximation. We chose to use 6.9% for consistency with the recent impact 
assessment of alcohol9 for our base case. The reduced probability of working based on the 
quantity definition was explored in sensitivity analysis.  
 
As for health and crime harms, it was necessary to develop risk functions to examine the impact 
of a small shift in consumption. While no AAF was available in the literature, it was possible to 
calculate the excessive risk of not working based on the mean participation rate6, the proportion 
of problem drinkers** and the reduced probability of not working if someone is a “problem 
drinker”5.  
 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 92 
A risk function was then estimated using a similar method as described in section 2.3.2. As 
defined by MacDonald and Shields (2004)5, the probability of working was assumed to be driven 
by chronic rather than acute drinking. Furthermore, the risk was assumed to start after a 
threshold of 7.1 units per day for males and 5.0 units per day for females (equivalent to 50 and 
35 units per week respectively) based on the definition of “harmful drinker” in England. 
 
Risk functions are presented in Figure 22 and Figure 23 for males and females respectively. 
The coefficients (or slope) are presented in Appendix 13.  
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Figure 22: Risk functions for unemployment in males 
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Figure 23: Risk functions for unemployment in females 
 
25 – 34 years 
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2.7.1.3 Structure of the model for unemployment 
 
The structure of the model is presented in Figure 26. 
 
As for health and crimes, two scenarios were compared: 
- “do nothing” scenario 
- implementation of a policy. 
 
For each scenario, the PIF is calculated based on the consumption distribution at time 0 and 
time t. The PIF was then applied to the “not working rate” and the eligible population to work 
(population of England aged 16 years to 64 years old) to calculate the number of unemployed 
individuals. Note that no time delay was assumed between changes in alcohol consumption and 
the risk of not working. The unemployment is then valued for both scenarios using the annual 
gross income for England, varied by age group and gender.  
 
Finally, the difference between the two scenarios is computed to estimate the effect of the policy 
compared to the baseline. 
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2.7.2 ABSENTEEISM 
 
2.7.2.1 Association between alcohol and absence from work 
 
The original Cabinet Office (2003) work used the Whitehall 2 study4 of civil servant health and 
employment to estimate the effects of alcohol on absenteeism (Table 21). The work assumes a 
relative risk of absenteeism of 1.20 and 1.19 if alcohol consumption is within certain limits (see 
Table 28 of Contract Research Report 422 / 2002).  This is based on the relative risk of absence 
from work “due to injury”.   
 
Table 21:  Reproduction of Table 28 from research report 422/2002 – rate ratios for spells 
of absence attributable to injury and for all spells by units of alcohol consumption in the 
last 7 days 
 
 Rate ratios for men and women combined 
Units per Week 
Male / Female 
Spells due to injury Spells for all reasons 
0 1.04 1.06 
1-10     /    1-7 1.00 1.00 
11-21   /    8-14 1.20 0.98 
22-35/    15+ 1.19 0.93 
 
There is an endogeneity problem with alcohol and absence from work, in that on the one hand 
people who drink too heavily can become absent from work (causal) but on the other hand 
people who are absent from work due to significant illness may be less likely to drink alcohol.  
Table 21 shows that this can be the case since the relative risks of “all absences” as opposed to 
“absence due to injury” actually slope in the opposite direction, i.e. people who drink more have 
lower absence rates.  This is probably due to people with significant illnesses and higher 
absence rates drinking less alcohol. 
 
The Cabinet Office (2003) analysis assumed that the relative risks seen for absence “due to 
injury” can apply to all alcohol related absence. 
In searching the literature, we found one important non-UK study that enables some further 
analysis and assessment of the appropriateness of this assumption70. This article by Roche et al 
(2008)70 examines absenteeism due to alcohol in Australia. It provides useful further evidence 
because it explicitly asks respondents whether their absence was caused by alcohol.  
Respondents suggest†† that 3.5% of people took absence from work for one day or more in the 
previous three months as a consequence of their alcohol consumption compared with 39.7% 
due to illness/injury not due to alcohol. 
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In contrast to the Whitehall 2 study, the Roche et al (2008)70 study also shows a positive slope 
for the relation between all illness / injury absenteeism and alcohol consumption. In particular, 
the risks of absence were 7.34 for people drinking at “high risk levels” (males >43, females >29 
units per week) and 4.26 for people drinking at “risky” levels (males >29, females >15 units per 
week). 
 
Table 22 : Proportion absent from work - reproduction of Table 5 page 745 Roche et al 
(2008)70  
 
 Male workers  Female workers 
Age (years) Estimated work-
force (millions) 
(95% CI) 
Proportion absent 
for ≥ 1 day (95% 
CI) 
 Estimated work-force 
(millions) (95% CI) 
Proportion absent for 
≥ 1 day (95% CI) 
Alcohol related absenteeism 
14 – 19 0.182 
(0.149 – 0.214) 
7.2% 
(3.9 – 12.9%) 
 0.127 
(0.101 – 0.153) 
11.0% 
(6.7 – 17.7%) 
20 – 29 0.891 
(0.820 – 0.961) 
9.2% 
(7.2 – 11.7%) 
 0.686 
(0.636 – 0.737) 
5.3% 
(4.1 – 6.9%) 
30 – 39 1.141 
(1.071 – 1.2111) 
4.2% 
(3.3 – 5.4%) 
 0.801 
(0.748 – 0.855) 
2.0% 
(1.4 – 2.9%) 
40 – 49 1.146 
(1.070 – 1.222) 
2.6% 
(1.6 – 4.0%) 
 0.859 
(0.799 – 0.918) 
1.4% 
(0.8 – 2.4%) 
50 – 59 0.820 
(0.761 – 0.879) 
1.3% 
(0.7 – 2.3%) 
 0.537 
(0.498 – 0.577) 
0.1% 
(0.0 – 0.3%) 
60 + 0.181 
(0.156 – 0.207) 
0.3% 
(0.0 – 2.4%) 
 0.124 
(0.102 – 0.146) 
0.0% 
Total 4.361 
(4.196 – 4.526) 
4.2% 
(3.6 – 5.0%) 
 3.134 
(3.009 – 3.260) 
2.5% 
(2.1 – 3.1%) 
Illness/injury absenteeism 
14 – 19 0.175 
(0.143 – 0.208) 
59.3% 
(50.5 – 67.7%) 
 0.123 
(0.098 – 0.149) 
69.7% 
(61.7 – 76.6%) 
20 – 29 0.865 
(0.795 – 0.934) 
47.4% 
(43.5 – 51.3%) 
 0.664 
(0.614 – 0.713) 
55.2% 
(51.9 – 58.5%) 
30 – 39 1.065 
(0.998 – 1.132) 
40.7% 
(37.9 – 43.6%) 
 0.735 
(0.685 – 0.786) 
44.9% 
(42.1 – 47.7%) 
40 – 49 1.057 
(0.983 – 1.131) 
33.4% 
(30.4 – 36.4%) 
 0.784 
(0.728 – 0.839) 
35.6% 
(32.5 – 38.7%) 
50 – 59 0.747 
(0.690 – 0.803) 
27.0 
(23.7 – 30.5%) 
 0.473 
(0.435 – 0.511) 
30.3% 
(26.7 – 34.1%) 
60 + 0.156 
(0.133 – 0.179) 
18.0 
(13.4 – 23.8%) 
 0.112 
(0.091 – 0.132) 
23.8% 
(17.1 – 32.2%) 
Total 4.065 
(3.905 – 4.224) 
37.6% 
(36.0 – 39.3%) 
 2.890 
(2.771 – 3.010) 
42.6% 
(41.0 – 44.2%) 
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2.7.2.2 Risk function and AAF 
 
While findings from the Whitehall II study were England-specific, findings from Roche et al 
(2008) were used for our baseline due to the absence of a split by age and sex group in the 
Whitehall II study. Furthermore, the Whitehall study reported the relative risk for absenteeism 
due to injury which may not accurately reflect the relative risk of absenteeism due to alcohol. 
 
Based on Roche et al’s (2008) findings, it was possible to estimate an AAF for absenteeism by 
age and sex group. While Roche et al (2008) reported the proportion of individuals absent from 
work for more than 1 day due to alcohol or injury/illness in the Australian population; these 
figures were applied to England to calculate the AAF due to the lack of specific English data. 
Furthermore, adjustments were necessary to match with the age group distribution used in the 
model. 
 
AAF for absenteeism were calculated as follow: 
 
Proportion absent for ≥ 1 day due to alcohol  
AAF= 
(Proportion absent for ≥ 1 day due to alcohol + Proportion absent for ≥ 1 day  due to injury/illness)  
 
 
Thus, based on this calculation, the AAF for absenteeism for men and women were assumed to 
be 10.3% (4.2 / 4.2 + 36.7) and 5.5% (2.5 / (2.5 + 42.6) respectively. 
 
Calculated AAF for absenteeism by age and sex group are reported in Table 23. 
 
Table 23: Estimate AAF for absenteeism based on Roche et al (2008) 
 
 Male workers  Female workers 
Age (years)    
16 – 17 10.83%  13.63% 
18 – 24 14.52%  10.45% 
25 – 34 13.20%  6.80% 
35 – 44 8.41%  4.05% 
45 – 54 6.07%  2.23% 
55 – 64 3.43%  0.18% 
65 – 74 1.64%  0.00% 
75+ 1.64%  0.00% 
 
RR functions were then calculated for each age/sex group derived from the AAF (Roche et al, 
2008) using the methods described in section 2.3 assuming the English consumption 
distribution. Absenteeism due to alcohol was assumed to be a consequence of the acute 
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drinking behaviour. This assumption is supported by Roche et al’s (2008) findings. The risk was 
assumed to start after a threshold of 4 units for men and 3 units for women, as for other acute 
harms. 
 
Calculated RR functions for absenteeism are presented in Figure 24 and Figure 25 for males 
and females respectively. 
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Figure 24: Risk functions for absenteeism in males 
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Figure 25: Risk functions for absenteeism in females 
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2.7.2.3 Model structure 
 
The absenteeism model is linked to the unemployment component in a dynamic approach. 
Based on baseline consumption, consumption at time t and the risk functions derived above, a 
PIF is calculated and applied to the absence rate. Absenteeism is assumed to be related to 
acute drinking and so maximum daily intake is applied as the consumption measure and it is 
assumed that there is no time delay between exposure to alcohol and subsequent absenteeism. 
 
The number of days absent from work is then calculated based on the absence rate, the mean 
number of days worked and the number of working individuals in each age-group/gender sub-
group. Days absent from work are then valued using daily gross income. 
 
Outcomes for the two scenarios – do nothing and policy implementation – are computed 
separately. The difference is then taken to estimate the incremental effect of the policy. 
 
A simplified schematic of the model structure is presented in Figure 26. 
 
Consumption t=0 Consumption t=t1
PIF estimate t=t1
Modified out of 
work rate t=t1
Relative risk 
function
Baseline out of 
work rate t=0
Average 
earnings
Cost estimate 
t=t1
Population 
t=0 In work t=t1
Partition 
probability
Out of 
work 
t=t1
Consumption t=0 Consumption t=t1
PIF estimate t=t1
Relative risk 
function
Modified absence 
rate t=t1
Baseline 
absence rate t=0
Absent t=t1
Cost estimate 
t=t1  
Figure 26: Simplified schematic of the consumption to “harms in the workplace” model 
 
2.7.3 PARTICIPATION RATE, ANNUAL GROSS INCOME, ABSENCE RATE AND 
DAYS WORKED IN ENGLAND 
 
Inputs to populate the “harms in the workplace” model were mainly extracted from the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS, 2006)6 for the absence rate, the number of days work, the annual gross 
income and working rate. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) provides robust and reliable 
information on the workplace. 
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Absence rates were derived for 45,9806 employed individuals aged 16 years old and over for 
whom data was available about the following variable: “In that week had days off sick/injured”. 
While the LFS only reports the absence rate the last week, it was assumed to be a proxy of the 
absence rate in England. The mean number of days scheduled to work was assumed to be a 
proxy of the mean number of working days and was derived from the Labour Force Survey 
20066 for 46,063 employed individuals aged 16 years old and over. Gross annual earnings by 
age and sex groups were derived among 11,736 employed individuals aged 16 years and over 
for which data was available about the gross weekly earning. Finally, participation rates were 
extracted from the LFS (2006) for 78,161 individuals. Main inputs collected through this survey 
are presented in Table 24. 
 
 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 100 
Table 24: Workplace inputs 
 
 Absence rate  Days scheduled to work  Gross annual earnings  Working rate1 
Age (years) Male Female  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
16 – 17 2.82% 1.96%             2.94             2.29    £      5,106   £      3,264   35.2% 40.4% 
18 – 24 3.15% 3.39%             4.27             3.88    £    14,074   £    11,790   66.9% 62.9% 
25 – 34 2.31% 3.62%             4.67             3.99    £    25,887   £    19,454   89.2% 72.4% 
35 – 44 2.46% 3.13%             4.63             4.13    £    32,132   £    18,975   89.9% 75.1% 
45 – 54 1.99% 3.63%             4.37             3.75    £    27,160   £    15,869   87.2% 77.9% 
55 – 64 2.52% 2.77%             3.34             2.83    £    15,750   £      7,636   67.9% 49.7% 
65 – 74 1.47% 1.72%             3.11             2.29    £      7,492   £      2,802   15.7% 8.6% 
75+ 0.00% 2.04%             2.94             2.29    £      5,106   £      3,264   2.5% 1.1% 
 
1 The working rate was calculated using a similar definition as in MacDonald and Shields (2004) including both economically active and inactive population aged 16 years and over. 
Non-workers were derived from following variables in the LFS: ILO unemployed and inactive. Such a definition thus takes into consideration females taking care of their child and/or 
permanently sick individuals.   
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2.8 DIRECT ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
 
2.8.1 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS TO GOVERNMENT 
 
At this stage, the potential direct costs on government of implementation of each of the 
specific policies are excluded from the analysis. 
 
2.8.2 CHANGES IN SALES VOLUME / VALUE FOR RETAILERS 
 
The modelling of expected changes in purchasing of alcohol as a consequence of different 
policies provides results concerning potential reductions or shifts in purchasing patterns.   The 
model produces estimates of changes in volumes of alcohol expected to be sold as a 
consequence of each policy.  Combined with the price information this is used within the 
model to derive, for the country as a whole, the retail sales value (£) of different types of 
alcohol on- and off-trade.   
 
These estimates are not broken down by type of retailer or particular named retailers.  Nor do 
they make any estimates of profit or otherwise from alcohol for retailers since analysis of 
retailers’ cost-base are not included in the modelling.  Similarly, there is no quantified 
assessment here (beyond the retail sales overall) of the potential impact on different 
producers of alcohol, since direct information on their costs, the wholesale market, and the 
profit made by producers in selling on to retailers are not covered by the modelling. 
 
2.8.3 CHANGES IN TAX REVENUE INCOME TO  GOVERNMENT 
 
Alcohol sales are divided in three main revenues: 
- Retail sale 
- Duty 
- Value-added tax (VAT) 
 
The amount of duty is different for each product category (beer, wine, spirit) and is calculated 
either based on the unit of alcohol or litre of product. Note that the duty may also be different 
within one alcohol category. 
 
The average amount of duty (including the VAT associated with the duty) per litre of product 
was extracted from a recent analysis conducted by the DH71. For the purpose of our analysis, 
this figure was transformed into the amount of duty per unit of ethanol derived from the ABV 
used in the same study. Note that this study reported a duty for beer and cider. The duty for 
beer was thus weighted based on consumption data for beer and cider. Furthermore, the duty 
per unit of ethanol for alcopops was assumed to be similar to the duty per unit of ethanol for 
spirit (HMRC).  
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Average duty per unit of alcohol used in the model are presented is Table 25. 
 
Table 25: Duty per unit of alcohol 
 
 Duty (excluding VAT) 
Beer  £           0.129  
Wine  £           0.148  
Spirit  £           0.196  
Alcopops  £           0.196  
 
 
The VAT is assumed to be 17.5% for both the duty or retail sales. 
 
Thus, given data about the volume of sales (in units) and the value of sales (in £), it is 
possible to estimate the value of duty, the value of the VAT (associated with the duty and 
associated with the retail) and the value of retail. 
 
2.8.4 EXCLUSION OF WIDER ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
 
The important costs that are not considered here are the transitional costs. These include the 
effects on specific alcohol producers / retailers, and effect on advertising or media industry. 
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2.9 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Main parameters presenting uncertainties were tested in a one-way sensitivity analysis. A 
Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis (PSA) could not be performed due to the short timelines for 
this project and little information about distribution to perform such analysis. 
 
Since this study examined several price/promotion scenarios, ideally, a sensitivity analysis 
should be done for all scenarios analysed. However, such a task requires large amount of 
time which was not possible given the timelines. An alternative approach was thus 
undertaken to provide to the reader an overview about the degree of uncertainty for main 
parameters exploring the impact on one selected scenario. We judged that there was little 
additional benefit in examining further policies with sensitivity analyses.  
 
Sensitivity analyses were conducted using the 40p minimum price policy. 
 
The following key parameters were tested in our model: 
 
· Elasticity matrices. These are a source of uncertainty since the matrices are 
different when they are calculated among all drinkers or separated per drinker 
categories. Two alternative scenarios were thus explored in sensitivity analysis using 
an elasticity matrix calculated among all drinkers and an elasticity matrix calculated 
per drinker categories (moderate, hazardous and harmful). 
 
· Binge regression models. Regression coefficients from the binge model were tested 
in a one-way sensitivity analysis for two extreme scenarios assuming a steeper binge 
function (maximum slope in the 95th CI and minimum constant) or a less steeper 
binge function (minimum slope in the 95th CI and maximum constant). Age and sex 
covariates were assumed to be similar. 
 
· Potential benefits in terms of health harms associated with alcohol 
consumption. These were included in our model in the base case (using risk 
functions). However, such potential benefits are subject to controversy. A sensitivity 
analysis was thus conducted excluding conditions with a potential benefit. Four 
conditions were excluded: cholelitiatis, diabetes, ischemic heart disease and ischemic 
stroke. 
 
· Time delay between alcohol exposure and the occurrence of the event. We 
assumed in the base case a time lag of 10 years for both mortality and mortality 
based on published evidence (time lag between 5 and 15 years mainly). Sensitivity 
analyses were thus performed exploring a time lag of 5 years and 15 years 
respectively. 
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· Crime. First, a sensitivity analysis was conducted using a lesser multiplier for “less 
serious wounding”, 1.8 versus 7.7 due to anticipated significant impact on results (i.e. 
Home Office analysis). Secondly, AAF for crime using Q1 (OCJS, 2005)65 were 
estimated and used to derive risk functions. These new risk functions were tested in 
sensitivity analysis (against risk function derived from Q2). 
 
- Workplace. Three parameters were explored in sensitivity analyses in the 
“consumption to harms in the workplace” model. Firstly, risk functions were derived 
from the Whitehall II study based on the excess risk of absenteeism due to alcohol. 
The excess risk was assumed to be similar between males and females. A second 
sensitivity analysis was performed assuming a higher impact of alcohol on 
unemployment (16.6% vs 6.9%) based on the definition of “problem drinker” 
assessed by the mean weekly intake of alcohol (MacDonald and Shields, 2004)5. 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis was conducted using a lower annual gross income for 
both unemployment and absenteeism. The gross income was tested using the 25th 
percentiles6. 
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3 RESULTS 
 
In this section the results are reported for 
· General price increases 
· Minimum price policies 
· Off-trade discounting restrictions 
· Some exploratory analyses of advertising restrictions. 
 
3.1 EFFECTS OF PRICE CHANGE POLICIES 
 
The model has been used to estimate impact on consumption and harms of 33 different 
policies relating to prices.  Scenarios 1-9 examine general price increases, scenarios 10-26 
examine minimum price policies, and scenarios 27-33 focus on off-trade discounting. We first 
take the reader through three example policy analyses (a general price rise of +10%, a 
minimum price of 40p and a restriction of off-trade price based promotions to no greater than 
20% ) to illustrate the model outputs presented in the tables and their interpretation.  The rest 
of the section focuses on comparing results across all of the price-based policies.  
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3.1.1 EXAMPLE POLICY ANALYSIS:  +10% GENERAL PRICE RISE IN ALL 16 
CATEGORIES OF ALCOHOL (SCENARIO 2) 
 
Table 26 shows the results for consumption changes, consumer spending and sales. 
 
Overall weekly consumption reduces -4.4%: Consumption is estimated to reduce by on 
average 35.5 units per person per year, a change of -4.4%.   
 
Consumption changes are greatest for harmful drinkers (-3.17 units per week). 
 
Groups are impacted differentially:  
11 to 18s     (-5.3%)  
18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers  (-6.0%).   
Hazardous drinkers smaller reductions  (-4.7%) 
 
Moderate drinkers are affected in a small way (-0.49 units per week).  
 
Table 27 shows the effects of the 10% price increase policy scenario on health, crime and 
employment harms, as well as a financial valuation 
 
Effects on health are estimated to be substantial with deaths estimated to reduce by 
232 per annum within the first year and a full effect after 10 years of 1,681.  Again deaths 
are differentially distributed across the groups, with just 3 saved in year 1 for 11-18s but 98 for 
hazardous, 96 for harmful and 38 for moderate drinkers.  Illness also decreases with an 
estimated reduction of 1,800 acute and 5,800 chronic within year 1.  
 
Hospital admissions are estimated to reduce by 10,100 in year 1, and a full effect after 10 
years of 50,800 avoided admissions per annum. 
 
Healthcare service costs are estimated to £43m in year 1, with a QALY gain valued at 
£119m 
 
Crime is estimated to fall by 65,000 offences overall.  The distribution of effect here across 
the groups is very different to that for health.  For 11-18s, a reduction of 18,800, 18-24 
hazardous 15,000, moderate 13,400, hazardous 29,900, harmful 12,900 is estimated.   
 
The harm avoided in terms of victim quality of life is valued at £98m p.a. (note that 
QALYs are for victims and do not necessarily belong to the same population as the sub-group 
in which they are ‘saved’) 
 
Direct crime costs are estimated to reduce by £70m p.a.  
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Workplace harms are reduced by 12,800 fewer unemployed people and 310,000 fewer 
sick days. Work absence are more equally distributed amongst the different drinking groups, 
with the overall reduction in estimated days of absence per annum occurring amongst harmful 
drinkers (65,000), hazardous drinkers (143,000) and moderate drinkers (97,000). For 
unemployment due to alcohol we only considered harmful drinkers, thus the 12,800 fewer 
unemployment cases estimated in the model occur all within this group.   
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Table 26  Results table for 10% general price increase (consumption effects) 
 
Males and Females Population Subgroups Scenario 2
Consumption Patterns England Hazardous Moderate Hazardous Harmful
Total 11-18s 18-24 All ages All ages All ages
Baseline
Mean consumption per person per week 12.63              4.08                27.01              4.58                26.90              69.82              
n people 36,781,777     4,264,561       714,039          23,570,854     6,863,921       2,299,162       
Mean consumption per drinker per week 15.79              12.50              27.01              5.65                26.90              69.82              
n drinkers 29,431,779     1,393,062       714,039          19,092,355     6,863,921       2,299,162       
% binge (>8 males, >6 females) 17.4% 8.5% 57.2% 8.2% 39.3% 68.1%
Mean scale of binge if binge occurs (units) 13.7                14.2                14.7                12.0                13.8                16.2                
Volume sales Off-trade Beer 126.8              69.1                153.4              32.1                190.7              758.1              
(units per drinker per year) Wine 302.1              61.4                185.9              97.4                573.2              1,322.6           
Spirit 66.6                30.9                72.6                23.6                109.4              318.0              
RTD 9.0                  11.4                16.4                3.2                  8.8                  57.4                
On-trade Beer 226.9              253.2              548.0              89.0                369.5              960.4              
Wine 35.2                32.3                54.1                23.8                59.2                61.8                
Spirit 36.8                77.8                226.9              19.7                61.3                91.7                
RTD 20.0                115.7              151.2              6.0                  30.5                70.6                
Total 823.3              651.8              1,408.3           294.8              1,402.5           3,640.7           
Value sales Off-trade Beer 45£                 21£                 55£                 13£                 69£                 250£               
(£ per drinker per year) Wine 143£               27£                 87£                 47£                 271£               619£               
Spirit 25£                 10£                 29£                 10£                 41£                 114£               
RTD 7£                   9£                   13£                 3£                   7£                   46£                 
On-trade Beer 212£               220£               539£               90£                 341£               865£               
Wine 86£                 95£                 124£               61£                 137£               139£               
Spirit 42£                 79£                 244£               25£                 68£                 100£               
RTD 29£                 148£               227£               9£                   44£                 100£               
Total 590£               610£               1,319£            257£               979£               2,233£            
Absolute change
Mean consumption per person per week -0.55 -0.22 -1.62 -0.16 -1.26 -3.17
Mean consumption per drinker per week -0.69 -0.66 -1.62 -0.20 -1.26 -3.17
% change in mean consumption -4.4% -5.3% -6.0% -3.5% -4.7% -4.5%
Change in volume of consumption Off-trade Beer -5.65 -3.19 -7.10 -1.16 -8.84 -35.00
(units per drinker per year) Wine -11.72 -2.46 -7.33 -3.74 -22.24 -51.51
Spirit -3.81 -1.80 -4.33 -1.16 -6.53 -18.99
RTD -0.35 -0.44 -0.67 -0.10 -0.36 -2.35
On-trade Beer -8.72 -10.19 -23.28 -2.34 -15.83 -41.12
Wine -1.10 -1.03 -1.94 -0.61 -2.13 -2.22
Spirit -3.85 -11.16 -33.93 -1.02 -8.37 -11.53
RTD -0.70 -4.10 -5.85 -0.15 -1.18 -2.73
Total -35.90 -34.36 -84.42 -10.28 -65.48 -165.46
Change in £ value of Off-trade Beer £2.29 £1.08 £2.70 £0.78 £3.38 £12.25
 purchases (sales) Wine £8.28 £1.53 £5.03 £2.74 £15.68 £35.76
 (£ per drinker per year) Spirit £0.95 £0.38 £1.00 £0.46 £1.42 £3.92
RTD £0.41 £0.53 £0.70 £0.17 £0.38 £2.51
On-trade Beer £12.38 £12.16 £29.02 £6.34 £18.19 £46.20
Wine £5.66 £6.01 £7.50 £4.38 £8.29 £8.39
Spirit £1.16 -£0.70 -£1.15 £1.56 £0.31 £1.11
RTD £1.77 £9.14 £13.07 £0.68 £2.52 £5.73
Total £32.89 £30.14 £57.86 £17.12 £50.16 £115.88
Effect of policy on "pocket" Off-trade Beer £4.48 £2.15 £5.52 £1.30 £6.92 £24.99
  if drinkers did not change Wine £14.33 £2.71 £8.74 £4.75 £27.10 £61.90
  consumption Spirit £2.53 £1.03 £2.90 £1.00 £4.13 £11.41
 (£ per drinker per year) RTD £0.71 £0.90 £1.28 £0.26 £0.69 £4.57
On-trade Beer £21.25 £21.99 £53.94 £8.96 £34.09 £86.53
Wine £8.58 £9.49 £12.38 £6.10 £13.69 £13.87
Spirit £4.23 £7.85 £24.38 £2.46 £6.84 £10.05
RTD £2.87 £14.85 £22.74 £0.93 £4.40 £9.98
Total £58.97 £60.98 £131.87 £25.75 £97.87 £223.30
Total change in retailer Off-trade 394.9£m         5.9£m             7.8£m             85.6£m           161.4£m         143.9£m         
 received £m On-trade 589.2£m         37.7£m           37.3£m           222.4£m         200.1£m         139.5£m         
 (after VAT+Duty) Total 984.1£m         43.6£m           45.2£m           308.0£m         361.6£m         283.5£m         
Total Change in VAT Off-trade 43.9-£m           1.0-£m             1.1-£m             6.3-£m             18.2-£m           18.8-£m           
 & Duty Received On-trade 27.9£m           0.7-£m             2.7-£m             25.0£m           1.0£m             1.7£m             
Total 16.0-£m           1.6-£m             3.9-£m             18.8£m           17.2-£m           17.1-£m           
% change in spend / sales Off-trade +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
On-trade +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
Total +5.6% +4.9% +4.4% +6.6% +5.1% +5.2%
Total Change Pop'n Spend Off-trade 351.0£m         4.9£m             6.7£m             79.4£m           143.2£m         125.2£m         
 (Sales) On-trade 617.1£m         37.1£m           34.6£m           247.4£m         201.1£m         141.2£m         
Total 968.1£m         42.0£m           41.3£m           326.8£m         344.3£m         266.4£m          
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The societal value of these harm reductions is £7.8b in total (when discounted) over the 
10-year period modelled. In the first year, the estimated societal value of the harm reduction 
is as follows:  NHS cost reductions (£43m), value of QALYs saved (£119m), crime costs 
saved (£70m), value of crime QALYs saved (£98m) and employment related harms avoided 
(£330m).  
 
The societal value of harm reductions varies by groups: with hazardous drinkers accounting 
for £2.0bn of the £7.8bn total value, harmful drinkers for £4.0bn and the moderate drinkers for 
£1.7bn.  
 
Returning to Table 26, the spending and sales results are as follows: 
 
Absolute reductions in consumption are biggest in off-trade wines , on-trade beer and 
off-trade beer.  Spirits and RTDs have lower absolute changes in volume consumed. 
 
The cost impact of the policy on consumers varies substantially between drinker types 
groups.  
Overall:    £33 per drinker per annum.  
Harmful drinkers:  £116 per annum  
Moderate drinkers  £17 per annum.   
 
If consumption did not change in response to price increases then the effect “on the 
pocket” would be  
Harmful drinkers:  £223 per annum  
Moderate drinkers  £26 per annum.   
 
An overall increased spend by consumers is estimated of £968m per annum, two thirds 
of which is in the on-trade sector.   
 
Overall VAT and duty changes by -£16m. 
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Table 27  Results table for 10% general price increase (harm effects) 
 
Males and Females Scenario 2
Harm Reductions Population Subgroups
Absolute change England Hazardous Moderate Hazardous Harmful
Total 11-18s 18-24 All ages All ages All ages
Health Deaths Chronic -125 0 0 -3 -50 -72
Changes Acute -108 -3 -5 -35 -48 -24
in Year 1 Total -232 -3 -5 -38 -98 -96
Sick Chronic -1,786 -19 -12 -234 -548 -996
Acute -5,768 -315 -328 -1,826 -2,569 -1,244
Total -7,554 -333 -339 -2,060 -3,117 -2,240
Admissions Chronic -3,621 -33 -20 -431 -1,061 -2,116
Acute -6,518 -386 -412 -2,054 -2,908 -1,398
Total -10,140 -418 -432 -2,485 -3,968 -3,514
QALYs per annum -2,372 -138 -132 -680 -1,017 -618
Value of 'saved' QALYs -118,595,107 -6,878,589 -6,593,750 -34,022,559 -50,861,658 -30,895,265
Cost (£) Chronic -10,090,156 -142,830 -90,151 -1,541,102 -3,319,507 -5,166,354
Acute -32,852,441 -1,763,953 -1,871,032 -10,383,436 -14,639,084 -7,098,992
Total (£) -42,942,598 -1,906,783 -1,961,183 -11,924,538 -17,958,590 -12,265,346
Health Deaths p.a. Chronic -1,569 0 -1 -35 -583 -951
Changes Acute -112 -3 -5 -36 -50 -25
per annum Total -1,681 -3 -6 -71 -633 -976
in Year 10 Illnesses p.a. Chronic -21,599 -61 -76 -2,623 -6,272 -12,675
Acute -5,998 -296 -302 -1,904 -2,672 -1,299
Total -27,597 -357 -379 -4,527 -8,945 -13,974
Admissions p.a. Chronic -44,094 -106 -134 -4,837 -12,195 -27,011
Acute -6,736 -363 -380 -2,129 -3,004 -1,452
Total -50,829 -469 -514 -6,967 -15,200 -28,463
QALYs per annum -11,467 -150 -156 -5,097 -3,231 -3,074
Cost (£) Chronic -120,528,130 -471,069 -595,877 -17,222,180 -37,629,595 -65,447,767
Acute -34,157,631 -1,660,164 -1,727,877 -10,826,823 -15,224,698 -7,414,244
Total (£) -154,685,760 -2,131,232 -2,323,754 -28,049,003 -52,854,292 -72,862,011
Cumulative Discounted QALYs -56,355 -1,354 -1,370 -21,738 -18,143 -15,892
Health Change Discounted Costs -772,858,585 -17,242,725 -18,277,514 -160,446,962 -281,050,650 -323,992,920
over 10 yrs Valye of Discounted QALYs -2,817,756,389 -67,698,367 -68,503,631 -1,086,902,904 -907,135,050 -794,616,393
Total Value of Health Changes -3,590,614,974 -84,941,093 -86,781,145 -1,247,349,866 -1,188,185,700 -1,118,609,313
Crime Volume Violent -15,535 -1,835 -4,268 -4,032 -7,467 -3,380
Changes Damage -28,139 -5,486 -7,735 -6,314 -13,444 -6,088
per annum Theft/Oth -21,234 -11,507 -2,954 -3,099 -8,956 -3,470
Total -64,908 -18,828 -14,957 -13,445 -29,867 -12,939
Cost (£) Violent -44,111,672 -5,065,626 -11,708,880 -11,632,542 -21,131,422 -9,552,135
Damage -11,114,877 -2,166,821 -3,055,517 -2,494,071 -5,310,218 -2,404,881
Theft/Oth -14,369,309 -7,058,637 -2,160,168 -2,408,299 -6,198,445 -2,517,078
Total (£) -69,595,858 -14,291,084 -16,924,565 -16,534,912 -32,640,085 -14,474,094
QALYs Violent -832 -91 -215 -219 -399 -181
Damage -164 -32 -45 -37 -78 -35
Theft/Oth -210 -83 -38 -38 -92 -40
Total Total -1,206 -205 -298 -295 -570 -256
Value of 'saved' QALYs -97,697,326 -16,636,489 -24,110,393 -23,864,442 -46,146,368 -20,736,543
Employment Volume Absence days -310,447 -15,026 -49,204 -97,293 -143,325 -64,755
Changes Unempl people -12,828 -335 0 0 0 -12,828
per annum   Cost (£) Absence -28,616,437 -464,339 -3,036,463 -9,405,479 -13,108,916 -5,942,981
Unempl -301,441,599 -1,464,313 0 0 0 -301,441,599
Total (£) -330,058,036 -1,928,651 -3,036,463 -9,405,479 -13,108,916 -307,384,579
Summary Health Costs (£) -42,942,598 -1,906,783 -1,961,183 -11,924,538 -17,958,590 -12,265,346
Financial Value Crime Costs (£) -69,595,858 -14,291,084 -16,924,565 -16,534,912 -32,640,085 -14,474,094
Harm Reduction Employment Costs (£) -330,058,036 -1,928,651 -3,036,463 -9,405,479 -13,108,916 -307,384,579
Year 1 Total Direct Costs (£) -442,596,491 -18,126,519 -21,922,211 -37,864,929 -63,707,591 -334,124,019
Health QALYs (£) -118,595,107 -6,878,589 -6,593,750 -34,022,559 -50,861,658 -30,895,265
Crime QALYs (£) -97,697,326 -16,636,489 -24,110,393 -23,864,442 -46,146,368 -20,736,543
Total Societal Value (£) -658,888,923 -41,641,596 -52,626,354 -95,751,929 -160,715,616 -385,755,827
Cumul 10 year Health Costs (£) -772,858,585 -17,242,725 -18,277,514 -160,446,962 -281,050,650 -323,992,920
Summary Crime Costs (£) -578,801,281 -118,853,305 -140,754,931 -137,514,334 -271,454,703 -120,375,325
Financial Value Employment Costs (£) -2,744,962,417 -16,039,832 -25,253,063 -78,221,659 -109,021,680 -2,556,396,228
Harm Reduction Total Direct Costs (£) -4,096,622,282 -152,135,863 -184,285,508 -376,182,954 -661,527,032 -3,000,764,473
Health QALYs (£) -2,817,756,389 -67,698,367 -68,503,631 -1,086,902,904 -907,135,050 -794,616,393
Crime QALYs (£) -900,982,769 -153,424,770 -222,350,498 -220,082,289 -425,570,319 -191,236,225
Total Societal Value (£) -7,815,361,440 -373,259,000 -475,139,637 -1,683,168,148 -1,994,232,401 -3,986,617,091  
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3.1.2 EXAMPLE POLICY ANALYSIS:  40P MINIMUM PRICE (SCENARIO 15) 
 
Table 28 shows the results for consumption changes, consumer spending and sales. 
 
Overall weekly consumption reduces -2.6%: Consumption is estimated to reduce by on 
average 22 units per person per year.   
 
Consumption changes are greatest for harmful drinkers (-3.15 units per week). 
 
Groups are impacted differentially:  
11 to 18s     (-4.0%)  
18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers  (-0.7%).   
All-age hazardous drinkers have smaller reductions (-1.8%) but the absolute scale of 
reduction is much larger (-0.47 units per week).   
 
Moderate drinkers are affected in a small way (-0.07 units per week).  
 
Table 29 shows the effects of the policy scenario on health, crime and employment harms, as 
well as a financial valuation. 
 
Effects on health are estimated to be substantial with deaths estimated to reduce by 
157 within the first year and a full effect after 10 years of 1,381.  Again deaths are 
differentially distributed across the groups, with just 2 saved in year 1 for 11-18s but 48 for 
hazardous, 98 for harmful and 12 for moderate drinkers.  Illness also decreases with an 
estimated reduction in of 1,500 acute and 2,900 chronic within year 1.  
 
Hospital admissions are estimated to reduce by 6,300 in year 1, and a full effect after 10 
years of 40,800 avoided admissions per annum. 
 
Healthcare service costs are estimated to change by £25m in year 1, with a QALY gain 
valued at £63m. 
 
Crime is estimated to fall by 16,000 offences overall.  The distribution of effect here across 
the groups is very different to that for health.  For 11-18s, a reduction of 9,600, 18-24 
hazardous 700, moderate 40, hazardous 6,100, and harmful 9,100 are estimated.   
 
The harm avoided in terms of victim quality of life is valued at £21m. 
 
Direct costs of crime are estimated to reduce by £17m. 
 
Workplace harms are reduced by 12,400 fewer unemployed people and 100,000 fewer 
sick days.  
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Table 28: Results table for 40p minimum price (consumption effects) 
Males and Females Population Subgroups Scenario 15
Consumption Patterns England Hazardous Moderate Hazardous Harmful
Total 11-18s 18-24 All ages All ages All ages
Baseline
Mean consumption per person per week 12.63              4.08                27.01              4.58                26.90              69.82              
n people 36,781,777     4,264,561       714,039          23,570,854     6,863,921       2,299,162       
Mean consumption per drinker per week 15.79              12.50              27.01              5.65                26.90              69.82              
n drinkers 29,431,779     1,393,062       714,039          19,092,355     6,863,921       2,299,162       
% binge (>8 males, >6 females) 17.4% 8.5% 57.2% 8.2% 39.3% 68.1%
Mean scale of binge if binge occurs (units) 13.7                14.2                14.7                12.0                13.8                16.2                
Volume sales Off-trade Beer 126.8              69.1                153.4              32.1                190.7              758.1              
(units per drinker per year) Wine 302.1              61.4                185.9              97.4                573.2              1,322.6           
Spirit 66.6                30.9                72.6                23.6                109.4              318.0              
RTD 9.0                  11.4                16.4                3.2                  8.8                  57.4                
On-trade Beer 226.9              253.2              548.0              89.0                369.5              960.4              
Wine 35.2                32.3                54.1                23.8                59.2                61.8                
Spirit 36.8                77.8                226.9              19.7                61.3                91.7                
RTD 20.0                115.7              151.2              6.0                  30.5                70.6                
Total 823.3              651.8              1,408.3           294.8              1,402.5           3,640.7           
Value sales Off-trade Beer 45£                 21£                 55£                 13£                 69£                 250£               
(£ per drinker per year) Wine 143£               27£                 87£                 47£                 271£               619£               
Spirit 25£                 10£                 29£                 10£                 41£                 114£               
RTD 7£                   9£                   13£                 3£                   7£                   46£                 
On-trade Beer 212£               220£               539£               90£                 341£               865£               
Wine 86£                 95£                 124£               61£                 137£               139£               
Spirit 42£                 79£                 244£               25£                 68£                 100£               
RTD 29£                 148£               227£               9£                   44£                 100£               
Total 590£               610£               1,319£            257£               979£               2,233£            
Absolute change
Mean consumption per person per week -0.33 -0.16 -0.18 -0.05 -0.47 -3.15
Mean consumption per drinker per week -0.42 -0.50 -0.18 -0.07 -0.47 -3.15
% change in mean consumption -2.6% -4.0% -0.7% -1.2% -1.8% -4.5%
Change in volume of consumption Off-trade Beer -21.48 -18.16 -22.56 -2.40 -29.07 -160.12
(units per drinker per year) Wine -1.50 -3.33 -2.66 -1.99 1.30 -6.75
Spirit -8.55 -9.61 -7.75 -1.81 -13.85 -48.52
RTD 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.08
On-trade Beer 9.44 4.00 24.00 2.52 16.45 49.49
Wine 0.14 0.12 0.35 0.03 0.36 0.35
Spirit 0.05 0.10 -1.89 0.08 -0.16 0.38
RTD 0.14 0.61 1.03 0.05 0.20 0.58
Total -21.75 -26.25 -9.42 -3.50 -24.74 -164.50
Change in £ value of Off-trade Beer £1.48 £0.50 £1.81 £0.74 £2.05 £6.40
 purchases (sales) Wine £8.39 £0.86 £5.80 £1.76 £17.00 £41.52
 (£ per drinker per year) Spirit £0.77 -£0.46 £0.88 £0.41 £1.17 £3.36
RTD £0.04 £0.02 £0.04 £0.02 £0.02 £0.25
On-trade Beer £10.02 £8.32 £28.05 £2.69 £17.33 £51.36
Wine £0.36 £0.36 £0.84 £0.11 £0.88 £0.95
Spirit £0.24 £0.37 £0.49 £0.16 £0.29 £0.78
RTD £0.22 £0.93 £1.77 £0.08 £0.34 £0.91
Total £21.52 £10.90 £39.69 £5.95 £39.07 £105.54
Effect of policy on "pocket" Off-trade Beer £10.11 £7.79 £10.91 £1.70 £13.74 £70.73
  if drinkers did not change Wine £8.14 £2.11 £6.10 £2.50 £14.48 £39.72
  consumption Spirit £4.28 £3.40 £4.11 £1.16 £6.87 £23.20
 (£ per drinker per year) RTD £0.02 £0.00 £0.00 £0.01 £0.01 £0.17
On-trade Beer £0.74 £3.42 £2.43 £0.11 £1.19 £3.80
Wine £0.01 £0.00 £0.00 £0.01 £0.00 £0.05
Spirit £0.04 £0.09 £0.55 £0.02 £0.09 £0.06
RTD £0.00 £0.04 £0.05 £0.00 £0.01 £0.02
Total £23.34 £16.84 £24.16 £5.50 £36.39 £137.75
Total change in retailer Off-trade 404.4£m         7.6£m             8.6£m             65.7£m           161.1£m         172.2£m         
 received £m On-trade 234.3£m         10.9£m           16.8£m           42.4£m           95.1£m           90.5£m           
 (after VAT+Duty) Total 638.6£m         18.5£m           25.4£m           108.1£m         256.2£m         262.7£m         
Total Change in VAT Off-trade 90.1-£m           6.4-£m             2.5-£m             9.9-£m             22.2-£m           53.8-£m           
 & Duty Received On-trade 84.9£m           3.0£m             5.4£m             15.4£m           34.2£m           33.7£m           
Total 5.2-£m             3.4-£m             2.9£m             5.5£m             12.0£m           20.1-£m           
% change in spend / sales Off-trade +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
On-trade +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
Total +3.6% +1.8% +3.0% +2.3% +4.0% +4.7%
Total Change Pop'n Spend Off-trade 314.3£m         1.3£m             6.1£m             55.8£m           138.9£m         118.5£m         
 (Sales) On-trade 319.2£m         13.9£m           22.2£m           57.8£m           129.3£m         124.2£m         
Total 633.5£m         15.2£m           28.3£m           113.6£m         268.2£m         242.7£m          
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The societal value of these harm reductions is £5.4bn in total over the 10-year period 
modelled. In the first year, the estimated societal value of the harm reduction is as follows:  
NHS cost reductions (£25m), value of QALYs saved (£63m), crime costs saved (£17m), value 
of crime QALYs saved (£21m) and employment related harms avoided (£312m).  
 
The societal value of harm reductions varies is again distributed differentially across the 
groups, with hazardous drinkers accounting for £0.7bn of the total value, harmful drinkers for 
£3.9bn and the moderate drinkers for £0.8bn.  
 
Returning to Table 28, the spending and sales results are as follows: 
 
Absolute reductions in consumption are largest in off-trade beers and off-trade spirits. 
There is a large absolute increase in the consumption of on-trade beers. 
 
The cost impact of the policy on consumers varies substantially between drinker types 
groups.  
Overall:    £22 per drinker per annum.  
Harmful drinkers:  £106 per annum  
Moderate drinkers  £6 per annum.   
 
If consumption did not change in response to price increases then the effect “on the 
pocket” would be  
Harmful drinkers:  £138 per annum  
Moderate drinkers  £6 per annum.   
 
An overall increased spend by consumers is estimated of £633m per annum, split 
approximately equally between off-trade and on-trade sectors.   
 
Overall VAT and duty changes by -£5.2m. 
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Table 29: Results table for 40p minimum price (harm effects) 
Males and Females Scenario 15
Harm Reductions Population Subgroups
Absolute change England Hazardous Moderate Hazardous Harmful
Total 11-18s 18-24 All ages All ages All ages
Health Deaths Chronic -106 0 0 -2 -30 -75
Changes Acute -51 -2 0 -10 -17 -23
in Year 1 Total -157 -2 0 -12 -48 -98
Illness Chronic -1,520 -8 -1 -165 -319 -1,035
Acute -2,901 -168 -25 -605 -1,057 -1,233
Total -4,421 -177 -27 -770 -1,376 -2,268
Admissions Chronic -3,115 -15 -3 -303 -614 -2,197
Acute -3,194 -207 -32 -644 -1,163 -1,377
Total -6,309 -221 -35 -948 -1,777 -3,574
QALYs per annum -1,263 -73 -12 -218 -419 -623
Value of 'saved' QALYs -63,144,310 -3,641,711 -585,742 -10,911,963 -20,927,405 -31,139,317
Cost (£) Chronic -8,371,316 -61,090 -11,730 -1,083,900 -1,916,706 -5,363,294
Acute -16,317,580 -940,548 -131,280 -3,339,655 -5,932,331 -7,011,015
Total (£) -24,688,895 -1,001,639 -143,010 -4,423,556 -7,849,037 -12,374,309
Health Deaths p.a. Chronic -1,326 0 0 -16 -316 -995
Changes Acute -54 -1 0 -12 -19 -24
per annum Total -1,381 -2 0 -27 -334 -1,019
in Year 10 Illnesses p.a. Chronic -18,116 -23 -26 -1,657 -3,287 -13,168
Acute -3,117 -158 -23 -693 -1,130 -1,288
Total -21,233 -181 -49 -2,350 -4,417 -14,456
Admissions p.a. Chronic -37,438 -41 -45 -3,039 -6,346 -28,047
Acute -3,408 -194 -30 -736 -1,233 -1,431
Total -40,846 -235 -74 -3,774 -7,579 -29,478
QALYs per annum -8,474 -76 -22 -3,636 -1,767 -3,064
Cost (£) Chronic -98,432,293 -175,878 -199,749 -10,836,427 -19,639,642 -67,927,110
Acute -17,536,090 -881,925 -121,388 -3,837,382 -6,338,927 -7,325,299
Total (£) -115,968,383 -1,057,803 -321,137 -14,673,809 -25,978,569 -75,252,408
Cumulative Discounted QALYs -38,757 -693 -155 -13,728 -9,058 -15,921
Health Change Discounted Costs -545,957,918 -8,697,898 -1,893,992 -76,790,635 -135,447,567 -333,242,978
over 10 yrs Valye of Discounted QALYs -1,937,855,254 -34,666,693 -7,732,303 -686,417,103 -452,924,341 -796,048,155
Total Value of Health Changes -2,483,813,172 -43,364,591 -9,626,296 -763,207,737 -588,371,908 -1,129,291,132
Crime Volume Violent -3,184 -1,106 -214 -28 -1,113 -2,017
Changes Damage -5,291 -3,028 -166 277 -1,882 -3,517
per annum Theft/Oth -7,573 -5,394 -328 -208 -3,111 -3,592
Total -16,048 -9,528 -708 41 -6,106 -9,126
Cost (£) Violent -9,458,670 -3,051,332 -661,896 -177,885 -3,297,971 -5,907,794
Damage -2,089,916 -1,196,064 -65,529 109,362 -743,266 -1,389,247
Theft/Oth -5,290,285 -3,469,428 -284,683 -191,463 -2,021,613 -2,675,683
Total (£) -16,838,871 -7,716,825 -1,012,108 -259,986 -6,062,850 -9,972,724
QALYs Violent -173 -55 -11 -2 -59 -111
Damage -31 -18 -1 2 -11 -20
Theft/Oth -59 -40 -2 1 -25 -32
Total Total -263 -112 -13 1 -95 -164
Value of 'saved' QALYs -21,296,307 -9,074,078 -1,064,778 79,420 -7,701,506 -13,266,895
Employment Volume Absence days -100,358 -9,153 -4,630 -11,061 -34,661 -54,459
Changes Unempl people -12,405 -381 0 0 0 -12,405
per annum   Cost (£) Absence -9,611,389 -283,120 -270,303 -1,038,982 -3,194,350 -5,373,303
Unempl -302,782,644 -1,636,242 0 0 0 -302,782,644
Total (£) -312,394,033 -1,919,362 -270,303 -1,038,982 -3,194,350 -308,155,946
Summary Health Costs (£) -24,688,895 -1,001,639 -143,010 -4,423,556 -7,849,037 -12,374,309
Financial Value Crime Costs (£) -16,838,871 -7,716,825 -1,012,108 -259,986 -6,062,850 -9,972,724
Harm Reduction Employment Costs (£) -312,394,033 -1,919,362 -270,303 -1,038,982 -3,194,350 -308,155,946
Year 1 Total Direct Costs (£) -353,921,799 -10,637,825 -1,425,421 -5,722,524 -17,106,237 -330,502,979
Health QALYs (£) -63,144,310 -3,641,711 -585,742 -10,911,963 -20,927,405 -31,139,317
Crime QALYs (£) -21,296,307 -9,074,078 -1,064,778 79,420 -7,701,506 -13,266,895
Total Societal Value (£) -438,362,416 -23,353,614 -3,075,942 -16,555,067 -45,735,148 -374,909,191
Cumul 10 year Health Costs (£) -545,957,918 -8,697,898 -1,893,992 -76,790,635 -135,447,567 -333,242,978
Summary Crime Costs (£) -140,042,240 -64,177,786 -8,417,301 -2,162,200 -50,422,330 -82,939,207
Financial Value Employment Costs (£) -2,598,057,875 -15,962,573 -2,248,004 -8,640,804 -26,566,151 -2,562,811,382
Harm Reduction Total Direct Costs (£) -3,284,058,033 -88,838,257 -12,559,298 -87,593,639 -212,436,047 -2,978,993,567
Health QALYs (£) -1,937,855,254 -34,666,693 -7,732,303 -686,417,103 -452,924,341 -796,048,155
Crime QALYs (£) -196,398,473 -83,682,819 -9,819,581 732,423 -71,024,709 -122,349,752
Total Societal Value (£) -5,418,311,761 -207,187,770 -30,111,182 -773,278,319 -736,385,097 -3,897,391,474 
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Example Policy Analysis:  Restrict Off-Trade Discounting via Priced Based Promotion 
to no greater than 20% (Scenario 30) 
 
 
Table 30 shows the results for consumption changes, consumer spending and sales. 
 
Overall weekly consumption reduces -0.8%: Consumption is estimated to reduce by on 
average 6.5 units per person per year.  
 
Consumption changes are greatest for harmful drinkers (-0.62 units per week) 
 
Groups are impacted differentially:  
11 to 18s     (-0.3%)  
18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers  (-0.2%).   
Hazardous drinkers larger reductions  (-0.9%)   
 
Moderate drinkers are affected in a small way (-0.03 units per week):  
 
Table 31 shows the effects of the policy scenario on health, crime and employment harms, as 
well as a financial valuation 
 
Effects on health are estimated to be substantial with deaths are estimated to reduce 
by 48 per annum within the first year and a full effect after 10 years of 374.  Again deaths 
are differentially distributed across the groups, with 0 saved in year 1 for 11-18s but 22 for 
hazardous, 20 for harmful and 5 for moderate drinkers.  Illness also decreases with an 
estimated reduction in of 1,000 acute and 400 chronic within year 1.  
 
Hospital admissions are estimated to reduce by 1,900 in year 1, and a full effect after 10 
years of 10,600 avoided admissions per annum. 
 
Healthcare service costs are estimated to reduce by £8m in year 1, with a QALY gain 
valued at £21m. 
 
Crime is estimated to fall by 3,700 offences overall.  The distribution of effect here across 
the groups is very different to that for health.  For 11-18s, a reduction of 720, 18-24 
hazardous 340, moderate 840, hazardous 1,650, harmful 1,020 is estimated. 
 
The harm avoided in terms of victim quality of life is valued at £6m p.a. 
 
Direct costs of crime are estimated to reduce by £5m p.a.  
 
Workplace harms are reduced by 2,400 fewer unemployed people and 38,000 fewer 
sick days.  
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Table 30: Results table for maximum 20% off-trade discount (consumption effects) 
Males and Females Population Subgroups Scenario 30
Consumption Patterns England Hazardous Moderate Hazardous Harmful
Total 11-18s 18-24 All ages All ages All ages
Baseline
Mean consumption per person per week 12.63              4.08                27.01              4.58                26.90              69.82              
n people 36,781,777     4,264,561       714,039          23,570,854     6,863,921       2,299,162       
Mean consumption per drinker per week 15.79              12.50              27.01              5.65                26.90              69.82              
n drinkers 29,431,779     1,393,062       714,039          19,092,355     6,863,921       2,299,162       
% binge (>8 males, >6 females) 17.4% 8.5% 57.2% 8.2% 39.3% 68.1%
Mean scale of binge if binge occurs (units) 13.7                14.2                14.7                12.0                13.8                16.2                
Volume sales Off-trade Beer 126.8              69.1                153.4              32.1                190.7              758.1              
(units per drinker per year) Wine 302.1              61.4                185.9              97.4                573.2              1,322.6           
Spirit 66.6                30.9                72.6                23.6                109.4              318.0              
RTD 9.0                  11.4                16.4                3.2                  8.8                  57.4                
On-trade Beer 226.9              253.2              548.0              89.0                369.5              960.4              
Wine 35.2                32.3                54.1                23.8                59.2                61.8                
Spirit 36.8                77.8                226.9              19.7                61.3                91.7                
RTD 20.0                115.7              151.2              6.0                  30.5                70.6                
Total 823.3              651.8              1,408.3           294.8              1,402.5           3,640.7           
Value sales Off-trade Beer 45£                 21£                 55£                 13£                 69£                 250£               
(£ per drinker per year) Wine 143£               27£                 87£                 47£                 271£               619£               
Spirit 25£                 10£                 29£                 10£                 41£                 114£               
RTD 7£                   9£                   13£                 3£                   7£                   46£                 
On-trade Beer 212£               220£               539£               90£                 341£               865£               
Wine 86£                 95£                 124£               61£                 137£               139£               
Spirit 42£                 79£                 244£               25£                 68£                 100£               
RTD 29£                 148£               227£               9£                   44£                 100£               
Total 590£               610£               1,319£            257£               979£               2,233£            
Absolute change
Mean consumption per person per week -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.24 -0.62
Mean consumption per drinker per week -0.12 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.24 -0.62
% change in mean consumption -0.8% -0.3% -0.2% -0.5% -0.9% -0.9%
Change in volume of consumption Off-trade Beer -1.21 -1.20 -1.22 -0.15 -1.66 -8.73
(units per drinker per year) Wine -5.79 -1.35 -3.67 -1.47 -11.84 -26.03
Spirit -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.13 -0.42
RTD -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.06
On-trade Beer 0.59 0.49 1.60 0.15 1.09 2.88
Wine 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
Spirit 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.06
RTD 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03
Total -6.47 -2.05 -3.19 -1.49 -12.48 -32.24
Change in £ value of Off-trade Beer £0.31 £0.23 £0.32 £0.08 £0.42 £1.91
 purchases (sales) Wine £2.26 £0.47 £1.29 £0.89 £4.10 £9.05
 (£ per drinker per year) Spirit £0.04 £0.02 £0.04 £0.01 £0.06 £0.18
RTD £0.01 £0.01 £0.02 £0.01 £0.01 £0.08
On-trade Beer £0.56 £0.43 £1.62 £0.15 £1.04 £2.68
Wine £0.02 £0.02 £0.04 £0.01 £0.04 £0.04
Spirit £0.02 £0.03 £0.15 £0.01 £0.04 £0.07
RTD £0.01 £0.05 £0.10 £0.00 £0.02 £0.05
Total £3.23 £1.27 £3.58 £1.16 £5.74 £14.06
Effect of policy on "pocket" Off-trade Beer £0.62 £0.52 £0.64 £0.12 £0.86 £4.10
  if drinkers did not change Wine £5.16 £1.10 £3.14 £1.65 £10.02 £21.93
  consumption Spirit £0.07 £0.03 £0.07 £0.02 £0.11 £0.32
 (£ per drinker per year) RTD £0.02 £0.02 £0.03 £0.01 £0.02 £0.12
On-trade Beer £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
Wine £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
Spirit £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
RTD £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
Total £5.86 £1.68 £3.88 £1.80 £11.01 £26.47
Total change in retailer Off-trade 95.7£m           1.4£m             1.5£m             20.6£m           40.5£m           33.6£m           
 received £m On-trade 13.0£m           0.5£m             1.0£m             2.4£m             5.6£m             4.7£m             
 (after VAT+Duty) Total 108.8£m         1.9£m             2.5£m             23.1£m           46.1£m           38.2£m           
Total Change in VAT Off-trade 18.8-£m           0.4-£m             0.3-£m             1.8-£m             8.9-£m             7.8-£m             
 & Duty Received On-trade 5.1£m             0.2£m             0.4£m             0.9£m             2.2£m             1.9£m             
Total 13.7-£m           0.1-£m             0.0£m             0.9-£m             6.7-£m             5.9-£m             
% change in spend / sales Off-trade +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
On-trade +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
Total +0.5% +0.2% +0.3% +0.5% +0.6% +0.6%
Total Change Pop'n Spend Off-trade 77.0£m           1.0£m             1.2£m             18.9£m           31.6£m           25.8£m           
 (Sales) On-trade 18.2£m           0.8£m             1.4£m             3.3£m             7.8£m             6.5£m             
Total 95.1£m           1.8£m             2.6£m             22.2£m           39.4£m           32.3£m            
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The societal value of these harm reductions is £1.3bn in total over the 10-year period 
modelled. In the first year, the estimated societal value of the harm reduction is as follows:  
NHS cost reductions (£8m), value of QALYs saved (£21m), crime costs saved (£5m), value of 
crime QALYs saved (£6m) and employment related harms avoided (£58m).  
 
The societal value of harm reductions varies by groups with hazardous drinkers accounting 
for £0.3bn of the total value, harmful drinkers for £0.7bn and the moderate drinkers for 
£0.3bn.  
 
Returning to Table 30, the spending and sales results are as follows: 
 
Absolute reductions in consumption are biggest in off-trade wines. 
 
The cost impact of the policy on consumers varies substantially between drinker types 
groups.  
Overall:    £3 per drinker per annum.  
Harmful drinkers:  £14 per annum  
Moderate drinkers  £1 per annum.   
 
If consumption did not change in response to price increases then the effect “on the 
pocket” would be  
Harmful drinkers:  £26 per annum  
Moderate drinkers  £2 per annum.   
 
An overall increased spend by consumers is estimated of £95m per annum 20% of 
which is in the on-trade sector.   
 
Overall VAT and duty changes by -£14m. 
 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 118
Table 31: Results table for maximum 20% off-trade discount (harm effects) 
Males and Females Scenario 30
Harm Reductions Population Subgroups
Absolute change England Hazardous Moderate Hazardous Harmful
Total 11-18s 18-24 All ages All ages All ages
Health Deaths Chronic -29 0 0 -1 -13 -15
Changes Acute -19 0 0 -5 -9 -5
in Year 1 Total -48 0 0 -5 -22 -20
Illnes Chronic -385 -1 0 -40 -139 -206
Acute -1,040 -14 -11 -266 -492 -279
Total -1,426 -15 -11 -306 -631 -485
Admissions Chronic -780 -1 -1 -74 -268 -438
Acute -1,146 -18 -13 -295 -543 -303
Total -1,925 -19 -14 -369 -811 -741
QALYs per annum -426 -6 -5 -99 -196 -130
Value of 'saved' QALYs -21,317,868 -314,722 -231,641 -4,931,543 -9,785,510 -6,508,627
Cost (£) Chronic -2,153,213 -5,238 -3,775 -264,100 -826,168 -1,060,961
Acute -5,857,571 -79,289 -57,099 -1,497,057 -2,778,821 -1,559,409
Total (£) -8,010,783 -84,527 -60,874 -1,761,158 -3,604,989 -2,620,370
Health Deaths p.a. Chronic -354 0 0 -6 -148 -200
Changes Acute -20 0 0 -5 -10 -5
per annum Total -374 0 0 -11 -158 -206
in Year 10 Illnesses p.a. Chronic -4,606 -2 -3 -440 -1,566 -2,599
Acute -1,108 -13 -10 -280 -526 -298
Total -5,714 -15 -13 -720 -2,092 -2,897
Admissions p.a. Chronic -9,386 -4 -5 -812 -3,035 -5,538
Acute -1,213 -17 -12 -309 -577 -322
Total -10,599 -20 -17 -1,121 -3,612 -5,860
QALYs per annum -2,384 -6 -5 -1,059 -694 -629
Cost (£) Chronic -25,470,701 -15,204 -22,822 -2,883,774 -9,259,227 -13,321,103
Acute -6,236,599 -74,201 -52,764 -1,576,951 -2,971,785 -1,666,867
Total (£) -31,707,300 -89,405 -75,587 -4,460,725 -12,231,012 -14,987,970
Cumulative Discounted QALYs -11,321 -59 -48 -4,229 -3,795 -3,280
Health Change Discounted Costs -155,019,690 -735,012 -586,122 -24,953,796 -62,634,719 -67,208,927
over 10 yrs Valye of Discounted QALYs -566,045,145 -2,943,815 -2,406,467 -211,429,598 -189,744,191 -163,975,036
Total Value of Health Changes -721,064,836 -3,678,827 -2,992,589 -236,383,394 -252,378,909 -231,183,963
Crime Volume Violent -1,036 -90 -98 -266 -469 -278
Changes Damage -1,421 -221 -124 -327 -628 -404
per annum Theft/Oth -1,282 -408 -113 -251 -549 -336
Total -3,738 -720 -336 -844 -1,646 -1,019
Cost (£) Violent -3,102,763 -253,697 -287,572 -803,270 -1,410,446 -825,487
Damage -561,300 -87,428 -49,093 -129,209 -247,920 -159,576
Theft/Oth -1,002,564 -274,910 -95,709 -215,262 -421,631 -266,349
Total (£) -4,666,627 -616,035 -432,374 -1,147,740 -2,079,997 -1,251,413
QALYs Violent -58 -4 -5 -15 -27 -15
Damage -8 -1 -1 -2 -4 -2
Theft/Oth -13 -3 -1 -3 -6 -3
Total Total -79 -9 -7 -20 -36 -21
Value of 'saved' QALYs -6,391,794 -709,069 -536,334 -1,581,549 -2,899,523 -1,716,987
Employment Volume Absence days -37,896 -833 -1,651 -10,628 -17,920 -9,144
Changes Unempl people -2,386 -33 0 0 0 -2,386
per annum   Cost (£) Absence -3,815,614 -24,934 -98,118 -1,072,347 -1,831,384 -905,896
Unempl -54,604,634 -132,220 0 0 0 -54,604,634
Total (£) -58,420,247 -157,154 -98,118 -1,072,347 -1,831,384 -55,510,530
Summary Health Costs (£) -8,010,783 -84,527 -60,874 -1,761,158 -3,604,989 -2,620,370
Financial Value Crime Costs (£) -4,666,627 -616,035 -432,374 -1,147,740 -2,079,997 -1,251,413
Harm Reduction Employment Costs (£) -58,420,247 -157,154 -98,118 -1,072,347 -1,831,384 -55,510,530
Year 1 Total Direct Costs (£) -71,097,658 -857,716 -591,366 -3,981,245 -7,516,371 -59,382,313
Health QALYs (£) -21,317,868 -314,722 -231,641 -4,931,543 -9,785,510 -6,508,627
Crime QALYs (£) -6,391,794 -709,069 -536,334 -1,581,549 -2,899,523 -1,716,987
Total Societal Value (£) -98,807,320 -1,881,506 -1,359,341 -10,494,337 -20,201,404 -67,607,927
Cumul 10 year Health Costs (£) -155,019,690 -735,012 -586,122 -24,953,796 -62,634,719 -67,208,927
Summary Crime Costs (£) -38,810,499 -5,123,318 -3,595,884 -9,545,303 -17,298,516 -10,407,505
Financial Value Employment Costs (£) -485,858,138 -1,306,986 -816,009 -8,918,286 -15,230,902 -461,659,169
Harm Reduction Total Direct Costs (£) -679,688,327 -7,165,316 -4,998,014 -43,417,385 -95,164,136 -539,275,600
Health QALYs (£) -566,045,145 -2,943,815 -2,406,467 -211,429,598 -189,744,191 -163,975,036
Crime QALYs (£) -58,946,304 -6,539,168 -4,946,175 -14,585,341 -26,739,938 -15,834,371
Total Societal Value (£) -1,304,679,776 -16,648,299 -12,350,656 -269,432,324 -311,648,264 -719,085,007 
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3.1.3 CONSUMPTION, SPENDING AND SALES EFFECTS ACROSS ALL 
POLICIES 
 
Table 32 shows the model estimates for overall changes in consumption, spending and sales 
for the population of England for the 33 pricing policy scenarios examined.  Equivalent tables 
for population subgroups under 18s, 18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers, and the moderate, 
hazardous and harmful drinkers are shown in section 3.1.7 (Table 37 to Table 41 on pages 
138 to 142). 
 
Changes in consumption 
 
Greater general price increases lead to larger consumption reductions: As general 
prices are increased further, estimated reductions in consumption become larger (e.g. +1%, 
+10% and +25% price rise gives -0.4%, -4.4% and -11.3% estimated consumption change 
respectively – scenarios 1-3).   
 
Targeted price changes only on low priced products are less effective than across the 
board price changes: as they affect only part of the market (<30p per unit off trade, <80p on-
trade) and therefore produce smaller consumption changes than across the board price 
changes (e.g. +10% price rise in lower priced products gives estimated consumption change 
of -0.2% off-trade and -0.5% for on-trade – scenarios 4 and 6). 
 
Targeting low priced products causes some switching: if only low priced products have 
price increases then the reductions in consumption are estimated to occur mostly in beers 
and spirits (e.g. scenario 5), with some switching estimated towards wine consumption.  This 
is due to small positive cross-price elasticities in the econometric model, so that if for example 
cheaper beers are increased in price, then there is a small increase in purchasing of wine as 
a substitution.   
 
Increasing levels of minimum pricing show steep increases in effectiveness: if a 
minimum price per unit of alcohol is implemented, the effects on consumption become larger 
as the threshold minimum price per unit increases.  As the minimum price increases in 5p 
increments larger and larger reductions in consumption are estimated (e.g. 20p gives -0.1% 
and 25p gives -0.3%, a difference of -0.2% from scenario 11 to 12, whereas 35p gives -1.4% 
and 40p gives -2.6%, a difference of -1.2% from scenario 14 to 15).   
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Table 32  Summary of estimated effects of price policies on consumption, spending and sales on all England population (Scenarios 1 to 33) 
 
SUMMARY - TOTAL          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    (all 
beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
%change 
in price per 
unit 
consumed
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
1 General Price +1% -0.4% -1.4 -1.2 -0.8 -0.1 -3.5 +41.9 +62.7 -3.7 +3.6 +104.4 +0.6% +1.0% +3.55 +5.90
2 General Price +10% -4.4% -14.4 -12.8 -7.7 -1.0 -35.9 +394.9 +589.2 -43.9 +27.9 +968.1 +5.6% +10.4% +32.89 +58.97
3 General Price +25% -11.3% -37.2 -33.5 -19.3 -2.6 -92.7 +882.5 +1308.5 -137.4 +36.0 +2089.6 +12.0% +26.2% +71.00 +147.44
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.2% -0.9 +0.0 -1.1 +0.0 -1.9 +61.4 +29.7 -6.5 +11.7 +96.3 +0.6% +0.8% +3.27 +2.31
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.6% -2.2 +0.0 -2.6 +0.0 -4.7 +141.6 +74.3 -18.6 +29.3 +226.5 +1.3% +1.9% +7.70 +5.78
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.5% -2.3 +1.3 -3.2 -0.1 -4.3 +12.5 +76.5 +11.1 -21.4 +78.6 +0.5% +1.0% +2.67 +5.29
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -1.3% -5.8 +3.2 -8.1 -0.2 -10.8 +31.2 +147.7 +27.7 -61.6 +145.0 +0.8% +2.2% +4.93 +13.22
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.8% -3.2 +1.3 -4.3 -0.0 -6.2 +74.0 +106.5 +4.5 -9.7 +175.2 +1.0% +1.8% +5.95 +7.60
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -1.9% -8.2 +3.3 -10.8 -0.1 -15.8 +173.2 +223.5 +8.8 -32.7 +372.9 +2.1% +4.1% +12.67 +19.00
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0% -0.1 +0.0 -0.1 +0.0 -0.1 +8.2 +6.1 -0.6 +2.4 +16.1 +0.1% +0.1% +0.55 +0.28
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.1% -0.8 +0.3 -0.3 +0.0 -0.7 +26.5 +16.5 -2.4 +6.4 +47.1 +0.3% +0.4% +1.60 +0.96
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.3% -2.4 +0.9 -0.6 +0.0 -2.1 +63.6 +37.1 -6.6 +14.0 +108.1 +0.6% +0.9% +3.67 +2.47
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.6% -4.9 +1.7 -2.0 +0.1 -5.2 +138.7 +82.3 -18.5 +30.7 +233.2 +1.3% +2.0% +7.92 +5.93
14 Minimum Price 35p -1.4% -7.9 +1.1 -4.7 +0.1 -11.4 +255.6 +153.2 -45.7 +56.5 +419.6 +2.4% +3.9% +14.26 +12.76
15 Minimum Price 40p -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +6.5% +21.52 +23.34
16 Minimum Price 45p -4.5% -17.2 -6.8 -13.2 +0.2 -37.0 +579.3 +325.1 -155.5 +114.6 +863.6 +5.0% +9.9% +29.34 +38.04
17 Minimum Price 50p -6.9% -23.2 -15.4 -18.4 +0.2 -56.8 +755.9 +425.1 -243.3 +145.2 +1082.8 +6.2% +14.1% +36.79 +56.31
18 Minimum Price 60p -12.8% -35.8 -40.0 -30.0 +0.2 -105.6 +1022.7 +643.8 -478.1 +205.3 +1393.7 +8.0% +23.9% +47.35 +100.38
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -18.6% -41.1 -70.5 -42.0 +0.2 -153.4 +1180.2 +881.9 -720.3 +255.9 +1597.7 +9.2% +34.2% +54.28 +150.68
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.6% -3.2 +1.4 -2.9 -0.0 -4.7 +37.3 +84.0 +7.1 -12.4 +116.0 +0.7% +1.2% +3.94 +5.56
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -2.1% -12.5 +5.5 -10.3 -0.1 -17.4 +176.9 +251.6 +14.3 -37.0 +405.9 +2.3% +4.5% +13.79 +21.59
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -5.4% -33.0 +7.0 -18.6 -0.3 -44.8 +492.0 +640.3 -19.8 -20.3 +1092.1 +6.3% +12.4% +37.11 +65.19
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.5% -7.5 +3.2 +0.2 +0.0 -4.2 +81.4 +40.0 -8.8 +14.2 +126.8 +0.7% +1.2% +4.31 +3.72
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.1% +1.5 -2.5 +0.1 +0.0 -0.8 +29.1 +24.5 -5.4 +9.8 +58.0 +0.3% +0.4% +1.97 +1.31
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.0% +1.1 +1.0 -2.3 +0.0 -0.2 +27.7 +17.2 -4.2 +6.5 +47.2 +0.3% +0.3% +1.60 +0.91
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.0% +0.00 +0.00
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0% +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.7 +0.2 -0.1 +0.1 +0.9 +0.0% +0.0% +0.03 +0.04
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.1% -0.1 -1.0 +0.0 +0.0 -1.0 +15.4 +2.2 -2.9 +0.8 +15.5 +0.1% +0.2% +0.53 +0.92
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.3% -0.2 -2.4 +0.0 +0.0 -2.7 +40.5 +5.6 -7.6 +2.2 +40.7 +0.2% +0.6% +1.38 +2.43
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.8% -0.6 -5.8 -0.1 -0.0 -6.5 +95.7 +13.0 -18.8 +5.1 +95.1 +0.5% +1.3% +3.23 +5.86
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -1.6% -1.5 -11.2 -0.4 -0.0 -13.1 +190.6 +26.8 -39.2 +10.5 +188.6 +1.1% +2.7% +6.41 +11.96
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -2.8% -3.2 -18.4 -1.4 -0.1 -23.0 +331.0 +51.0 -71.0 +20.0 +331.0 +1.9% +4.8% +11.25 +21.31
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.0% -0.5 +0.2 -0.0 +0.0 -0.4 +10.5 +4.4 -0.9 +1.7 +15.8 +0.1% +0.1% +0.54 +0.39  
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Minimum pricing affects beers and spirits:  changes in minimum price produce bigger 
estimated changes in consumption of beers and spirits, and have lesser effects on wine and 
RTDs (e.g. 40p minimum price gives estimated changes of -12.0 units per drinker per year for 
beer and -8.5 for spirits but only -1.4 for wines and a very small switching effect increase of 
+0.2 for RTDs in scenario 15). 
 
Higher minimum prices reduce switching effects:  The substitution effects towards wine 
estimated for lower minimum prices (e.g. 25p minimum implies a +0.9 units per annum per 
drinker increase in wine consumption) are reversed as the minimum price threshold is 
increased and price rises in wine itself are estimated to reduce consumption.   
 
Differential minimum pricing for on-trade and off-trade leads to substantial reductions 
in consumption:  Implementing differential minimum prices for on-trade and off-trade has 
substantial additional effects.  For example, a minimum price of 30p gives an estimated -0.6% 
consumption change, but a minimum price of 30p off- and 80p on-trade gives an estimated 
consumption change of -2.1% (compare scenario 13 to 21). 
 
Minimum prices targeted at particular beverages are only effective for beer:  a minimum 
price of 30p applied just to beers would have effects similar to the overall minimum price of 
30p with an estimated 0.5% reduction in consumption (compare scenarios 13 and 23), 
whereas a targeted 30p minimum price per unit for just wines, or just spirits or just RTDs 
would lead to very small changes in consumption, estimated at -0.1% or smaller (scenarios 
24-26).   
 
Ban of off-trade ‘buy one get one free’ offers has small effects:  Changes in consumption 
are estimated to be marginal if only very substantial discounts are restricted.  Banning 
discounts if they are >50% affects only a small proportion of products and produces a 
negligible change.   
 
Tighter restrictions on off-trade discounting have increasing effects:  Increasing 
restriction of off-trade discounting does have increasing effects in a similar way to minimum 
pricing (e.g. restrictions to 40%, 30%, 20% and 10% discounting give estimated consumption 
changes of -0.1%, -0.3%, -1.6%, -2.8% respectively).   
 
Tighter restrictions on off-trade discounting affect wine consumption:  Increasingly tight 
restrictions on discounting affect wine more than beers and spirits (e.g. banning discounts 
over 10% gives estimated consumption changes of -1.5 units per drinker per year for beers, 
but -11.2 units for wine – scenario 31).   
 
A total ban on discounting reduces consumption by 23 units per year. This would give 
an estimated change in consumption of -2.8%, which is of a similar order of magnitude to a 
40p minimum price policy (compare scenarios 32 and 15). 
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Bans on discounts only for lower-priced alcohol are not effective in reducing 
consumption: a targeted ban on discounting only focussed on products with a regular low 
price below 30p has negligible effects because so few of those products are discounted 
(scenario 33).   
 
Changes in Consumer Spending 
 
Price increases are not matched by consumption reductions and spending is 
estimated to increase: Estimated reductions in consumption do not match the increases in 
prices (since the elasticities are less than -1.0).  Hence as prices increase, even though 
consumption decreases somewhat, spending overall does increase.  For example, with a 
+1% price increase, consumption is estimated to change by -0.4% and overall spending to 
increase by +0.6% (scenario 1).   
 
Changes in spending per drinker for each policy are broadly proportionate to the price 
increase: The estimated change in spending per drinker per annum (2nd column from the 
right in Table 32) becomes higher as prices increase.  For example, a 30p minimum price 
policy implies an average increase in spending of £7.92 per year for each drinker (scenario 
13), whereas a minimum price of 40p implies an increase of £21.52 per year.   
 
Changes in spending affect mostly harmful drinkers, with hazardous drinkers 
somewhat affected and moderate drinkers affected least:  As shown earlier, spending 
increases are very different for the three consumption groups.  Table 37 to Table 41 (pages 
138 to 142) show the results for each policy.  Harmful drinkers are estimated to incur the 
greatest spending increases and moderate drinkers incur generally very small increases (e.g. 
+£38.38 per annum for harmful and +£8.44 for hazardous versus +£1.20 per annum for the 
30p minimum price scenario 13).   
 
If drinkers did not change consumption in response to price changes, the effect “on the 
pocket” of spending per drinker would be somewhat higher for most policies (final column of 
Table 32). For example, a +10% price increase leads to increased spending of £32.89 per 
drinker if consumption is reduced as expected, but if drinkers were to maintain current 
consumption the increase would be £58.97.  This is not the case for every policy because 
switching effects, particularly between on- and off-trade in the very low minimum price 
scenarios (e.g. 20p scenario 11), mean that some drinkers would purchase more expensive 
products.  
 
Changes in Sales and Tax/Duty 
 
Annual retail sales value is estimated to increase:  The model predicts increases in both 
off-trade and on-trade retail receipts (excluding duty and VAT) for every price increasing 
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policy.  The greater the price increase the greater the retail receipts.  For example, the 30p 
minimum price option is estimated to increase off-trade receipts per annum by +£139m 
versus +£404m for a 40p minimum price option.  There are similar increases (e.g. +£82m for 
30p versus +£234m for 40p) in the on-trade.  
 
Effects on tax and duty are estimated to be relatively small and vary according to 
whether on- or off-trade is most affected:   Since the minimum price policies affect mostly 
off-trade sales, the duty and tax paid from this sector is estimated to decrease (e.g. -£90m tax 
and duty from off-trade for 40p minimum price) but this can be partly or, in some cases, totally 
compensated for by increased duty and tax from the on-trade sector as some switching is 
estimated to occur (e.g. +£85m tax and duty from off-trade for 40p minimum price).  The 
picture varies by policy because the duty is applied to the volume of sales on a per unit basis 
(which in most scenarios is reducing), but the VAT applies to the monetary value of the sales 
(which is increasing).   
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3.1.4 HEALTH, CRIME AND EMPLOYMENT HARM EFFECTS ACROSS ALL 
POLICIES 
 
Table 33 shows the results of each pricing scenario in terms of estimated changes in health, 
crime and employment alcohol related harm and Table 34 shows the percentage changes 
from our model estimated baseline of alcohol attributable harms.  Table 42 to Table 46 (pages 
143 to 147) show a similarly structured table of harm reductions.  They separate the priority 
groups of 11-18s, 18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers and the moderate, hazardous and 
harmful drinker groups. 
 
As prices increase, the modelling estimates that more deaths are avoided:  for example, 
a move from a 30p to a 40p minimum price per unit changes the estimated year 1 deaths 
avoided from just 30 (-0.9%) to 157 (-4.5%).  The full effects of chronic disease risk 
reductions on deaths are modelled to take 10 years to full effect, and the results show the 
deaths per annum avoided in year 10 are approximately 10 times higher than in year 1.  The 
changes in deaths for each policy are broadly in proportion to the changes in consumption 
(see Figure 27).   
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Figure 27:  Relationship of estimated change in deaths (year 1) to estimated change in 
consumption across different policies. 
 
Deaths avoided occur disproportionately in harmful drinkers: Harmful drinkers have both 
a higher mortality risk and respond to policy changes with larger absolute changes in 
consumption than moderate and hazardous drinkers.  Policies that target price increases at 
low priced alcohol target the harmful drinkers particularly.  For example, of the 302 deaths 
avoided per annum at full effect by a 30p minimum price, 263 (81%) are in the harmful group.  
This proportion varies substantially by policy. 
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Policies with bigger price increases reduce consumption in moderate and hazardous 
drinkers, and do reduce deaths in these groups also: e.g. in scenario 2 (+10% price 
increase) the full effect of deaths in harmful drinkers avoided was 976 (58% of all deaths 
avoided), but there are also significant reductions in the moderate (71) and hazardous (633) 
drinking groups. 
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Table 33 Summary of estimated effects of policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harms: England population (Scenarios 1 to 33) 
 
SUMMARY - TOTAL                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemployed 
('000s
people)
1 General Price +1% -23 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 -0.2 -169 -2.2 -0.6 -5.1 -5.7 -1.5 -2.8 -2.1 -6.4 -0.1 -30.5 -1.3
2 General Price +10% -232 -1.8 -5.8 -10.1 -2.4 -1681 -21.6 -6.0 -50.8 -56.4 -15.5 -28.1 -21.2 -64.9 -1.2 -310.4 -12.8
3 General Price +25% -585 -4.4 -14.7 -25.6 -6.0 -4180 -53.4 -15.3 -125.8 -141.6 -39.9 -72.2 -54.2 -166.3 -3.1 -798.1 -31.9
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -13 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.0 -129 -1.8 -0.1 -3.7 -2.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.0 -6.2 -1.2
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -35 -0.4 -0.5 -1.3 -0.2 -332 -4.4 -0.5 -9.7 -8.4 -0.2 -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -0.0 -15.8 -3.1
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -22 -0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -0.3 -152 -2.3 -0.7 -5.5 -5.9 -4.0 -8.0 -7.2 -19.2 -0.3 -53.8 -1.2
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -58 -0.5 -1.8 -3.0 -0.7 -396 -5.7 -1.8 -13.9 -15.5 -10.1 -20.0 -18.2 -48.3 -0.8 -135.5 -3.0
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -39 -0.3 -1.0 -1.9 -0.4 -296 -4.1 -1.0 -9.6 -10.0 -4.1 -8.1 -7.8 -20.0 -0.3 -60.4 -2.4
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -99 -0.9 -2.6 -4.7 -1.1 -751 -10.3 -2.7 -24.1 -25.4 -10.4 -20.5 -19.7 -50.6 -0.8 -153.5 -6.1
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 -1 -0.1 +0.2 -0.1 +0.4 +0.1 +0.2 -0.0 +0.3 +0.0 +0.3 -0.1
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -2 -0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.0 -32 -0.7 +0.1 -1.2 -0.4 +0.1 +0.2 -0.4 -0.0 +0.0 -1.8 -0.5
12 Minimum Price 25p -8 -0.1 +0.1 -0.2 +0.0 -108 -1.9 +0.1 -3.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 -1.3 -0.0 -8.0 -1.6
13 Minimum Price 30p -30 -0.4 -0.4 -1.2 -0.2 -302 -4.5 -0.4 -9.9 -8.0 -0.6 -1.0 -2.3 -3.8 -0.0 -21.3 -3.8
14 Minimum Price 35p -78 -0.8 -1.3 -3.1 -0.6 -714 -9.8 -1.4 -21.9 -19.7 -1.5 -2.4 -4.5 -8.4 -0.1 -49.1 -7.3
15 Minimum Price 40p -157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -12.4
16 Minimum Price 45p -268 -2.5 -5.2 -10.8 -2.2 -2288 -29.4 -5.5 -66.6 -65.3 -6.2 -10.3 -12.4 -28.9 -0.5 -183.7 -19.1
17 Minimum Price 50p -406 -3.7 -8.1 -16.4 -3.4 -3393 -43.2 -8.6 -97.9 -98.2 -10.3 -17.1 -18.5 -45.8 -0.8 -296.9 -27.1
18 Minimum Price 60p -728 -6.3 -15.3 -29.7 -6.4 -5875 -74.1 -16.3 -168.8 -175.4 -20.9 -34.3 -33.2 -88.4 -1.7 -590.3 -43.4
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -1034 -8.8 -22.6 -42.7 -9.4 -8104 -102.9 -24.1 -234.4 -248.8 -31.7 -51.7 -49.3 -132.7 -2.5 -888.3 -55.0
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -19 -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.3 -124 -2.0 -0.6 -5.0 -5.5 -5.0 -10.7 -10.2 -25.9 -0.4 -58.8 -2.0
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -92 -0.8 -2.6 -4.7 -1.1 -700 -10.3 -2.6 -24.4 -25.3 -13.3 -27.2 -27.2 -67.6 -1.1 -181.2 -7.5
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -294 -2.6 -7.1 -13.4 -3.0 -2295 -30.8 -7.5 -71.9 -74.5 -24.2 -48.9 -48.1 -121.2 -2.0 -380.4 -19.1
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -13 -0.2 +0.2 -0.3 +0.0 -171 -3.1 +0.3 -6.3 -3.7 -1.1 -2.2 -1.2 -4.5 -0.1 -25.2 -3.7
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -70 -0.8 -0.1 -1.6 -1.7 +0.5 +1.1 -0.4 +1.2 +0.0 +0.1 +0.1
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -1 -0.1 +0.2 +0.1 +0.1 -37 -0.6 +0.2 -1.0 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 -0.7 -0.5 +0.0 +3.8 -0.1
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -1 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.1 -0.0
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -60 -0.7 -0.2 -1.7 -1.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.0 -5.6 -0.4
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -20 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -0.2 -156 -1.9 -0.5 -4.4 -4.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -1.5 -0.0 -15.4 -1.0
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -48 -0.4 -1.0 -1.9 -0.4 -374 -4.6 -1.1 -10.6 -11.3 -1.0 -1.4 -1.3 -3.7 -0.1 -37.9 -2.4
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -95 -0.8 -2.1 -3.8 -0.8 -749 -9.3 -2.2 -21.4 -22.7 -2.2 -3.0 -2.7 -7.9 -0.2 -77.9 -4.8
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -165 -1.4 -3.5 -6.7 -1.5 -1299 -16.2 -3.8 -37.3 -39.4 -4.0 -5.7 -4.8 -14.4 -0.3 -138.4 -8.5
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 -12 -0.3 +0.2 -0.5 +0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.0 -2.1 -0.3  
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Table 34 Summary of % change estimated in alcohol related health, crime and employment harms: England population (Scenarios 1 to 33) 
% CHANGE FROM MODELLED BASELINE
SUMMARY - TOTAL                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-10 
('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemployed 
('000s 
people )
Baseline Alcohol Attributable Harm 
(Estimated by Modelling zero consumption) +3490 +27 +146 +220 +58 +12196 +323 +148 +792 +976 +483 +863 +585 +1931 +37 +9456 +107
Policy Scenario
1 General Price +1% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.5% -0.4% -1.4% -0.7% -0.4% -0.6% -0.6% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -1.2%
2 General Price +10% -6.7% -6.5% -4.0% -4.6% -4.1% -13.8% -6.7% -4.1% -6.4% -5.8% -3.2% -3.3% -3.6% -3.4% -3.3% -3.3% -12.0%
3 General Price +25% -16.8% -16.2% -10.1% -11.6% -10.4% -34.3% -16.5% -10.4% -15.9% -14.5% -8.3% -8.4% -9.3% -8.6% -8.3% -8.4% -29.8%
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.4% -0.6% -0.0% -0.2% -0.1% -1.1% -0.5% -0.1% -0.5% -0.3% -0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -1.1%
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -1.0% -1.4% -0.3% -0.6% -0.4% -2.7% -1.4% -0.4% -1.2% -0.9% -0.0% -0.0% -0.2% -0.1% -0.0% -0.2% -2.9%
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.6% -0.7% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -1.2% -0.7% -0.4% -0.7% -0.6% -0.8% -0.9% -1.2% -1.0% -0.9% -0.6% -1.1%
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -1.7% -1.8% -1.2% -1.4% -1.3% -3.2% -1.8% -1.2% -1.7% -1.6% -2.1% -2.3% -3.1% -2.5% -2.1% -1.4% -2.8%
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -1.1% -1.3% -0.7% -0.8% -0.7% -2.4% -1.3% -0.7% -1.2% -1.0% -0.9% -0.9% -1.3% -1.0% -0.9% -0.6% -2.3%
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -2.8% -3.2% -1.8% -2.1% -1.9% -6.2% -3.2% -1.8% -3.0% -2.6% -2.2% -2.4% -3.4% -2.6% -2.2% -1.6% -5.7%
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.0% -0.0% +0.1% +0.1% +0.1% -0.0% -0.0% +0.1% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0%
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.0% -0.2% +0.1% +0.0% +0.1% -0.3% -0.2% +0.1% -0.2% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.1% -0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.5%
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.2% -0.5% +0.1% -0.1% +0.0% -0.9% -0.6% +0.1% -0.5% -0.2% -0.0% -0.0% -0.2% -0.1% -0.0% -0.1% -1.5%
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.9% -1.3% -0.3% -0.5% -0.3% -2.5% -1.4% -0.3% -1.2% -0.8% -0.1% -0.1% -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -3.5%
14 Minimum Price 35p -2.2% -2.9% -0.9% -1.4% -1.0% -5.9% -3.0% -1.0% -2.8% -2.0% -0.3% -0.3% -0.8% -0.4% -0.3% -0.5% -6.8%
15 Minimum Price 40p -4.5% -5.6% -2.0% -2.9% -2.2% -11.3% -5.6% -2.1% -5.2% -4.0% -0.7% -0.6% -1.3% -0.8% -0.7% -1.1% -11.6%
16 Minimum Price 45p -7.7% -9.1% -3.6% -4.9% -3.8% -18.8% -9.1% -3.8% -8.4% -6.7% -1.3% -1.2% -2.1% -1.5% -1.4% -1.9% -17.8%
17 Minimum Price 50p -11.6% -13.4% -5.5% -7.4% -5.9% -27.8% -13.3% -5.8% -12.4% -10.1% -2.1% -2.0% -3.2% -2.4% -2.2% -3.1% -25.3%
18 Minimum Price 60p -20.9% -23.0% -10.5% -13.5% -11.0% -48.2% -22.9% -11.1% -21.3% -18.0% -4.3% -4.0% -5.7% -4.6% -4.5% -6.2% -40.5%
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -29.6% -32.2% -15.5% -19.4% -16.2% -66.5% -31.8% -16.3% -29.6% -25.5% -6.6% -6.0% -8.4% -6.9% -6.7% -9.4% -51.3%
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.5% -0.6% -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -1.0% -0.6% -0.4% -0.6% -0.6% -1.0% -1.2% -1.7% -1.3% -1.1% -0.6% -1.8%
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -2.6% -3.1% -1.8% -2.2% -1.9% -5.7% -3.2% -1.8% -3.1% -2.6% -2.8% -3.1% -4.6% -3.5% -2.9% -1.9% -7.0%
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -8.4% -9.4% -4.9% -6.1% -5.2% -18.8% -9.5% -5.1% -9.1% -7.6% -5.0% -5.7% -8.2% -6.3% -5.3% -4.0% -17.8%
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.4% -0.8% +0.1% -0.1% +0.0% -1.4% -0.9% +0.2% -0.8% -0.4% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -3.5%
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.2% -0.3% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.6% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% +0.1% +0.1% -0.1% +0.1% +0.1% +0.0% +0.1%
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.0% -0.2% +0.1% +0.0% +0.1% -0.3% -0.2% +0.1% -0.1% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.1% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.1%
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0.0% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% +0.0% -0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0%
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -0.3%
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.6% -0.6% -0.3% -0.4% -0.3% -1.3% -0.6% -0.3% -0.6% -0.5% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.9%
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -1.4% -1.4% -0.7% -0.9% -0.7% -3.1% -1.4% -0.8% -1.3% -1.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.4% -2.2%
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -2.7% -2.8% -1.4% -1.7% -1.5% -6.1% -2.9% -1.5% -2.7% -2.3% -0.5% -0.4% -0.5% -0.4% -0.4% -0.8% -4.5%
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -4.7% -5.0% -2.4% -3.0% -2.5% -10.7% -5.0% -2.5% -4.7% -4.0% -0.8% -0.7% -0.8% -0.7% -0.8% -1.5% -7.9%
33 Ban Off Trade Discounting if Regular Price <30p +0.0% -0.1% +0.1% +0.0% +0.1% -0.1% -0.1% +0.1% -0.1% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.3%  
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As prices increase, alcohol attributable hospital admissions are estimated to reduce:  
Targeting only very cheap alcohol e.g. a 15p minimum price is estimated to have negligible 
effects on hospital admissions, with a reduction of around 100 p.a. (Table 33 scenario 10).  
Increasing the prices of cheap off-trade alcohol by 10% or 25%, increasing prices of cheap 
on-trade alcohol by 10%, introducing a 20p minimum unit price or banning discounts at the 
40% level all have very small effects (e.g. 0.2% reduction for 20p). Policy options leading to 
greater price rises do begin to have larger effects e.g. a 40p minimum price gives an 
estimated change of around 40,000 admissions per annum at the full effect (-5.2%). 
 
Crime harms are estimated to reduce as prices are increased:  a minimum price of 30p is 
estimated to reduce total crimes by around 3,800 whereas for 40p the reduction is estimated 
at 16,000 per annum.  For the 40p scenario, violent crimes are estimated to fall by 3,200, 
criminal damage by 5,300 and thefts, robberies and other crimes by 7,600. 
 
Crime harms are estimated to reduce particularly for 11-18s because they are 
disproportionately involved in alcohol related crime and are affected significantly by 
targeting price rises at low priced products: For example, of the 16,000 total crimes per 
annum reduction for the 40p minimum price scenario, 9,500 (around 60%) of the estimated 
reduction is in crimes committed by 11 to 18s (see Table 42).   
 
Crime related harms are estimated to reduce proportionately less than health related 
harms overall: For example, for the 40p minimum price, deaths in year 1 are estimated to 
change by -4.5%, whilst crimes are estimated to change by -0.8%.  This is because firstly, the 
crime harms are more related to level of maximum daily use of alcohol i.e. binge than to mean 
consumption, and secondly, because the cross-sectional evidence from GHS suggests that 
for harmful drinkers, scale of binge decreases by around 5% for every 10% reduction in mean 
consumption.   
 
Absence from work is estimated to reduce as prices are increased:  a minimum price of 
30p is estimated to reduce days absent from work by around 21,000 per annum whereas for 
40p the reduction is estimated at 100,000.   
 
Absence reductions are particularly focussed on hazardous and harmful drinkers:  e.g. 
for 40p, the 100,000 estimated reduction in days absence includes 35,000 days for hazardous 
and 54,000 days for harmful drinkers. 
 
Unemployment due to alcohol problems is focussed on harmful drinkers and is 
estimated to reduce as prices increase:  e.g. 3,800 avoided unemployment cases for 30p 
versus 12,400 for 40p minimum price. 
 
Unemployment harm reduces proportionately more than health or crime harms: This is 
because only harmful drinkers are assumed in the modelling to be at increased risk of 
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unemployment, and these drinkers reduce their consumption in absolute terms the most.  For 
example, alcohol related unemployment is estimated to change by -11.5% for 40p whilst 
health harms change by around -2% to -5% and alcohol related crimes by less than -1%. 
 
 
Figure 28 shows that the policies which are most effective from a health and employment 
perspective do not necessarily correspond to the most effective policies for crime reduction. 
This is because different sub-groups in the population having different elasticities, preferred 
beverages and preferred price points. For example, young male drinkers (who commit a 
disproportionately high volume of total crime) have a high proportion of their purchases in on-
trade beer and therefore are less affected by policies targeting cheap alcohol than other 
groups. 
 
 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 130 
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4  Cheap off-t alc +10%
5  Cheap off-t alc +25%
6  Cheap on-t alc +10%
7  Cheap on-t alc +25%
8  All cheap alc +10
9  All cheap alc +25%
11  Min Price 20p
13  Min Price 30p
15  Min Price 40p
17  Min Price 50p
20  Min Price 20p Off/60p On
21  Min Price 30p Off /80p On 
22  Min Price 40p Off/100p On
28  Discount ban  if > 40%
29  Discount ban  if > 30%
30  Discount ban  if > 20%
31  Discount ban  if > 10%
32  Total discount ban (off)
% fewer alcohol-attributable cases/deaths
Acute Illness
Chronic Illness
Deaths
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22  Min Price 40p Off/100p On
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Figure 28: Health harms, employment harms and crime harms summary 
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3.1.5 FINANCIAL VALUATION OF HARM REDUCTIONS FOR PRICE CHANGE 
POLICIES 
 
The financial value of harm reductions has been estimated for each policy incorporating 
· Costs to healthcare services 
· Costs to the criminal justice system 
· Costs of days of absence 
· Costs of lost productivity due to employment absence 
· A financial value of the health gain (per quality adjusted life year - QALY) 
· A financial value of the crime impacts on quality of life (per quality adjusted life year of 
the crime victims) 
This has been done for year 1 after the proposed policy is introduced and also cumulatively 
over the 10 year time horizon (accounting for discounting of costs and QALY benefits). 
 
Table 35 shows the results summary for the England population, Table 36 the % changes 
from modelled baseline, and Table 47 through to Table 51 (pages 148 to 152) show the 
results for the priority groups. 
 
The financial value of harm reductions becomes larger as prices are increased:    The 
overall cumulative discounted financial value of harm changes over 10 years for a 30p 
minimum price is estimated at -£1,410m, which is a £1.4 billion reduction in harms.  This gets 
larger for example with the 40p minimum price policy, with an estimate of -£5,418m, more 
than trebling the value of the harm avoided.   
 
The largest financially valued component of harm reductions is in the estimated 
unemployment reductions.  For example, just over half of the total £1.4 billion harm 
reduction in the 30p minimum pricing scenario is from unemployment-related reductions 
(-£812m).  The reason for this being the largest component is that most of the policies 
disproportionately affect harmful drinkers, who in turn are at substantially increased risk of 
unemployment.   
 
Healthcare costs are reduced as prices are increased:  e.g. NHS costs avoided due to 
reduced illness and admissions are estimated to change by -£115m for the 30p minimum 
price and  -546m for 40p. 
 
The financial value of mortality and morbidity avoided using the QALY measure also 
improves as prices are increased: e.g. the value of QALY loss avoided changes from 
-£401m for the 30p minimum price to -£1,938 for 40p. 
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Crime costs are also estimated to reduce as prices increase:  e.g. costs of crime for 30p 
minimum price change by -£31m compared with -£140m over 10 years for 40p.  Similarly the 
value of the loss victim quality of life changes from -£34m to -£196m.   
 
The financial value of harm reduction comes mostly from reductions in consumption 
and associated harm for harmful drinkers: Table 47 to Table 51 show that, for example, 
the -£1.4 billion harm reduction estimated for the 30p minimum price option includes within it 
-£0.08bn for 11 to 18 year olds (mostly through crime reductions), -£0.1bn for moderate 
drinkers, -£0.1bn for hazardous, and -£1.2bn for harmful drinkers. 
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Table 35 Summary of financial valuation of pricing policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harms: England population (Scen 1 to 33) 
 SUMMARY - TOTAL          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
1 General Price +1% -4.3 -6.9 -2.8 -30.2 -44.1 -11.8 -9.6 -65.6 -77 -57 -23 -251 -409 -283 -89 -780
2 General Price +10% -42.9 -69.6 -28.6 -301.4 -442.6 -118.6 -97.7 -658.9 -773 -579 -238 -2,507 -4,097 -2,818 -901 -7,815
3 General Price +25% -109.0 -178.4 -73.7 -754.0 -1,115.1 -301.8 -250.6 -1,667.5 -1,941 -1,484 -613 -6,271 -10,308 -7,081 -2,311 -19,700
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -1.1 -.6 -.6 -28.8 -31.1 -1.9 -.1 -33.1 -42 -5 -5 -240 -292 -142 -1 -435
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -4.7 -1.8 -1.5 -72.2 -80.1 -10.9 -1.2 -92.3 -122 -15 -12 -600 -750 -421 -11 -1,182
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -4.8 -19.1 -3.9 -24.6 -52.4 -14.1 -25.6 -92.0 -84 -159 -33 -204 -480 -296 -236 -1,011
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -12.8 -48.1 -9.8 -61.2 -131.9 -37.4 -64.4 -233.7 -218 -400 -82 -509 -1,208 -773 -594 -2,576
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -7.7 -19.9 -4.5 -53.7 -85.9 -21.2 -26.5 -133.6 -142 -166 -38 -447 -793 -501 -244 -1,538
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -19.5 -50.5 -11.5 -135.6 -217.0 -54.1 -67.0 -338.1 -359 -420 -96 -1,127 -2,002 -1,270 -618 -3,890
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.8 +.3 -.0 -2.3 -1.2 +2.6 +.9 +2.3 +5 +3 - -19 -12 +21 +8 +18
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0.5 +.1 -.2 -14.3 -14.0 +1.7 +1.0 -11.2 -8 +1 -2 -119 -128 -21 +9 -139
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.2 -1.1 -.8 -43.3 -45.5 +.1 -.4 -45.8 -34 -9 -7 -361 -411 -113 -4 -528
13 Minimum Price 30p -4.1 -3.7 -2.1 -97.6 -107.4 -9.9 -3.7 -120.9 -115 -31 -17 -812 -975 -401 -34 -1,410
14 Minimum Price 35p -11.9 -8.5 -4.7 -182.1 -207.1 -30.0 -9.8 -246.9 -281 -70 -39 -1,514 -1,904 -986 -90 -2,981
15 Minimum Price 40p -24.7 -16.8 -9.6 -302.8 -353.9 -63.1 -21.3 -438.4 -546 -140 -80 -2,518 -3,284 -1,938 -196 -5,418
16 Minimum Price 45p -43.0 -30.9 -17.6 -461.7 -553.2 -111.0 -40.8 -705.0 -915 -257 -147 -3,840 -5,159 -3,264 -376 -8,799
17 Minimum Price 50p -66.0 -49.6 -28.6 -649.6 -793.7 -171.6 -66.8 -1,032.2 -1,373 -413 -238 -5,402 -7,426 -4,909 -616 -12,951
18 Minimum Price 60p -122.3 -97.4 -57.1 -1,033.9 -1,310.6 -321.6 -133.7 -1,765.9 -2,452 -810 -475 -8,599 -12,335 -8,769 -1,233 -22,337
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -178.2 -147.0 -85.3 -1,298.2 -1,708.7 -471.1 -201.6 -2,381.4 -3,500 -1,223 -710 -10,797 -16,229 -12,440 -1,859 -30,528
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -4.6 -24.1 -4.0 -41.5 -74.2 -13.8 -33.2 -121.2 -77 -200 -34 -345 -656 -273 -306 -1,235
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -19.4 -64.8 -13.3 -172.6 -270.1 -55.5 -87.7 -413.4 -357 -539 -111 -1,436 -2,442 -1,264 -809 -4,515
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -55.2 -117.7 -31.0 -457.6 -661.5 -150.4 -160.1 -972.0 -1,047 -979 -258 -3,806 -6,090 -3,724 -1,476 -11,291
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.1 -4.7 -2.7 -99.7 -107.2 +.0 -6.9 -114.0 -52 -39 -23 -829 -942 -185 -63 -1,190
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.9 +1.3 +.0 +2.8 +3.2 -2.1 +2.8 +3.9 -24 +11 + +23 +11 -83 +26 -46
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.8 -.1 +.6 +.0 +1.4 +3.2 +1.2 +5.8 -4 -1 +5 + + -2 +11 +10
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0.2 +.0 -.0 -.3 -.0 +.8 +.1 +.9 +1 + - -2 -1 +6 +1 +6
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -1.3 -.7 -.6 -8.2 -10.7 -3.4 -.9 -15.0 -25 -6 -5 -68 -103 -90 -8 -201
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -3.3 -1.9 -1.5 -22.3 -29.1 -8.8 -2.5 -40.5 -64 -16 -13 -186 -279 -235 -23 -537
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -8.0 -4.7 -3.8 -54.6 -71.1 -21.3 -6.4 -98.8 -155 -39 -32 -454 -680 -566 -59 -1,305
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -15.9 -9.8 -7.9 -111.5 -145.1 -42.5 -13.5 -201.1 -311 -81 -65 -928 -1,385 -1,134 -124 -2,644
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -27.6 -17.7 -14.0 -197.5 -256.8 -73.6 -24.6 -355.0 -541 -147 -116 -1,643 -2,447 -1,968 -227 -4,642
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0.7 -.3 -.2 -8.3 -8.1 +2.3 -.1 -6.0 +1 -3 -2 -69 -72 +8 -1 -65  
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Table 36 Summary of % change in financial valuation harm reductions across pricing policies: England population (Scenarios 1 to 33) 
% CHANGE FROM MODELLED BASELINE
SUMMARY - TOTAL          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Healthcar
e costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
Baseline Alcohol Attributable Harm 
(Estimated by Modelling zero consumption) +1005 +2111 +872 +2568 +6556 +2911 +3002 +12469 +15280 +17556 +7252 +21355 +61443 +48796 +27690 +137929
Policy Scenario
1 General Price +1% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -1.2% -0.7% -0.4% -0.3% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.3% -1.2% -0.7% -0.6% -0.3% -0.6%
2 General Price +10% -4.3% -3.3% -3.3% -11.7% -6.8% -4.1% -3.3% -5.3% -5.1% -3.3% -3.3% -11.7% -6.7% -5.8% -3.3% -5.7%
3 General Price +25% -10.8% -8.5% -8.4% -29.4% -17.0% -10.4% -8.3% -13.4% -12.7% -8.5% -8.4% -29.4% -16.8% -14.5% -8.3% -14.3%
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.1% -0.0% -0.1% -1.1% -0.5% -0.1% -0.0% -0.3% -0.3% -0.0% -0.1% -1.1% -0.5% -0.3% -0.0% -0.3%
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.5% -0.1% -0.2% -2.8% -1.2% -0.4% -0.0% -0.7% -0.8% -0.1% -0.2% -2.8% -1.2% -0.9% -0.0% -0.9%
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.5% -0.9% -0.4% -1.0% -0.8% -0.5% -0.9% -0.7% -0.6% -0.9% -0.4% -1.0% -0.8% -0.6% -0.9% -0.7%
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -1.3% -2.3% -1.1% -2.4% -2.0% -1.3% -2.1% -1.9% -1.4% -2.3% -1.1% -2.4% -2.0% -1.6% -2.1% -1.9%
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.8% -0.9% -0.5% -2.1% -1.3% -0.7% -0.9% -1.1% -0.9% -0.9% -0.5% -2.1% -1.3% -1.0% -0.9% -1.1%
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -1.9% -2.4% -1.3% -5.3% -3.3% -1.9% -2.2% -2.7% -2.3% -2.4% -1.3% -5.3% -3.3% -2.6% -2.2% -2.8%
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.1% +0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -0.0% +0.1% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.6% -0.2% +0.1% +0.0% -0.1% -0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.6% -0.2% -0.0% +0.0% -0.1%
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -1.7% -0.7% +0.0% -0.0% -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1% -1.7% -0.7% -0.2% -0.0% -0.4%
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -3.8% -1.6% -0.3% -0.1% -1.0% -0.8% -0.2% -0.2% -3.8% -1.6% -0.8% -0.1% -1.0%
14 Minimum Price 35p -1.2% -0.4% -0.5% -7.1% -3.2% -1.0% -0.3% -2.0% -1.8% -0.4% -0.5% -7.1% -3.1% -2.0% -0.3% -2.2%
15 Minimum Price 40p -2.5% -0.8% -1.1% -11.8% -5.4% -2.2% -0.7% -3.5% -3.6% -0.8% -1.1% -11.8% -5.3% -4.0% -0.7% -3.9%
16 Minimum Price 45p -4.3% -1.5% -2.0% -18.0% -8.4% -3.8% -1.4% -5.7% -6.0% -1.5% -2.0% -18.0% -8.4% -6.7% -1.4% -6.4%
17 Minimum Price 50p -6.6% -2.4% -3.3% -25.3% -12.1% -5.9% -2.2% -8.3% -9.0% -2.4% -3.3% -25.3% -12.1% -10.1% -2.2% -9.4%
18 Minimum Price 60p -12.2% -4.6% -6.5% -40.3% -20.0% -11.0% -4.5% -14.2% -16.0% -4.6% -6.5% -40.3% -20.1% -18.0% -4.5% -16.2%
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -17.7% -7.0% -9.8% -50.6% -26.1% -16.2% -6.7% -19.1% -22.9% -7.0% -9.8% -50.6% -26.4% -25.5% -6.7% -22.1%
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.5% -1.1% -0.5% -1.6% -1.1% -0.5% -1.1% -1.0% -0.5% -1.1% -0.5% -1.6% -1.1% -0.6% -1.1% -0.9%
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -1.9% -3.1% -1.5% -6.7% -4.1% -1.9% -2.9% -3.3% -2.3% -3.1% -1.5% -6.7% -4.0% -2.6% -2.9% -3.3%
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -5.5% -5.6% -3.6% -17.8% -10.1% -5.2% -5.3% -7.8% -6.9% -5.6% -3.6% -17.8% -9.9% -7.6% -5.3% -8.2%
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.0% -0.2% -0.3% -3.9% -1.6% +0.0% -0.2% -0.9% -0.3% -0.2% -0.3% -3.9% -1.5% -0.4% -0.2% -0.9%
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.1% +0.1% +0.0% +0.1% +0.0% -0.1% +0.1% +0.0% -0.2% +0.1% +0.0% +0.1% +0.0% -0.2% +0.1% -0.0%
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.1% -0.0% +0.1% +0.0% +0.0% +0.1% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% +0.1% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0%
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.1% -0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.2% -0.1% -0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.0% -0.1%
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.3% -0.1% -0.2% -0.9% -0.4% -0.3% -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.1% -0.2% -0.9% -0.5% -0.5% -0.1% -0.4%
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.8% -0.2% -0.4% -2.1% -1.1% -0.7% -0.2% -0.8% -1.0% -0.2% -0.4% -2.1% -1.1% -1.2% -0.2% -0.9%
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -1.6% -0.5% -0.9% -4.3% -2.2% -1.5% -0.4% -1.6% -2.0% -0.5% -0.9% -4.3% -2.3% -2.3% -0.4% -1.9%
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -2.7% -0.8% -1.6% -7.7% -3.9% -2.5% -0.8% -2.8% -3.5% -0.8% -1.6% -7.7% -4.0% -4.0% -0.8% -3.4%
33 Ban Off Trade Discounting if Reg Price <30p +0.1% -0.0% -0.0% -0.3% -0.1% +0.1% -0.0% -0.0% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0% -0.3% -0.1% +0.0% -0.0% -0.0%  
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Figure 29 shows the total 10-year financial savings in £millions (shown as positive in this 
figure) associated with a selected subset of pricing policies.  
 
It is clear that the savings increase steeply the higher the minimum price selected. A 
move from a 30p unit price via 35p to 40p corresponds to more than a tripling of the saving 
(from £1.4bn to £3.0bn and £5.4bn over the 10-year period).  
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11  Min Price 20p
12  Min Price 25p
20  Min Price 20p off/60p on
13  Min Price 30p
14  Min Price 35p
21  Min Price 30p off/80p on
15  Min Price 40p
16  Min Price 45p
22  Min Price 40p off/100p on
17  Min Price 50p
18  Min Price 60p
19  Min Price 70p
4  Cheap off-t alc +10%
6  Cheap on-t alc +10%
5  Cheap off-t alc +25%
8  All cheap alc +10
7  Cheap on-t alc +25%
9  All cheap alc +25%
28  Discount ban  if > 40%
29  Discount ban if > 30%
30  Discount ban  if > 20%
31  Discount ban if > 10%
32  Tot discount ban (off)
Total 10-yr savings (£m)
30p Minimum pricing comparison 
line
 
Figure 29  Comparison of financial harm saved across selected policies. 
 
Introducing minimum unit prices in the on-trade as well as the off-trade is estimated to 
makes policies substantially more effective: because such policies would target lower 
priced alcohol in the on-trade as well as in the off-trade, mitigating some substitution effects 
from off-trade to on-trade. Adding an 80p on-trade minimum unit price to a 30p off-trade unit 
price changes the savings from £1.4bn to £4.5bn. 
 
Policies targeting cheap alcohol and leading to a price increase of 10% in low priced 
alcohol, for example scenario 8, only have a relatively small effect, similar in scale to a 
25p-30p minimum unit price.  Policies targeting cheap alcohol specifically in the off-trade and 
leading to a 25% increase are only marginally more effective. However, policies leading to a 
25% price increase for cheap alcohol in both on-trade and off-trade are estimated to be as 
effective as a 35-40p minimum unit price. 
 
Finally, policies restricting off-trade discounts over a certain level are only effective if 
they cover a substantial proportion of the market. Bans on 50% and 40% discounts have 
small effects on harm reduction.  A ban on any promotions larger than “20% off” is only as 
effective as a minimum unit price of 30p. Banning promotions larger than “10% off” would 
have a comparable impact to the minimum unit price of 35p. A total ban on price-based 
promotions is estimated to be still somewhat less effective than a 40p per unit minimum price.  
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3.1.6 DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT POLICIES ON MODERATE, 
HAZARDOUS AND HARMFUL DRINKERS 
 
In this section, we present findings on the scale of effects for moderate, hazardous and 
harmful drinkers. An important question is whether those who are most affected in terms of 
additional expenditure on alcohol as a consequence of a policy are also those who benefit the 
most. Considerations for policy makers include: Which groups benefit most from the policy 
change in terms of avoided health harm? And, which groups are most affected in terms of 
their consumer expenditure?  
 
Figure 30 shows the reductions of annual hospital admissions saved (at 10 years, i.e. after 
the full policy effect has been achieved) for the three consumption groups’ moderate, 
hazardous and harmful for a selected subset of pricing policy options).  Hospital admissions 
have been chosen as an exemplar here, but the pattern of savings is similar for other 
morbidity indicators. It is clear that, regardless of the policy scenario, the vast majority of 
avoided hospital admissions are those for harmful drinkers, followed by hazardous drinkers, 
and with small reductions for moderate drinkers.  
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Figure 30: Hospital admissions saved per year for moderate, hazardous and harmful 
drinkers 
 
Figure 31 shows a similar pattern across consumption groups for how much extra per year 
they each would spend on alcohol. Most of the extra spending is accounted for by harmful 
drinkers. The extra spending for moderate drinkers varies from £0.19 to £14 per year 
depending on the policy option, with most policies in the range of £2 to £5. Note that this is 
taking into consideration a reduction in consumption after prices change. If everyone chose to 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 137
continue to drink at the same level, the extra costs would typically be around £5 per year, with 
a range of between £0.59 and £21. For hazardous and harmful drinkers, the additional annual 
expenditure is significantly more and varies substantially by policy option: For the highest 
impact policy analysed, hazardous drinkers are estimated to spend an additional £68 (£107 if 
they had not changed consumption) and harmful drinkers £169 (or £309 without consumption 
change).  
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Figure 31: Extra spending on alcohol, per drinker per year, after policy change 
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3.1.7 SUMMARY TABLES FOR CONSUMPTION ANALYSIS OF PRICING POLICIES BY PRIORITY GROUP 
 
Table 37  Summary of estimated effects of price policies on consumption, spending and sales – 11 to 18 year old drinkers 
SUMMARY - 11 TO 18          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    (all 
beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
1 General Price +1% -0.5% -1.3 -0.3 -1.3 -0.5 -3.4 +0.6 +4.1 -0.1 -0.0 +4.6 +0.5% +3.29 +6.10
2 General Price +10% -5.3% -13.4 -3.5 -13.0 -4.5 -34.4 +5.9 +37.7 -1.0 -0.7 +42.0 +4.9% +30.14 +60.98
3 General Price +25% -13.4% -34.4 -9.0 -32.6 -11.4 -87.4 +13.2 +82.1 -2.7 -4.1 +88.4 +10.4% +63.45 +152.45
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.4% -1.4 -0.1 -1.1 +0.1 -2.5 +1.6 +0.9 -0.6 +0.4 +2.3 +0.3% +1.63 +1.49
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -1.0% -3.6 -0.2 -2.7 +0.1 -6.3 +3.5 +2.3 -1.6 +1.0 +5.2 +0.6% +3.76 +3.73
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -2.3% -4.1 +0.3 -10.2 -0.7 -14.7 +0.1 +3.2 +0.1 -3.8 -0.3 -0.0% -0.24 +8.91
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -5.7% -10.3 +0.8 -25.7 -1.7 -36.9 +0.3 +3.5 +0.3 -10.4 -6.2 -0.7% -4.46 +22.28
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -2.6% -5.6 +0.2 -11.3 -0.6 -17.3 +1.7 +4.2 -0.5 -3.4 +2.0 +0.2% +1.40 +10.40
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -6.7% -14.1 +0.5 -28.4 -1.5 -43.5 +3.8 +5.9 -1.2 -9.5 -0.9 -0.1% -0.66 +26.01
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0% +0.1 -0.4 -0.1 +0.0 -0.3 +0.2 +0.2 -0.1 +0.1 +0.4 +0.0% +0.30 +0.16
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.3% +0.3 -1.1 -1.0 +0.1 -1.7 +0.9 +0.7 -0.5 +0.3 +1.5 +0.2% +1.06 +0.79
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.8% -1.5 -1.7 -2.2 +0.2 -5.2 +2.3 +1.8 -1.3 +0.7 +3.5 +0.4% +2.53 +2.57
13 Minimum Price 30p -1.7% -4.9 -2.2 -4.2 +0.3 -11.0 +4.2 +3.9 -2.7 +1.3 +6.7 +0.8% +4.84 +5.79
14 Minimum Price 35p -2.8% -9.2 -2.8 -6.7 +0.5 -18.3 +6.0 +7.1 -4.5 +2.1 +10.7 +1.3% +7.70 +10.58
15 Minimum Price 40p -4.0% -14.2 -3.2 -9.5 +0.6 -26.2 +7.6 +10.9 -6.4 +3.0 +15.2 +1.8% +10.90 +16.84
16 Minimum Price 45p -5.5% -19.5 -3.9 -13.2 +0.7 -36.0 +9.0 +15.3 -8.6 +3.7 +19.5 +2.3% +14.01 +24.67
17 Minimum Price 50p -7.3% -25.3 -5.5 -17.1 +0.7 -47.3 +9.8 +20.4 -11.1 +4.5 +23.5 +2.8% +16.88 +34.04
18 Minimum Price 60p -10.7% -37.1 -10.5 -23.1 +0.7 -70.0 +10.4 +30.4 -15.9 +5.5 +30.5 +3.6% +21.87 +55.52
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -14.2% -43.0 -16.7 -33.2 +0.5 -92.4 +11.3 +38.9 -19.5 +4.7 +35.4 +4.2% +25.40 +80.34
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -2.9% -11.4 -0.8 -6.4 -0.5 -19.1 +1.1 +10.5 -0.3 -2.4 +8.9 +1.0% +6.39 +16.26
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -8.9% -28.8 -1.3 -26.4 -1.7 -58.2 +4.6 +15.2 -2.2 -9.7 +7.9 +0.9% +5.68 +42.77
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -16.1% -58.8 -1.4 -40.7 -4.4 -105.2 +8.7 +27.6 -5.5 -15.3 +15.5 +1.8% +11.14 +96.05
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.9% -6.6 +0.3 +0.1 +0.1 -6.0 +2.3 +2.4 -1.0 +0.6 +4.3 +0.5% +3.07 +3.67
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.2% +1.0 -2.8 +0.1 +0.1 -1.6 +0.5 +1.0 -0.6 +0.4 +1.3 +0.2% +0.93 +0.69
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.5% +0.7 +0.4 -4.4 +0.0 -3.3 +1.4 +0.6 -1.0 +0.2 +1.2 +0.1% +0.84 +1.42
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.00 +0.00
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0% +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.02 +0.02
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.0% -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 +0.0 -0.3 +0.2 +0.1 -0.1 +0.0 +0.3 +0.0% +0.20 +0.25
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.1% -0.3 -0.6 -0.0 +0.0 -0.9 +0.6 +0.2 -0.2 +0.1 +0.8 +0.1% +0.55 +0.71
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.3% -0.7 -1.3 -0.0 +0.0 -2.0 +1.4 +0.5 -0.4 +0.2 +1.8 +0.2% +1.27 +1.68
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -0.6% -1.4 -2.5 -0.1 +0.0 -4.0 +2.7 +1.1 -0.7 +0.4 +3.5 +0.4% +2.53 +3.41
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -1.1% -2.6 -4.0 -0.4 -0.0 -7.0 +4.8 +2.0 -1.3 +0.8 +6.4 +0.8% +4.61 +6.23
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.1% -0.7 -0.0 -0.1 +0.0 -0.8 +0.4 +0.2 -0.2 +0.1 +0.6 +0.1% +0.40 +0.40  
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Table 38  Summary of estimated effects of price policies on consumption, spending and sales – 18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers 
SUMMARY - HAZARDOUS 18 to 24          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    (all 
beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
1 General Price +1% -0.6% -3.0 -0.9 -3.8 -0.7 -8.3 +0.8 +4.1 -0.1 -0.2 +4.6 +0.5% +6.50 +13.19
2 General Price +10% -6.0% -30.4 -9.3 -38.3 -6.5 -84.4 +7.8 +37.3 -1.1 -2.7 +41.3 +4.4% +57.86 +131.87
3 General Price +25% -15.4% -79.2 -24.2 -96.6 -16.4 -216.4 +17.4 +77.5 -3.4 -10.1 +81.4 +8.6% +114.03 +329.68
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% +0.0% +1.8 -0.4 -0.9 +0.1 +0.6 +1.3 +2.3 -0.2 +0.9 +4.2 +0.5% +5.94 +2.13
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% +0.1% +4.4 -0.9 -2.3 +0.3 +1.5 +3.0 +5.7 -0.6 +2.2 +10.3 +1.1% +14.39 +5.33
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -2.4% -4.6 +0.9 -30.0 -0.6 -34.3 +0.3 +0.6 +0.2 -5.5 -4.4 -0.5% -6.20 +14.11
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -6.1% -11.4 +2.2 -75.7 -1.5 -86.4 +0.7 -4.1 +0.6 -14.8 -17.7 -1.9% -24.80 +35.27
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -2.4% -2.9 +0.5 -30.9 -0.5 -33.7 +1.6 +2.9 +0.0 -4.6 -0.2 -0.0% -0.24 +16.24
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -6.1% -7.4 +1.3 -78.1 -1.2 -85.3 +3.7 +1.6 -0.0 -12.7 -7.4 -0.8% -10.36 +40.60
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0% -0.3 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 -0.0 +0.2 +0.3 -0.0 +0.1 +0.7 +0.1% +0.92 +0.35
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0.0% -0.2 +0.1 +0.2 +0.1 +0.2 +0.7 +1.2 -0.1 +0.5 +2.3 +0.2% +3.20 +1.13
12 Minimum Price 25p +0.0% -0.4 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 +0.4 +1.5 +2.6 -0.2 +1.0 +4.8 +0.5% +6.79 +2.48
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.0% -0.2 +0.5 -1.4 +0.4 -0.6 +3.1 +5.4 -0.5 +1.9 +9.9 +1.1% +13.85 +5.94
14 Minimum Price 35p -0.2% +1.5 -0.5 -4.7 +0.8 -2.9 +5.6 +10.7 -1.3 +3.6 +18.5 +2.0% +25.97 +13.02
15 Minimum Price 40p -0.7% +1.4 -2.3 -9.6 +1.1 -9.4 +8.6 +16.8 -2.5 +5.4 +28.3 +3.0% +39.69 +24.16
16 Minimum Price 45p -1.6% -0.1 -6.1 -18.2 +1.4 -23.0 +12.0 +23.5 -4.2 +6.9 +38.2 +4.1% +53.46 +39.76
17 Minimum Price 50p -3.0% -3.0 -11.7 -28.7 +1.7 -41.8 +15.1 +30.6 -6.4 +8.2 +47.5 +5.0% +66.58 +59.03
18 Minimum Price 60p -6.4% -8.9 -27.6 -55.7 +2.1 -90.2 +18.9 +45.1 -12.0 +10.0 +61.9 +6.6% +86.75 +104.24
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -10.5% -7.6 -47.8 -95.2 +2.3 -148.3 +20.5 +56.8 -17.5 +9.1 +68.8 +7.3% +96.37 +157.61
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -2.8% -9.7 +1.7 -31.4 -0.4 -39.9 +1.1 +3.8 +0.3 -5.5 -0.3 -0.0% -0.35 +21.23
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -7.2% -22.7 +4.3 -82.1 -1.4 -101.8 +4.2 +4.5 +0.4 -14.5 -5.4 -0.6% -7.53 +61.17
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -9.8% -50.7 +4.6 -88.9 -2.9 -137.9 +10.8 +29.5 -0.8 -12.1 +27.3 +2.9% +38.27 +151.84
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.1% -4.9 +2.8 +0.7 +0.3 -1.1 +1.9 +3.2 -0.3 +1.2 +5.9 +0.6% +8.26 +3.75
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only +0.1% +3.5 -2.8 +0.2 +0.1 +1.0 +0.8 +1.7 -0.1 +0.7 +3.0 +0.3% +4.22 +1.41
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.0% +1.2 +0.5 -2.2 +0.0 -0.5 +0.5 +0.5 -0.1 +0.1 +1.0 +0.1% +1.36 +0.77
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.00 +0.00
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0% +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.04 +0.03
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.0% +0.1 -0.6 +0.0 +0.0 -0.5 +0.2 +0.2 -0.0 +0.1 +0.4 +0.0% +0.57 +0.58
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.1% +0.2 -1.5 +0.0 +0.0 -1.3 +0.6 +0.4 -0.1 +0.2 +1.1 +0.1% +1.52 +1.57
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.2% +0.4 -3.7 +0.0 +0.0 -3.2 +1.5 +1.0 -0.3 +0.4 +2.6 +0.3% +3.58 +3.88
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -0.5% +0.4 -7.0 -0.3 +0.1 -6.8 +3.1 +2.0 -0.7 +0.8 +5.2 +0.6% +7.31 +8.18
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -0.9% +0.2 -11.4 -1.2 -0.0 -12.5 +5.8 +3.9 -1.4 +1.5 +9.7 +1.0% +13.60 +15.41
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.0% -0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.2 +0.3 -0.0 +0.1 +0.6 +0.1% +0.81 +0.31  
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Table 39  Summary of estimated effects of price policies on consumption, spending and sales – moderate drinkers 
SUMMARY - MODERATE          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    (all 
beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
1 General Price +1% -0.3% -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.0 -1.0 +9.0 +23.1 -0.5 +2.7 +34.2 +0.7% +1.79 +2.57
2 General Price +10% -3.5% -3.5 -4.4 -2.2 -0.2 -10.3 +85.6 +222.4 -6.3 +25.0 +326.8 +6.6% +17.12 +25.75
3 General Price +25% -8.9% -9.0 -11.0 -5.5 -0.6 -26.1 +195.4 +521.3 -19.6 +55.8 +753.0 +15.3% +39.44 +64.37
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.1% +0.1 -0.3 -0.2 +0.0 -0.4 +9.5 +5.8 -1.0 +2.2 +16.5 +0.3% +0.86 +0.59
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.3% +0.3 -0.7 -0.6 +0.0 -0.9 +22.2 +14.5 -2.8 +5.5 +39.4 +0.8% +2.06 +1.49
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.4% -0.6 +0.2 -0.8 +0.0 -1.2 +1.0 +25.7 +0.9 -0.8 +26.8 +0.5% +1.40 +2.00
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -1.0% -1.6 +0.5 -2.0 +0.0 -3.0 +2.6 +57.2 +2.2 -3.2 +58.8 +1.2% +3.08 +5.01
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.5% -0.5 -0.1 -1.0 +0.0 -1.6 +10.6 +31.5 -0.1 +1.5 +43.4 +0.9% +2.27 +2.60
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -1.3% -1.3 -0.2 -2.5 +0.0 -4.0 +24.8 +72.1 -0.7 +2.3 +98.5 +2.0% +5.16 +6.50
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0% -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +1.1 +0.7 -0.1 +0.3 +2.0 +0.0% +0.11 +0.06
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.0% -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.1 +3.1 +2.4 -0.2 +0.9 +6.2 +0.1% +0.33 +0.18
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.1% -0.1 +0.0 -0.1 +0.0 -0.2 +7.1 +5.6 -0.4 +2.1 +14.4 +0.3% +0.75 +0.43
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.2% -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 +0.0 -0.5 +18.3 +14.2 -1.7 +5.2 +36.0 +0.7% +1.89 +1.20
14 Minimum Price 35p -0.6% +0.1 -0.9 -0.9 +0.0 -1.6 +38.2 +27.4 -4.9 +10.0 +70.8 +1.4% +3.71 +2.87
15 Minimum Price 40p -1.2% +0.1 -2.0 -1.7 +0.1 -3.5 +65.7 +42.4 -9.9 +15.4 +113.6 +2.3% +5.95 +5.50
16 Minimum Price 45p -2.2% -0.1 -3.7 -2.7 +0.1 -6.5 +102.5 +59.7 -17.0 +21.1 +166.3 +3.4% +8.71 +9.39
17 Minimum Price 50p -3.5% -0.4 -6.1 -3.9 +0.1 -10.4 +145.4 +79.1 -26.4 +27.3 +225.4 +4.6% +11.81 +14.45
18 Minimum Price 60p -7.1% -1.5 -12.7 -6.8 +0.1 -20.9 +233.2 +123.9 -53.2 +40.0 +343.8 +7.0% +18.01 +27.39
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -11.3% -3.0 -20.4 -10.1 +0.2 -33.4 +296.2 +178.4 -89.7 +52.7 +437.6 +8.9% +22.92 +42.71
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.3% -0.4 +0.1 -0.6 +0.0 -0.8 +3.9 +18.0 +0.5 +0.1 +22.5 +0.5% +1.18 +1.39
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -1.3% -1.6 +0.4 -2.6 +0.1 -3.8 +21.3 +70.4 +0.8 +0.7 +93.3 +1.9% +4.88 +6.31
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -3.9% -4.8 -0.7 -6.0 +0.1 -11.5 +72.6 +183.9 -4.5 +7.1 +259.1 +5.3% +13.57 +20.60
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.1% -0.6 +0.3 +0.1 +0.0 -0.2 +8.0 +7.4 -0.4 +2.7 +17.8 +0.4% +0.93 +0.56
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.1% +0.2 -0.6 +0.0 +0.0 -0.4 +5.8 +2.5 -0.9 +0.9 +8.3 +0.2% +0.43 +0.42
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.0% +0.3 +0.2 -0.5 +0.0 +0.0 +4.3 +3.8 -0.5 +1.4 +9.0 +0.2% +0.47 +0.23
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.00 +0.00
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0% +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 -0.0 +0.0 +0.2 +0.0% +0.01 +0.01
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.1% +0.0 -0.2 +0.0 +0.0 -0.2 +3.3 +0.4 -0.3 +0.2 +3.6 +0.1% +0.19 +0.28
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.2% +0.0 -0.6 +0.0 +0.0 -0.6 +8.7 +1.0 -0.7 +0.4 +9.4 +0.2% +0.49 +0.74
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.5% -0.0 -1.5 -0.0 +0.0 -1.5 +20.6 +2.4 -1.8 +0.9 +22.2 +0.5% +1.16 +1.80
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -1.0% -0.1 -2.9 -0.1 +0.0 -3.1 +41.7 +5.0 -3.9 +1.9 +44.7 +0.9% +2.34 +3.71
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -1.8% -0.2 -4.8 -0.4 -0.0 -5.4 +73.8 +10.0 -7.3 +3.7 +80.1 +1.6% +4.20 +6.70
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.0% -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +1.2 +0.8 -0.1 +0.3 +2.2 +0.0% +0.12 +0.07  
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Table 40  Summary of estimated effects of price policies on consumption, spending and sales – hazardous drinkers 
SUMMARY - HAZARDOUS          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    (all 
beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
1 General Price +1% -0.5% -2.4 -2.4 -1.5 -0.2 -6.4 +17.2 +21.7 -1.5 +0.4 +37.8 +0.6% +5.50 +9.79
2 General Price +10% -4.7% -24.7 -24.4 -14.9 -1.5 -65.5 +161.4 +200.1 -18.2 +1.0 +344.3 +5.1% +50.16 +97.87
3 General Price +25% -12.1% -64.0 -64.3 -37.6 -3.9 -169.8 +358.2 +428.3 -58.2 -12.4 +715.9 +10.7% +104.30 +244.66
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.1% -0.4 +0.7 -1.7 +0.0 -1.4 +23.8 +12.8 -0.8 +5.0 +40.7 +0.6% +5.93 +3.50
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.2% -1.1 +1.7 -4.2 +0.1 -3.5 +55.1 +31.9 -2.9 +12.5 +96.6 +1.4% +14.07 +8.75
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.6% -4.2 +2.8 -7.1 -0.2 -8.7 +6.3 +24.5 +5.4 -12.5 +23.6 +0.4% +3.44 +8.85
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -1.6% -10.6 +7.1 -18.0 -0.4 -21.9 +15.6 +40.9 +13.6 -35.2 +34.9 +0.5% +5.09 +22.11
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.7% -4.7 +3.5 -8.8 -0.1 -10.1 +30.1 +37.4 +4.6 -7.6 +64.5 +1.0% +9.39 +12.35
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -1.8% -12.0 +8.8 -22.2 -0.3 -25.8 +70.9 +73.4 +10.6 -22.9 +132.0 +2.0% +19.23 +30.86
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0% -0.3 +0.3 -0.2 +0.0 -0.2 +3.1 +1.9 -0.0 +0.7 +5.6 +0.1% +0.81 +0.42
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.0% -1.2 +0.9 -0.3 +0.0 -0.6 +9.7 +5.5 -0.1 +2.1 +17.2 +0.3% +2.51 +1.36
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.1% -3.0 +2.4 -0.8 +0.1 -1.4 +23.3 +13.5 -0.2 +5.1 +41.7 +0.6% +6.08 +3.42
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.3% -5.4 +4.8 -3.0 +0.1 -3.6 +52.4 +31.8 -1.7 +11.9 +94.3 +1.4% +13.75 +8.44
14 Minimum Price 35p -0.7% -8.1 +5.0 -7.5 +0.2 -10.4 +99.5 +61.2 -8.4 +22.5 +174.8 +2.6% +25.47 +19.08
15 Minimum Price 40p -1.8% -12.6 +1.7 -14.0 +0.2 -24.7 +161.1 +95.1 -22.2 +34.2 +268.2 +4.0% +39.07 +36.39
16 Minimum Price 45p -3.5% -18.8 -7.9 -22.4 +0.3 -48.8 +236.2 +133.0 -45.4 +46.2 +370.0 +5.5% +53.90 +61.41
17 Minimum Price 50p -5.9% -26.4 -24.2 -31.7 +0.3 -82.0 +314.0 +174.2 -78.8 +58.5 +467.8 +7.0% +68.16 +93.11
18 Minimum Price 60p -12.1% -43.7 -73.0 -53.0 +0.3 -169.4 +432.2 +263.0 -175.4 +81.8 +601.6 +9.0% +87.65 +170.67
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -18.5% -49.9 -134.5 -75.2 +0.3 -259.4 +494.0 +356.3 -280.7 +99.4 +669.1 +10.0% +97.48 +259.17
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.6% -5.5 +3.5 -6.7 -0.1 -8.8 +15.4 +27.3 +4.7 -9.6 +37.9 +0.6% +5.51 +9.21
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -1.9% -19.3 +13.6 -21.3 -0.3 -27.3 +72.2 +81.8 +15.0 -26.0 +143.0 +2.1% +20.83 +35.13
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -4.5% -50.7 +20.5 -32.7 -0.7 -63.6 +205.4 +228.0 +13.2 -18.3 +428.4 +6.4% +62.42 +106.66
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.1% -9.2 +6.9 +0.3 +0.0 -2.0 +29.8 +16.8 +1.2 +6.1 +53.9 +0.8% +7.86 +4.85
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.1% +2.1 -4.2 +0.1 +0.0 -2.0 +11.5 +8.0 -2.4 +3.2 +20.3 +0.3% +2.96 +2.22
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.0% +1.8 +2.1 -3.5 +0.0 +0.4 +11.0 +7.0 -0.5 +2.5 +20.0 +0.3% +2.91 +1.37
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.00 +0.00
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0% +0.0 -0.1 +0.0 +0.0 -0.1 +0.3 +0.1 -0.0 +0.0 +0.3 +0.0% +0.05 +0.06
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.1% -0.0 -2.0 +0.0 +0.0 -2.0 +6.6 +0.9 -1.4 +0.4 +6.5 +0.1% +0.95 +1.76
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.4% -0.2 -5.0 +0.0 +0.0 -5.2 +17.3 +2.4 -3.7 +1.0 +17.0 +0.3% +2.48 +4.60
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.9% -0.6 -11.8 -0.1 +0.0 -12.5 +40.5 +5.6 -8.9 +2.2 +39.4 +0.6% +5.74 +11.01
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -1.8% -1.5 -22.9 -0.8 -0.0 -25.2 +79.9 +11.6 -18.5 +4.5 +77.5 +1.2% +11.29 +22.33
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -3.1% -3.7 -37.2 -2.5 -0.1 -43.5 +136.3 +21.8 -33.0 +8.5 +133.6 +2.0% +19.46 +39.13
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.0% -0.6 +0.4 -0.0 +0.0 -0.2 +3.8 +1.8 +0.1 +0.7 +6.4 +0.1% +0.94 +0.53  
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Table 41  Summary of estimated effects of price policies on consumption, spending and sales – harmful drinkers 
SUMMARY - HARMFUL          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    (all 
beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
1 General Price +1% -0.4% -7.4 -5.2 -3.0 -0.5 -16.2 +15.3 +15.1 -1.6 +0.4 +29.2 +0.6% +12.69 +22.33
2 General Price +10% -4.5% -76.1 -53.7 -30.5 -5.1 -165.5 +143.9 +139.5 -18.8 +1.7 +266.4 +5.2% +115.88 +223.30
3 General Price +25% -11.8% -197.2 -141.9 -76.9 -12.8 -428.8 +319.9 +299.3 -57.8 -6.3 +555.1 +10.8% +241.43 +558.26
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.4% -10.2 +0.5 -6.2 +0.1 -15.9 +27.0 +10.5 -4.3 +4.3 +37.5 +0.7% +16.32 +13.54
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -1.1% -25.6 +1.1 -15.6 +0.2 -40.0 +61.8 +26.3 -11.8 +10.6 +87.0 +1.7% +37.83 +33.84
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.4% -10.3 +6.3 -9.4 -0.3 -13.8 +5.1 +24.3 +4.7 -5.8 +28.3 +0.6% +12.33 +21.28
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -0.9% -25.7 +15.8 -23.8 -0.8 -34.6 +12.7 +47.5 +11.8 -16.9 +55.1 +1.1% +23.97 +53.20
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.8% -20.7 +6.8 -15.7 -0.2 -29.9 +32.2 +35.0 +0.4 -1.5 +66.0 +1.3% +28.70 +34.81
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -2.1% -52.7 +16.8 -39.5 -0.6 -75.9 +74.8 +74.4 -0.2 -6.4 +142.6 +2.8% +62.01 +87.04
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0% -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 +0.0 -0.9 +4.0 +3.5 -0.5 +1.4 +8.4 +0.2% +3.63 +1.78
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.2% -5.9 +1.0 -1.3 +0.1 -6.2 +13.2 +8.3 -1.8 +3.3 +23.0 +0.4% +10.01 +6.45
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.5% -20.4 +4.0 -3.3 +0.2 -19.5 +31.6 +17.0 -5.2 +6.5 +50.0 +1.0% +21.75 +16.82
13 Minimum Price 30p -1.3% -44.4 +8.5 -11.1 +0.3 -46.7 +65.0 +34.1 -13.4 +13.0 +98.8 +1.9% +42.97 +38.38
14 Minimum Price 35p -2.6% -73.5 +5.9 -27.0 +0.5 -94.1 +113.6 +60.6 -29.5 +22.8 +167.5 +3.3% +72.86 +78.31
15 Minimum Price 40p -4.5% -110.6 -6.4 -48.1 +0.7 -164.5 +172.2 +90.5 -53.8 +33.7 +242.7 +4.7% +105.54 +137.75
16 Minimum Price 45p -7.1% -154.5 -32.2 -73.5 +0.7 -259.4 +234.6 +123.5 -87.2 +45.0 +315.8 +6.2% +137.37 +215.93
17 Minimum Price 50p -10.3% -203.3 -72.4 -101.1 +0.8 -376.0 +290.0 +159.5 -130.4 +56.6 +375.7 +7.3% +163.39 +309.46
18 Minimum Price 60p -17.7% -298.9 -185.5 -161.0 +0.7 -644.7 +350.5 +237.7 -238.9 +79.4 +428.7 +8.4% +186.46 +526.30
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -24.1% -334.1 -324.5 -218.1 -0.1 -876.8 +382.4 +321.9 -336.9 +99.5 +466.9 +9.1% +203.08 +768.97
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.6% -17.3 +6.2 -10.3 +0.0 -21.4 +17.5 +31.2 +2.1 -2.5 +48.3 +0.9% +20.99 +26.47
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -2.5% -80.1 +26.7 -36.0 -0.3 -89.6 +80.3 +88.4 +0.1 -6.9 +161.8 +3.2% +70.38 +103.66
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -6.9% -210.3 +34.2 -72.6 -1.0 -249.8 +208.0 +207.5 -24.8 -0.8 +390.0 +7.6% +169.61 +308.68
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -1.2% -61.3 +17.6 +0.8 +0.1 -42.7 +41.8 +14.0 -8.9 +4.9 +51.8 +1.0% +22.54 +26.84
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.0% +11.9 -13.7 +0.5 +0.2 -1.0 +11.7 +14.0 -2.1 +5.7 +29.3 +0.6% +12.74 +6.64
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.1% +5.3 +4.5 -12.4 +0.0 -2.6 +11.3 +6.1 -2.3 +2.4 +17.5 +0.3% +7.61 +4.91
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0% +0.00 +0.00
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0% +0.0 -0.2 +0.0 +0.0 -0.2 +0.3 +0.1 -0.0 +0.0 +0.4 +0.0% +0.16 +0.18
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.1% -0.6 -4.3 +0.0 +0.0 -4.9 +5.3 +0.8 -1.2 +0.3 +5.3 +0.1% +2.29 +4.08
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.4% -2.3 -10.9 -0.0 -0.0 -13.2 +14.1 +2.0 -3.1 +0.8 +13.8 +0.3% +5.99 +10.85
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.9% -5.8 -26.0 -0.4 -0.0 -32.2 +33.6 +4.7 -7.8 +1.9 +32.3 +0.6% +14.06 +26.47
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -1.8% -13.1 -50.3 -2.3 -0.1 -65.8 +67.0 +9.5 -16.3 +3.8 +64.0 +1.2% +27.83 +54.21
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -3.2% -26.2 -82.6 -7.1 -0.8 -116.7 +117.5 +17.9 -29.7 +7.2 +112.9 +2.2% +49.10 +97.67
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.1% -4.5 +0.9 -0.2 +0.0 -3.8 +5.2 +1.6 -0.8 +0.7 +6.8 +0.1% +2.94 +2.59  
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3.1.8 SUMMARY TABLES FOR HEALTH, CRIME AND EMPLOYMENT HARMS ANALYSES OF PRICING POLICIES BY PRIORITY GROUP  
Table 42 Summary of estimated effects of policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harm – 11 to 18 year olds 
SUMMARY - 11 TO 18                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemployed 
('000s 
people )
1 General Price +1% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.1 -1.9 -0.0 -1.5 -0.0
2 General Price +10% -3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -1.8 -5.5 -11.5 -18.8 -0.2 -15.0 -0.3
3 General Price +25% -8 -0.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.4 -8 -0.2 -0.8 -1.2 -3.5 -4.7 -14.0 -29.3 -47.9 -0.5 -38.2 -0.7
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.0 -0.7 -0.0
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 -1.9 -0.0 -1.9 -0.1
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 -2.4 -4.9 -8.0 -0.1 -6.1 -0.1
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -1.9 -5.9 -12.4 -20.2 -0.2 -15.2 -0.3
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -2.6 -5.4 -8.8 -0.1 -6.8 -0.2
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -3 -0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -1.6 -2.2 -6.6 -13.5 -22.2 -0.2 -17.2 -0.4
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 +0.0 -0.1 -0.0
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.0 -0.6 -0.0
12 Minimum Price 25p -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.1 -1.8 -0.0 -1.8 -0.1
13 Minimum Price 30p -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 -2.0 -3.6 -0.0 -3.7 -0.2
14 Minimum Price 35p -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -2.0 -3.5 -6.2 -0.1 -6.2 -0.3
15 Minimum Price 40p -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -1.1 -3.0 -5.4 -9.5 -0.1 -9.2 -0.4
16 Minimum Price 45p -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -4.4 -8.1 -14.1 -0.2 -13.0 -0.5
17 Minimum Price 50p -3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 -3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -2.2 -6.1 -11.3 -19.6 -0.2 -17.6 -0.6
18 Minimum Price 60p -6 -0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -2.3 -3.4 -9.6 -18.4 -31.4 -0.4 -27.6 -0.7
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -8 -0.0 -0.8 -1.0 -0.3 -8 -0.1 -0.7 -1.1 -3.2 -4.6 -13.2 -26.3 -44.1 -0.5 -37.6 -0.9
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.9 -1.1 -3.6 -7.7 -12.5 -0.1 -9.1 -0.1
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -6 -0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -2.3 -3.2 -9.8 -20.0 -33.0 -0.4 -25.4 -0.5
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -10 -0.1 -1.0 -1.3 -0.4 -10 -0.2 -0.9 -1.4 -4.1 -5.8 -17.5 -35.1 -58.4 -0.6 -45.5 -0.8
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -1.7 -0.0 -2.0 -0.1
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.0 -0.8 +0.0
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -1.1 -0.0 -0.9 -0.1
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.0 -0.4 -0.0
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.0 -0.8 -0.0
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.5 -0.0 -1.6 -0.1
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -1.5 -2.6 -0.0 -2.8 -0.1
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0  
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Table 43 Summary of estimated effects of policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harm – 18 to 24 year old hazardous drinkers 
SUMMARY - HAZARDOUS 18 to 24                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemploye
d ('000s 
people )
1 General Price +1% -1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3 -1.5 -0.0 -4.8 +0.0
2 General Price +10% -5 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -4.3 -7.7 -3.0 -15.0 -0.3 -49.2 +0.0
3 General Price +25% -13 -0.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.3 -15 -0.2 -0.8 -1.3 -3.5 -11.0 -19.9 -7.6 -38.4 -0.8 -126.2 +0.0
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.2 +0.0 +0.3 +0.0 +0.6 +0.0
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.2 +0.5 +0.1 +0.8 +0.0 +1.4 +0.0
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.7 -2.9 -1.2 -5.8 -0.1 -19.7 +0.0
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -5 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -4.2 -7.4 -3.0 -14.6 -0.3 -49.7 +0.0
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.6 -2.7 -1.2 -5.5 -0.1 -19.2 +0.0
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -5 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -4.0 -6.9 -3.0 -13.9 -0.3 -48.6 +0.0
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.2 +0.0
12 Minimum Price 25p +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.2 +0.0 +0.3 +0.0
13 Minimum Price 30p +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.0 -0.1 +0.0
14 Minimum Price 35p +0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.2 -0.1 +0.1 +0.0 -1.1 +0.0
15 Minimum Price 40p -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -0.0 -4.6 +0.0
16 Minimum Price 45p -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -0.8 -2.7 -0.1 -12.2 +0.0
17 Minimum Price 50p -2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -1.6 -2.5 -1.5 -5.6 -0.1 -22.7 +0.0
18 Minimum Price 60p -4 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 -3.8 -6.2 -3.1 -13.1 -0.3 -49.9 +0.0
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -7 -0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -9 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.2 -10.1 -5.2 -21.5 -0.4 -82.1 +0.0
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -3 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -3 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -2.2 -4.2 -1.4 -7.8 -0.2 -23.9 +0.0
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -6 -0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -1.7 -5.0 -8.8 -3.6 -17.3 -0.3 -58.7 +0.0
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -8 -0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -10 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -12.5 -4.8 -24.2 -0.5 -80.1 +0.0
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.4 -0.0 -0.8 +0.0
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.0 +0.6 +0.0 +1.0 +0.0
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.2 +0.0
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 +0.0
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.6 +0.0
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0 -1.7 +0.0
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -0.0 -3.6 +0.0
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -1.5 -0.0 -6.7 +0.0
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0  
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Table 44 Summary of estimated effects of policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harm – moderate drinkers 
SUMMARY - MODERATE                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemploye
d ('000s 
people )
1 General Price +1% -4 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -2.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -1.3 -0.0 -9.6 +0.0
2 General Price +10% -38 -0.2 -1.8 -2.5 -0.7 -71 -2.6 -1.9 -7.0 -21.7 -4.0 -6.3 -3.1 -13.4 -0.3 -97.3 +0.0
3 General Price +25% -95 -0.6 -4.6 -6.3 -1.7 -169 -6.6 -4.8 -17.6 -54.6 -10.3 -16.1 -7.9 -34.2 -0.7 -247.3 +0.0
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% +0 -0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.0 +0 -0.2 +0.1 -0.3 -0.8 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +0.2 +0.0 -0.2 +0.0
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -4 -0.5 -0.1 -1.0 -3.0 +0.1 +0.4 +0.0 +0.5 +0.0 -0.6 +0.0
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -4 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -9 -0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -2.1 -0.8 -1.2 -0.6 -2.6 -0.1 -13.8 +0.0
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -11 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -21 -0.8 -0.6 -2.1 -5.5 -1.9 -3.1 -1.5 -6.5 -0.1 -34.7 +0.0
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -6 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -12 -0.5 -0.3 -1.3 -3.7 -0.7 -1.1 -0.6 -2.4 -0.1 -14.2 +0.0
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -14 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.3 -29 -1.3 -0.8 -3.3 -9.3 -1.8 -2.8 -1.5 -6.1 -0.1 -35.9 +0.0
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +1 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.2 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.0
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +1 -0.0 +0.1 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.4 +0.0
12 Minimum Price 25p +1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +2 -0.1 +0.1 -0.1 -0.4 +0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.2 +0.0 +0.6 +0.0
13 Minimum Price 30p -0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -1 -0.3 +0.0 -0.6 -2.2 +0.1 +0.3 +0.0 +0.4 +0.0 +0.7 +0.0
14 Minimum Price 35p -4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -11 -0.9 -0.2 -1.8 -6.5 +0.1 +0.4 -0.0 +0.5 +0.0 -2.3 +0.0
15 Minimum Price 40p -12 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.2 -27 -1.7 -0.7 -3.8 -13.7 -0.0 +0.3 -0.2 +0.0 +0.0 -11.1 +0.0
16 Minimum Price 45p -23 -0.3 -1.2 -1.8 -0.4 -50 -2.8 -1.3 -6.5 -23.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -1.2 -0.0 -27.6 +0.0
17 Minimum Price 50p -37 -0.4 -1.9 -2.8 -0.7 -76 -4.2 -2.1 -10.0 -35.8 -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -3.3 -0.1 -52.0 +0.0
18 Minimum Price 60p -72 -0.7 -3.8 -5.5 -1.4 -135 -7.8 -4.1 -18.7 -64.7 -3.1 -3.6 -3.0 -9.7 -0.2 -121.6 +0.0
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -113 -1.1 -6.1 -8.7 -2.2 -188 -11.8 -6.6 -28.8 -93.7 -5.8 -7.2 -5.5 -18.5 -0.4 -210.0 +0.0
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -3 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -1.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.4 -1.6 -0.0 -8.7 +0.0
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -13 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.3 -28 -1.2 -0.7 -3.1 -8.5 -2.0 -3.1 -1.6 -6.7 -0.1 -36.7 +0.0
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -41 -0.3 -2.1 -2.9 -0.8 -81 -3.7 -2.2 -9.3 -27.4 -5.1 -8.0 -4.1 -17.1 -0.4 -102.4 +0.0
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only +2 -0.0 +0.2 +0.2 +0.1 +4 -0.1 +0.2 +0.1 -0.5 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.2 +0.0 -0.5 +0.0
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -1.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -2.4 +0.0
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +2 -0.0 +0.2 +0.2 +0.1 +3 -0.1 +0.2 +0.0 +0.3 +0.1 +0.2 +0.1 +0.3 +0.0 +2.8 +0.0
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +1 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -1.6 +0.0
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -1.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0 -4.3 +0.0
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -5 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -11 -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 -4.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -0.0 -10.6 +0.0
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -11 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -22 -0.9 -0.6 -2.3 -8.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -1.8 -0.0 -22.0 +0.0
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -20 -0.1 -1.0 -1.3 -0.4 -39 -1.6 -1.0 -4.1 -14.9 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0 -3.3 -0.1 -39.2 +0.0
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +2 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.2 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.1 +0.0  
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Table 45 Summary of estimated effects of policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harm – hazardous drinkers 
SUMMARY - HAZARDOUS                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemploye
d ('000s 
people )
1 General Price +1% -10 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -65 -0.6 -0.3 -1.5 -1.8 -0.7 -1.3 -0.9 -2.9 -0.1 -14.0 +0.0
2 General Price +10% -98 -0.5 -2.6 -4.0 -1.0 -633 -6.3 -2.7 -15.2 -18.1 -7.5 -13.4 -9.0 -29.9 -0.6 -143.3 +0.0
3 General Price +25% -248 -1.4 -6.7 -10.3 -2.6 -1579 -16.1 -6.9 -39.1 -46.5 -19.2 -34.6 -22.9 -76.8 -1.5 -370.5 +0.0
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -3 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -24 -0.2 +0.0 -0.4 -0.4 +0.1 +0.1 -0.2 +0.0 +0.0 -0.7 +0.0
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -62 -0.6 -0.1 -1.2 -1.4 +0.1 +0.4 -0.5 +0.0 +0.0 -2.0 +0.0
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -8 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -48 -0.6 -0.3 -1.4 -1.9 -2.2 -4.2 -3.5 -9.9 -0.2 -28.7 +0.0
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -23 -0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -0.3 -137 -1.4 -0.8 -3.8 -5.2 -5.5 -10.7 -8.8 -25.1 -0.4 -72.4 +0.0
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -13 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -82 -0.8 -0.4 -2.1 -2.8 -2.1 -4.1 -3.7 -10.0 -0.2 -29.6 +0.0
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -34 -0.2 -1.0 -1.6 -0.4 -211 -2.1 -1.1 -5.3 -7.2 -5.4 -10.4 -9.3 -25.2 -0.4 -75.3 +0.0
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +4 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 +0.0
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +2 -0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.0 -1.0 +0.0
12 Minimum Price 25p +0 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 -4 -0.1 +0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.0 -2.5 +0.0
13 Minimum Price 30p -5 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -38 -0.3 -0.1 -0.8 -1.3 -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 -1.7 -0.0 -6.0 +0.0
14 Minimum Price 35p -20 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -136 -1.3 -0.5 -3.0 -4.0 -0.4 -0.8 -2.0 -3.2 -0.0 -14.8 +0.0
15 Minimum Price 40p -48 -0.3 -1.1 -1.8 -0.4 -334 -3.3 -1.1 -7.6 -9.1 -1.1 -1.9 -3.1 -6.1 -0.1 -34.7 +0.0
16 Minimum Price 45p -92 -0.6 -2.1 -3.5 -0.8 -640 -6.4 -2.2 -14.9 -16.9 -2.5 -4.1 -5.0 -11.6 -0.2 -70.8 +0.0
17 Minimum Price 50p -149 -1.0 -3.4 -5.7 -1.4 -1035 -10.6 -3.7 -24.6 -27.4 -4.4 -7.3 -7.5 -19.2 -0.4 -122.2 +0.0
18 Minimum Price 60p -290 -2.0 -7.0 -11.5 -2.7 -1981 -21.3 -7.5 -49.2 -53.6 -9.5 -15.6 -14.2 -39.3 -0.7 -259.6 +0.0
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -425 -3.0 -10.3 -17.2 -4.1 -2891 -32.5 -11.1 -74.7 -79.4 -14.5 -23.8 -21.3 -59.6 -1.1 -397.2 +0.0
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -7 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -27 -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 -1.7 -3.0 -6.3 -5.1 -14.5 -0.2 -33.4 +0.0
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -28 -0.1 -1.0 -1.5 -0.4 -158 -1.7 -1.0 -4.5 -6.9 -7.1 -14.2 -12.8 -34.0 -0.6 -90.3 +0.0
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -96 -0.6 -2.7 -4.1 -1.1 -614 -6.0 -2.8 -14.9 -19.6 -10.9 -21.8 -19.5 -52.3 -0.9 -157.1 +0.0
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only +3 +0.0 +0.2 +0.2 +0.1 +16 +0.1 +0.3 +0.5 +0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -1.8 -0.0 -7.2 +0.0
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -4 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -37 -0.4 -0.0 -0.7 -0.4 +0.1 +0.3 -0.5 -0.1 +0.0 -0.5 +0.0
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 -1 -0.0 +0.1 +0.0 +0.2 +0.1 +0.2 -0.0 +0.2 +0.0 +2.2 +0.0
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -1 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.1 +0.0
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -27 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -2.7 +0.0
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -68 -0.7 -0.2 -1.5 -1.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.0 -7.3 +0.0
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -22 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -158 -1.6 -0.5 -3.6 -3.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -1.6 -0.0 -17.9 +0.0
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -44 -0.3 -1.0 -1.6 -0.4 -309 -3.1 -1.1 -7.2 -7.6 -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 -3.5 -0.1 -36.8 +0.0
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -74 -0.5 -1.7 -2.8 -0.7 -520 -5.3 -1.8 -12.2 -13.1 -1.8 -2.5 -2.0 -6.4 -0.1 -64.8 +0.0
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +1 +0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.0 +5 +0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.5 +0.0  
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Table 46 Summary of estimated effects of policies on health, crime and employment alcohol related harm – harmful drinkers 
SUMMARY - HARMFUL                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemploye
d ('000s 
people )
1 General Price +1% -10 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -97 -1.3 -0.1 -2.9 -1.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -1.3 -0.0 -6.4 -1.3
2 General Price +10% -96 -1.0 -1.2 -3.5 -0.6 -976 -12.7 -1.3 -28.5 -15.9 -3.4 -6.1 -3.5 -12.9 -0.3 -64.8 -12.8
3 General Price +25% -239 -2.4 -3.1 -8.6 -1.5 -2428 -30.6 -3.2 -68.6 -39.0 -8.7 -15.6 -8.9 -33.2 -0.7 -167.4 -31.9
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -10 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -106 -1.3 -0.2 -3.0 -1.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -0.0 -5.4 -1.2
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -26 -0.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.2 -265 -3.3 -0.4 -7.5 -4.1 -0.6 -1.1 -1.1 -2.7 -0.0 -13.6 -3.1
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -95 -1.4 -0.1 -3.1 -1.7 -0.8 -1.6 -0.8 -3.3 -0.1 -9.7 -1.2
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -23 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 -236 -3.4 -0.3 -7.8 -4.2 -2.1 -4.1 -2.1 -8.3 -0.2 -24.4 -3.0
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -20 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -202 -2.7 -0.3 -6.2 -3.4 -1.1 -2.1 -1.3 -4.4 -0.1 -15.2 -2.4
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -50 -0.5 -0.7 -1.9 -0.3 -510 -6.8 -0.7 -15.3 -8.4 -2.7 -5.2 -3.2 -11.1 -0.2 -38.5 -6.1
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0 -0.0 +0.0 -0.0 +0.0 -6 -0.1 +0.0 -0.2 -0.1 +0.1 +0.2 +0.0 +0.3 +0.0 +0.3 -0.1
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -35 -0.6 -0.0 -1.3 -0.6 +0.1 +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 +0.0 -1.2 -0.5
12 Minimum Price 25p -9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -106 -1.7 -0.1 -3.7 -1.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.0 -6.1 -1.6
13 Minimum Price 30p -24 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -263 -3.8 -0.3 -8.6 -4.5 -0.5 -0.9 -1.3 -2.7 -0.0 -16.2 -3.8
14 Minimum Price 35p -54 -0.6 -0.7 -2.1 -0.4 -567 -7.6 -0.8 -17.1 -9.2 -1.2 -2.1 -2.4 -5.6 -0.1 -32.2 -7.3
15 Minimum Price 40p -98 -1.0 -1.2 -3.6 -0.6 -1019 -13.2 -1.3 -29.5 -15.9 -2.0 -3.5 -3.6 -9.1 -0.2 -54.5 -12.4
16 Minimum Price 45p -153 -1.6 -1.9 -5.5 -1.0 -1598 -20.2 -2.0 -45.1 -24.5 -3.2 -5.4 -5.0 -13.6 -0.3 -84.3 -19.1
17 Minimum Price 50p -219 -2.2 -2.6 -7.7 -1.3 -2282 -28.3 -2.8 -63.2 -34.7 -4.5 -7.7 -6.7 -18.9 -0.4 -120.6 -27.1
18 Minimum Price 60p -364 -3.6 -4.4 -12.5 -2.2 -3757 -45.1 -4.6 -100.6 -56.5 -7.7 -12.8 -9.7 -30.2 -0.6 -204.2 -43.4
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -493 -4.7 -5.9 -16.5 -3.0 -5022 -58.5 -6.3 -130.6 -74.7 -10.3 -16.9 -12.5 -39.7 -0.8 -272.7 -55.0
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -89 -1.4 -0.1 -3.1 -1.7 -1.1 -2.1 -0.9 -4.1 -0.1 -13.7 -2.0
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -48 -0.6 -0.7 -2.0 -0.3 -512 -7.4 -0.7 -16.6 -9.0 -3.2 -6.2 -3.5 -12.9 -0.2 -47.0 -7.5
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -153 -1.7 -2.0 -5.8 -1.0 -1596 -21.0 -2.1 -47.2 -25.8 -6.4 -12.3 -7.8 -26.4 -0.5 -107.2 -19.1
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -17 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -192 -3.1 -0.2 -6.8 -3.6 -0.8 -1.5 -0.7 -3.1 -0.1 -17.7 -3.7
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -30 -0.2 -0.0 -0.5 -0.3 +0.4 +0.9 +0.2 +1.5 +0.0 +3.1 +0.1
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -39 -0.5 -0.1 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.0 -1.3 -0.1
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -0.0 -0.0
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -31 -0.4 -0.0 -0.9 -0.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -1.3 -0.4
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -84 -1.1 -0.1 -2.4 -1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.0 -3.7 -1.0
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -20 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -206 -2.6 -0.3 -5.9 -3.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.0 -0.0 -9.1 -2.4
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -40 -0.4 -0.5 -1.5 -0.2 -418 -5.3 -0.5 -11.9 -6.5 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -2.1 -0.0 -18.8 -4.8
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -71 -0.7 -0.8 -2.5 -0.4 -740 -9.4 -0.9 -20.9 -11.4 -1.1 -1.6 -1.2 -3.9 -0.1 -33.7 -8.5
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -19 -0.3 -0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0 -1.5 -0.3  
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3.1.9 SUMMARY TABLES FOR FINANCIAL VALUE OF HARM REDUCTIONS BY PRIORITY GROUP  
Table 47 Summary of estimated for financial value of harm reductions – 11 to 18 year olds 
SUMMARY - 11 TO 18          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
1 General Price +1% -0.2 -1.4 -.0 -.1 -1.8 -.7 -1.6 -4.1 -2 -12 - -1 -15 -7 -15 -37
2 General Price +10% -1.9 -14.3 -.5 -1.5 -18.1 -6.9 -16.6 -41.6 -17 -119 -4 -12 -152 -68 -153 -373
3 General Price +25% -4.9 -36.4 -1.2 -3.2 -45.6 -17.5 -42.4 -105.5 -44 -302 -10 -26 -383 -173 -391 -947
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.0 -.6 -.0 -.2 -.8 -.1 -.6 -1.5 - -5 - -2 -7 -1 -5 -13
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.2 -1.5 -.1 -.5 -2.2 -.5 -1.7 -4.4 -1 -13 - -4 -18 -5 -15 -39
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.8 -6.1 -.2 -.7 -7.8 -2.9 -7.0 -17.7 -7 -51 -2 -6 -66 -28 -64 -158
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -2.0 -15.4 -.5 -1.7 -19.5 -7.3 -17.5 -44.3 -18 -128 -4 -14 -164 -72 -162 -398
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.9 -6.8 -.2 -.9 -8.8 -3.2 -7.7 -19.7 -8 -56 -2 -8 -73 -31 -71 -176
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -2.2 -17.0 -.5 -2.0 -21.8 -8.0 -19.5 -49.4 -20 -142 -4 -17 -183 -79 -180 -442
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.0 -.1 -.0 -.0 -.1 +.1 +.1 +.1 + -1 - - -1 +1 +1 +1
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.0 -.5 -.0 -.1 -.6 -.1 -.3 -1.0 - -4 - -1 -5 -1 -3 -9
12 Minimum Price 25p -0.1 -1.5 -.1 -.3 -2.0 -.5 -1.4 -3.9 -1 -12 - -3 -17 -5 -13 -35
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.3 -3.0 -.1 -.7 -4.2 -1.3 -3.3 -8.7 -3 -25 -1 -6 -35 -12 -30 -77
14 Minimum Price 35p -0.6 -5.2 -.2 -1.2 -7.2 -2.4 -5.8 -15.4 -6 -43 -2 -10 -60 -23 -54 -136
15 Minimum Price 40p -1.0 -7.7 -.3 -1.6 -10.6 -3.6 -9.1 -23.4 -9 -64 -2 -14 -89 -35 -84 -207
16 Minimum Price 45p -1.5 -11.2 -.4 -2.1 -15.1 -5.4 -13.4 -33.9 -13 -93 -3 -17 -127 -52 -124 -302
17 Minimum Price 50p -2.1 -15.3 -.5 -2.5 -20.4 -7.4 -18.5 -46.3 -18 -127 -5 -21 -171 -71 -170 -412
18 Minimum Price 60p -3.3 -24.1 -.9 -3.2 -31.4 -11.7 -29.4 -72.6 -29 -201 -7 -26 -263 -114 -271 -649
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -4.6 -33.6 -1.2 -3.7 -43.1 -16.4 -40.5 -100.0 -41 -279 -10 -31 -361 -161 -374 -896
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -1.2 -8.9 -.3 -.4 -10.9 -4.3 -10.9 -26.2 -11 -74 -2 -4 -92 -43 -101 -236
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -3.3 -24.4 -.8 -2.1 -30.7 -11.7 -29.6 -72.0 -30 -203 -7 -18 -258 -117 -273 -647
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -5.9 -43.7 -1.4 -3.6 -54.6 -20.9 -52.6 -128.1 -53 -363 -12 -30 -459 -207 -485 -1,150
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.2 -1.4 -.1 -.5 -2.1 -.5 -1.9 -4.5 -1 -12 -1 -4 -18 -5 -17 -40
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.1 -.6 -.0 +.0 -.7 -.3 -.5 -1.6 -1 -5 - + -6 -3 -5 -14
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.1 -.9 -.0 -.2 -1.2 -.3 -.7 -2.2 -1 -8 - -2 -10 -3 -6 -19
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 - - - - - - - -
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.0 -.1 -.0 -.0 -.1 -.1 -.1 -.3 - -1 - - -1 -1 -1 -3
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.0 -.3 -.0 -.1 -.4 -.1 -.3 -.8 - -2 - - -3 -1 -3 -7
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.1 -.6 -.0 -.1 -.9 -.3 -.7 -1.9 -1 -5 - -1 -7 -3 -7 -17
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -0.2 -1.2 -.0 -.3 -1.7 -.6 -1.4 -3.8 -1 -10 - -2 -14 -6 -13 -33
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -0.3 -2.2 -.1 -.4 -3.0 -1.1 -2.5 -6.7 -3 -18 -1 -4 -25 -11 -24 -59
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0.0 -.2 -.0 -.1 -.2 +.1 -.1 -.2 + -1 - -1 -2 +1 -1 -2  
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Table 48 Summary of estimated for financial value of harm reductions –18 to 24 year old hazardous 
 
SUMMARY - HAZARDOUS 18 to 24          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
1 General Price +1% -0.2 -1.7 -.3 +.0 -2.2 -.6 -2.4 -5.2 -2 -14 -2 + -18 -7 -22 -47
2 General Price +10% -2.0 -16.9 -3.0 +.0 -21.9 -6.6 -24.1 -52.6 -18 -141 -25 + -184 -69 -222 -475
3 General Price +25% -5.0 -43.4 -7.8 +.0 -56.3 -16.9 -61.9 -135.1 -47 -361 -65 + -473 -176 -571 -1,220
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% +0.0 +.3 +.0 +.0 +.4 +.1 +.6 +1.2 + +3 + + +3 +1 +5 +10
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% +0.1 +.8 +.1 +.0 +1.0 +.2 +1.4 +2.6 +1 +7 +1 + +8 +2 +13 +23
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -0.8 -6.6 -1.2 +.0 -8.6 -2.7 -9.3 -20.6 -7 -55 -10 + -72 -28 -86 -186
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -2.0 -16.7 -3.1 +.0 -21.7 -6.7 -23.5 -51.8 -19 -138 -25 + -182 -70 -216 -469
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -0.8 -6.3 -1.2 +.0 -8.2 -2.6 -8.8 -19.7 -7 -53 -10 + -69 -27 -81 -178
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -1.9 -16.0 -3.0 +.0 -20.9 -6.6 -22.4 -49.8 -18 -133 -25 + -176 -69 -206 -451
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) -0.0 -.0 -.0 +.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 -.0 - - - + - - - -
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0.0 +.1 +.0 +.0 +.1 +.1 +.2 +.4 + +1 + + +1 +1 +2 +4
12 Minimum Price 25p +0.0 +.2 +.0 +.0 +.2 +.1 +.3 +.7 + +2 + + +2 +1 +3 +6
13 Minimum Price 30p +0.0 +.1 -.0 +.0 +.1 +.0 +.3 +.4 - +1 - + +1 - +3 +3
14 Minimum Price 35p -0.0 -.0 -.1 +.0 -.1 -.1 +.2 +.0 -1 - - + -1 -2 +2 -2
15 Minimum Price 40p -0.1 -1.0 -.3 +.0 -1.4 -.6 -1.1 -3.1 -2 -8 -2 + -13 -8 -10 -30
16 Minimum Price 45p -0.5 -3.4 -.7 +.0 -4.6 -1.7 -4.4 -10.7 -5 -28 -6 + -39 -19 -41 -99
17 Minimum Price 50p -0.9 -6.7 -1.4 +.0 -9.0 -3.1 -9.0 -21.1 -9 -56 -11 + -76 -35 -83 -194
18 Minimum Price 60p -1.9 -15.5 -3.0 +.0 -20.4 -6.8 -21.1 -48.3 -19 -129 -25 + -173 -74 -194 -441
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -3.2 -25.4 -5.0 +.0 -33.6 -11.2 -34.6 -79.4 -31 -211 -41 + -284 -120 -319 -723
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -1.0 -8.6 -1.5 +.0 -11.1 -3.2 -12.6 -26.8 -9 -72 -12 + -93 -34 -116 -243
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -2.3 -19.8 -3.6 +.0 -25.7 -7.9 -27.9 -61.6 -23 -165 -30 + -217 -84 -258 -559
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -3.2 -27.4 -4.9 +.0 -35.5 -10.8 -39.0 -85.3 -31 -228 -41 + -300 -118 -359 -778
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -0.0 -.4 -.1 +.0 -.5 -.1 -.6 -1.1 - -3 - + -4 -1 -6 -11
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only +0.1 +.6 +.1 +.0 +.7 +.2 +1.0 +1.9 + +5 +1 + +6 +2 +9 +16
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.0 -.0 -.0 +.0 -.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 + - - + - + + +
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0.0 +.0 -.0 +.0 +.0 +.1 +.1 +.2 + + - + + +1 +1 +2
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.0 -.1 -.0 +.0 -.1 -.0 -.1 -.2 - - - + -1 - -1 -2
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.0 -.2 -.0 +.0 -.2 -.1 -.2 -.5 - -1 - + -2 -1 -2 -5
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -0.1 -.4 -.1 +.0 -.6 -.2 -.5 -1.4 -1 -4 -1 + -5 -2 -5 -12
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -0.1 -1.0 -.2 +.0 -1.3 -.5 -1.2 -3.1 -1 -8 -2 + -11 -5 -11 -28
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -0.3 -1.9 -.4 +.0 -2.5 -.9 -2.4 -5.9 -2 -16 -3 + -21 -10 -22 -53
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.1 +.1 +.2 + + + + + +1 +1 +2  
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Table 49 Summary of estimated for financial value of harm reductions – moderate drinkers 
SUMMARY - MODERATE          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
1 General Price +1% -1.2 -1.6 -.9 +.0 -3.7 -3.4 -2.4 -9.5 -16 -14 -8 + -37 -109 -22 -168
2 General Price +10% -11.9 -16.5 -9.4 +.0 -37.9 -34.0 -23.9 -95.8 -160 -138 -78 + -376 -1,087 -220 -1,683
3 General Price +25% -30.3 -42.1 -23.9 +.0 -96.2 -86.3 -60.7 -243.3 -407 -350 -199 + -956 -2,730 -560 -4,246
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% +0.3 +.3 -.0 +.0 +.6 +1.4 +.7 +2.6 -2 +2 - + + -42 +6 -36
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.5 +.6 -.0 +.0 +.1 -.5 +1.2 +.7 -16 +5 - + -12 -148 +11 -148
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -1.4 -3.1 -1.1 +.0 -5.7 -4.0 -4.4 -14.0 -19 -26 -10 + -54 -107 -40 -202
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -3.5 -7.8 -2.9 +.0 -14.2 -10.1 -11.0 -35.4 -48 -65 -24 + -137 -277 -102 -516
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -1.9 -2.9 -1.2 +.0 -6.0 -5.3 -4.1 -15.4 -28 -24 -10 + -63 -183 -38 -283
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -4.9 -7.5 -3.0 +.0 -15.3 -13.4 -10.3 -39.0 -72 -62 -25 + -159 -463 -95 -717
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.3 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.3 +.9 +.2 +1.4 +2 + + + +2 +9 +2 +13
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0.3 +.2 +.0 +.0 +.5 +1.3 +.5 +2.4 +2 +1 + + +3 + +5 +8
12 Minimum Price 25p +0.6 +.2 +.1 +.0 +.9 +2.3 +.7 +3.9 +3 +2 +1 + +6 -18 +6 -6
13 Minimum Price 30p +0.1 +.5 +.1 +.0 +.7 +1.0 +1.1 +2.7 -7 +4 +1 + -2 -110 +10 -103
14 Minimum Price 35p -1.4 +.5 -.2 +.0 -1.1 -2.9 +1.2 -2.8 -33 +4 -1 + -30 -324 +11 -343
15 Minimum Price 40p -4.4 -.3 -1.0 +.0 -5.7 -10.9 +.1 -16.6 -77 -2 -9 + -88 -686 +1 -773
16 Minimum Price 45p -8.5 -2.0 -2.7 +.0 -13.2 -21.8 -2.4 -37.3 -137 -17 -22 + -176 -1,182 -22 -1,380
17 Minimum Price 50p -13.4 -4.8 -5.1 +.0 -23.4 -35.1 -6.3 -64.7 -212 -40 -43 + -295 -1,792 -58 -2,144
18 Minimum Price 60p -26.3 -13.3 -12.0 +.0 -51.7 -70.3 -18.2 -140.1 -404 -111 -100 + -615 -3,237 -168 -4,020
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -41.6 -24.7 -20.7 +.0 -87.0 -112.2 -34.1 -233.4 -628 -205 -172 + -1,005 -4,687 -315 -6,006
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -0.9 -2.0 -.7 +.0 -3.6 -2.6 -2.8 -9.0 -14 -16 -6 + -36 -81 -26 -143
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -4.5 -8.2 -3.0 +.0 -15.7 -12.6 -11.5 -39.8 -67 -68 -25 + -160 -426 -106 -692
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -14.0 -20.8 -8.9 +.0 -43.7 -38.5 -29.4 -111.6 -204 -173 -74 + -452 -1,372 -271 -2,095
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only +1.1 +.3 -.1 +.0 +1.3 +3.4 +.6 +5.3 +8 +2 -1 + +10 -23 +5 -8
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.5 -.3 -.2 +.0 -1.0 -1.4 -.3 -2.7 -8 -2 -2 + -12 -48 -3 -62
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.9 +.5 +.3 +.0 +1.7 +3.1 +1.1 +5.9 +6 +4 +3 + +12 +15 +10 +37
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0.3 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.3 +.8 +.0 +1.1 +2 + + + +2 +7 + +9
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.3 -.2 -.2 +.0 -.6 -.8 -.2 -1.6 -4 -1 -1 + -7 -34 -2 -43
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -0.7 -.5 -.4 +.0 -1.6 -2.0 -.6 -4.3 -10 -4 -4 + -18 -88 -6 -112
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -1.8 -1.1 -1.1 +.0 -4.0 -4.9 -1.6 -10.5 -25 -10 -9 + -43 -211 -15 -269
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -3.6 -2.4 -2.2 +.0 -8.2 -10.1 -3.3 -21.7 -51 -20 -19 + -90 -426 -31 -546
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -6.4 -4.4 -4.0 +.0 -14.8 -18.0 -6.1 -38.8 -91 -36 -33 + -160 -743 -56 -959
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0.4 +.1 -.0 +.0 +.5 +1.4 +.2 +2.2 +4 + - + +4 +11 +2 +17  
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Table 50 Summary of estimated for financial value of harm reductions – hazardous drinkers 
 
SUMMARY - HAZARDOUS          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
1 General Price +1% -1.8 -3.2 -1.3 +.0 -6.2 -5.0 -4.5 -15.8 -28 -27 -11 + -65 -90 -42 -197
2 General Price +10% -18.0 -32.6 -13.1 +.0 -63.7 -50.9 -46.1 -160.7 -281 -271 -109 + -662 -907 -426 -1,994
3 General Price +25% -46.5 -84.0 -34.0 +.0 -164.5 -131.7 -118.9 -415.0 -727 -699 -282 + -1,708 -2,326 -1,096 -5,130
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -0.1 +.1 -.0 +.0 -.0 -.1 +.4 +.3 -6 +1 - + -5 -20 +4 -22
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -0.8 +.2 -.2 +.0 -.8 -2.0 +.8 -2.0 -20 +2 -1 + -19 -70 +7 -82
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -1.9 -10.2 -2.0 +.0 -14.1 -5.8 -13.6 -33.5 -27 -85 -17 + -129 -94 -126 -348
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -5.4 -25.8 -5.1 +.0 -36.3 -16.5 -34.4 -87.1 -75 -215 -43 + -332 -259 -317 -908
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -2.8 -10.2 -2.1 +.0 -15.1 -8.2 -13.4 -36.7 -41 -85 -18 + -143 -141 -124 -407
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -7.1 -25.8 -5.4 +.0 -38.4 -21.2 -34.1 -93.6 -105 -215 -45 + -364 -360 -314 -1,039
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.5 -.1 -.0 +.0 +.4 +1.4 -.0 +1.8 +4 -1 - + +4 +14 - +18
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " +0.4 -.3 -.1 +.0 +.0 +1.1 -.2 +1.0 +3 -2 -1 + + +7 -2 +6
12 Minimum Price 25p +0.4 -.6 -.2 +.0 -.4 +1.0 -.5 +.1 +2 -5 -2 + -5 -3 -5 -13
13 Minimum Price 30p -0.8 -1.5 -.5 +.0 -2.8 -2.3 -1.5 -6.6 -14 -12 -4 + -31 -66 -14 -111
14 Minimum Price 35p -3.2 -2.9 -1.3 +.0 -7.5 -8.8 -3.4 -19.6 -55 -24 -11 + -90 -201 -31 -322
15 Minimum Price 40p -7.8 -6.1 -3.2 +.0 -17.1 -20.9 -7.7 -45.7 -135 -50 -27 + -212 -453 -71 -736
16 Minimum Price 45p -15.3 -12.2 -6.6 +.0 -34.2 -40.9 -16.4 -91.4 -265 -101 -55 + -421 -847 -151 -1,420
17 Minimum Price 50p -25.4 -20.7 -11.6 +.0 -57.7 -67.8 -28.4 -153.9 -438 -172 -96 + -707 -1,369 -262 -2,337
18 Minimum Price 60p -51.3 -43.4 -24.8 +.0 -119.5 -137.5 -60.1 -317.1 -880 -361 -207 + -1,448 -2,678 -554 -4,680
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -76.7 -66.5 -37.8 +.0 -181.0 -205.8 -91.6 -478.4 -1,335 -553 -314 + -2,202 -3,969 -844 -7,015
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -1.8 -14.1 -2.2 +.0 -18.1 -6.0 -19.2 -43.4 -24 -117 -18 + -159 -87 -177 -424
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -6.8 -33.9 -6.3 +.0 -47.0 -21.2 -45.3 -113.5 -93 -282 -52 + -426 -345 -418 -1,190
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -18.7 -51.8 -12.3 +.0 -82.8 -53.4 -70.5 -206.6 -285 -431 -102 + -818 -980 -650 -2,447
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only +1.3 -1.7 -.8 +.0 -1.1 +3.1 -2.6 -.7 +14 -14 -7 + -6 +15 -24 -15
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.2 -.0 +.0 +.0 -.2 -.4 +.6 +.0 -10 - + + -10 -22 +6 -26
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only +0.4 +.3 +.3 +.0 +1.0 +1.3 +.7 +3.0 +2 +3 +2 + +7 +10 +6 +24
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% +0.0 +.0 -.0 +.0 -.0 +.0 +.1 +.1 - + - + - - +1 +
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.6 -.3 -.3 +.0 -1.2 -1.6 -.4 -3.2 -10 -3 -2 + -15 -31 -4 -50
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -1.5 -.8 -.7 +.0 -3.1 -4.1 -1.2 -8.4 -27 -7 -6 + -40 -80 -11 -130
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -3.6 -2.1 -1.8 +.0 -7.5 -9.8 -2.9 -20.2 -63 -17 -15 + -95 -190 -27 -312
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -7.2 -4.4 -3.8 +.0 -15.4 -19.7 -6.1 -41.2 -125 -36 -31 + -193 -380 -57 -629
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -12.5 -7.9 -6.6 +.0 -27.0 -33.9 -11.2 -72.2 -214 -66 -55 + -335 -653 -103 -1,091
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p +0.5 -.1 -.1 +.0 +.4 +1.3 -.1 +1.6 +4 -1 - + +3 +13 -1 +15  
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Table 51 Summary of estimated for financial value of harm reductions – harmful drinkers 
 
SUMMARY - HARMFUL          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
1 General Price +1% -1.3 -1.4 -.6 -30.2 -33.4 -3.2 -2.0 -38.7 -33 -12 -5 -251 -301 -81 -19 -401
2 General Price +10% -12.3 -14.5 -5.9 -301.4 -334.1 -30.9 -20.7 -385.8 -324 -120 -49 -2,507 -3,001 -795 -191 -3,987
3 General Price +25% -30.2 -37.2 -15.4 -754.0 -836.8 -76.7 -53.3 -966.8 -788 -309 -128 -6,271 -7,497 -1,950 -492 -9,938
4 Low Priced Off Trade Products +10% -1.4 -1.1 -.5 -28.8 -31.8 -3.4 -1.5 -36.8 -35 -9 -4 -240 -288 -82 -14 -384
5 Low Priced Off Trade Products +25% -3.5 -2.9 -1.3 -72.2 -79.8 -8.6 -3.8 -92.2 -87 -24 -11 -600 -722 -206 -35 -963
6 Low Priced On Trade Products +10% -1.3 -3.5 -.7 -24.6 -30.0 -3.2 -5.0 -38.3 -35 -29 -6 -204 -274 -84 -46 -405
7 Low Priced On Trade Products +25% -3.2 -8.8 -1.7 -61.2 -74.9 -8.2 -12.7 -95.7 -87 -73 -14 -509 -684 -210 -117 -1,010
8 All Low Priced Products +10% -2.7 -4.6 -1.2 -53.7 -62.3 -6.7 -6.6 -75.5 -70 -39 -10 -447 -566 -168 -61 -794
9 All Low Priced Products +25% -6.7 -11.7 -3.0 -135.6 -157.1 -17.0 -16.6 -190.6 -176 -98 -25 -1,127 -1,426 -420 -153 -1,999
10 Minimum Price 15p (Off and On Trade) +0.0 +.3 -.0 -2.3 -2.0 +.1 +.5 -1.4 -2 +3 - -19 -18 -3 +5 -17
11 Minimum Price 20p      "           " -0.3 +.2 -.2 -14.3 -14.7 -.9 +.5 -15.1 -13 +2 -1 -119 -132 -30 +4 -157
12 Minimum Price 25p -1.3 -.8 -.7 -43.4 -46.1 -3.4 -.8 -50.2 -40 -7 -6 -361 -412 -94 -7 -514
13 Minimum Price 30p -3.4 -2.8 -1.7 -97.6 -105.5 -8.7 -3.5 -117.8 -95 -24 -14 -812 -944 -226 -33 -1,203
14 Minimum Price 35p -7.3 -6.0 -3.2 -182.1 -198.6 -18.4 -7.9 -224.8 -194 -50 -27 -1,514 -1,785 -462 -72 -2,319
15 Minimum Price 40p -12.4 -10.0 -5.4 -302.8 -330.5 -31.1 -13.3 -374.9 -333 -83 -45 -2,518 -2,979 -796 -122 -3,897
16 Minimum Price 45p -18.9 -15.1 -8.3 -461.7 -504.0 -47.6 -20.4 -572.0 -511 -126 -69 -3,840 -4,546 -1,226 -188 -5,960
17 Minimum Price 50p -26.7 -21.2 -11.9 -649.6 -709.4 -67.4 -28.9 -805.6 -720 -176 -99 -5,402 -6,397 -1,733 -266 -8,396
18 Minimum Price 60p -43.8 -34.8 -20.1 -1,033.9 -1,132.6 -111.0 -48.3 -1,291.8 -1,160 -289 -167 -8,599 -10,215 -2,823 -445 -13,483
19 Minimum Price 70p      "           " -58.4 -46.0 -26.6 -1,298.2 -1,429.3 -148.3 -64.0 -1,641.6 -1,525 -383 -221 -10,797 -12,926 -3,734 -590 -17,250
20 Minimum Price 20p Off and 60p On Trade -1.3 -4.4 -1.0 -41.5 -48.3 -3.5 -6.4 -58.2 -35 -37 -9 -345 -425 -87 -59 -571
21 Minimum Price 30p Off and 80p On Trade -6.8 -13.8 -3.8 -172.7 -197.1 -17.5 -19.6 -234.2 -186 -115 -32 -1,436 -1,768 -448 -181 -2,397
22 Minimum Price 40p Off and 100p On Trade -20.2 -28.2 -9.4 -457.6 -515.4 -50.6 -39.8 -605.8 -537 -235 -78 -3,806 -4,656 -1,289 -367 -6,312
23 30p Minimum Price Beers Only -2.6 -3.4 -1.8 -99.7 -107.5 -6.7 -5.2 -119.4 -74 -28 -15 -829 -947 -179 -48 -1,174
24 30p Minimum Price Wines Only -0.2 +1.6 +.2 +2.8 +4.4 -.4 +2.5 +6.5 -6 +13 +2 +23 +32 -13 +23 +41
25 30p Minimum Price Spirits Only -0.5 -.9 -.0 +.0 -1.4 -1.3 -.7 -3.3 -13 -7 - + -20 -28 -7 -54
26 30p Minimum Price Alcopops (RTDs) Only +0.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0 +.0
27 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 50% -0.0 +.0 -.0 -.3 -.3 -.0 +.0 -.3 - + - -2 -3 -1 + -3
28 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 40% -0.4 -.2 -.1 -8.2 -8.9 -1.0 -.2 -10.1 -10 -1 -1 -68 -81 -25 -2 -108
29 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 30% -1.1 -.5 -.4 -22.3 -24.3 -2.7 -.7 -27.6 -27 -4 -3 -186 -220 -67 -6 -293
30 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 20% -2.6 -1.3 -.9 -54.6 -59.4 -6.5 -1.7 -67.6 -67 -10 -8 -454 -539 -164 -16 -719
31 Ban Off Trade Discounting if > 10% -5.0 -2.6 -1.9 -111.5 -121.1 -12.5 -3.6 -137.2 -134 -22 -16 -928 -1,099 -327 -33 -1,459
32 Total Ban Off Trade Discounting -8.6 -4.8 -3.4 -197.5 -214.2 -21.3 -6.6 -242.2 -235 -40 -28 -1,643 -1,945 -569 -61 -2,576
33 Ban Off Trade Discount if Reg Price <30p -0.3 -.3 -.1 -8.3 -9.0 -.7 -.4 -10.2 -7 -3 -1 -69 -80 -17 -4 -101  
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3.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES ON MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
A series of sensitivity analyses have been undertaken on key model parameters and 
underpinning assumptions.  Scenario 15 (the 40p minimum price policy option) was chosen 
as a basecase scenario as it has reasonably large effects on each of the dimensions.  The 
results of the sensitivity analyses are presented in detail in Table 35 to Table 57 and 
summarised in Figure 32. 
 
 
-100.0% -75.0% -50.0% -25.0% +0.0% +25.0% +50.0% +75.0% +100.0%
Use Mod, Haz & Harm Elasticity Matrices
Use Steeper Binge Functions (upper 95%CI)
Use Less Steep Binge Functions (lower 95%)
Exclude Protective Health Effects Of Alcohol
Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 5 Years
Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 15 Years
Less Serious Wounding Multiplier = 1.8 not 7.7
Crime data using "Been Drinking" not      "Reason was
drinking"
Absence Risks Using Whitehall 2 data
RRisk Not Working if Harmful= -16.6% not -6.9%
Salary if Transition between Unempl and Work    = 25%ile 
% Difference in 10 year harm financial value estimate
 
Figure 32  Results of sensitivity analyses on model parameters 
 
A single elasticity matrix:  The model has used 2 elasticity matrices in the basecase 
analysis, one for moderate drinkers and a second for hazardous and harmful drinkers 
combined.  It was important to do this because, as discussed earlier,  a matrix based on all 
the EFS cases together is heavily weighted towards moderate drinkers and misses some 
features of hazardous and harmful drinkers responsiveness to price.  In particular, the “all” 
cases elasticity matrix has very small estimates for cross-elasticities and so under-estimates 
the effects of price changes on the switching behaviour of hazardous and harmful drinkers.  
This can be seen in Table 35 scenario 42, which shows much greater consumption reductions 
for the population than the basecase scenario 15. 
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Three elasticity matrices:  Another option is to further split the data in moderate, hazardous 
and harmful matrices.  This is tested in scenario 43.  The results show smaller consumption 
changes than our basecase due to some switching behaviours towards wine in particular.  
This occurs in the basecase but is more pronounced here. Detailed examination at 
age/sex/consumption group level showed some groups having larger increases in off-trade 
wine consumption wine than were felt plausible given the relatively small change in price for 
the products that those groups consume.  We therefore chose the two matrix form as our 
basecase.  Figure 32 shows the results of working the difference through to the full 10 year 
cumulative financial value of harms, with a resulting figure that is 39.6% below the basecase 
level. 
 
The use of different slopes for the expected scale of binge given mean consumption function, 
the exclusion of any protective effects of alcohol, and alternative assumptions of the time to 
full effect for chronic harms ranging from 5 to 15 years all make relatively little difference to 
the final cumulative value result, affecting it by less than +/-20%.  This is partly because the 
figure is made up of a large component of unemployment related harm, but the healthcare 10 
year costs are also relatively stable, ranging from -£412m to -£731m around the basecase 
estimate -£546m. 
 
The use of an alternative multiplier for the extent of reporting of “less serious wounding” 
crimes, makes little difference overall (-2.1%), but does affect the overall estimated crime 
reduction -£93m crime costs to the justice system versus the basecase of -£140. 
 
Similarly, use of base data for the fraction of crimes attributable to alcohol based on answers 
to the OCJS survey question on whether the offender had been drinking rather than was 
alcohol the ‘reason’ causes just over a doubling of the attributable fraction on average and 
hence a doubling of the crime harm value.  In terms of total harm reduction this cause a 9.9% 
difference from basecase. 
 
Use of the UK based Whitehall 2 study absence data rather than the Roche et al Australian 
study makes very little difference (1.9%). 
 
Sensitivity on the salary to use for valuation of lost productivity due to unemployment also 
makes some difference.  If a lower 25th percentile is used from the Labour Force Survey 
rather than the national mean, the resulting 10 year cumulative value would change by -
20.7%. 
 
The largest sensitivity effect is seen in scenario 51, in which an alternative relative risk of not 
working for problem drinking parameter is taken from the results of MacDonald and Shields.  
The basecase used MacDonald and Shields estimate of 6.9% which was a conservative 
assumption at the lower end of the various alternative statistical models presented in their 
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study.  If we use instead -16.6%, then the unemployment harm reductions become 
substantially larger and the difference from the basecase is +67.8%. 
 
All of the above sensitivity analyses are on model parameters rather than the particulars on 
any one policy over another.  They would therefore not substantially affect the relative 
differences between the policies. 
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Table 52:  Parameter sensitivity analysis – effects on consumption results 
SUMMARY - TOTAL          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    
(all beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
15 Minimum Price 40p -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
42 Use "All" Elasticity Matrix -6.2% -23.0 -18.5 -9.4 -0.0 -50.9 +244.4 +21.0 -216.6 +2.9 +51.7 +0.3% +1.76 +23.34
43 Use Mod, Haz & Harm Elasticity Matrices -1.1% -7.8 +6.9 -8.0 +0.2 -8.7 +479.3 +311.3 -29.7 +115.6 +876.4 +5.0% +29.78 +23.34
44 Use Steeper Binge Functions (upper 95%CI) -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
45 Use Less Steep Binge Functions (lower 95%) -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
46 Exclude Protective Health Effects Of Alcohol -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
47 Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 5 Years -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
48 Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 15 Years -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
49 Less Serious Wounding Multiplier = 1.8 not 7.7 -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
50 Crime data using "Been Drinking" not      
"Reason was drinking" -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
51 Absence Risks Using Whitehall 2 data -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
52 RRisk Not Working if Harmful= -16.6% not -6.9% -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34
53 Salary if Transition between Unempl and 
Work    = 25%ile -2.6% -12.0 -1.4 -8.5 +0.2 -21.7 +404.4 +234.3 -90.1 +84.9 +633.5 +3.6% +21.52 +23.34  
 
Table 53:  Parameter sensitivity analysis – effects on harm reduction results 
SUMMARY - TOTAL                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemployed 
('000s
people)
15 Minimum Price 40p -157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -12.4
42 Use "All" Elasticity Matrix -347 -2.9 -7.5 -14.4 -3.2 -2744 -35.3 -7.9 -81.1 -84.1 -13.7 -23.7 -18.7 -56.1 -1.1 -335.9 -22.7
43 Use Mod, Haz & Harm Elasticity Matrices -64 -0.9 -0.7 -2.7 -0.4 -723 -11.4 -0.8 -24.7 -17.9 +1.6 +3.2 -2.7 +2.2 +0.1 +4.8 -10.7
44 Use Steeper Binge Functions (upper 95%CI) -193 -1.5 -5.1 -8.7 -2.0 -1420 -18.1 -5.6 -43.5 -46.8 -4.6 -7.6 -11.2 -23.3 -0.4 -143.1 -12.4
45 Use Less Steep Binge Functions (lower 95%) -140 -1.5 -1.8 -5.1 -0.9 -1362 -18.1 -1.9 -39.6 -34.8 -2.3 -3.7 -5.4 -11.4 -0.2 -72.1 -12.4
46 Exclude Protective Health Effects Of Alcohol -115 -1.4 -2.9 -6.1 -1.2 -786 -16.8 -3.1 -38.2 -32.5 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -12.4
47 Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 5 Years -263 -3.0 -2.9 -9.4 -1.5 -1314 -17.5 -3.1 -39.4 -54.5 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -12.4
48 Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 15 Years -122 -1.0 -2.9 -5.3 -1.2 -942 -12.1 -3.1 -28.5 -29.5 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -12.4
49 Less Serious Wounding Multiplier = 1.8 not 7.7 -157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -1.6 -5.3 -7.6 -14.4 -0.2 -100.4 -12.4
50 Crime data using "Been Drinking" not      
"Reason was drinking" -157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -9.1 -11.5 -21.7 -42.4 -0.7 -100.4 -12.4
51 Absence Risks Using Whitehall 2 data -157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -228.1 -12.4
52 RRisk Not Working if Harmful= -16.6% not -6.9%-157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -30.4
53 Salary if Transition between Unempl and 
Work    = 25%ile -157 -1.5 -2.9 -6.3 -1.3 -1381 -18.1 -3.1 -40.8 -38.8 -3.2 -5.3 -7.6 -16.0 -0.3 -100.4 -12.4  
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Table 54:  Parameter sensitivity analysis – effects on financial value of harm results 
 
 SUMMARY - TOTAL          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
Comaprison of 
10 year harm 
reduction versus 
40p min price 
option
15 Minimum Price 40p -24.7 -16.8 -9.6 -302.8 -353.9 -63.1 -21.3 -438.4 -546 -140 -80 -2,518 -3,284 -1,938 -196 -5,418 0%
42 Use "All" Elasticity Matrix -59.2 -61.6 -32.8 -540.7 -694.2 -157.9 -86.6 -938.8 -1,164 -513 -272 -4,497 -6,446 -4,203 -799 -11,447 +111.3%
43 Use Mod, Haz & Harm Elasticity Matrices -8.6 +3.6 +.7 -266.4 -270.8 -18.5 +8.7 -280.5 -278 +30 +5 -2,215 -2,458 -894 +81 -3,271 -39.6%
44 Use Steeper Binge Functions (upper 95%CI) -37.2 -24.5 -13.6 -302.8 -378.1 -99.1 -30.7 -507.9 -655 -203 -113 -2,518 -3,490 -2,338 -283 -6,111 +12.8%
45 Use Less Steep Binge Functions (lower 95%) -18.5 -11.9 -6.9 -302.8 -340.2 -45.3 -15.1 -400.6 -493 -99 -58 -2,518 -3,167 -1,741 -139 -5,048 -6.8%
46 Exclude Protective Health Effects Of Alcohol -24.2 -16.8 -9.6 -302.8 -353.4 -62.0 -21.3 -436.8 -519 -140 -80 -2,518 -3,257 -1,625 -196 -5,078 -6.3%
47 Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 5 Years -33.1 -16.8 -9.6 -302.8 -362.3 -77.3 -21.3 -460.9 -731 -140 -80 -2,518 -3,469 -2,723 -196 -6,388 +17.9%
48 Chronic Health Harms Full Effect = 15 Years -21.9 -16.8 -9.6 -302.8 -351.2 -58.5 -21.3 -430.9 -412 -140 -80 -2,518 -3,150 -1,477 -196 -4,823 -11.0%
49 Less Serious Wounding Multiplier = 1.8 not 7.7 -24.7 -11.2 -9.6 -302.8 -348.3 -63.1 -14.0 -425.4 -546 -93 -80 -2,518 -3,237 -1,938 -129 -5,304 -2.1%
50 Crime data using "Been Drinking" not      
"Reason was drinking" -24.7 -44.5 -9.6 -302.8 -381.6 -63.1 -54.3 -499.0 -546 -370 -80 -2,518 -3,514 -1,938 -501 -5,953 +9.9%
51 Absence Risks Using Whitehall 2 data -24.7 -16.8 -22.2 -302.8 -366.5 -63.1 -21.3 -451.0 -546 -140 -185 -2,518 -3,389 -1,938 -196 -5,523 +1.9%
52 RRisk Not Working if Harmful= -16.6% not -6.9% -24.7 -16.8 -9.6 -744.6 -795.8 -63.1 -21.3 -880.2 -546 -140 -80 -6,193 -6,959 -1,938 -196 -9,093 +67.8%
53 Salary if Transition between Unempl and 
Work    = 25%ile -24.7 -16.8 -5.3 -171.9 -218.7 -63.1 -21.3 -303.2 -546 -140 -44 -1,430 -2,160 -1,938 -196 -4,294 -20.7%  
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3.3 EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING POLICIES AND 
ASSESSMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
There is much less routine data available on advertising than for the pricing policies.  Ideally, 
one would require data to link the extent of advertising exposure in England, the relationship 
between advertising and purchasing patterns, the moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers’ 
different responses, separate data on under 18s etc.   
 
In the absence of such detailed integrated data for England, it is published evidence that we 
use to examine the potential effects of advertising policies. As discussed in the methods 
section, there are substantial differences between studies, as well as considerable uncertainty 
and controversy. 
 
Given this, we have undertaken a series of exploratory analyses to examine the effects of 
different assumptions concerning the effects of advertising on consumption.  The framework 
of the modelling is exactly the same as that used for the pricing policies.   
 
The analyses examine three specific areas: 
· The possible effects of proposals to include public health based messages in 1/6th of 
all alcohol advertising  
· Eliminating exposure of under-18s to TV based advertising 
· A total ban on all alcohol advertising. 
 
The results of analyses are shown in Table 35 for consumption and spending, Table 56 for 
health, crime and employment harms, and Table 57 for financial value. 
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3.3.1 EFFECTS OF PROPOSALS TO INCLUDE PUBLIC HEALTH BASED 
MESSAGES IN 1/6TH OF ADVERTISING  
 
In scenarios 34 to 36, an attempt has been made to quantify the effects of the recently 
suggested proposal that 1/6th of advertising time be used for public health messages.  In line 
with the systematic review of evidence and as discussed earlier, we do not assume any direct 
benefits from this, but have examined the impact by assuming that advertisers would maintain 
their budget and that this would therefore reduce advertising exposure pro rata. There is 
obviously a large degree of uncertainty around the appropriateness of this assumption.  Note 
also that we have modelled this as a total effect across all channels not just broadcast, 
including internet, radio etc.  Also the modelling does not differentiate between end-frames & 
replacing 1/6th of adverts 
 
The results in Table 35 show relatively small effects compared to some of the pricing policy 
options with a change in mean consumption of -0.5% if the median estimated elasticity is 
used from the meta-analysis by Gallet (2007).  Uncertainty is substantial though, with the 
results ranging from -0.2% to -2.2% (an eleven-fold difference) if higher or lower estimated 
advertising elasticities also reported by Gallet are used.  
 
The results for harm reduction are similarly varied, with for example 7 deaths saved in year 1 
using the lower estimate and 119 using the higher estimate.  This is reflected again in crime 
harms (range from 800 to 8,000 violent crimes avoided depending on the assumption used. 
And again, for employment, there is an almost 15-fold difference between the lower and 
upper estimates of days absence. 
 
Figure 33 shows the corresponding uncertainty in the expected financial value of savings.  
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Figure 33: Uncertainty in 10 year cumulative financial value of savings: proposals to 
include public health based messages in 1/6th of advertising 
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Table 55 Summary of uncertainty in consumption effects for advertising policies: England population (scenarios 34 to 41) 
 
SUMMARY - TOTAL          Mean annual consumption per drinker (units)             Total spending on alcohol (£ millions) Per drinker (£  p)
Policy Scenario
% change in 
consumption    
(all beverages) Beer Wine Spirit RTD
All 
beverages
Off retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
On retail 
(exc duty + 
VAT)
Off duty + 
VAT
On duty + 
VAT
Total 
spending 
change
% spending 
change
Change in 
spend per 
drinker p.a.
Change in 
spend p.a. if 
no change 
in consump.
34 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (Median) -0.5% -1.8 -1.7 -0.5 -0.2 -4.2 -16.2 -41.5 -15.7 -15.6 -89.0 -0.5% -3.02 +0.00
35 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (Low) -0.2% -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3 -4.3 -14.4 -4.2 -5.5 -28.5 -0.2% -0.97 +0.00
36 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (High) -2.2% -7.9 -7.4 -2.3 -0.7 -18.3 -72.0 -178.6 -69.9 -67.0 -387.4 -2.2% -13.16 +0.00
37 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (Mid) -0.3% -1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -2.8 -4.0 -48.3 -4.5 -19.5 -76.3 -0.4% -2.59 +0.00
38 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (Low) -0.1% -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 -1.5 -18.3 -1.7 -7.4 -29.0 -0.2% -0.98 +0.00
39 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (High) -0.4% -1.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -3.6 -5.1 -62.4 -5.9 -25.2 -98.6 -0.6% -3.35 +0.00
40 Total Adv Ban (Saffer & Dave Evidence) -26.9% -95.3 -90.9 -27.8 -7.8 -221.8 -887.8 -2131.5 -860.2 -796.6 -4676.1 -26.9% -158.88 +0.00
41 Total Adv Ban (Nelson & Young Evidence) +4.9% +17.4 +16.6 +5.1 +1.4 +40.4 +161.8 +388.5 +156.8 +145.2 +852.2 +4.9% +28.96 +0.00  
 
Table 56 Summary of financial of uncertainty in harm reduction effects for advertising policies: England population (scenarios 34 to 41) 
 
SUMMARY - TOTAL                 Health outcomes p.a. (first year)                Health outcomes p.a. (full effect) Crime outcomes p.a.  Workplace harm p.a.
Policy Scenario Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s) 
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
QALYs 
saved 
('000s) Deaths
Chronic 
illness 
('000s)
Acute 
illness 
('000s)
Hospital 
admission
s ('000s)
Cum. 
dicounted 
QALYs 
Years 1-
10 ('000s)
Violent 
crime 
('000s)
Criminal 
damage 
('000s)
Other 
crime 
('000s)
Total 
crimes 
('000s)
QALYs of 
crime 
victims  
('000s)
Days     
Absence  
('000s 
days)
Unemployed 
('000s
people)
34 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (Median) -27 -0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -0.3 -188 -2.5 -0.7 -5.9 -6.6 -1.9 -3.7 -3.9 -9.6 -0.2 -37.1 -1.4
35 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (Low) -7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -45 -0.6 -0.2 -1.5 -1.9 -0.8 -1.9 -3.1 -5.8 -0.1 -11.6 -0.4
36 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (High) -119 -0.9 -3.1 -5.3 -1.3 -830 -10.9 -3.2 -25.8 -29.1 -8.0 -15.2 -13.9 -37.1 -0.6 -161.9 -6.2
37 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (Mid) -6 -0.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.3 -8 -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 -3.1 -3.6 -10.9 -23.5 -37.9 -0.4 -29.1 -0.4
38 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (Low) -2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.2 -1.4 -4.1 -8.9 -14.4 -0.2 -11.0 -0.2
39 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (High) -8 -0.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.4 -11 -0.4 -0.8 -1.6 -4.0 -4.6 -14.0 -30.3 -48.9 -0.5 -37.6 -0.6
40 Total Adv Ban (Saffer & Dave Evidence) -1349 -9.8 -36.6 -60.9 -14.8 -8971 -117.2 -38.1 -278.6 -326.7 -93.1 -167.8 -127.8 -388.7 -7.3 -1957.9 -64.2
41 Total Adv Ban (Nelson & Young Evidence) +294 +2.1 +8.5 +13.8 +3.3 +1969 +25.8 +9.0 +62.8 +72.3 +17.8 +32.2 +24.3 +74.3 +1.4 +375.9 +14.5  
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Table 57 Summary of uncertainty in financial value advertising policies: England population (scenarios 34 to 41) 
 
 SUMMARY - TOTAL          Value of harm reduction in year 1 (£ millions)      Cumulative discounted value of harm reduction over 10 years (£m)
Policy Scenario
Healthcare 
costs      
Year 1
Crime 
costs      
Year 1
Absence 
costs      
Year 1
Unemploy
ment 
costs      
Year 1
Total 
direct 
costs      
Year 1
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction incl. 
QALYs      
Year 1
Healthcare 
costs      
Years 1-10
Crime 
costs      
Years 1-10
Absence 
costs      
Years 1-10
Unemploy
ment costs      
Years 1-10
Total direct 
costs      
Years 1-10
Health 
QALY 
value
Crime 
QALY 
value
Total value of 
harm 
reduction 
incl. QALYs      
Year 1-10
34 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (Median) -5.3 -9.4 -3.4 -33.0 -51.0 -14.7 -12.8 -78.5 -91 -78 -28 -274 -472 -332 -118 -922
35 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (Low) -1.6 -4.8 -.9 -8.1 -15.5 -4.8 -6.1 -26.4 -25 -40 -7 -68 -141 -93 -57 -290
36 Adverts with Public Health 1_6th (High) -22.9 -37.8 -15.0 -146.1 -221.8 -63.6 -52.5 -338.0 -400 -314 -125 -1,215 -2,055 -1,453 -484 -3,992
37 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (Mid) -3.8 -28.1 -.9 -1.8 -34.5 -13.6 -33.2 -81.3 -38 -233 -8 -15 -294 -153 -306 -753
38 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (Low) -1.4 -10.7 -.3 -.7 -13.1 -5.1 -12.6 -30.9 -14 -89 -3 -6 -112 -58 -116 -286
39 Eliminate Exposure to TV Adverts <18s (High) -4.9 -36.2 -1.2 -2.3 -44.6 -17.6 -42.9 -105.1 -49 -301 -10 -19 -379 -198 -396 -973
40 Total Adv Ban (Saffer & Dave Evidence) -265.6 -416.7 -185.1 -1,530.7 -2,398.1 -740.7 -589.7 -3,728.5 -4,528 -3,466 -1,540 -12,730 -22,263 -16,335 -5,438 -44,037
41 Total Adv Ban (Nelson & Young Evidence) +60.6 +79.8 +35.7 +345.7 +521.8 +167.5 +113.8 +803.0 +1,002 +664 +297 +2,875 +4,838 +3,614 +1,049 +9,501  
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3.3.2 ELIMINATING EXPOSURE OF UNDER-18S TO TV BASED ADVERTISING 
 
The analysis presented here assumes that there is no effect on any drinkers over the age of 
18, and also assumes it is possible to eliminate exposure to TV advertising for children.  This 
elimination is not evidence based but rather a ‘what-if analysis’ to obtain an estimate of the 
potential upper bound of effect of some attempt at restriction on exposure.  
 
In the ‘Mid’ scenario (37) here, the effect of the policy is simplistically modelled as equivalent 
to the effect of one ‘media ban’, as defined and evidenced with an associated consumption 
elasticity (-8.98% per ban) in the study by Saffer and Dave (2002).  As alternative evidence 
scenarios, Saffer & Dave’s 2006 study presents several analyses providing estimated 
elasticities for advertising exposure and we take an upper and lower estimate from the 
published ranges. 
 
The result of the ‘Mid’ scenario (37) is an estimated reduction in total consumption of just -
0.3%, but the effects on 11 to 18 year olds are estimated to be much more substantial with a 
reduction in consumption for that group of -9%.  The estimated consequent reduction in harm 
occurs particularly in the area of crime, with -38,000 offences and a crime costs reduction of -
£28m per annum. 
 
Using higher and lower estimates for elasticities provides a range for example of -£11m to 
-£36m crime costs per annum (scenarios 38, 39).  This range does not account however for 
the uncertainty concerning the potential for actually implementing a total elimination of 
exposure to TV advertising for the under-18s. 
 
Figure 34 shows the corresponding uncertainty in the expected financial value of savings. 
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Figure 34: Uncertainty in 10 year cumulative financial value of savings: eliminating 
exposure of <18s to TV advertising 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 163
 
3.3.3 COMPLETE ADVERTISING BAN 
 
Two scenarios (40, 41) have been examined to investigate a total ban on all advertising.   
 
Scenario 40 uses method and assumptions based again on Saffer and Dave 2002. If the 
assumptions and results of that study were believed to hold and apply to England as of 2008, 
then the estimated impact of a total ban on advertising would be substantial.  A -26.9% 
estimated change in mean consumption would be the result, with consequently very high 
reductions in harm and a 10-year cumulative financial value of harm reduction of -£44bn.  
This is much higher than any equivalent figure seen in the pricing policy scenarios examined 
(compare for example -£20bn for a +25% increase in prices across the board). 
 
Scenario 41 uses published work by Nelson and Young in which they argue that advertising 
bans have little benefit and in fact can cause harm because suppliers compete for market 
share instead on the basis of price and thus, as prices fall, consumption actually rises.  The 
results of using this assumption therefore is a +4.9% increase in consumption, and an 
associated increase in harms, with a ten year financial value effect of +£9bn more harm, as 
compared to the Saffer & Dave based -£44bn. 
 
Figure 35 shows the uncertainty in the expected financial value of savings. 
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Figure 35: Uncertainty in 10 year cumulative financial value of savings: total 
advertising ban 
 
Given this disparity in evidence, and the associated controversy, an accurate estimate of 
potential effect cannot be determined without further primary research, ideally in the UK. 
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4 DISCUSSION  
 
This discussion section summarises the capability of the new alcohol policy model built for 
this project, sets out the results of validating the model against earlier work on alcohol 
attributable harms, details the main assumptions limitations and cautions, and discusses 
areas for possible future work. 
4.1 CAPABILITIES OF THE MODEL 
 
This is the first study to integrate modelling approaches intended to answer specific policy 
questions around pricing and promotion of alcohol and the related effects on harms in terms 
of health, crime and employment in England.  We have developed an integrated suite of 
models, linking the aspects of price, advertising, drinking patterns, purchasing patterns, 
elasticities, health conditions including diseases wholly attributable to alcohol, chronic and 
acute alcohol-related illnesses and mortality, crimes including violence and criminal damage, 
and work absence and unemployment attributable to alcohol.  
 
Importantly, we have made substantial use of contemporary data from a variety of sources 
including individual level data on patterns of drinking, purchasing of alcohol, as well as UK 
and international evidence on the harms attributable to alcohol.  This study is the first to 
derive own-and cross-price elasticities for 16 beverage categories (high- and low-priced 
beers, wines, spirits and RTDs, split further by on- and off-trade purchasing). These are more 
detailed figures broadly in line with meta-estimates of elasticities reported in our systematic 
review.  This has been done for two groups (a) moderate drinkers and (b) combined 
hazardous and harmful drinkers. It also contains detailed data on individual consumption and 
purchasing patterns through linked use of GHS and EFS data, enabling analysis by 
age/sex/consumption group and by the 16 categories of alcohol. Thus the modelling accounts 
for the heterogeneity in the UK drinking population in terms of consumption preferences and 
in terms of responses to changes in product prices, including substitution effects.  
 
The model has been constructed in conjunction with a systematic review of evidence of 
available evidence.  It runs in EXCEL VBA based software, and can rapidly analyse 
alternative policies and assumptions, taking around fifteen minutes to undertake one policy 
analysis. 
 
The aim of the modelling has been to provide new insight into potential policies on pricing and 
promotion intervention for policymakers, and its first use has been to provide the results here 
to inform policy for the Department of Health and government in England.  The range of 
questions the modelling is able to address extends beyond the current report and the aim will 
be to adapt and utilise the model as part of a number of research programmes including those 
for the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence as well as in collaborations 
internationally.  
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4.2 VALIDATION OF MODEL  
 
As a central part of model testing and validation, particularly for the consumption-to-harm 
model, we ran the model to the very extreme in a scenario of zero alcohol consumption in 
England. This is essentially asking the same question as that recently addressed by Home 
Office and the NWPHO reports, i.e. what is the estimated alcohol-attributable cost of health, 
crime and employment related harms?  Several aspects of the Home Office analysis fed into 
our modelling work, including use of the same 47 health conditions, unit costs for inpatient 
admission, for crimes etc. There are many necessary differences in approach though in order 
for our work to address the more complex questions around marginal changes in 
consumption and due to our updated evidence review. We have undertaken a comparison 
with the recently revised Department of Health and Home Office analysis (Table 58). The 
results are very similar for health and unemployment. The difference in crime results is 
explained by our use of different lower alcohol attributable fractions AAF and our exclusion of 
lost output due to premature deaths for homicide. The difference in absence from work costs 
is explained by our use of the latest available detailed attributable fractions (Roche et al, 
2008). 
  
Table 58: Comparison of estimates of total attributable alcohol costs 
 Home Office Analysis 2008 
£bn p.a. 
Our Model 
£bn p.a 
NHS related costs 2.7 2.8 * 
Crime related costs 9.0 - 15.0 5.1 
Absence from work costs 1.4 - 2.0 0.9 
Unemployment costs    2.0 - 2.5 2.6 
* assuming full effect after 10 year time delay 
 
4.3 MODELLING ISSUES, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Both “price to consumption” and “consumption to harm” models are populated with a very 
large number of inputs, and it has not been possible to examine the uncertainty in a 
probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) within the scope of the current project. We undertook 
exploration of uncertainty using one-sensitivity analysis for key parameters and results 
suggest confidence bounds of +/-25% on the cumulative value of harm reduction for most of 
the key parameters, with greater sensitivity for the use of further split elasticity matrix (-39%) 
and for the relative risk of not working for harmful drinkers (+68%). 
 
A – Price, promotion and consumption data sets 
The model results present are based on the assumption that the datasets and reported 
relationships used in the various components of the model are representative. We base much 
of our analysis on the GHS datasets on consumption and EFS datasets on purchasing. Both 
are cross-sectional surveys and enable examination of the impact of changes in price on 
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changes in consumption under the assumption that the cross-sectional econometric modelling 
is representative of longitudinal change. A recent meta-analysis (Gallet 2007) compared 
average elasticities derived from time-series, panel and cross-sectional studies (-0.54, -0.47 
and -0.63, respectively). These do no differ substantially; which lends important credence to 
our cross-sectional derived elasticity estimates.  
 
Binge drinking is not adequately represented in EFS and we mapped the relationship 
between average and peak consumption from GHS.  We were thus not able to derive 
elasticities specifically for “binge”.  Similarly, one cannot disentangle demand response to 
price from the demand response to price promotions using EFS, and so different elasticities to 
represent the feeling that one is getting “a bargain” cannot be computed. One also cannot 
explore the relationship between size of discount and volume of purchasing required to qualify 
for the discount, again due to EFS data limitations.  
 
The “ideal” integrated dataset would have contained longitudinal cohort data on consumption, 
pricing, sales and purchasing patterns of alcohol. This would have enabled a more direct 
analysis of the impact of prices on drinking behaviour, including bingeing, than our 
approaches. The GHS information on consumption patterns and EFS information on 
purchasing behaviour were linked through matching the behaviours of “similar” people (based 
on a large range of variables including age, gender, income, region, educational status, 
quantity of alcohol bought etc). This loses some of the individual variability present in the 
original data sources.  
 
The EFS is advantageous in that it provides detailed measures of purchasing in terms of both 
price paid and quantity bought. Of course, the main limitations are that the person who buys 
is not necessarily the person who drinks, and alcohol bought in the off-trade may be stored 
over any length of time. Purchasing behaviour, including the price paid, may also be 
influenced by aspects of utility other than ethanol content (for example, convenience of 
shopping or amenity value of drinking location).  
 
Alcohol surveys have a number of general limitations, including a tendency to underestimate 
alcohol consumption due to underreporting and through under sampling people who drink the 
most. GHS, SDD and EFS all under-represent population groups that are likely to experience 
significant alcohol-related harm, for example the homeless, those not regularly attending 
mainstream schools etc. (groups unlikely to account for a large proportion of the population 
but who may account for significant harm). Our analyses of GHS and HMRC Clearance data 
suggest that methodological revisions have reduced this problem from around 50% in 2005 to 
21% in 2006 (Table 59). Interestingly, sales data obtained from Nielsen for the same period 
also underestimates HMRC Clearance data by 20%. Unfortunately, there are no robust data 
that allow us to determine whether under-reporting is consistent across age and consumption 
groups (moderate, heavy and harmful drinkers). This under-reporting affects only sales value 
estimates in the modelling, rather than the level of harms avoided, because harm estimates 
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are scaled to match routine available data on total observed harm, for example, number of 
crimes or hospitalisations.  
 
Table 59: Underestimation of alcohol sales and consumption in datasets used 
 
 l of pure alcohol 
HMRC Clearance 2006/7 (per adult) 11.39 
GHS 2006: Total consumption per person >16 years* 8.96 
  
HMRC Clearance 2006/7 (total litres) 560,000,000 
Nielsen: Total litres of pure alcohol sold year ending May 
2007* 
446,069,462 
*ABV estimation method follows the revised ONS recommendations 
 
Our population sub-group analysis is strongest for those groups for which we have the most 
data, particularly moderate drinkers. Our modelling is less strong for under-16s since their 
purchasing behaviour is not represented in the EFS and their total consumption levels are 
likely to be less strongly linked to price because they also obtain alcohol from other sources – 
e.g. parents – and as such may have price elasticities that are functions of both their own and 
others’ behaviour. 
 
The available data sources provide little evidence on detailed patterns of consumption, 
including frequency of binge drinking, which has implications for the model’s ability to fully 
capture impacts on acute harms (e.g. a drinker may cut weekly consumption by 1 drink a 
week but still ensure that a budget is available to drink to intoxication at the weekend). 
 
B – Advertising effects 
The evidence base on the effects of advertising on consumption, whilst comprising many 
hundreds of papers, is severely limited due to methodological difficulties, as discussed in 
detail in our systematic review report and the relevant report section. Studies estimating 
advertising elasticities rely on high-level aggregates of advertising expenditure, mostly with 
short-run series. This makes it unlikely that such studies will find significant effects. Cohort 
studies can be prone to confounding effects, i.e. unmeasured third variables that influence 
both advertising exposure and later drinking behaviour. Given these problems, we have 
chosen to adopt an exploratory approach. We model a range of plausible effect sizes reported 
in the literature, including some of the smallest and some of the largest effects reported, to 
give an idea of the boundaries of effects that might be expected. Data limitations have also 
prevented us from analysing the effects of time-based restrictions on alcohol advertising (e.g. 
a 9pm watershed). Crucially, we also cannot consider indirect and long-term influences of 
advertising on consumption through third variables such as changes in social norms and 
acceptability of alcohol. 
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It should be noted that the effectiveness of a particular intervention involving a form of 
restriction or ban will be determined by a number of other factors, including the degree of 
enforcement and opportunities for advertisers to redirect their resources to other channels 
that might escape the effect of a ban e.g. product placement or event sponsorship. We have 
not been able to consider industry responses as part of our model and policy makers will 
need to carefully evaluate the potential for substitution. 
 
C – Evidence on risk functions 
Many risk estimates in our modelling were based on non-UK research as UK studies were 
either not available, did not provide the necessary detail of information or were of insufficient 
quality (see Systematic Review report for details of identified studies). A further limitation of 
the evidence base is that some of the risk estimates were available for only few exposure 
categories, which may under/overestimate the risk after the last risk estimates point. Often, 
risk estimates were also not available for all age and gender groups modelled, most notably 
for the under-18s age group. Where this was the case, risk functions were assumed to be 
similar between age and sex groups. Finally, most of the literature on partially attributable 
disease risk functions and AAF examines mortality and hospitalisation data together in some 
weighted mix, so that different relative risk functions for mortality and morbidity are not 
available. Risk functions and/or AAF were often not adjusted for confounding factors such as 
smoking which may overestimate risk associated with alcohol exposure.  
 
Risk modelling is further developed for health harms than crime and employment outcomes. 
However, when risk functions were not available, we have often transformed AAF and/or 
published cohort-based risk models with step functions of relative risks for groups into linear 
risk models. A linear approach was selected in the absence of empirical evidence. The risk 
was assumed to start after a threshold of 4/3 units for acute drinking and 3/2 units for chronic 
drinking for males and females respectively due to the absence of consensus. Such approach 
may thus present a limitation, notably for harms caused by acute drinking behaviour. 
However, we judged that these assumptions would be a better approximate than assuming a 
risk increase after a threshold of 0, or after the threshold of “binge drinking”. 
 
D – Evidence on morbidity 
Essentially in our health harm model we assume that the person-specific hospitalisation rates 
for each age/sex group can be considered as a proxy for the prevalence of the disease. 
Clearly, this assumption has major limitations, since persons with an alcohol-attributable 
disease who are not hospitalised during the year are not included in the dataset. Therefore, 
morbidity and consequent health savings are likely to be underestimated in our models. 
 
E – Evidence on lag between consumption change and impact on harm 
Very limited research evidence exists on population-based “lags”, i.e. information on the 
timescales and functional forms that link reductions in consumption to effects on harms. For 
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example, it is unclear whether harm effects are accrued following a linear pattern, or another 
functional form. Indeed, there is some debate whether, at the population (aggregate) level, 
lags should be modelled at all (e.g. Kerr et al. 200072). 
 
In the absence of clear evidence, we made an assumption of a 10-year lag with linear 
progression (i.e. 1/10th of the effect is accrued each year). This may lead to significant 
underestimates if full benefits are either gained earlier or if health benefits are 
disproportionately achieved in the early years (Ramstedt, 200473). We also made an 
assumption that the time lag to full effect for chronic conditions is similar for both morbidity 
and mortality. This may not be true for many conditions, but no empirical evidence on this 
could be identified. Uncertainty analyses have been conducted to test effects using a 5- and 
15-year lag structure. 
4.4 AREAS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Given the trends in consumption over the past ten years it is unlikely that a ‘do nothing’ policy 
would result in no change to the consumption of alcohol in the population. The model 
currently takes an incremental approach and compares the effect of a new policy against a 
‘stay steady’ position.  This is not too great a limitation for comparing the relative incremental 
effect of different policy options but does limit its absolute predictive power. Further research 
could be undertaken to analyse trends for different population subgroups and project forward 
a continuation of these trends if no policy action were taken. 
 
At present our analyses exclude the direct costs to government of implementation and 
monitoring of any of the policies and when available these should be considered alongside 
our results. Detailed data on the extent of sales promotion in the on-trade are lacking and 
research or infrastructure investment to ascertain patterns here would probably be beneficial 
for policy and evaluation of change. 
 
A much more intensive economics based research programme could develop modelling 
approaches to account for the effects of actions taken by the industry in response to the 
policy options and the possible effects on the market structure and supply.   This could also 
potentially extend to other exclusions from our analysis such as wider costs or benefits to the 
economy beyond health, crime and employment, any “drinkers’ pleasure” or “social lubricant” 
effects of alcohol and on the harm side, modelling the impact on lower-level social disorder 
and the effect on families and friends of individuals who misuse alcohol. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
 
The development of these modelling approaches to consider policy questions 
represents a substantial challenge.  This work has surmount several of the important 
hurdles and aims to support policy makers directly in relation to important decisions.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Age/sex consumption distribution from the GHS (2006) – Descriptive 
statistics 
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Figure 36: Age and sex-specific distribution of drinking behaviour in adults in England in 2006 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Proxy of the binge behaviour in England in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  18 – 24 years 25 – 34 years 35 – 44 years 45 – 54 years 55 – 64 years 65 – 74 years 75 years + 
Mean 
Consumption 
Intake the 
heaviest day 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Abstainers  
10.71% 14.03% 10.47% 14.21% 7.20% 12.86% 8.67% 13.28% 8.18% 15.30% 8.37% 20.59% 15.99% 27.00% 
< 6 / 8 units 41.97% 46.49% 43.95% 51.11% 46.60% 54.20% 49.59% 53.73% 50.65% 57.89% 59.88% 58.50% 65.84% 59.95% Moderate 
≥ 8 / 6 units 
10.06% 10.93% 10.58% 8.30% 9.79% 6.67% 6.87% 4.97% 4.05% 2.66% 2.09% 1.16% 0.78% 0.38% 
< 6 / 8 units 
10.06% 9.79% 9.92% 9.33% 14.64% 11.35% 15.90% 13.90% 18.60% 14.57% 19.42% 15.31% 14.13% 11.28% Hazardous 
≥ 8 / 6 units 
16.27% 11.58% 15.59% 9.85% 12.62% 8.60% 9.21% 6.21% 8.10% 3.78% 3.60% 1.37% 0.62% 0.25% 
< 6 / 8 units 
2.78% 1.47% 1.96% 1.80% 2.51% 2.06% 2.98% 3.26% 3.01% 2.58% 3.37% 2.01% 1.71% 1.01% Harmful 
≥ 8 / 6 units 
8.14% 5.71% 7.52% 5.39% 6.63% 4.26% 6.78% 4.66% 7.41% 3.22% 3.26% 1.06% 0.93% 0.13% 
  
              
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 18 – 24 years 25 – 34 years 35 – 44 years 45 – 54 years 55 – 64 years 65 – 74 years 75 years + 
Intake the heaviest day M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Abstainers 
10.71% 14.03% 10.47% 14.21% 7.20% 12.86% 8.67% 13.28% 8.18% 15.30% 8.37% 20.59% 15.99% 27.00% 
< 6 / 8 units 
54.82% 57.75% 55.83% 62.24% 63.75% 67.61% 68.47% 70.89% 72.27% 75.04% 82.67% 75.82% 81.68% 72.24% 
≥ 8 / 6 units 
34.48% 28.22% 33.70% 23.54% 29.05% 19.53% 22.85% 15.84% 19.55% 9.66% 8.95% 3.59% 2.33% 0.76% 
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Appendix 2: Nielsen Data Specification 
 
Requirement specification for price and promotion distribution of alcohol sales – FINAL 
VERSION 
 
1. Summary 
This document finalises the specification for the distribution of alcohol sales price and promotion. 
 
 
2. Our understanding of Nielsen’s raw data 
Nielsen hold data on the sales of SKUs (defined by individual bar-codes) for alcoholic beverages, 
where each item of data includes at least the following fields: 
· SKU code 
· Week 
· Store / outlet (this is at individual store level, e.g. Waitrose, Marylebone High Street) 
· Volume of sales (litres of beverage) 
· Value of sales (in £) 
· Flag identifying whether these sales were on promotion or not 
· Product category 
 
This data is available for the Grocery Multiples channel. Data is more limited for the Impulse and 
on-trade channels; in particular, promotion data is not available in these channels. 
 
 
3. Our requirement for price distribution 
 
We require a description of the price at which products are sold. 
 
For every Product we will provide a set of 10 ranges of sales price per unit volume. For every range, 
we require the total sales volume and the total sales value for the SKUs (at individual week and 
outlet level) falling within that range, split by those SKUs that were sold on promotion and those not 
sold on promotion. For those SKUs on promotion, we also require the hypothetical sales value if the 
SKUs had been sold at non-promotional price. 
 
An example template for a Product is shown below (Template 1). We will provide the information 
shown in bold italics. We require Nielsen to provide the information in italics. The data shown is for 
illustrative purposes only. 
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Product  Cider/ 
perry 
Non-
promotional 
sales 
 Promotional 
sales 
  
Price 
range 
identifier 
Price 
range 
(in £ 
per 
litre) 
Total volume 
of sales (in 
litres) 
Total value 
of sales (in 
£) 
Total volume 
of sales (in 
litres) 
Total value 
of sales (in 
£) 
Total non-
promotional 
value of sales 
(in £) 
1 Under 
0.50 
10,000,000  2,500,000 8,000,000 1,500,000 2,200,000 
2 0.50 to 
less 
than 
0.60 
12,000,000 7,000,000 11,000,000 4,000,000 6,500,000 
… … … … … … … 
10 5.00 
and 
over 
1,000,000 7,500,000 500,000 1,500,000 3,500,000 
 
4. Our requirement for promotion distribution 
 
We require a description of the extent of sales promotions within the price distribution. 
 
Nielsen use an industry recognised method to determine if a price of an item (an SKU in an outlet) 
is promotional or not in any given week. The highest price recorded over the previous 5 weeks in 
the outlet is treated as the regular price (“RRP”) of the item. If the price drops from the RRP by 5% 
or more in a subsequent week, the item is classified as being on promotion. If the reduced price 
remains in place for more than 4 weeks it then becomes the new RRP (i.e. the item is no longer on 
promotion). 
 
Using RRP to determine the distribution of promotion 
 
Each record in the raw data would now conceptually have three new attributes: 
· RRP (computed as above) 
· Price band identifier from 1 to 10 (as described in Section 3 above) corresponding to sales 
price 
· Price band identifier from 1 to 10 corresponding to RRP. 
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These attributes can be used to derive the “Total non-promotional value of sales” (for promotional 
sales only) for each price band, as required in Template 1, using the formula: 
 
 Total non-promotional value of sales product, sales_price_band =  
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productin  SKUs Total
1
outlets Total
1
52
1week
,,,,__,,, RRP
SKU outlet
weekoutletSKUweekoutletSKUbandpricesalesweekoutletSKU IVolume  
where ISKU,outlet,week = 1 if SKU, outlet, week is on promotion 
ISKU,outlet,week = 0 if SKU, outlet, week is not on promotion. 
 
Additional table as a by-product of the analysis 
 
As a by-product of the above computation, Nielsen will provide the following descriptive output. We 
do not anticipate this would require further bespoke analysis, but simply a standard cross-tabulation 
of the data. 
 
For each of the 32 Product categories we require a summary of volume sales split by sales price 
band and RRP price band. The summary should be for promotional sales only. The resulting output 
is shown in the template below (Template 2): 
 
Product Cider/ 
Perry 
RRP range (in £ per 
litre) 
  
  Under 0.50 0.50 to 
less than 
0.60 
… 5.00 and 
over 
Sales price 
range (in £ 
per litre) 
Under 0.50 200,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 50,000 
 0.50 to 
less than 
0.60 
0 150,000 1,250,000 70,000 
 … … … … … 
 5.00 and 
over 
0 0 0 500,000 
 
We will have already provided the price ranges definitions shown in bold italic. We require Nielsen 
to populate the aggregate volume of promotional sales shown in italic.  
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As an example, in the illustrative data shown in Template 2 above, 1,000,000 litres of Cider/Perry 
sold at a promotional price of less than 0.50 £/litre had an associated RRP of between 0.5 and 0.6 
£/litre. 
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5. Product inclusion 
 
Our aim is to perform analysis at the aggregated level of beers, wines, spirits and alcopops but we 
wish to have slightly more detail by Nielsen Product categories so that we can aggregate later by 
ethanol content. 
Beers: 
· Non/low alcoholic lager 
· Commodity lager 
· Standard lager 
· Premium lager 
· Superstrength lager 
· Non/low alcoholic ale 
· Commodity ale 
· Standard ale 
· Premium ale 
· Superstrength ale 
· Stout 
· Cider and perry 
Spirits: 
· Blended Scotch Whisky 
· Malt Whisky 
· Imported Whisky 
· Gin 
· Vodka 
· Liquers 
· Brandy/cognac 
· Rum 
Wines: 
· Australian Light Wine 
· French Light Wine 
· Italian Light Wine 
· USA Light Wine 
· German Light Wine 
· Chilean Light Wine 
· Sparkling Wine 
· Champagne 
Fortified wines: 
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· Sherry 
· Port 
· Vermouth 
Alcopops: 
· RTDs (Flavoured Alcoholic Beverages) 
6. Data coverage 
 
We understand that data is available for Great Britain and can also be partitioned for England & 
Wales. However data for England in isolation is not available. 
 
Our requirement is: 
 
Timeframe = Three separate analyses for each of the three years of Nielsen data. 
Geography = England & Wales only. 
 
 
7. Supplementary analysis requirements 
 
We also require Nielsen to provide the following supplementary analyses for each of the 52 weeks 
of data. 
 
A. Total volume and value of sales in Grocery Multiples in England & Wales 
 
We require Nielsen to complete the template below, in which all sales of alcoholic beverages are 
summarised in the high-level categories of beer, wine, fortified wine, spirits and alcopops. We have 
distinguished between wine and fortified wine because of likely differences in both ABV and the 
market coverage by the Products included in the main analysis. 
 
 Total volume of sales 
(litres) 
Total value of sales (£) 
Beer   
Wine   
Fortified wine   
Spirits   
Alcopops   
 
B. Impulse channel sales 
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We require Nielsen to provide the total volume and value of sales in the Impulse channel for 
England & Wales, ideally divided into price ranges. The set of Products should be the same as the 
main analysis. The template to be completed is shown below: 
 
Product  Cider/ perry   
Price 
range 
identifier 
Price range (in £ per litre) Total volume of sales 
(in litres) 
Total value of sales (in 
£) 
1 Under 0.50 8,000,000  1,500,000 
2 0.50 to less than 0.60 10,000,000 6,000,000 
… … … … 
10 5.00 and over 1,500,000 9,500,000 
 
We also require the total volumes and values of Impulse sales by aggregated categories of beers, 
wines, fortified wines, spirits and alcopops (i.e. a repeat of supplementary analysis 1 for the Impulse 
channel). 
 
C. On-trade sales 
 
We require total volume and value of sales by each Product itemised in the main analysis as shown 
in the template below: 
 
Product Total volume of sales (in litres) Total value of sales (in £) 
Non/low alcoholic lager 1,000,000  2,500,000 
Commodity lager 90,000,000 250,000,000 
… … … 
RTDs 25,000,000 55,500,000 
 
We also require the total volumes and values of on-trade sales by aggregated categories of beers, 
wines, fortified wines, spirits and alcopops (i.e. a repeat of supplementary analysis 1 for the on-
trade). 
 
 
 
 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 179 
 
 
Appendix 3: Statistical regression model: Relationship between the scale of the binge and the mean daily consumption 
 
 
 IF (Moderate) IF (Hazardous) IF (Harmful)  
 
maximum unit drunk =  
 
Moderate drinker 
 
(mean daily intake)*2.349081 + 0.5176387 
 
 
Hazardous drinker 
 
(mean daily intake)*1.160154 + 7.146892 
 
 
Harmful drinker 
 
(mean daily intake)*0.5618365 + 8.342676 
 
 
 
 
1.844889 
1.607251 
1.027955 
0.8532059 
0.510439 
0.2033556 
-0.4201547 
0.4240746 
1.211984 
0.9236356 
0.6555516 
0.4335669 
-0.0194434 
-0.3256304 
-0.6310582 
 
 
 
-1.093021 
-1.638768 
-2.237691 
-3.701012 
-4.568189 
-6.000076 
-7.129887 
-4.053762 
-3.156531 
-3.123848 
-4.187639 
-5.321915 
-6.004615 
-7.261813 
-8.084949 
 
 
 
1.885406 
3.1741 
-0.1498614 
-1.765391 
-2.78108 
-4.294118 
-6.214318 
-2.865602 
1.974312 
-1.234301 
0.3792851 
-4.245981 
-5.15465 
-6.039655 
-12.7028 
 
 
 
 
male aged 18 – 24 
male aged 25 – 34 
male aged 35 – 44 
male aged 45 – 54 
male aged 55 – 64 
male aged 65 – 74 
male aged 75 + 
female aged 16 – 17 
female aged 18 – 24 
female aged 25 – 34 
female aged 35 – 44 
female aged 45 – 54 
female aged 55 – 64 
female aged 65 – 74 
female aged 75 + 
     
     
R-Squared 0.2517 0.1423 0.1974  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2501 0.1370 0.1860  
Root MSE 3.2255 5.2096 7.3303  
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Appendix 4: Elasticities: econometric analysis of alcohol demand 
 
 
The aim of this section is to estimate own and cross price elasticity of demand for different 
types of alcohol products. The Expenditure Food Survey (EFS) 2001-2005, enables 
estimation of own price (responsiveness of demand for product j to changes in the price of 
product j) and cross price elasticity of demand (responsiveness of demand for product j to 
changes in the price of product k) for various types of alcohol products consistently for five 
years.17 A critical advantage of the EFS over other potential data sources, such as the 
General Household Survey (GHS) which also records the volume of alcohol consumption, is 
that information is available upon the unit price paid for each item of expenditure. This is 
crucial for the empirical analysis in that price is allowed to vary across each observational 
unit, i.e. individuals i and time t. Comparative data sources at the individual and/or household 
level which are available over time do not possess detailed price information at such levels of 
disaggregation, meaning that it is not possible to accurately estimate elasticities.18 The basic 
unit of analysis is the individual within the household where interviews are spread evenly over 
the year to ensure that seasonal effects are covered.19 In 2005-06, the latest sweep, the EFS 
collected the diaries of 16,085 people within 6,785 households across the United Kingdom. 
Specifically advantageous for our analysis is that each individual aged 16 and over in the 
household is visited and asked to keep diary records of daily expenditure for two weeks.20 For 
the analysis which follows we restrict the sample to individuals in England. 
An advantage of the EFS over its predecessor the FES is that records of individual 
consumption is recorded in milliliters for each year, which are converted to units of equivalent 
alcohol consumption, denoted by ,t ijc , across the J=4 types of goods, where 1=beer; 2=wine; 
3=spirits; 4=alcopops (RTD); and 1J +  (i.e. 5)=other non durable (OND) goods: food, soft 
drinks and tobacco (natural units for these consumption goods are given in millilitres, grams 
or as a count; we convert to MJ of energy to provide commensurability). The vector X  
contains demographic controls for gender, ethnicity, age,21 education,22 region, household 
composition,23 household size and whether the individual is unemployed. The log price of 
beer is denoted by ln 1p , ln 2p  is log price of wine, ln 3p  is log price of spirits, ln 4p  is 
log price of alcopops, and ln 5p  is log average price of other non durable goods. The log of 
household income (labour and non labour) is given by ln dy . Note all prices are allowed to 
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vary over individuals and time, which is a key advantage of the EFS, and are deflated to 2005 
prices.  
, , , , ,
1 1 1 1, 1 1 11
, , , , ,
2 2 2 2, 2 2 21
, , , , ,
3 3 3 3, 3 3 31
, , ,
4 4 4 4,1
ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
ln ln l
Jt i i t t i t i t t i
j jj
Jt i t i t i t i t t i
j jj
Jt i t i t i t i t t i
j jj
Jt i t i t i
jj
c dy p a
c dy p a
c dy p a
c dy
q g p e
q g p e
q g p e
q g
=
=
=
=
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ +
å
å
å
å
= X
= X
= X
= X
b
b
b
b , ,4 4 4n ln
t i t t i
jp ap e+ +
     (1) 
Advertising promotion of type is given in logs and is denoted by ln tja , notice that this only 
varies across type of good and over time t not the individual unit of observation i.24 Note that 
since promotion data is more aggregated than all other covariates and the dependent 
variables the standard errors will need to be adjusted to take this into account, Moulton 
(1990). The functional form of the model is double log whereby the g  parameters are actual 
elasticities. 
Across each alcohol type j=1,…,4 we consider whether alcohol is consumed on/off 
premises and whether it is high/low price, hence the model given in equation (1) is expanded. 
For all off (on) trade consumption a low price is defined as below £0.3 (£0.8) per unit of 
alcohol and a high price greater or equal to £0.3 (£0.8) per unit of alcohol respectively. Hence 
the initial model which is estimated, shown in equation (2) below, becomes a system of 17 
simultaneous equations, i.e. for each alcohol type there are four equations q=1,…,4. For 
example, considering beer consumption: low price off-trade beer (q=1); high price off-trade 
beer (q=2); low price on-trade beer (q=3); and high price on-trade beer (q=4). Consequently, 
in the estimated empirical model there are 16 alcohol price and terms in each equation and a 
single price term for other goods. An incremental approach is taken, with off-trade low price 
as baseline.  
Estimates of own price and cross price elasticity of demand can be obtained from 
equation (2), i.e. the , , ,ˆk r j qg  parameters which are algebraic functions of the estimated 
g parameters, as defined in Table 1. Given that the model is log-log, we can estimate the 
impact of an z per cent increase in the price, of good j,q upon the percentage change in 
consumption, which is given by ,ˆ j q zg ´ . Specifically, the , , ,ˆk r j qg  parameters represent own 
price elasticity terms (shaded area on lead diagonal in the following tables) and the , , ,ˆk r j qg  
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parameters (for all except the case j q= combined with k r= ) represent cross price 
elasticity terms (off lead diagonal terms in the following tables). If , , ,ˆ 1k r j qg <  then own price 
elasticity of demand is inelastic, i.e. the proportional change in demand is less than the 
proportional change in price. 
, , , , , ,
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 (2) 
Moreover, if , , ,ˆ 1j k j kg <  then a 1 per cent increase in price for a specific alcohol leads to less 
than a 1 per cent decrease in demand, , , ,ˆ j k j kg  per cent, which is what might be expected 
from a product which is habitual such as alcohol. Moreover, evidence based for the UK 
suggests that own price elasticity is inelastic, see Banks et al. (1997) and Crawford et al. 
(1999).25 Similarly, if , , ,ˆ 1k r j qg <  then the cross price elasticity of demand is inelastic, i.e. 
demand is not sensitive to price changes in other types of alcohol. Furthermore, the sign of 
the cross price effect indicates whether goods are complements (negative cross price) or 
substitutes (positive cross price) for each other. 
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Results 
Using iterative three stage least squares to estimate the system of simultaneous equations, 
Farrell and Shields (2007), we have been able to estimate results for two major sub-groups in 
the population: (i) moderate drinkers (males consuming no more than 21 units per week, 
females consuming no more than 14 units per week) aged 16 and over; (ii) hazardous and 
harmful drinkers combined (males consuming more than 21 units per week, females 
consuming more than 14 units per week) aged 16 and over. The results are shown in Tables 
2 and 4 respectively. 
Considering low price off-trade beer consumption, all age groups are found to drink 
more than the omitted group (over 65). Throughout all types of beer consumption, males are 
found to consume more than females. Relative to females male individuals are also found to 
consume more off-trade wine and off-trade spirits. Income effects reveal that where significant 
demand is income inelastic, i.e. a 1% increase in income is associated with a less than 1% 
change in consumption. Mostly, alcohol products are normal goods, i.e. an increase in income 
is associated with an increase in consumption. Exceptions include, perhaps surprisingly, high 
price on-trade beer, where a 1% increase in income is associated with a 0.09% fall in 
consumption and  high priced off-trade spirits. 
In terms of price elasticity, considering consumption of low price off-trade beer the 
own price elasticity is 1,1,1,1 1,1,1,1ˆ 0.4217g g= = - , i.e. where a 1 per cent increase in the price 
of off-trade low priced beer reduces the consumption of off-trade low price beer by 0.42 
percentage points.26 Considering on-trade high priced wine consumption own price elasticity 
is calculated using Table 2 as 2,4,2,4 2,4,2,1 2,4,2,4ˆ 0.0004 0.2911 0.2907g g g= + = - = - . 
Hence, a 1 per cent increase in the price of on-trade high price wine reduces the consumption 
of on-trade high price wine by 0.29 percentage points. 
In terms of cross-elasticities, concerning hazardous and harmful drinkers, the cross 
price elasticity for on-trade high price beer consumption in response to a price change in off-
trade low price alcohol is estimated as 1,4,1,1 1,4,1,1ˆ 0.0157g g= = . In this case, a 1 per cent 
increase in the price of off-trade low price beer increases on-trade high price beer 
consumption by 0.02 percent. 
University of Sheffield: Modelling alcohol pricing and promotion effects on consumption and harm 
 
 184
 
References 
Banks, J., Blundell, R. and A. Lewbel (1997) Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer Demand. Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 79(4), 527-39. 
Crawford, I., Smith, Z. and S. Tanner (1999) Alcohol Taxes, Tax Revenues and the Single European Market. Fiscal 
Studies, 20(3), 287-304. 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) An Almost Ideal Demand System. American Economic Review. 70(3), 312-67. 
Farrell, L. and M. Shields (2007) Children as Consumers: Investigating Child Diary Expenditure Data. Canadian 
Journal of Economics. 40(2), 445-67. 
Moulton, B. (1990) An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro Units. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 72, 334-8. 
Table 1: Interpretation of Parameter Estimates , , ,j k q rg  – subscripts j,k,q,r shown 
CONSUMPTION ® OFF ON 
   BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD 
PRICE ¯  LOW HI  LOW  HI  LOW  HI  LOW  HI  LOW  HI  LOW  HI  LOW  HI  LOW  HI  
OFF BEER LOW 1,1,1,1 1,2,1,1 2,1,1,1 2,2,1,1 3,1,1,1 3,2,1,1 4,1,1,1 4,2,1,1 1,3,1,1 1,4,1,1 2,3,1,1 2,4,1,1 3,3,1,1 3,4,1,1 4,3,1,1 4,4,1,1 
  HI 1,1,1,1 + 1,1,1,2  
1,2,1,1 
+ 
1,2,1,2  
2,1,1,1 + 
2,1,1,2  
2,2,1,1 + 
2,2,1,2  
3,1,1,1 + 
3,1,1,2  
3,2,1,1 + 
3,2,1,2  
4,1,1,1 + 
4,1,1,2  
4,2,1,1 + 
4,2,1,2  
1,3,1,1 + 
1,3,1,2  
1,4,1,1 + 
1,4,1,2  
2,3,1,1 
+ 
2,3,1,2  
2,4,1,1 
+ 
2,4,1,2  
3,3,1,1 
+ 
3,3,1,2  
3,4,1,1 + 
3,4,1,2  
4,3,1,1 
+ 
4,3,1,2  
4,4,1,1 + 
4,4,1,2  
 WINE LOW 1,1,2,1 1,2,2,1 2,1,2,1 2,2,2,1 3,1,2,1 3,2,2,1 4,1,2,1 4,2,2,1 1,3,2,1 1,4,2,1 2,3,2,1 2,4,2,1 3,3,2,1 3,4,2,1 4,3,2,1 4,4,2,1 
  HI 1,1,2,1 + 1,1,2.2 
1,2,2,1 
+ 
1,2,2.2 
2,1,2,1 + 
2,1,2.2 
2,2,2,1 + 
2,2,2,2 
3,1,2,1 + 
3,1,2.2 
3,2,2,1 + 
3,2,2.2 
4,1,2,1 + 
4,1,2.2 
4,2,2,1 + 
4,2,2.2 
1,3,2,1 + 
1,3,2.2 
1,4,2,1 + 
1,4,2.2 
2,3,2,1 
+ 
2,3,2.2 
2,4,2,1 
+ 
2,4,2.2 
3,3,2,1 
+ 
3,3,2.2 
3,4,2,1 + 
3,4,2.2 
4,3,2,1 
+ 
4,3,2.2 
4,4,2,1 + 
4,4,2.2 
 SPIRIT LOW 1,1,3,1 1,2,3,1 2,1,3,1 2,2,3,1 3,1,3,1 3,2,3,1 4,1,3,1 4,2,3,1 1,3,3,1 1,4,3,1 2,3,3,1 2,4,3,1 3,3,3,1 3,4,3,1 4,3,3,1 4,4,3,1 
  HI 1,1,3,1, + 1,1,3,2 
1,2,3,1, 
+ 
1,2,3,2 
2,1,3,1, + 
2,1,3,2 
2,2,3,1, + 
2,2,3,2 
3,1,3,1, 
+ 3,1,3,2 
3,2,3,1, + 
3,2,3,2 
4,1,3,1, 
+ 4,1,3,2 
4,2,3,1, + 
4,2,3,2 
1,3,3,1, + 
1,3,3,2 
1,4,3,1, + 
1,4,3,2 
2,3,3,1, 
+ 
2,3,3,2 
2,4,3,1, 
+ 
2,4,3,2 
3,3,3,1, 
+ 
3,3,3,2 
3,4,3,1, + 
3,4,3,2 
4,3,3,1, 
+ 
4,3,3,2 
4,4,3,1, 
+ 4,4,3,2 
 RTD LOW 1,1,4,1 1,2,4,1 2,1,4,1 2,2,4,1 3,1,4,1 3,2,4,1 4,1,4,1 4,2,4,1 1,3,4,1 1,4,4,1 2,3,4,1 2,4,4,1 3,3,4,1 3,4,4,1 4,3,4,1 4,4,4,1 
  HI 1,1,4,1 + 1,1,4,2 
1,2,4,1 
+ 
1,2,4,2 
2,1,4,1 + 
2,1,4,2 
2,2,4,1 + 
2,2,4,2 
3,1,4,1 + 
3,1,4,2 
3,2,4,1 + 
3,2,4,2 
4,1,4,1 + 
4,1,4,2 
4,2,4,1 + 
4,2,4,2 
1,3,4,1 + 
1,3,4,2 
1,4,4,1 + 
1,4,4,2 
2,3,4,1 
+ 
2,3,4,2 
2,4,4,1 
+ 
2,4,4,2 
3,3,4,1 
+ 
3,3,4,2 
3,4,4,1 + 
3,4,4,2 
4,3,4,1 
+ 
4,3,4,2 
4,4,4,1 + 
4,4,4,2 
ON BEER LOW 1,1,1,1 + 1,1,1,3 
1,2,1,1 
+ 
1,2,1,3 
2,1,1,1 + 
2,1,1,3 
2,2,1,1 + 
2,2,1,3 
3,1,1,1 + 
3,1,1,3 
3,2,1,1 + 
3,2,1,3 
4,1,1,1 + 
4,1,1,3 
4,2,1,1 + 
4,2,1,3 
1,3,1,1 + 
1,3,1,3 
1,4,1,1 + 
1,4,1,3 
2,3,1,1 
+ 
2,3,1,3 
2,4,1,1 
+ 
2,4,1,3 
3,3,1,1 
+ 
3,3,1,3 
3,4,1,1 + 
3,4,1,3 
4,3,1,1 
+ 
4,3,1,3 
4,4,1,1 + 
4,4,1,3 
  HI 1,1,1,1 + 1,1,1,4 
1,2,1,1 + 
1,2,1,4 
2,1,1,1 + 
2,1,1,4 
2,2,1,1 + 
2,2,1,4 
3,1,1,1 + 
3,1,1,4 
3,2,1,1 + 
3,2,1,4 
4,1,1,1 + 
4,1,1,4 
4,2,1,1 + 
4,2,1,4 
1,3,1,1 + 
1,3,1,4 
1,4,1,1 + 
1,4,1,4 
2,3,1,1 + 
2,3,1,4 
2,4,1,1 + 
2,4,1,4 
3,3,1,1 + 
3,3,1,4 
3,4,1,1 + 
3,4,1,4 
4,3,1,1 + 
4,3,1,4 
4,4,1,1 + 
4,4,1,4 
 WINE LOW 1,1,2,1 + 1,1,2,3 
1,2,2,1 
+ 
1,2,2,3 
2,1,2,1 + 
2,1,2,3 
2,2,2,1 + 
2,2,2,3 
3,1,2,1 + 
3,1,2,3 
3,2,2,1 + 
3,2,2,3 
4,1,2,1 + 
4,1,2,3 
4,2,2,1 + 
4,2,2,3 
1,3,2,1 + 
1,3,2,3 
1,4,2,1 + 
1,4,2,3 
2,3,2,1 
+ 
2,3,2,3 
2,4,2,1 
+ 
2,4,2,3 
3,3,2,1 
+ 
3,3,2,3 
3,4,2,1 + 
3,4,2,3 
4,3,2,1 
+ 
4,3,2,3 
4,4,2,1 + 
4,4,2,3 
  HI 1,1,2,1 + 1,1,2,4 
1,2,2,1 + 
1,2,2,4 
2,1,2,1 + 
2,1,2,4 
2,2,2,1 + 
2,2,2,4 
3,1,2,1 + 
3,1,2,4 
3,2,2,1 + 
3,2,2,4 
4,1,2,1 + 
4,1,2,4 
4,2,2,1 + 
4,2,2,4 
1,3,2,1 + 
1,3,2,4 
1,4,2,1 + 
1,4,2,4 
2,3,2,1 + 
2,3,2,4 
2,4,2,1 + 
2,4,2,4 
3,3,2,1 + 
3,3,2,4 
3,4,2,1 + 
3,4,2,4 
4,3,2,1 + 
4,3,2,4 
4,4,2,1 + 
4,4,2,4 
 SPIRIT LOW 1,1,3,1 + 1,1,3,3 
1,2,3,1 
+ 
1,2,3,3 
2,1,3,1 + 
2,1,3,3 
2,2,3,1 + 
2,2,3,3 
3,1,3,1 + 
3,1,3,3 
3,2,3,1 + 
3,2,3,3 
4,1,3,1 + 
4,1,3,3 
4,2,3,1 + 
4,2,3,3 
1,3,3,1 + 
1,3,3,3 
1,4,3,1 + 
1,4,3,3 
2,3,3,1 
+ 
2,3,3,3 
2,4,3,1 
+ 
2,4,3,3 
3,3,3,1 
+ 
3,3,3,3 
3,4,3,1 + 
3,4,3,3 
4,3,3,1 
+ 
4,3,3,3 
4,4,3,1 + 
4,4,3,3 
  HI 1,1,3,1 + 1,1,3,4 
1,2,3,1 + 
1,2,3,4 
2,1,3,1 + 
2,1,3,4 
2,2,3,1 + 
2,2,3,4 
3,1,3,1 + 
3,1,3,4 
3,2,3,1 + 
3,2,3,4 
4,1,3,1 + 
4,1,3,4 
4,2,3,1 + 
4,2,3,4 
1,3,3,1 + 
1,3,3,4 
1,4,3,1 + 
1,4,3,4 
2,3,3,1 + 
2,3,3,4 
2,4,3,1 + 
2,4,3,4 
3,3,3,1 + 
3,3,3,4 
3,4,3,1 + 
3,4,3,4 
4,3,3,1 + 
4,3,3,4 
4,4,3,1 + 
4,4,3,4 
 RTD LOW 1,1,4,1 + 1,1,4,3 
1,2,4,1 
+ 
1,2,4,3 
2,1,4,1 + 
2,1,4,3 
2,2,4,1 + 
2,2,4,3 
3,1,4,1 + 
3,1,4,3 
3,2,4,1 + 
3,2,4,3 
4,1,4,1 + 
4,1,4,3 
4,2,4,1 + 
4,2,4,3 
1,3,4,1 + 
1,3,4,3 
1,4,4,1 + 
1,4,4,3 
2,3,4,1 
+ 
2,3,4,3 
2,4,4,1 
+ 
2,4,4,3 
3,3,4,1 
+ 
3,3,4,3 
3,4,4,1 + 
3,4,4,3 
4,3,4,1 
+ 
4,3,4,3 
4,4,4,1 + 
4,4,4,3 
  HI 1,1,4,1 + 1,1,4,4 
1,2,4,1 + 
1,2,4,4 
2,1,4,1 + 
2,1,4,4 
2,2,4,1 + 
2,2,4,4 
3,1,4,1 + 
3,1,4,4 
3,2,4,1 + 
3,2,4,4 
4,1,4,1 + 
4,1,4,4 
4,2,4,1 + 
4,2,4,4 
1,3,4,1 + 
1,3,4,4 
1,4,4,1 + 
1,4,4,4 
2,3,4,1 + 
2,3,4,4 
2,4,4,1 + 
2,4,4,4 
3,3,4,1 + 
3,3,4,4 
3,4,4,1 + 
3,4,4,4 
4,3,4,1 + 
4,3,4,4 
4,4,4,1 + 
4,4,4,4 
 Table 2: Moderate Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – Iterative Three Stage Least Squares  
 BEER 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 11c  PRICE HIGH 12c  PRICE LOW 13c  PRICE HIGH 14c  
Male 0.0236*** 0.0415*** 0.1357*** 0.2042*** 
White -0.0014___ 0.0086*__ -0.0049___ -0.0083___ 
Age 16_18 0.0231**_ 0.0122___ 0.0876*** -0.0334___ 
Age 18_25 0.0200*** 0.0143___ 0.0653*** 0.0905*** 
Age 25_35 0.0162*** 0.0266*** 0.0751*** 0.1144*** 
Age 35_45 0.0145*** 0.0229*** 0.0789*** 0.0978*** 
Age 45_55 0.0144*** 0.0088___ 0.0787*** 0.0846*** 
Age 55_65 0.0070*__ 0.0011___ 0.0564*** 0.0289**_ 
Left school <16 0.0059___ 0.0065___ 0.0575*** 0.0588*** 
Left school =16 0.0061___ 0.0109___ 0.0256**_ 0.0545*** 
Left school >16 and <=18 0.0058___ 0.0102___ 0.0111___ 0.0393*** 
Left school >18 and <=21 0.0012___ 0.0017___ 0.0094___ 0.0127___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 0.0052___ 0.0107___ 0.0105___ 0.0221___ 
Unemployed 0.0150**_ -0.0285**_ 0.0276___ -0.0319___ 
Household size -0.0012___ 0.0000___ 0.0005___ -0.0100*** 
Log gross income  0.0025**_ 0.0014___ -0.006*__ -0.0088**_ 
Log advertising expenditure 0.0260*__ -0.0092___ 0.0352___ -0.0307___ 
Log price beer (low/off) -0.4217*** 0.0044*** 0.0131*** 0.0157*** 
Log price beer (high/off) 0.4255*** -0.4268*** 0.0000___ 0.0017___ 
Log price beer (low/on) 0.4268*** 0.0022___ -0.3909*** 0.0102*** 
Log price beer (high/on) 0.4277*** 0.0041*** 0.0076*** -0.4220*** 
Log price wine (low/off) 0.0051*** 0.0063*** 0.0115*** 0.0102*** 
Log price wine (high/off) -0.0011___ 0.0001___ -0.0005___ 0.0053*__ 
Log price wine (low/on) -0.0044*__ -0.0082**_ 0.0033___ 0.0048___ 
Log price wine (high/on) -0.0030*** -0.0029*__ 0.0006___ -0.0031___ 
Log price spirits (low/off) 0.0030*__ 0.0098*** 0.0151*** 0.0142*** 
Log price spirits (high/off) 0.0019___ -0.0043___ -0.0027___ 0.0019___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) -0.0013___ -0.0092___ -0.0122___ -0.0252___ 
Log price spirits (high/on) -0.0015___ -0.0088*** -0.0189*** -0.0202*** 
Log price RTD (low/off) 0.0118**_ 0.0075___ 0.0123___ 0.0068___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) -0.0059___ 0.0029___ -0.0040___ 0.0035___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) -0.0102___ -0.006___ -0.0048___ -0.0006___ 
Log price RTD (high/on) -0.0109*__ -0.0057___ -0.0037___ -0.0056___ 
Log price OND 0.0024**_ 0.0038**_ 0.0151*** 0.0174*** 
Intercept -0.2593*__ 0.0845___ -0.3079___ 0.4093___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.9536 0.9216 0.8281 0.8101 
OBSERVATIONS 14,275 
Denotes significance at the *** 1% level,  ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Table 2 Contd: Moderate Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – Iterative Three Stage Least Squares  
 WINE 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 21c  PRICE HIGH 22c  PRICE LOW 23c  PRICE HIGH 24c  
Male 0.0105*** 0.0413*** 0.0006___ 0.0016___ 
White 0.0010___ -0.0057___ 0.0005___ 0.0054___ 
Age 16_18 0.0021___ -0.007___ 0.0035___ -0.0057___ 
Age 18_25 -0.0028___ -0.0203**_ 0.0028___ 0.0013___ 
Age 25_35 -0.0014___ -0.0159**_ 0.0036*__ 0.0125___ 
Age 35_45 -0.0046___ -0.0094___ 0.0024___ -0.0058___ 
Age 45_55 -0.0019___ 0.0049___ 0.0023___ -0.0012___ 
Age 55_65 0.0001___ 0.0135**_ 0.0015___ 0.0204*** 
Left school <16 0.0011___ -0.0266*** 0.0029___ -0.0179**_ 
Left school =16 -0.0034___ -0.0186*** 0.0005___ -0.0117___ 
Left school >16 and <=18 -0.0014___ -0.0105___ -0.0007___ -0.0099___ 
Left school >18 and <=21 -0.0038___ -0.0117___ -0.0028___ -0.0091___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 0.0026___ 0.0229**_ -0.0036___ 0.0014___ 
Unemployed 0.0051___ 0.0106___ 0.0022___ 0.0178___ 
Household size -0.0007___ 0.0026___ 0.0004___ -0.0006___ 
Log gross income  -0.0006___ 0.0081*** 0.0004___ 0.0109*** 
Log advertising expenditure -0.0206*__ 0.0153___ -0.0018___ 0.0063___ 
Log price beer (low/off) 0.0023*** 0.0082*** 0.0001___ 0.002___ 
Log price beer (high/off) 0.0004___ 0.0013___ -0.0002___ 0.0005___ 
Log price beer (low/on) 0.0004___ 0.0000___ -0.0004___ 0.0025___ 
Log price beer (high/on) -0.0002___ 0.0008___ -0.0001___ -0.0023___ 
Log price wine (low/off) -0.4127*** 0.0032**_ -0.0002___ 0.0004___ 
Log price wine (high/off) 0.4139*** -0.4644*** 0.0000___ 0.0017___ 
Log price wine (low/on) 0.4136*** -0.0002___ -0.2326*** 0.0009___ 
Log price wine (high/on) 0.4138*** 0.0021___ 0.0001___ -0.2911*** 
Log price spirits (low/off) 0.0023*__ 0.0097*** 0.0003___ -0.0006___ 
Log price spirits (high/off) -0.0009___ -0.0012___ -0.0003___ 0.0022___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) 0.0009___ 0.0004___ -0.0002___ 0.0196*__ 
Log price spirits (high/on) -0.0014___ -0.0074**_ 0.0004___ -0.0096*** 
Log price RTD (low/off) 0.0022___ 0.0010___ -0.0020___ -0.0006___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) -0.0020___ 0.0043___ 0.0003___ 0.0022___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) -0.0023___ -0.0048___ 0.0007___ 0.0100___ 
Log price RTD (high/on) -0.0026___ 0.0010___ 0.0139___ 0.0049___ 
Log price OND 0.0002___ 0.0028*__ 0.0004___ -0.0018___ 
Intercept 0.2241**_ -0.1555___ -0.0002___ -0.1004___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.9733 0.9603 0.7828 0.7387 
OBSERVATIONS 14,275 
Denotes significance at the *** 1% level,  ** 5% level, * 10% level 
Table 2 Contd: Moderate Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – I3LS 
 SPIRIT 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 31c  PRICE HIGH 32c  PRICE LOW 33c  PRICE HIGH 34c  
Male 0.0034*** 0.0180*** 0.0089___ -0.0045___ 
White -0.0003___ -0.0046*__ 0.0053___ -0.0059___ 
Age 16_18 -0.0019___ -0.0115___ 0.0628**_ 0.0224___ 
Age 18_25 -0.0014___ -0.0187*** -0.0063___ 0.0838*** 
Age 25_35 -0.0018___ -0.0131*** 0.0109___ 0.0533*** 
Age 35_45 -0.001___ -0.0131*** 0.0113___ 0.0221**_ 
Age 45_55 -0.0012___ -0.0093**_ 0.0034___ 0.0116___ 
Age 55_65 -0.0008___ -0.0088**_ 0.0010___ 0.0185*__ 
Left school <16 -0.0004___ -0.0069*__ 0.0002___ 0.0282**_ 
Left school =16 -0.0023___ -0.0041___ 0.0015___ 0.0138___ 
Left school >16 and <=18 -0.0017___ -0.0025___ 0.0165___ 0.0136___ 
Left school >18 and <=21 -0.0049**_ -0.0086___ 0.0076___ 0.0155___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 -0.0017___ -0.0010___ 0.0114___ -0.0166___ 
Unemployed -0.0011___ -0.0006___ -0.0149___ 0.0153___ 
Household size -0.0002___ -0.0002___ -0.0008___ 0.0009___ 
Log gross income  -0.0003___ -0.0022**_ -0.0018___ 0.0063**_ 
Log advertising expenditure 0.0035___ 0.0110___ 0.0284___ -0.0007___ 
Log price beer (low/off) 0.0011*** 0.0055*** 0.0029___ 0.0048**_ 
Log price beer (high/off) -0.0001___ -0.0018**_ 0.0003___ 0.0009___ 
Log price beer (low/on) -0.0001___ -0.0008___ 0.0014___ 0.0034___ 
Log price beer (high/on) -0.0001___ -0.0013___ 0.0021___ 0.0075*** 
Log price wine (low/off) 0.0012*** 0.0028*** 0.0033___ 0.0033*__ 
Log price wine (high/off) -0.0003___ 0.0005___ 0.0005___ 0.0009___ 
Log price wine (low/on) 0.0007___ -0.0012___ -0.0024___ 0.0034___ 
Log price wine (high/on) -0.0005___ 0.0003___ -0.0012___ 0.002___ 
Log price spirits (low/off) -0.5129*** 0.0029**_ 0.0024___ 0.0031___ 
Log price spirits (high/off) 0.5136*** -0.5271*** 0.0001___ 0.0005___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) 0.5131*** -0.0025___ -1.7834*** 0.0069___ 
Log price spirits (high/on) 0.5130*** -0.0029*__ -0.0029___ -0.1922*** 
Log price RTD (low/off) 0.0003___ 0.0008___ 0.0017___ -0.008___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) 0.0008___ 0.0019___ 0.0003___ 0.0114___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) 0.0001___ -0.0003___ 0.0397**_ -0.0069___ 
Log price RTD (high/on) 0.0003___ 0.0012___ 0.0033___ -0.0007___ 
Log price OND 0.0001___ 0.0005___ 0.0022___ 0.0023___ 
Intercept -0.0287___ -0.0654___ -0.2751___ -0.0142___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.9782 0.9532 0.5388 0.3680 
OBSERVATIONS 14,275 
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Table 2 Contd: Moderate Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – I3LS 
 RTD (ALCOPOPS) 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 41c  PRICE HIGH 42c  PRICE LOW 43c  PRICE HIGH 44c  
Male 0.0006___ 0.0079*** 0.0011___ -0.0102*** 
White -0.0004___ -0.0008___ 0.0003___ -0.0007___ 
Age 16_18 -0.0016___ -0.0038___ 0.0152*** 0.0615*** 
Age 18_25 -0.0006___ 0.0099*__ 0.0017___ 0.0229*** 
Age 25_35 -0.0005___ 0.0089**_ -0.0008___ 0.0060___ 
Age 35_45 -0.0002___ 0.0114*** -0.0016___ 0.0007___ 
Age 45_55 0.0010___ 0.0031___ -0.0007___ -0.0031___ 
Age 55_65 -0.0003___ 0.0061*__ -0.0001___ 0.0014___ 
Left school <16 -0.0011___ 0.0055___ -0.0009___ -0.0019___ 
Left school =16 -0.0003___ 0.0013___ 0.0009___ -0.0006___ 
Left school >16 and <=18 -0.0011___ 0.0009___ 0.0004___ -0.0017___ 
Left school >18 and <=21 -0.0008___ 0.0017___ -0.0004___ 0.0089___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 -0.0004___ 0.0006___ 0.0001___ -0.0061___ 
Unemployed 0.0005___ -0.0043___ -0.0008___ -0.0092___ 
Household size -0.0003___ -0.0012___ 0.0002___ 0.0012___ 
Log gross income  -0.0005**_ 0.0011___ 0.0002___ 0.0010___ 
Log advertising expenditure 0.0014___ 0.0214___ 0.0076___ -0.0062___ 
Log price beer (low/off) -0.0002___ 0.0035*** 0.0004___ 0.0050*** 
Log price beer (high/off) 0.0002___ -0.0003___ 0.0002___ 0.0005___ 
Log price beer (low/on) 0.0001___ -0.0009___ 0.0005___ 0.0015___ 
Log price beer (high/on) 0.0001___ -0.0004___ 0.0002___ 0.0025**_ 
Log price wine (low/off) 0.0001___ 0.0019*** 0.0001___ 0.0038*** 
Log price wine (high/off) -0.0001___ 0.0000___ 0.0001___ 0.0009___ 
Log price wine (low/on) -0.0001___ -0.0014___ 0.0001___ 0.0022___ 
Log price wine (high/on) -0.0001___ -0.0009___ 0.0005___ 0.0003___ 
Log price spirits (low/off) 0.0000___ 0.0018___ 0.0003___ 0.0033___ 
Log price spirits (high/off) 0.0000___ 0.0000___ 0.0000___ 0.0006___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) 0.0000___ -0.0014___ 0.002___ 0.0151*__ 
Log price spirits (high/on) 0.0000___ -0.0011___ 0.0001___ -0.0052**_ 
Log price RTD (low/off) -0.3146*** 0.0009___ 0.0004___ 0.0039___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) 0.3145*** -0.3296*** 0.0000___ 0.0002___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) 0.3146*** 0.0001___ -0.3308*** 0.0028___ 
Log price RTD (high/on) 0.3145*** -0.0002___ 0.0003___ -0.3230*** 
Log price OND -0.0001___ 0.0009___ -0.0007*__ 0.0011___ 
Intercept -0.0105___ -0.2191___ -0.0801___ 0.1010___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.8895 0.8434 0.8429 0.7669 
OBSERVATIONS 14,275 
Table 3: Moderate Drinkers: Own and Cross Price Elasticities Calculated from Table 1 
 CONSUMPTION ® OFF ON 
   BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD 
PRICE ¯   LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI 
OFF BEER LOW -
0.4217 0.0044 0.0023 0.0082 0.0011 0.0055 -0.0002 0.0035 0.0131 0.0157 0.0001 0.0020 0.0029 0.0048 0.0004 0.0050 
  HI 
0.0037 
-
0.4224 0.0027 0.0095 0.0010 0.0037 0.0000 0.0032 0.0130 0.0174 
-
0.0001 0.0025 0.0033 0.0057 0.0006 0.0055 
 WINE LOW 
0.0051 0.0063 
-
0.4127 0.0032 0.0012 0.0028 0.0001 0.0019 0.0115 0.0102 
-
0.0002 0.0004 0.0033 0.0033 0.0001 0.0038 
  HI 
0.0040 0.0064 0.0012 
-
0.4612 0.0009 0.0032 0.0000 0.0019 0.0111 0.0155 
-
0.0002 0.0020 0.0038 0.0042 0.0002 0.0047 
 SPIRIT LOW 
0.0030 0.0098 0.0023 0.0097 -0.5129 0.0029 0.0000 0.0018 0.0151 0.0142 0.0003 
-
0.0006 0.0024 0.0031 0.0003 0.0033 
  HI 
0.0049 0.0056 0.0014 0.0085 0.0007 
-
0.5242 0.0000 0.0019 0.0124 0.0161 0.0000 0.0017 0.0025 0.0036 0.0003 0.0039 
 RTD LOW 
0.0118 0.0075 0.0022 0.0010 0.0003 0.0008 -0.3146 0.0009 0.0123 0.0068 
-
0.0002 
-
0.0006 0.0017 -0.0080 0.0004 0.0039 
  HI 
0.0059 0.0104 0.0001 0.0053 0.0011 0.0027 -0.0001 
-
0.3287 0.0083 0.0103 0.0002 0.0016 0.0020 0.0034 0.0004 0.0041 
ON BEER LOW 
0.0051 0.0067 0.0027 0.0083 0.0010 0.0047 -0.0001 0.0027 
-
0.3778 0.0259 
-
0.0003 0.0044 0.0043 0.0082 0.0009 0.0064 
  HI 
0.0060 0.0085 0.0022 0.0091 0.0010 0.0042 -0.0001 0.0032 0.0206 
-
0.4063 0.0000 
-
0.0003 0.0051 0.0123 0.0006 0.0075 
 WINE LOW 
0.0007 
-
0.0019 0.0009 0.0030 0.0019 0.0016 0.0000 0.0005 0.0148 0.0150 
-
0.2328 0.0013 0.0010 0.0067 0.0002 0.0060 
  HI 
0.0021 0.0034 0.0010 0.0052 0.0007 0.0031 0.0000 0.0010 0.0121 0.0072 
-
0.0002 
-
0.2907 0.0022 0.0053 0.0006 0.0041 
 SPIRIT LOW 
0.0017 0.0006 0.0032 0.0101 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0029 
-
0.0110 0.0001 0.0190 
-
1.7810 0.0100 0.0023 0.0183 
  HI 
0.0015 0.0011 0.0009 0.0023 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 
-
0.0038 
-
0.0060 
-
0.0011 
-
0.0102 
-
0.0005 -0.1891 0.0004 -0.0020 
 RTD LOW 
0.0016 0.0015 
-
0.0001 
-
0.0038 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0011 0.0075 0.0061 
-
0.0022 0.0094 0.0414 -0.0149 -0.3304 0.0067 
  HI 
0.0009 0.0019 
-
0.0004 0.0020 0.0006 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0087 0.0012 0.0001 0.0043 0.0050 -0.0087 0.0007 -0.3191 
Note: Own price elasticities, shown along the lead diagonal, are all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4: Hazardous and Harmful Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – I3LS 
 BEER 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 11c  PRICE HIGH 12c  PRICE LOW 13c  PRICE HIGH 14c  
Male 0.0751*** 0.0791*** 0.1710*** 0.2325*** 
White 0.0176**_ -0.0091___ -0.0047___ -0.0246**_ 
Age 16_18 0.0486___ 0.0219___ -0.0147___ -0.1585**_ 
Age 18_25 0.0820*** 0.0573*** -0.0159___ 0.1014*** 
Age 25_35 0.0710*** 0.0574*** 0.0243___ 0.1600*** 
Age 35_45 0.0755*** 0.0762*** 0.0256*__ 0.1220*** 
Age 45_55 0.0741*** 0.0520*** 0.0499*** 0.0904*** 
Age 55_65 0.0446*** 0.0325*** 0.0381*** 0.0363**_ 
Left school <16 0.0085___ 0.0092___ 0.0587*** 0.1037*** 
Left school =16 0.0115___ -0.0020___ 0.0274**_ 0.1129*** 
Left school >16 and <=18 0.0004___ -0.0038___ 0.0285**_ 0.0535*** 
Left school >18 and <=21 -0.0028___ -0.0081___ 0.0067___ 0.0198___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 -0.0139___ -0.0218___ 0.0156___ 0.0192___ 
Unemployed -0.0188___ -0.0151___ -0.0219___ -0.0092___ 
Household size 0.0027___ -0.0022___ 0.0003___ -0.0206*** 
Log gross income  -0.0003___ 0.0002___ -0.0089**_ -0.0040___ 
Log advertising expenditure -0.0063___ -0.0059___ 0.0032___ -0.0779___ 
Log price beer (low/off) -0.5896*** 0.0086*** 0.0167*** 0.0249*** 
Log price beer (high/off) 0.5990*** -0.5832*** -0.0031___ -0.0043*__ 
Log price beer (low/on) 0.6097*** 0.0089*** -0.6328*** 0.0275*** 
Log price beer (high/on) 0.6097*** 0.0099*** 0.0161*** -0.6580*** 
Log price wine (low/off) 0.0198*** 0.0142*** 0.0248*** 0.0281*** 
Log price wine (high/off) -0.0030*__ 0.0009___ 0.0032*__ 0.0108*** 
Log price wine (low/on) -0.0149*__ -0.0175**_ -0.0560*** -0.0159___ 
Log price wine (high/on) -0.0102*** -0.0097*** -0.0100*** -0.0321*** 
Log price spirits (low/off) 0.0064*** 0.0120*** 0.0181*** 0.0206*** 
Log price spirits (high/off) -0.0008___ -0.0078*** 0.0024___ 0.0030___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) 0.0113___ 0.0070___ -0.0034___ -0.0078___ 
Log price spirits (high/on) 0.0003___ -0.0097*** -0.0229*** -0.0387*** 
Log price RTD (low/off) -0.0049___ -0.0115___ 0.0018___ 0.0044___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) 0.0047___ 0.0097___ -0.0003___ 0.0033___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) 0.0101___ 0.0157___ 0.0037___ 0.0074___ 
Log price RTD (high/on) 0.0074___ 0.0114___ 0.0134___ -0.0022___ 
Log price OND 0.0021___ 0.0044___ 0.0168*** 0.0031___ 
Intercept 0.0738___ 0.0972___ 0.1871___ 0.9435*__ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.9503 0.9332 0.8997 0.8906 
OBSERVATIONS 11,935 
Denotes significance at the *** 1% level,  ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
 Table 4 Contd: Hazardous and Harmful Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – I3LS 
 WINE 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 21c  PRICE HIGH 22c  PRICE LOW 23c  PRICE HIGH 24c  
Male 0.0256*** 0.0668*** 0.0009___ -0.0096___ 
White -0.0118___ -0.0036___ 0.0003___ -0.0059___ 
Age 16_18 -0.0338___ -0.0797___ 0.0015___ -0.0382___ 
Age 18_25 -0.0560*** -0.2057*** -0.0014___ 0.0058___ 
Age 25_35 -0.0311*** -0.1685*** 0.0056*__ -0.0003___ 
Age 35_45 -0.0172___ -0.0621*** 0.0020___ 0.0116___ 
Age 45_55 -0.0008___ 0.0035___ 0.0029___ 0.0122___ 
Age 55_65 0.0108___ 0.0433**_ 0.0061**_ 0.0072___ 
Left school <16 -0.0355*** -0.2211*** -0.0036___ -0.0208**_ 
Left school =16 -0.0182*__ -0.1554*** 0.0022___ -0.0224**_ 
Left school >16 and <=18 -0.0068___ -0.0814*** 0.0011___ -0.0201**_ 
Left school >18 and <=21 -0.0071___ -0.0806*** -0.0028___ -0.0014___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 0.0063___ -0.0102___ -0.0036___ -0.0095___ 
Unemployed -0.0270___ 0.0253___ -0.0065___ 0.0178___ 
Household size -0.0018___ 0.0092**_ -0.0007___ -0.0001___ 
Log gross income  0.0007___ 0.0239*** -0.0011___ 0.0050**_ 
Log advertising expenditure -0.0465___ 0.1286**_ -0.0078___ -0.0036___ 
Log price beer (low/off) 0.0088*** 0.0367*** -0.0002___ 0.0041*** 
Log price beer (high/off) 0.0011___ -0.0009___ 0.0007___ -0.0010___ 
Log price beer (low/on) 0.0041**_ 0.0097*** -0.0009*__ -0.0007___ 
Log price beer (high/on) 0.0026___ 0.0049___ 0.0000___ -0.0068*** 
Log price wine (low/off) -0.5603*** 0.0116*** -0.0001___ 0.0007___ 
Log price wine (high/off) 0.5656*** -0.6375*** 0.0000___ 0.0018___ 
Log price wine (low/on) 0.5594*** -0.0129___ -0.3798*** -0.0003___ 
Log price wine (high/on) 0.5624*** 0.0005___ 0.0002___ -0.4114*** 
Log price spirits (low/off) 0.0041**_ 0.0206*** 0.0006___ 0.0036*** 
Log price spirits (high/off) -0.0004___ -0.0025___ -0.0005___ -0.0011___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) -0.0060___ -0.0165___ -0.0019___ 0.0241*** 
Log price spirits (high/on) 0.0014___ -0.0027___ -0.0009___ -0.0051**_ 
Log price RTD (low/off) 0.0038___ 0.0178___ -0.0001___ 0.0006___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) 0.0097___ -0.0106___ 0.0000___ -0.0003___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) -0.0084___ -0.0135___ 0.0045___ 0.0014___ 
Log price RTD (high/on) 0.0010___ -0.0078___ 0.0009___ 0.0080___ 
Log price OND -0.0002___ 0.0248*** 0.0006___ -0.0021___ 
Intercept 0.5632___ -0.8760___ 0.0868___ 0.0591___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.9408 0.9180 0.7843 0.7539 
OBSERVATIONS 11,935 
Denotes significance at the *** 1% level,  ** 5% level, * 10% level.
 Table 4 Contd: Hazardous and Harmful Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – I3LS 
 SPIRIT 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 31c  PRICE HIGH 32c  PRICE LOW 33c  PRICE HIGH 34c  
Male 0.0150*** 0.0162*** 0.0069___ 0.0055___ 
White -0.0022___ -0.0113*__ -0.0176___ -0.0124___ 
Age 16_18 -0.0460___ -0.1155*** 0.4879*** 0.0915*__ 
Age 18_25 -0.0529*** -0.0581*** -0.0260___ 0.1333*** 
Age 25_35 -0.0405*** -0.0521*** 0.0185___ 0.0135___ 
Age 35_45 -0.0367*** -0.0388*** -0.0099___ -0.0022___ 
Age 45_55 -0.0311*** -0.0288*** -0.0026___ -0.0033___ 
Age 55_65 -0.0307*** -0.0151*__ -0.0022___ -0.0170___ 
Left school <16 0.0008___ -0.0177*__ -0.0036___ 0.0121___ 
Left school =16 -0.0051___ -0.0094___ -0.0021___ 0.0144___ 
Left school >16 and <=18 -0.0014___ -0.0125___ 0.0068___ 0.0149___ 
Left school >18 and <=21 0.0005___ -0.0358*** 0.0211___ 0.0209___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 0.0032___ -0.0073___ 0.0201___ 0.0180___ 
Unemployed -0.0114___ -0.0095___ 0.0471___ 0.0251___ 
Household size -0.0003___ 0.0006___ -0.0060___ 0.0014___ 
Log gross income  0.0005___ 0.0001___ 0.0015___ -0.0032___ 
Log advertising expenditure -0.0078___ 0.0209___ 0.0832___ -0.0055___ 
Log price beer (low/off) 0.0041*** 0.0057*** 0.0019___ 0.0073*** 
Log price beer (high/off) -0.0002___ -0.0024*__ -0.0003___ -0.0012___ 
Log price beer (low/on) 0.0010___ 0.0004___ 0.0020___ -0.0014___ 
Log price beer (high/on) 0.0005___ -0.0001___ 0.0030___ -0.0058*** 
Log price wine (low/off) 0.0024**_ 0.0065*** 0.0006___ 0.0048*** 
Log price wine (high/off) 0.0023**_ -0.0003___ -0.0007___ 0.0037**_ 
Log price wine (low/on) -0.0041___ 0.0058___ -0.0028___ -0.0117___ 
Log price wine (high/on) 0.0006___ -0.002___ -0.0034___ -0.0098*** 
Log price spirits (low/off) -0.6266*** 0.0016___ 0.0000___ -0.0009___ 
Log price spirits (high/off) 0.6283*** -0.6475*** 0.0002___ 0.0003___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) 0.6260*** -0.0052___ -3.7221*** 0.0236*__ 
Log price spirits (high/on) 0.6260*** -0.0034___ -0.0006___ -0.2852*** 
Log price RTD (low/off) -0.0047___ -0.0013___ -0.0012___ 0.0213*__ 
Log price RTD (high/off) 0.0092___ 0.0070___ -0.0016___ -0.0176___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) -0.0002___ 0.0059___ 0.0691*** -0.0512*** 
Log price RTD (high/on) 0.0066___ -0.0006___ 0.0031___ -0.0266**_ 
Log price OND 0.0022___ 0.0042___ -0.0012___ 0.0019___ 
Intercept 0.1610___ -0.0943___ -0.8245___ 0.1450___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.9715 0.9602 0.7589 0.4935 
OBSERVATIONS 11,935 
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Table 4 Contd: Hazardous and Harmful Drinkers: Alcohol Consumption – I3LS 
 RTD (ALCOPOPS) 
 OFF-TRADE ON-TRADE 
 PRICE LOW 41c  PRICE HIGH 42c  PRICE LOW 43c  PRICE HIGH 44c  
Male -0.0023*** -0.0016___ 0.0000___ -0.0128**_ 
White 0.0008___ 0.0001___ -0.0038**_ -0.0001___ 
Age 16_18 -0.0013___ -0.0147___ 0.0123___ 0.0613*__ 
Age 18_25 -0.0009___ 0.0076___ 0.0124*** 0.1040*** 
Age 25_35 -0.0005___ -0.0035___ -0.0019___ 0.0121___ 
Age 35_45 -0.0006___ 0.0075___ 0.0010___ 0.0065___ 
Age 45_55 -0.0012___ 0.005___ -0.0010___ -0.0047___ 
Age 55_65 -0.0010___ 0.0046___ -0.0010___ 0.0046___ 
Left school <16 -0.0014___ 0.0077___ 0.0017___ 0.0089___ 
Left school =16 0.0005___ 0.0078___ 0.0005___ 0.0046___ 
Left school >16 and <=18 -0.0015___ 0.0040___ 0.0002___ -0.0040___ 
Left school >18 and <=21 -0.0036*__ 0.0051___ 0.0005___ -0.0053___ 
Left school >21 and <=25 -0.0010___ 0.0072___ -0.0007___ -0.0056___ 
Unemployed 0.0017___ -0.0061___ 0.0099**_ 0.0072___ 
Household size 0.0005___ 0.0025___ -0.0004___ 0.0005___ 
Log gross income  0.0008**_ 0.0012___ 0.0010___ -0.0020___ 
Log advertising expenditure 0.0004___ 0.0472*__ 0.0101___ -0.0049___ 
Log price beer (low/off) 0.0002___ 0.0006___ 0.0002___ 0.0053*** 
Log price beer (high/off) 0.0001___ 0.0000___ 0.0002___ 0.0001___ 
Log price beer (low/on) -0.0002___ 0.0018___ -0.0013*** 0.0034**_ 
Log price beer (high/on) 0.0000___ 0.0010___ 0.0001___ -0.0027**_ 
Log price wine (low/off) 0.0003___ 0.0043*** 0.0005___ 0.0038*** 
Log price wine (high/off) -0.0001___ -0.0031*** 0.0003___ -0.0001___ 
Log price wine (low/on) -0.0002___ -0.0081**_ 0.0027___ 0.0007___ 
Log price wine (high/on) -0.0001___ -0.0036**_ 0.0008___ -0.0013___ 
Log price spirits (low/off) 0.0001___ -0.0001___ 0.0003___ 0.0004___ 
Log price spirits (high/off) -0.0001___ 0.0008___ 0.0001___ 0.0005___ 
Log price spirits (low/on) -0.0001___ 0.0002___ -0.0022___ -0.0142*__ 
Log price spirits (high/on) -0.0004___ -0.0025___ -0.0004___ -0.0047**_ 
Log price RTD (low/off) -0.3816*** -0.0005___ 0.0001___ -0.0007___ 
Log price RTD (high/off) 0.3817*** -0.4153*** 0.0000___ 0.0015___ 
Log price RTD (low/on) 0.3819*** 0.0011___ -0.3926*** 0.0143*__ 
Log price RTD (high/on) 0.3818*** 0.0009___ 0.0011___ -0.4186*** 
Log price OND 0.0001___ 0.0006___ -0.0007___ 0.0069*** 
Intercept -0.0054___ -0.5020*__ -0.1063___ 0.1200___ 
CONTROLS Respondent dummies, Regional dummies and year dummies 
R Squared 0.5186 0.3861 0.3876 0.3858 
OBSERVATIONS 11,935 
Table 5: Hazardous and Harmful Drinkers: Own and Cross Price Elasticities Calculated from Table 1 
 CONSUMPTION ® OFF ON 
   BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD BEER WINE SPIRIT RTD 
PRICE ¯   LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI LOW HI 
OFF BEER LOW -
0.5896 0.0086 0.0088 0.0367 0.0041 0.0057 0.0002 0.0006 0.0167 0.0249 
-
0.0002 0.0041 0.0019 0.0073 0.0002 0.0053 
  HI 
0.0094 
-
0.5746 0.0098 0.0357 0.0039 0.0033 0.0003 0.0006 0.0136 0.0206 0.0005 0.0032 0.0016 0.0061 0.0004 0.0054 
 WINE LOW 
0.0198 0.0142 
-
0.5603 0.0116 0.0024 0.0065 0.0003 0.0043 0.0248 0.0281 
-
0.0001 0.0007 0.0006 0.0048 0.0005 0.0038 
  HI 
0.0168 0.0151 0.0053 
-
0.6260 0.0047 0.0062 0.0002 0.0012 0.0280 0.0390 0.0000 0.0025 
-
0.0001 0.0085 0.0008 0.0037 
 SPIRIT LOW 
0.0064 0.0120 0.0041 0.0206 -0.6266 0.0016 0.0001 
-
0.0001 0.0181 0.0206 0.0006 0.0036 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0004 
  HI 
0.0056 0.0042 0.0037 0.0182 0.0017 
-
0.6459 0.0000 0.0007 0.0205 0.0236 0.0001 0.0025 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0009 
 RTD LOW -
0.0049 
-
0.0115 0.0038 0.0178 -0.0047 
-
0.0013 -0.3816 
-
0.0005 0.0018 0.0044 
-
0.0001 0.0006 
-
0.0012 0.0213 0.0001 -0.0007 
  HI -
0.0002 
-
0.0018 0.0135 0.0072 0.0045 0.0057 0.0000 
-
0.4158 0.0015 0.0077 
-
0.0001 0.0003 
-
0.0028 0.0037 0.0001 0.0008 
ON BEER LOW 
0.0201 0.0175 0.0129 0.0464 0.0052 0.0061 0.0000 0.0024 
-
0.6161 0.0524 
-
0.0011 0.0034 0.0039 0.0059 -0.0011 0.0088 
  HI 
0.0201 0.0185 0.0113 0.0415 0.0046 0.0055 0.0002 0.0015 0.0329 
-
0.6331 
-
0.0001 
-
0.0027 0.0048 0.0015 0.0003 0.0026 
 WINE LOW 
0.0049 
-
0.0033 
-
0.0009 
-
0.0014 -0.0017 0.0123 0.0001 
-
0.0038 
-
0.0312 0.0122 
-
0.3799 0.0004 
-
0.0022 -0.0069 0.0032 0.0045 
  HI 
0.0097 0.0045 0.0021 0.0121 0.0029 0.0045 0.0002 0.0007 0.0148 
-
0.0039 0.0001 
-
0.4106 
-
0.0028 -0.0050 0.0013 0.0025 
 SPIRIT LOW 
0.0176 0.0190 
-
0.0019 0.0041 -0.0005 
-
0.0036 0.0000 0.0001 0.0147 0.0128 
-
0.0012 0.0277 
-
3.7220 0.0227 -0.0019 -0.0138 
  HI 
0.0066 0.0023 0.0055 0.0179 -0.0006 
-
0.0018 -0.0003 
-
0.0026 
-
0.0048 
-
0.0181 
-
0.0003 
-
0.0015 
-
0.0006 -0.2861 -0.0002 -0.0043 
 RTD LOW 
0.0052 0.0042 
-
0.0046 0.0043 -0.0049 0.0046 0.0003 0.0006 0.0055 0.0119 0.0045 0.0020 0.0679 -0.0299 -0.3925 0.0135 
  HI 
0.0024 
-
0.0002 0.0048 0.0100 0.0019 
-
0.0020 0.0002 0.0003 0.0152 0.0022 0.0008 0.0086 0.0019 -0.0053 0.0012 -0.4194 
Note: Own price elasticities, shown along the lead diagonal, are all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Figure 1: Distributions of Alcohol Consumption in England 2005 – Comparison of the EFS and GHS (Head of Household) 
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Table A1: GHS and EFS Daily Units of Alcohol Consumption in 2005 (England – Head of Household) 
 GHS DAILY UNITS EFS DAILY UNITS DIFFERENCE IN MEAN 
 MEAN % NONE  MEAN % NONE EFS GHSj j jc cD = -  TSTAT 
BEER 0.922 64.2% 0.963 50.7% 0.041 (1.12) 
WINE 0.708 74.0% 0.816 40.2% 0.108 (3.27) 
SPIRITS 0.471 85.2% 0.493 72.7% 0.022 (0.68) 
ALCOPOPS 0.044 98.7% 0.030 97.4% -0.014 (1.57) 
Notes: Alcohol consumption in the EFS is given over a two week period in ml this is converted into alcohol units. The mean 
and difference are based upon trimming outliers (top 5%) from the two sample surveys. 
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Appendix 5: Detailled tables from the NWPHO report 
 
Table 60: Number of person-specific hospital admission attributable to alcohol– reproduction of the NWPHO report (2008)  43  
Conditions ICD-10 codes 16 – 24 yrs 25 – 34 yrs 35 – 44 yrs 45 – 54 yrs 55 – 64 yrs 65 – 74 yrs 75 + yrs 
  M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome E24.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Menral and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol F10 7,164 3,242 9,554 3,595 15,396 6,075 14,527 5,819 11,606 3,823 6,527 1,972 3,452 1,630 
Degeneration of nervous system due to alcohol G31.2 0 0 1 1 30 15 71 29 64 26 42 11 24 10 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 0 0 6 4 9 4 25 15 33 8 20 5 11 6 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 0 0 0 0 2 1 8 1 10 1 5 1 4 1 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I426 0 0 7 0 46 6 119 9 159 11 103 3 37 9 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 65 30 91 19 128 39 97 28 55 17 30 9 14 3 
Alcoholic liver disease K70 18 10 233 167 1,229 675 2,316 1,139 2,590 1,091 1,467 657 522 267 
Alcohol-induced chronic pancreatitis K86.0 39 12 155 32 331 80 261 72 146 30 52 17 18 3 
Ethanol T51.0 1,550 2,452 1,700 1,959 1,639 2,321 839 1,239 340 385 96 105 46 43 
Methanol T51.1 1 3 3 1 2 4 4 3 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Toxic effect of alcohol, unspecified T519 54 80 53 63 79 76 36 40 13 20 3 5 2 1 
Accidental poisoning by and exposure to alcohol X45 79 77 55 48 53 54 34 29 13 13 9 2 5 7 
Malignant neoplasms of lip, oral cavity and pharynx C00 - C14 11 8 27 19 101 49 395 113 565 165 395 129 254 122 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus C15 1 1 6 1 45 12 223 43 581 111 625 127 541 200 
Malignant neoplasm of colon C18 1 1 4 2 13 8 40 21 115 49 159 59 150 77 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum C20 0 0 2 2 12 7 60 20 156 41 185 44 131 48 
Malignant neopasm of liver and intrahepatic bile ducts C22 2 1 3 1 8 3 20 9 48 17 61 20 56 25 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 0 0 2 0 14 4 82 13 231 24 189 19 140 18 
Malignant neoplasm of breast C50 0 3 0 69 0 430 0 771 0 800 0 394 0 223 
Epilepsy G40-G41 1,581 2,314 1,966 2,757 2,558 3,062 2,636 2,760 2,832 2,669 2,460 1,960 2,459 2,469 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I15 201 173 971 602 4,119 2,476 12,368 6,303 23,317 11,755 25,438 12,593 19,292 13,699 
Cardiac arrhyththmias I47-I48 219 264 474 443 1,232 715 2,649 1,279 7,058 3,258 12,337 6,686 20,431 19,495 
Heart failure I50-I51 1 0 1 0 2 1 3 1 5 2 8 3 20 14 
Haemorrhagic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 36 19 69 27 138 81 294 128 348 141 348 125 349 182 
Ischaemic stroke I63-I66, 169.3, I69.4 9 2 22 -9 48 -21 308 -48 544 -108 465 -248 -305 -1,075 
Oesophageal varices I85 37 23 53 29 131 57 293 104 349 163 279 158 168 101 
Gastro-oesophageal laceration-haemorrhage K22.6 145 120 156 81 123 60 63 43 83 55 112 72 166 154 
Unspecified liver cirrhosis K73, K74 54 50 108 77 454 196 622 336 675 561 479 600 401 441 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis K86.1, K85 63 95 157 126 303 174 402 186 423 216 327 158 267 167 
Psoriasis L40 49 105 102 144 180 144 185 128 181 135 108 76 74 71 
Spontaneous abortion L40.5 0 2,156 0 3,603 0 2,374 0 70 0 1 0 0 0 11 
Road traffic accidents   1,035 178 1,013 202 697 121 417 91 114 16 55 13 60 18 
Pedestrian traffic accidents   33 8 38 7 35 7 24 7 9 2 6 1 13 2 
Water transport accidents V90-V94 6 2 9 2 11 3 6 2 7 2 2 2 1 2 
Air and Space transport accidents V95-V97 1 0 3 1 5 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Falls W00-W19 1,925 596 1,669 710 1,668 773 1,473 924 1,764 1,582 1,319 786 4,623 4,428 
Work/Machine injuries W24-W31 325 79 300 71 260 66 157 40 108 24 45 13 20 11 
Firearm injuries W32-W34 71 7 29 3 20 4 12 1 7 1 3 0 1 0 
Drowning W65-W74 4 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 4 
Inhalation of gastric contents/inhalation and ingestion of 
food causing obstruction of the respiratory tract W78-W79 9 5 10 9 15 12 15 12 21 19 37 23 81 98 
Fire injuries X00-X09 114 31 91 32 77 33 53 24 40 23 35 23 43 63 
Accidental excessive cold X31 2 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 3 14 27 
Intentional self-harm X60-X84, Y10-Y33 1,613 3,310 1,606 1,896 1,471 1,953 795 1,072 394 464 167 187 173 180 
Assault X85-Y09 3,016 481 1,907 372 1,281 269 534 112 185 42 64 26 39 60 
Diabetes mellitus E11 -20 -16 -82 -64 -302 -193 -731 -319 -1,258 -451 -1,108 -571 -790 -697 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 -8 -4 -59 -24 -495 -159 -957 -467 -2,224 -908 -3,039 -1,212 0 0 
Cholelithiasis K80 -49 -667 -207 -1,447 -541 -2,030 -843 -1,967 -1,179 -2,102 -1,347 -1,335 -1,387 -1,457 
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Table 61: Alcohol attributable fraction in England– reproduction of the NWPHO report (2008)  43 
 
 
 
 
Conditions ICD-10 codes 16 – 24 yrs 25 – 34 yrs 35 – 44 yrs 45 – 54 yrs 55 – 64 yrs 65 – 74 yrs 75 + yrs 
  M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome E24.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Menral and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol F10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Degeneration of nervous system due to alcohol G31.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I426 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcoholic liver disease K70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcohol-induced chronic pancreatitis K86.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ethanol T51.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Methanol T51.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Toxic effect of alcohol, unspecified T519 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Accidental poisoning by and exposure to alcohol X45 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Malignant neoplasms of lip, oral cavity and pharynx C00 - C14 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.35 0.49 0.36 0.53 0.35 0.50 0.33 0.44 0.26 0.36 0.20 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus C15 0.32 0.23 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.32 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.20 0.10 
Malignant neoplasm of colon C18 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum C20 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Malignant neopasm of liver and intrahepatic bile ducts C22 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.05 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 0.34 0.25 0.33 0.21 0.32 0.22 0.36 0.21 0.34 0.20 0.28 0.15 0.22 0.11 
Malignant neoplasm of breast C50 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 
Epilepsy G40-G41 0.56 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.35 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I15 0.34 0.24 0.33 0.19 0.32 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.34 0.18 0.27 0.13 0.20 0.09 
Cardiac arrhyththmias I47-I48 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.22 
Heart failure I50-I51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Haemorrhagic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.15 0.27 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.30 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.16 0.06 
Ischaemic stroke I63-I66, 169.3, I69.4 0.16 0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.18 -0.04 0.12 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 
Oesophageal varices I85 0.77 0.67 0.76 0.59 0.74 0.60 0.79 0.59 0.77 0.57 0.71 0.48 0.61 0.38 
Gastro-oesophageal laceration-haemorrhage K22.6 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Unspecified liver cirrhosis K73, K74 0.77 0.67 0.76 0.59 0.74 0.60 0.79 0.59 0.77 0.57 0.71 0.48 0.61 0.38 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis K86.1, K85 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.14 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.07 
Psoriasis L40 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.30 0.22 
Spontaneous abortion L40.5 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.12 
Road traffic accidents – Death   0.37 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Road traffic accidents – Hospitalisation   0.21 0.09 0.33 0.15 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 
Pedestrian traffic accidents – Death   0.69 0.50 0.58 0.22 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.42 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 
Pedestrian traffic accidents - Hospitalisation   0.35 0.16 0.45 0.19 0.46 0.21 0.46 0.21 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 
Water transport accidents V90-V94 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Air and Space transport accidents V95-V97 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Falls W00-W19 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 
Work/Machine injuries W24-W31 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Firearm injuries W32-W34 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Drowning W65-W74 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Inhalation of gastric contents W78-W79 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Fire injuries X00-X09 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Accidental excessive cold X31 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Intentional self-harm X60-X84, Y10-Y33 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.20 
Assault X85-Y09 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Diabetes mellitus E11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 
Cholelithiasis K80 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21 -0.24 -0.22 -0.26 -0.22 -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 -0.17 -0.11 
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Appendix 6: Risk functions 
Table 62: Constant and slope of the linear absolute risk function for mortality for wholly attributable conditions. 
  11 – 15 years 16 - 17 years 18 - 24 years 25 - 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 55 - 64 years 65 - 74 years 75 + years 
Conditions  M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
                    constant  8E-04                 Alcohol-induced pseudo-
Cushing's syndrome Slope                   
                    
constant 7E-04  9E-04 5E-04 5E-04 4E-04 6E-04 4E-04 1E-03 7E-04 2E-03 1E-03 2E-03 1E-03 3E-03 1E-03 5E-03 3E-03 Mental and behavioural 
disorders due to use of alcohol Slope 9E-05 1E-04 1E-04 9E-05 5E-05 5E-05 7E-05 8E-05 2E-04 2E-04 3E-04 3E-04 3E-04 4E-04 6E-04 6E-04 2E-03 2E-03 
                    
constant       6E-08 1E-07 2E-06 2E-06 6E-06 4E-06 8E-06 6E-06 1E-05 6E-06 3E-05 1E-05 Degeneration of nervous 
system due to alcohol Slope       3E-08 3E-08 2E-07 3E-07 9E-07 8E-07 1E-06 1E-06 3E-06 2E-06 7E-06 5E-06 
                    
constant       3E-07 4E-07 6E-07 4E-07 2E-06 2E-06 4E-06 2E-06 6E-06 3E-06 1E-05 8E-06 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy Slope       4E-08 7E-08 7E-08 8E-08 3E-07 4E-07 6E-07 5E-07 1E-06 8E-07 3E-06 3E-06 
                    
constant         1E-07 1E-07 7E-07 1E-07 1E-06 2E-07 2E-06 6E-07 5E-06 1E-06 
Alcoholic myopathy Slope         2E-08 3E-08 1E-07 4E-08 2E-07 7E-08 3E-07 2E-07 1E-06 5E-07 
                    
constant       4E-07  3E-06 6E-07 1E-05 1E-06 2E-05 3E-06 3E-05 2E-06 4E-05 1E-05 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy Slope       5E-08  4E-07 1E-07 2E-06 3E-07 3E-06 6E-07 6E-06 5E-07 1E-05 4E-06 
                    
constant   7E-06 4E-06 4E-06 3E-06 5E-06 2E-06 8E-06 4E-06 9E-06 4E-06 6E-06 4E-06 1E-05 5E-06 2E-05 4E-06 
Alcoholic gastritis Slope   8E-07 6E-07 4E-07 4E-07 6E-07 3E-07 1E-06 7E-07 1E-06 8E-07 1E-06 1E-06 2E-06 2E-06 4E-06 1E-06 
                    
constant   2E-06 1E-06 1E-06 1E-06 1E-05 2E-05 8E-05 7E-05 2E-04 2E-04 3E-04 2E-04 5E-04 4E-04 6E-04 3E-04 
Alcoholic liver disease Slope   2E-07 2E-07 1E-07 1E-07 1E-06 3E-06 9E-06 1E-05 3E-05 3E-05 5E-05 6E-05 9E-05 1E-04 2E-04 1E-04 
                    
constant  8E-04 4E-06 2E-06 2E-06 1E-06 9E-06 3E-06 2E-05 8E-06 2E-05 1E-05 2E-05 7E-06 2E-05 1E-05 2E-05 4E-06 Alcohol-induced chronic 
pancreatitis Slope   5E-07 3E-07 2E-07 2E-07 1E-06 5E-07 3E-06 1E-06 3E-06 2E-06 3E-06 2E-06 3E-06 3E-06 5E-06 1E-06 
                    
constant 3E-04  2E-04 4E-04 1E-04 3E-04 1E-04 2E-04 1E-04 3E-04 9E-05 2E-04 5E-05 1E-04 4E-05 8E-05 7E-05 7E-05 
Ethanol Slope 4E-05 1E-04 2E-05 7E-05 1E-05 4E-05 1E-05 4E-05 2E-05 6E-05 1E-05 5E-05 8E-06 4E-05 9E-06 3E-05 2E-05 4E-05 
                    
constant   1E-07 5E-07 6E-08 3E-07 2E-07 1E-07 1E-07 5E-07 4E-07 5E-07 1E-07    2E-06 3E-06 
Methanol Slope   2E-08 9E-08 3E-08 6E-08 3E-08 3E-08 3E-08 1E-07 8E-08 1E-07 3E-08    5E-07 2E-06 
                    
constant   7E-06 1E-05 4E-06 9E-06 3E-06 8E-06 6E-06 9E-06 4E-06 7E-06 2E-06 6E-06 1E-06 4E-06 3E-06 2E-06 Toxic effect of alcohol, 
unspecified Slope   8E-07 2E-06 4E-07 1E-06 4E-07 1E-06 8E-07 2E-06 6E-07 2E-06 3E-07 2E-06 3E-07 2E-06 1E-06 1E-06 
                    
constant  0E+00 1E-05 1E-05 5E-06 9E-06 4E-06 6E-06 4E-06 7E-06 4E-06 5E-06 2E-06 4E-06 4E-06 1E-06 8E-06 1E-05 Accidental poisoning by and 
exposure to alcohol Slope   1E-06 2E-06 6E-07 1E-06 4E-07 1E-06 5E-07 1E-06 6E-07 1E-06 3E-07 1E-06 8E-07 6E-07 2E-06 7E-06 
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Table 63: Constant and slope of the linear absolute risk function for morbidity for wholly attributable conditions 
 
  11 – 15 years 16 - 17 years 18 - 24 years 25 - 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 55 - 64 years 65 - 74 years 75 + years 
Conditions  M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
                    constant                   Alcohol-induced pseudo-
Cushing's syndrome Slope                   
                    
constant 3E-07  5E-07  2E-07  2E-06 6E-07 6E-06 4E-06 1E-05 9E-06 1E-05 2E-05 2E-05 9E-06 3E-05 2E-05 Mental and behavioural 
disorders due to use of alcohol Slope 5E-08  6E-08  3E-08  2E-07 1E-07 8E-07 9E-07 2E-06 2E-06 3E-06 5E-06 5E-06 4E-06 1E-05 1E-05 
                    
constant           2E-07  4E-07  3E-07  4E-06  Degeneration of nervous 
system due to alcohol Slope           3E-08  6E-08  7E-08  9E-07  
                    
constant           9E-08        
Alcoholic polyneuropathy Slope           3E-08        
                    
constant           2E-07  1E-07      
Alcoholic myopathy Slope           3E-08  3E-08      
                    
constant       1E-07 1E-07 8E-07  2E-06 6E-07 3E-06 7E-07 5E-06 6E-07 1E-06 1E-06 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy Slope       2E-08 3E-08 1E-07  3E-07 1E-07 4E-07 2E-07 1E-06 2E-07 3E-07 5E-07 
                    
constant        1E-07   9E-08  1E-07  3E-07    
Alcoholic gastritis Slope        3E-08   3E-08  3E-08  7E-08    
                    
constant     2E-07 2E-07 5E-06 5E-06 3E-05 3E-05 8E-05 6E-05 1E-04 1E-04 1E-04 1E-04 2E-04 1E-04 
Alcoholic liver disease Slope     3E-08 4E-08 6E-07 7E-07 4E-06 5E-06 1E-05 1E-05 2E-05 2E-05 3E-05 3E-05 4E-05 4E-05 
                    
constant       2E-07 1E-07 2E-07 1E-07 1E-06 4E-07 1E-06 5E-07 1E-06 6E-07 2E-06  Alcohol-induced chronic 
pancreatitis Slope       2E-08 3E-08 4E-08 3E-08 2E-07 9E-08 2E-07 1E-07 2E-07 2E-07 6E-07  
                    
constant     8E-08   1E-07 6E-07 2E-07 4E-07 3E-07 6E-07 3E-07 4E-07    
Ethanol Slope     2E-08   3E-08 1E-07 6E-08 8E-08 1E-07 1E-07 1E-07 1E-07    
                    
constant  2E-07       7E-08  1E-07        
Methanol Slope         3E-08  3E-08        
                    
constant  2E-07  3E-07 2E-07 2E-07 9E-07 4E-07 1E-06 2E-06 4E-06 2E-06 2E-06 3E-06 3E-06 3E-06 2E-06  Toxic effect of alcohol, 
unspecified Slope  4E-08  6E-08 2E-08 4E-08 1E-07 7E-08 2E-07 4E-07 6E-07 6E-07 3E-07 1E-06 8E-07 1E-06 5E-07  
                    
constant  0E+00  3E-07 3E-07 2E-07 8E-07 6E-07 2E-06 2E-06 4E-06 3E-06 2E-06 3E-06 3E-06 2E-06 2E-06  Accidental poisoning by and 
exposure to alcohol Slope  4E-08  6E-08 3E-08 4E-08 1E-07 1E-07 3E-07 5E-07 7E-07 7E-07 4E-07 1E-06 8E-07 9E-07 5E-07  
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Figure 38: Relative risk functions for partially chronic conditions attributable to alcohol 
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Table 64: Slope of the linear function for partially acute conditions attributable to alcohol 
 
 11 – 15 years 16 - 17 years 18 - 24 years 25 - 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 55 - 64 years 65 - 74 years 75 + years 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
                   Road traffic – deaths 0.69528 0.173454 0.09405 0.025168 0.08942 0.043672329 0.08942 0.043672 0.11357 0.066326 0.11357 0.066326 0.02874 0.000199 0.02874 0.000199 0.02874 0.00020 
                             
Road traffic– hosp 0.46673 0.17172 0.05686 0.031407 0.06639 0.042037688 0.06639 0.042038 0.05434 0.041922 0.05434 0.041922 0.02809 0.013213 0.02809 0.013213 0.02809 0.01321 
                             
Pedestrian traffic– 
deaths 0.44682 0.276398 0.44682 0.276398 0.18897 0.029381198 0.18897 0.029381 0.17849 0.212429 0.17849 0.212429 0.05099 0.032656 0.05099 0.032656 0.05099 0.03266 
                             
Pedestrian traffic - 
hosp 0.10836 0.052653 0.10836 0.052653 0.11234 0.056129004 0.11234 0.056129 0.14650 0.078224 0.14650 0.078224 0.08006 0.015893 0.08006 0.015893 0.08006 0.01589 
                             
Water transport 
accidents 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.087926723 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.087927 0.05076 0.08793 
                             
Air and Space 
transport accidents 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.067134352 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.067134 0.03860 0.06713 
                   
Falls 0.05418 0.052505 0.05418 0.052505 0.05418 0.052504642 0.05418 0.052505 0.05418 0.052505 0.05418 0.052505 0.05418 0.052505 0.05220 0.031951 0.05220 0.03195 
                             
Work/Machine 
injuries 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.026617749 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.026618 0.01516 0.02662 
                             
Firearm injuries 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273117 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.11727 
                             
Drowning 0.04479 0.045148 0.07494 0.119852 0.07494 0.119852028 0.07494 0.119852 0.16686 0.286913 0.14365 0.247599 0.14365 0.247599 0.14744 0.301356 0.14744 0.30136 
                             
Inhalation of gastric 
contents 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273117 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.11727 
                             
Fire injuries 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.215684001 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.215684 0.12451 0.21568 
                             
Accidental excessive 
cold 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273117 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.117273 0.06771 0.11727 
                             
Intentional self-harm 0.08579 0.134101 0.08579 0.134101 0.08579 0.134100664 0.07585 0.129364 0.09209 0.14889 0.11380 0.16487 0.12263 0.200287 0.14082 0.21133 0.19996 0.26948 
                             
Assault 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.130082505 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.130083 0.07539 0.13008 
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Appendix 7: Morbidity cost to the NHS 
 
Conditions ICD-10 codes           
 
 Multiplier Inpatient 
visits 
Outpatient 
visits 
 A&E 
visits 
Ambulance GP 
consultation 
Nurse 
visits 
Other health 
care cost 
 Total cost per 
person-specific 
hospitalisation 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's 
syndrome 
E24.4 2.04  £4,885 £920 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0  
£5,805 
Mental and behavioural disorders 
due to use of alcohol 
F10 1.05  £1,422 £473 £1,882 £979 £164 £15 £1,006  
£5,942 
Degeneration G31.2 3.50  £8,325 £1,977 £2,095 £654 £439 £41 £3,359  £16,890 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 2.26  £5,101 £1,532 £1,353 £422 £284 £27 £1,808  £10,526 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 2.71  £6,497 £1,834 £1,619 £506 £340 £32 £2,164  £12,991 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I42.6 1.86  £3,469 £1,261 £1,670 £1,043 £234 £22 £893  £8,592 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 2.63  £2,896 £1,187 £4,718 £2,456 £330 £31 £841  £12,459 
Alcoholic liver disease K70 1.32  £2,538 £297 £788 £492 £83 £8 £421  £4,626 
Chronic pancreatitis K86.0 4.64  £7,821 £2,619 £4,164 £2,601 £582 £54 £1,484  £19,324 
Ethanol poisoning T51.0 1.39  £576 £0 £2,494 £1,558 £0 £0 £0  £4,627 
Methanol poisoning T51.1 1.24  £857 £0 £2,226 £1,391 £0 £0 £0  £4,474 
Toxic effect of alcohol, unspecified T51.9 8.00  £3,531 £0 £14,371 £8,977 £0 £0 £0  £26,879 
Accidental poisoning by exposure 
to alcohol 
X45 0.51  £314 £0 £917 £572 £0 £0 £0  
£1,803 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral 
cavity and pharynx 
C00-C14 2.54  £4,924 £1,437 £762 £476 £319 £30 £407  
£8,355 
Malignant neoplasm of 
oesophagus 
C15 2.43  £2,964 £1,373 £727 £454 £229 £21 £389  
£6,158 
Malignant neoplasm of colon C18 3.77  £4,324 £2,130 £1,129 £705 £355 £33 £603  £9,280 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum C20 3.27  £3,751 £1,845 £978 £611 £308 £29 £523  £8,044 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and 
intrahepatic bile ducts 
C22 2.19  £3,428 £1,239 £656 £410 £207 £19 £351  
£6,310 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 1.65  £3,769 £932 £494 £308 £155 £15 £264  £5,937 
Malignant neoplasm of breast C50 1.77  £2,172 £998 £529 £330 £166 £16 £283  £4,494 
Diabetes mellitus (typeII) E11 2.04  £2,367 £1,150 £199 £1,142 £383 £36    £5,277 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus G40-G41 1.71  £2,612 £773 £2,561 £1,600 £269 £25 £0  £7,840 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I15 2.20  £3,819 £744 £0 £0 £413 £39 £0  £5,015 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 2.04  £2,054 £690 £1,828 £0 £0 £0    £4,572 
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Cardiac arrhythmias I47-I48 1.58  £3,269 £712 £1,886 £1,178 £99 £9 £0  £7,153 
haemorrhagic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 1.10  £3,517 £498 £990 £619 £104 £10 £0  £5,738 
Ischaemic stroke  I66-I66,I69.3, I69.4 2.04  £3,402 £920 £1,828 £1,142 £192 £18    £7,502 
Oesophageal varices I85 2.65  £2,609 £599 £2,379 £1,486 £166 £16 £0  £7,254 
Gastro-oesophageal laceration-
haemorrhage syndrome 
K22.6 0.80  £839 £181 £720 £450 £25 £2 £0  
£2,218 
Unspecified liver disease K73, K74 1.54  £2,646 £347 £921 £575 £97 £9 £0  £4,595 
Cholelithiasis k80 2.04  £2,093 £230 £2,437 £0 £0 £0    £4,760 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis K85, K86.1 1.26  £2,466 £568 £1,130 £706 £79 £7 £0  £4,956 
Psoriasis L40 excluding L40.5 2.31  £3,766 £782 £0 £0 £362 £34 £0  £4,944 
Spontaneous abortion O03 1.10  £657 £372 £1,641 £820 £138 £13 £0  £3,639 
Road traffic accidents - non 
pediastrian 
  2.92  £5,004 £660 £5,243 £3,275 £183 £17 £0  
£14,382 
Pedestrian traffic accidents   4.95  £9,785 £1,119 £7,412 £4,630 £311 £29 £0  £23,285 
Water transport accidents V90-V94 1.24  £2,294 £279 £1,851 £1,156 £39 £4 £0  £5,624 
Air/space transport accidents V95-V97 2.34  £4,010 £529 £2,101 £1,312 £0 £0 £0  £7,952 
Fall injuries W00-W19 0.82  £1,852 £92 £1,465 £763 £77 £7 £0  £4,255 
Work/machine injuries W24-W31 1.26  £2,162 £142 £1,887 £943 £119 £11 £0  £5,264 
Firearm injuries W32-W34 1.16  £1,562 £131 £1,730 £1,080 £0 £0 £0  £4,502 
Drowning W65-W74 1.05  £1,220 £236 £939 £587 £33 £3 £0  £3,018 
Inhalation of gastric contents W78 0.79  £1,771 £178 £945 £591 £25 £2 £0  £3,513 
Fire injuries X00-X09 0.75  £1,274 £170 £1,125 £703 £24 £2 £0  £3,298 
Accidental excessive cold X31 0.91  £1,636 £103 £1,638 £1,023 £29 £3 £0  £4,432 
Intentional self-harm X60-X84 1.22  £641 £137 £2,182 £1,136 £114 £11 £0  £4,222 
Assault X85-Y09 1.15  £1,252 £130 £2,067 £1,076 £36 £3 £0  £4,564 
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Appendix 8: Utilities 
 
 
  11 - 15 years 16 – 17 years 18 - 24 years 25 - 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 55 - 64 years 65 - 74 years 75 + 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-cushing 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.587 0.560 0.534 0.507 0.480 0.451 
Mental and behavioural disorders 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.550 0.524 0.500 0.475 0.450 0.423 
Degeneration of nervous system***** 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.587 0.560 0.534 0.507 0.480 0.451 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.587 0.560 0.534 0.507 0.480 0.451 
Alcoholic myopathy 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.629 0.600 0.571 0.544 0.515 0.484 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.629 0.600 0.571 0.544 0.515 0.484 
Alcoholic gastritis 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.524 0.500 0.476 0.453 0.429 0.403 
Alcoholic liver disease 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.544 0.519 0.494 0.470 0.445 0.418 
Chronic pancreatitis (alcohol 
induced) 0.509 0.509 0.509 0.491 0.469 0.447 0.424 0.403 0.377 
Ethanol poisoning 0.434 0.434 0.434 0.418 0.400 0.381 0.361 0.343 0.322 
Methanol poisoning 0.434 0.434 0.434 0.418 0.400 0.381 0.361 0.343 0.322 
Toxic effect of alcohol, unspecified 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.705 0.674 0.642 0.609 0.578 0.542 
Accidental poisoning by exposure 
to alcohol 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.617 0.588 0.562 0.533 0.505 0.474 
Malignant neoplast of lip, oral cavity 
and pharynx 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.691 0.660 0.629 0.598 0.566 0.532 
Malignant neoplast of oesophagus 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.756 0.723 0.688 0.653 0.620 0.581 
Malignant neoplast of colon 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.812 0.775 0.737 0.702 0.664 0.625 
Malignant neoplast of rectum 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.828 0.790 0.752 0.716 0.678 0.637 
Malignant neoplast of liver and bile 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.667 0.636 0.607 0.576 0.545 0.513 
Malignant neoplast of larynx 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.877 0.836 0.796 0.758 0.717 0.674 
Malignant neoplast of breast 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.811 0.774 0.736 0.701 0.664 0.624 
Diabetes mellitus (Type II) 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.680 0.649 0.617 0.588 0.556 0.523 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.600 0.574 0.546 0.519 0.492 0.461 
Hypertensive diseases 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.743 0.709 0.675 0.642 0.608 0.572 
Ischaemic Heart Disease 0.734 0.734 0.734 0.707 0.676 0.643 0.611 0.580 0.543 
Cardiac arrhythmias 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.768 0.733 0.699 0.664 0.628 0.591 
Haemorrhagic stroke 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.724 0.691 0.657 0.626 0.592 0.557 
Ischaemic stroke 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.620 0.593 0.564 0.535 0.508 0.476 
Oesophageal varices 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.683 0.653 0.622 0.590 0.560 0.525 
Gastro_oeso 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.911 0.871 0.829 0.787 0.748 0.701 
Unspecified liver disease 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.674 0.643 0.612 0.583 0.552 0.519 
Heart failure 0.679 0.679 0.679 0.655 0.625 0.597 0.566 0.536 0.504 
Cholelithiasis 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.813 0.777 0.740 0.702 0.667 0.625 
Acute an chronic pancreatitis 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.667 0.638 0.607 0.576 0.547 0.513 
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Psoriasis 0.733 0.733 0.733 0.707 0.676 0.643 0.610 0.580 0.543 
Spontaneous abortion 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.900 0.858 0.819 0.778 0.736 0.692 
Road traffic accidents – non 
pedestrian 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.656 0.626 0.598 0.567 0.537 0.505 
Pedestrian traffic accidents 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.636 0.606 0.577 0.549 0.520 0.489 
Water transport accident 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.656 0.626 0.598 0.567 0.537 0.505 
Air/space transport accidents 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.656 0.626 0.598 0.567 0.537 0.505 
Fall injuries 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.686 0.655 0.623 0.593 0.561 0.528 
Work/machine injuries 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.858 0.818 0.781 0.741 0.701 0.660 
Firearm injuries 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.636 0.606 0.577 0.549 0.520 0.489 
Drowning 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.636 0.606 0.577 0.549 0.520 0.489 
Inhalation of gastric contents and 
ingestion 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.937 0.894 0.852 0.809 0.767 0.720 
Fire injuries 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.636 0.606 0.577 0.549 0.520 0.489 
Accidental excessive cold 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.636 0.606 0.577 0.549 0.520 0.489 
Intentional self-harm 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.447 0.428 0.407 0.386 0.367 0.344 
Assault 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.679 0.650 0.618 0.587 0.557 0.522 
          
General population 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.937 0.894 0.852 0.809 0.767 0.720 
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Appendix 9: Summary from previous Home Office costs of alcohol attributable crime analysis64 
 
 
 
Offence code Offence 
Recorded crime 
2006/07 Multiplier 
Estimated 
offences 
Alcohol related 
proportion 
Estimated total 
alcohol related 
offences 
Unit cost of 
crime 
Estimated total cost 
of crime related to 
alcohol 
         
4.6 
Causing death by dangerous driving 
under the influence, driving after after 
having consumed excess alcohol 462 1 462 100% 462 £1,458,975 £674,046,450 
5 More serious wounding 17,281 1.8 31,106 26% 8,088 £21,422 £173,250,596 
8A + 8D Less serious wounding 487,463 7.7 3,753465 26% 975,901 £8,056 £7,861,857,860 
104 Assault on a constable 21,751 7.7 167,483 19% 31,822 £1,440 £45,823,267 
105 A+B Assault without injury 207,067 7.7 1,594416 19% 302,939 £1,440 £436,232,190 
56 - 59 Criminal damage 1,185,111 4.3 5,095,977 37% 1,885,512 £866 £1,632,853,046 
39 Theft from the person 114,865 4.6 528,379 7% 36,987 £844 £31,216,631 
34 Robbery 101,370 3.7 375,069 7% 26,255 £7,282 £191,187,672 
34A Robbery (Business) 9453 3.7 34,976 7% 2,448 £5,000 £12,241,635 
28 + 29 Burglary in a dwelling 292,285 2.2 643,027 7% 45,012 £3,268 £147,098,857 
30 + 31 Burglary not in a dwelling 329,759 2.1 692,494 7% 48,475 £2,700 £130,881,347 
44 Theft of a pedal cycle 110,531 3.6 397,912 7% 27,854 £634 £17,659,317 
45 Theft from vehicle 502,663 2.8 1,407,456 34% 478,535 £858 £410,583,181 
37.2 Aggravated vehicle taking 10919 1.2 13,103 34% 4,455 £4,138 £18,434,591 
48 Theft of vehicle 182,491 1.2 218989 34% 74,456 £4,138 £308,100,285 
49 Other theft 536,762 2.7 1,449,257 7% 101,448 £634 £64,318,043 
46 Theft from shops 294,304 100 29,430,400 7% 2,060,128 £100 £206,012,800 
65 Violent disorder 1744 1.8 3,139 21% 659 £10,407 £6,860,627 
  Total sexual offence 57,542 5.2 299,218 21% 62,836 £31,438 £1,975,433,892 
1 + 4 + 37 Homicide 1,414 1 1,414 21% 297 £1,458,975 £433,228,037 
         
 Total       £14,777,320,326 
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Appendix 10: Estimated number of offences per age group 
 
Conditions Codes 11 – 15 yrs 16 – 17 yrs 18 – 24 yrs 25 – 34 yrs 35 – 44 yrs 45 – 54 yrs 55 – 64 yrs 65 – 74 yrs Total 
  M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Causing death 
by dangerous 
driving under 
the influence, 
of alcohol 4.6 64 26 43 9 150 30 96 21 9 2 5 1 3 1 1 0 372 90 
More serious 
wounding 5 5,566 2,128 2,838 473 9,932 1,655 5,566 982 819 164 450 90 246 49 123 25 25,540 5,566 
Less serious 
wounding 8A+8D 671,673 256,816 342,421 57,070 1,198,475 199,746 671,673 118,530 98,775 19,755 54,326 10,865 29,633 5,927 14,816 2,963 3,081,792 671,673 
Assault on a 
constable 104 29,971 11,459 15,279 2,547 53,477 8,913 29,971 5,289 4,407 881 2,424 485 1,322 264 661 132 137,512 29,971 
Assault 
without injury 105A+B 285,317 109,092 145,455 24,243 509,094 84,849 285,317 50,350 41,958 8,392 23,077 4,615 12,587 2,517 6,294 1,259 1,309,099 285,317 
Criminal 
damage 56-59 1,486,327 318,499 448,257 47,185 1,568,900 165,147 743,163 106,166 106,166 0 58,391 0 31,850 0 15,925 0 4,458,980 636,997 
Theft from the 
person 39 84,084 53,980 37,371 14,302 130,797 50,058 99,655 33,218 9,343 3,114 5,138 1,713 2,803 934 1,401 467 370,592 157,787 
Roberry 34 97,240 27,783 40,131 3,087 140,458 10,804 55,566 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 333,395 41,674 
Roberry 
(Business) 34A 9,068 2,591 3,742 288 13,098 1,008 5,182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,090 3,886 
Bulgary in a 
dwelling 28+29 165,532 19,100 63,666 4,244 222,831 14,855 133,699 6,367 6,367 0 3,502 0 1,910 0 955 0 598,461 44,566 
Bulgary not in 
a dwelling 30+31 178,266 20,569 68,564 4,571 239,973 15,998 143,984 6,856 6,856 0 3,771 0 2,057 0 1,028 0 644,499 47,995 
Theft of a 
pedal cycle 44 63,322 40,651 28,143 10,771 98,501 37,698 75,048 25,016 7,036 2,345 3,870 1,290 2,111 704 1,055 352 279,086 118,826 
Theft from 
vehicle 45 223,976 143,787 99,545 38,097 348,408 133,341 265,453 88,484 24,886 8,295 13,687 4,562 7,466 2,489 3,733 1,244 987,155 420,301 
Aggravated 
vehicle taking 37.2 2,085 1,339 927 355 3,244 1,241 2,471 824 232 77 127 42 70 23 35 12 9,190 3,913 
Theft of 
vehicle 48 34,849 22,372 15,488 5,928 54,209 20,747 41,302 13,767 3,872 1,291 2,130 710 1,162 387 581 194 153,593 65,396 
Other theft 49 230,628 148,058 102,501 39,229 358,755 137,301 273,337 91,112 25,625 8,542 14,094 4,698 7,688 2,563 3,844 1,281 1,016,473 432,784 
Theft from 
shops 46 5,266,493 2,013,659 2,684,879 447,480 9,397,075 1,566,179 5,266,493 929,381 774,484 154,897 425,966 85,193 232,345 46,469 116,173 23,235 24,163,907 5,266,493 
Violent 
disorder 65 547 194 302 47 1,056 165 564 88 79 9 44 5 24 3 12 1 2,628 511 
Total sexual 
offence  74,805 0 22,164 0 77,575 0 74,805 0 24,935 0 13,714 0 7,480 0 3,740 0 299,218 0 
Homicide 1+4+37 253 97 129 21 451 75 253 45 37 7 20 4 11 2 6 1 1,161 253 
                    
Total  8,910,064 3,192,199 4,121,846 699,946 14,426,460 2,449,812 8,173,598 1,476,499 1,135,888 207,772 624,738 114,274 340,766 62,331 170,383 31,166 37,903,743 8,233,999 
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Appendix 11: Slope of the linear function used for crime 
 
  Male Female 
Offences AAF used Under 16 years old 16 years and over Under 16 years old 16 years and over 
Causing death by dangerous driving under the influence, driving 
after having consumed excess alcohol 
All violent offences 0 0.0292823 0.0195215 0.0658335 
More serious wounding Assault with Injury 0 0.0204662 0.0195215 0.0966432 
Less serious wounding Assault with Injury 0 0.0204662 0.0195215 0.0966432 
Assault on a constable Assault without Injury 0 0.0363766 0.0195215 0.0436861 
Assault without injury Assault without Injury 0 0.0363766 0.0195215 0.0436861 
Criminal damage Criminal damage 0.018368 0.0746887 0.2416419 0.1278472 
Theft from the person Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Roberry Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Roberry (Business) Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Burglary in a dwelling Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Burglary not in a dwelling Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Theft of a pedal cycle Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Theft from vehicle Vehicle related thefts 0 0.0086 1.4436236 0.2575445 
Aggravated vehicle taking Vehicle related thefts 0 0.0086 1.4436236 0.2575445 
Theft of vehicle Vehicle related thefts 0 0.0086 1.4436236 0.2575445 
Other theft Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Theft from shops Other theft 0.0280705 0.0016796 0.0401591 0.0027182 
Violent disorder All violent offences 0 0.0292823 0.0195215 0.0658335 
Total sexual offence All violent offences 0 0.0292823 0.0195215 0.0658335 
Homicide All violent offences 0 0.0292823 0.0195215 0.0658335 
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Appendix 12: Unit cost of crime used in the model (derived from Dubourg et al and Brand and Price) 
 
Conditions 
 
Defensive 
expenditure 
Insurance 
administration 
Physical and 
emotional 
impact on 
direct victims 
Value of 
property 
stolen 
Property damaged 
/destroyed 
Property 
recovered 
Victim 
services 
Lost 
output 
Health 
services 
Criminal 
Justice 
System 
Average 
cost (£) 
Causing death by dangerous 
driving under the influence, 
driving after having consumed 
excess alcohol 
4.6 
145 229 0 0 0 0 2,102 0 770 144,239 147,485 
More serious wounding 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 1,166 1,348 14,345 16,868 
Less serious wounding 
8A+8
D 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 1,166 1,348 978 3,501 
Assault on a constable 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 269 123 255 653 
Assault without injury 
105A
+B 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 269 123 255 653 
Criminal damage 56-59 13 36 0 0 212 0 2 6 0 126 395 
Theft from the person 39 59 52 0 281 69 -36 1 10 0 217 653 
Roberry 34 0 21 0 109 12 -19 16 1,011 483 2,601 4,234 
Roberry (Business) 34A 1,200 100 0 1,500       120 50 1,400 4,370 
Bulgary in a dwelling 
28+2
9 221 177 0 846 187 -22 11 64 0 1,137 2,621 
Bulgary not in a dwelling 
30+3
1 900 50 0 1,200 0 0 0 40 0 490 2,680 
Theft of a pedal cycle 44 0 33 0 175 17 -13 1 3 0 301 517 
Theft from vehicle 45 116 50 0 240 126 -11 1 20 0 50 592 
Aggravated vehicle taking 37.2 546 370 0 2,367 349 -542 1 47 0 199 3,337 
Theft of vehicle 48 546 370 0 2,367 349 -542 1 47 0 199 3,337 
Other theft 49 0 33 0 175 17 -13 1 3 0 301 517 
Theft from shops 46 30   0 50           20 100 
Violent disorder 65 1 1 0 0 0 0 9 1,648 1,347 1,928 4,934 
Total sexual offence  3 5 0 0 0 0 32 4,430 916 3,298 8,684 
Homicide 
1+4+
37 145 229 0 0 0 0 2,102 0 770 144,239 147,485 
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Appendix 13: Slope for the risk function for absenteeism and unemployment 
 
 Absenteeism  Unemployment 
Age (years) Male Female  Male Female 
16 – 17 0.032165066 0.052621428  0.008581818 0.0085054 
18 – 24 0.024393434 0.026885027  0.024937002 0.0246043 
25 – 34 0.022397746 0.01925162  0.042068445 0.0413112 
35 – 44 0.015560604 0.012292169  0.059020791 0.058 
45 – 54 0.012508971 0.007301323  0.061394295 0.0598779 
55 – 64 0.007713999 0.000896239  0.018979162 0.0188283 
65 – 74 0.005237434 0.000472704  0.002209442 0.0022043 
75+ 0.009056513 0  0.000128814 0.0001287 
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